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From mid -1994 to late -1996, the Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire harboured a defeated 
regime responsible for genocide. While assisting refugees, humanitarian action 
strengthened the extremists, and the refugee camps were attacked by their opponents. 
Thus the system established to protect refugees became the source of their peril. This 
thesis explores questions raised by the Rwandan refugee crisis about the negative 
consequences of humanitarian action and the role of refugee camps in war. 
The use of refugee camps by combatants has been a widespread feature of the 
contemporary refugee regime, yet has received scant attention as a phenomenon. This 
thesis examines four cases in which it occurred: the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan, 
the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan camps in Honduras, the Cambodian camps in Thailand, 
and the Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire. It seeks to demonstrate the mechanisms by 
which humanitarian action in refugee camps assists insurgents in their struggle against 
the refugee -generating state, and to assess the relative importance of the contribution of 
humanitarian assistance vis -à -vis other types of support the combatants received. 
Humanitarian action is increasingly accused of prolonging conflict, yet such claims are 
rarely substantiated through assessments of other resources available to belligerents. 
In each case the thesis explores the attitudes of the aid organisations to the use of the 
camps by combatants. It assesses the degree of knowledge the aid organisations 
acquired about the misuse of humanitarian assistance, and highlights their views on this. 
The dissertation investigates why the paradoxes of aid recur and persist in spite of the 
knowledge attained in the past. 
The thesis challenges many of the prevailing assumptions about the role and nature of 
humanitarian action. It demonstrates that humanitarian action is imbued with an 
inherent paradox and will inevitably generate negative effects. It suggests that tenets of 
the international aid regime and the institutional behaviour of aid organisations 
exacerbate these negative effects, and might actually prolong the suffering that they are 
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INTRODUCTION 
In October 1996, Zairean rebels and their Rwandan army allies attacked Rwandan 
refugee camps in Eastern Zaire. 
It was during the day, around 3 p.m. We heard gunfire, two shots far from us, 
and we were afraid it was the start of an operation. We took the possessions we 
could carry and fled... in the meantime, the soldiers encircled the group left in 
the forest with the children and took them away to massacre them, even the 
babies... Every time refugees erected camps, others [soldiers] would come and 
destroy them. There was a little camp near Kibumba where I found many dead. 
The Banyamulenge destroyed all the camps to disperse the refugees. All the 
dead [in Kibumba] had been shot.' 
Narcisse was a Rwandan refugee who fled the northern camps with 700,000 of his 
compatriots. Pursued by soldiers, they hid in the forest but Narcisse's wife, like tens of 
thousands of others, was caught and killed. For the previous two years they had lived 
under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), receiving humanitarian assistance and 
protection under international law. Yet neither ultimately saved them. 
Those who destroyed the refugee camps justified their act as self- defence: remnants of 
the Rwandan regime responsible for the 1994 genocide were using them as a base from 
which to launch raids into Rwanda. The Rwandan Government warned they would 
disperse the camps if the international community took no action, yet the UN and its 
member states remained impassive. The system established to protect the refugees 
became the source of their peril. 
Many questions raised by the Rwandan refugee crisis are at the heart of this inquiry. 
Why did refugee camps harbour a defeated army and others suspected of crimes against 
humanity? How did refugee camps and humanitarian aid contribute to the war? What 
did the UN, donor governments and aid organisations know of the misuse of the camps? 
What were their attitudes towards this? Why did such an outcome occur? 
The Rwandan crisis marked a turning point in the post -Cold War international relief 
system? First the failure of the UN and its member states to stop the genocide eroded 
the last vestiges of optimism held by the aid community in a new `humanitarian' world 
Zaire. "Attacked by All Sides ": Civilians and the War in Eastern Zaire (New York and Paris: Human 
Rights Watch Africa/Fédération des Droits de l'Homme Vol. 9, No. 1 (A), March 1997), p. 9. 
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order. Then humanitarian action became the subject of unprecedented criticism as the 
perverse side -effects of humanitarian relief in the refugee camps became conspicuous. 
The Rwandan crisis has emerged as the symbol of the failure of the international system 
to mitigate the humanitarian consequences of political crises, and is the archetype 
invoked in contemporary critiques and discussions of humanitarian action. Posing 
dilemmas to aid agencies and donor governments, and the subject of the most 
comprehensive evaluation of an international `humanitarian' response,' the Rwandan 
crisis has spawned widespread introspection by aid agencies and attention in the 
academic literature. 
Yet for all this attention, the questions raised above remain, for the most part, 
unanswered. None of the existing literature in the areas of international relations, 
refugee studies, humanitarian affairs or peacekeeping provides a comprehensive 
explanation of how, why, and to what extent refugee camps and humanitarian aid 
become embroiled in conflict, and the implications for the refugees and humanitarian 
actors operating therein. Writings within each field of inquiry offer insights into aspects 
of the problem, but these have not been integrated into a broad and historical analysis to 
facilitate deeper understanding of the issues. This thesis contributes to filling this void. 
This study explores the questions posed by the Rwandan crisis within the broader 
context of humanitarian action and the negative consequences that it can generate. The 
profound paradox of humanitarian action is its potential to contradict its fundamental 
purpose: it can prolong the suffering it intends to alleviate. This is particularly the case 
in times of conflict. Humanitarian assistance has been held responsible for fuelling 
conflicts or protracting their duration from the Biafran secessionist conflict in the Iate 
3 
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This term is borrowed from John Borton, `Recent Changes in the International Relief System', 
Disasters 17, No. 3 (1993): 187 -201. 
The five volume, multi -donor evaluation of the International Response to the Rwandan crisis, 
published in 1996 was `an unprecedented international collaboration' according to the Head of the 
Evaluation, Niels Dabelstein. It was overseen by a Steering Committee composed of 19 
representatives of the aid community, and cost $1.6 million (all dollars are US unless otherwise 
stated). See David Millwood (ed.), The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons 
from the Rwanda Experience (Copenhagen: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of 
Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996); Niels Dabelstein, `Evaluating the International 
Humanitarian System: Rationale, Process and Management of the Joint Evaluation of the 
International Response to Genocide', Disasters 20, No. 4 (1996): 287 -294 at p. 287. In 1999 the UN 
also commissioned a report into its actions during the genocide. Ingvar Carlsson, Han Sung -Joo and 
Rufus M. Kupolati, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During 
the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda (New York, 15 December 1999). 
htt p: / /www.un.org/News /ossp/rwanda report.htm. 
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1960s to the wars in the former Yugoslavia and the Sudan in the 1990s. Yet such claims 
predominantly rest on the potential for aid to prolong conflict; they are rarely 
substantiated by assessments of the impact of humanitarian aid in relation to other 
political, economic and military resources available to belligerents.' 
The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that the unintended negative consequences of 
humanitarian aid persist and recur, and to explore the reasons why. This inquiry 
comprises three elements. First, it examines how humanitarian assistance becomes a 
political and economic resource for combatants. Second, it assesses the relative 
importance of humanitarian assistance to these combatant forces vis -à -vis the other 
types of support that they receive. Finally, and most importantly, this study explores the 
reasons why the paradoxes of aid persist and recur in spite of the knowledge that aid 
organisations acquire of them. 
In addressing these interrelated questions, this study examines the `side -effects' of 
humanitarian action from the perspective of combatants, aid organisations, and their 
respective sponsors. By situating humanitarian action within the broader political and 
military context, the study endeavours to avoid either exaggerating or diminishing the 
significance of aid to the war effort of belligerents, and to identify the circumstances in 
which aid might be said to prolong conflict. The study analyses the attitudes of aid 
organisations towards the unintended consequences of their actions, which in turn 
illuminates some of the reasons why the paradoxes of aid persist. The thesis argues that 
negative consequences are inherent in humanitarian action, but are exacerbated by the 
institutionalist logic that underpins the behaviour of aid organisations. It argues that 
there are institutional barriers to learning that help to explain the persistence of the 
paradoxes of humanitarian action over a range of cases surveyed, and therefore requires 
a particular response by aid organisations. 
This inquiry is undertaken in refugee camp settings for several reasons. As a regular 
feature of the international relief system for the past thirty years, they offer a relatively 
constant environment in which to examine the recurrence of the negative consequences 
of humanitarian action. Norms of state sovereignty predominantly relegated aid 
organisations to refugee camps on the periphery of conflicts during the Cold War (1946- 
4 For a recent example see Edward N. Luttwak, `Give War a Chance', Foreign Affairs 78, No. 4 
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1989),5 an area that multiplied during the late 1970s as the number of refugees fleeing 
repression and violence increased dramatically.6 Many of the techniques employed by 
aid organisations to respond to the needs of displaced and dispossessed populations 
were developed in refugee camps, and their duration - decades in the case of Palestinian 
and Afghan refugee camps - constitutes one of the few constants of the humanitarian 
domain. Refugee camps are obviously also the most pertinent context in which to 
address the questions raised above in connection with the Rwandan case. This study 
sheds light on how refugee camps, as one component of the field of humanitarian action, 
can be of benefit to combatants and hence can be implicated in the suffering that 
humanitarian action aims to relieve. 
An investigation of the negative consequences of aid is also pertinent to the broader 
humanitarian field. This study focuses on four of the paradoxes of humanitarian action. 
The first is the protective functions of refugee camps and other `protected zones' for 
combatants. The second is the contribution of aid to the economy of war. The third is 
the legitimacy that humanitarian action can accord to individuals, political causes or 
movements. The fourth is the role of humanitarian action in the control of populations. 
Each will be examined in detail in Chapter 1. 
This introductory chapter illustrates the scope and importance of the issues addressed by 
this study, and situates it within the existing literature on refugee studies and 
humanitarian affairs. It then outlines some of the fundamental concepts, structures and 
actors of the international aid system. The introduction concludes with a discussion of 
the method of inquiry and the case studies chosen for analysis, and the procedure that 
the thesis follows. 
(1999): 36 -44, esp. pp. 41 -44. 
s The end of the Cold War can be signified by one of three events: the collapse of the Berlín Wall in 
1989; German reunification in 1990; and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. According to 
one author, the most conventional designation is 1989. See `Introduction', in Paul F. Diehl (ed.) The 
Politics of Global Governance: International Organizations in an Interdependent World (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 1997), pp. 1 -6 at p. 3. 
6 The number of refugees recognised by UNHCR grew from fewer than 3 million in 1975 to 
approximately 10 million in 1982, and reached a peak of nearly 20 million by 1993. UNHCR, The 
State of the World's Refugees 1995 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 20. 
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1. Refugee Camps, Humanitarian Action and War 
This inquiry is located within refugee studies and the burgeoning literature on 
humanitarian affairs, but it is also pertinent to international relations and peacekeeping. 
The use of refugee camps as bases arrières by combatants has direct implications for 
international and regional stability. It compounds the threat to regional harmony posed 
by refugee flows, and increases the stakes in relations between the governments of 
asylum countries and the refugee -generating state. It embroils the refugee population in 
the conflict, and poses practical and ethical problems for humanitarian aid organisations 
operating in the camps. Aristide Zolberg, Astri Suhrke and Sergio Aguayo coined the 
term `refugee -warriors' to describe this phenomenon in their seminal study on the 
causes of refugee flows, Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the 
Developing World.' 
Despite the threat that refugee -warriors pose to the `international peace and security' 
that the UN is charged with maintaining,' the phenomenon has received scant attention 
in the international relations and peacekeeping literature.' This lacuna is particularly 
surprising in light of the continuing relevance of refugee -warriors and the sanctuaries 
provided by refugee camps in contemporary conflicts: the multinational force in East 
Timor in late 1999 faced its largest threat from militias sheltering among refugees in 
West Timor. 
Refugee -warrior communities have been a widespread feature of the international arena 
for the past fifty years. The Palestinian refugees in the Middle East constituted the first 
Aristide R. Zolberg, Astri Suhrke and Sergio Aguayo, Escape from Violence: Conflict and the 
Refugee Crisis in the Developing World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 275. 
8 The first purpose issued to the United Nations in Article 1 of the UN Charter is 'to maintain 
international peace and security'. 
' The notable exceptions are the work of Myron Weiner and Gil Loescher on the security implications 
of international migration and refugee flows. For overviews of the broad strategic implications of 
refugee flows, of which refugee -warriors are only one aspect, see Myron Weiner, `Introduction: 
Security, Stability and International Migration', in Myron Weiner (ed.), International Migration and 
Security (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 1 -35, and Gil Loescher, Refugee Movements and 
International Security (London: Adelphi Paper 268, IISSBrassey's, 1992). Sporadic articles like that 
of Ben Barber have also appeared in international relations literature, but a survey of prominent 
works in the peacekeeping literature dealing with conflict, stability and intervention in the Third 
World, conducted by Howard Adelman, found that the issue is virtually ignored. Ben Barber, 
'Feeding Refugees, or War? The Dilemma of Humanitarian Aid', Foreign Affairs 76, No. 4 (1997): 
8 -14; Howard Adelman, `Why Refugee Warriors are Threats', Journal of Conflict Studies 18, No. 1 
(1998): 49 -69 at fn 11. 
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refugee -warrior community,10 and one that still exists today. On the African continent, 
Tunisia and Morocco were host to the Algerian resistance opposing the French colonial 
government in the 1950s, and another early refugee -warrior community was formed 
among Tutsi refugees who fled post- independence violence in Rwanda, beginning in 
1959. After some thirty years in exile, this community and their descendants 
successfully reinvaded Rwanda in 1994 under the banner of the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front," with the ensuing refugee exodus providing the base for a new refugee -warrior 
community among their opponents. Burundian refugees in Tanzania also engaged in 
military activities against their home state, and Liberian refugees in Sierra Leone were 
suspected of assisting the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)." 
Eritrean insurgents opposing successive Ethiopian Governments operated elaborate 
bases in refugee camps in the Sudan throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, and 
Ethiopia was host to Sudanese refugees and rebels opposing Khartoum. The armed 
branch of the South -West African People's Organisation maintained bases beside 
Namibian refugee camps in Angola, and refugee camps in many of the `front -line states' 
bordering South Africa provided recruitment grounds for the African National Congress 
(ANC) resistance. Algeria played host to refugees and Polisario guerrillas from Western 
Sahara; guerrillas from northern Chad mixed with refugees in Libya; and the Somali 
refugee camps in Kenya fulfilled some of the functions of a humanitarian sanctuary to a 
few of Somalia's warring factions in the early 1990s. 
In Asia, refugees from East Pakistan were trained and equipped in refugee camps in 
India before their victorious return to form the state of Bangladesh in 1971, and Pakistan 
provided sanctuary to Afghan refugees and mujahideen opposing the Soviet -backed 
regime in Kabul. Refugee camps in Thailand provided sanctuary to rebels trained by the 
10 
ll 
ZoIberg et al., Escape from Violence, p. 277. For more detailed discussion of the Palestinian refugee 
issue, see Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947 -1949 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
For a history of the Rwandan exile and armed insurgency see Théo Karabayinga and José Kagabo, 
`Les Réfugiés, de l'Exil au Retour Armé', Les Temps Modernes 583 (July- August 1995): 63 -90; 
Ogenga Otunnu, `Rwandese Refugees and Immigrants in Uganda', in Howard Adelman and Asti 
Suhrke (eds), The Path of a Genocide: The Rwandan Crisis from Uganda to Zaire (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 1999), pp. 3 -29 and Ogenga Otunnu, `An Historical Analysis of the Invasion 
by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA)', in Adelman and Suhrke (eds) The Path of a Genocide, pp. 
31 -49; and Exile from Rwanda: Background to an Invasion (Washington: US Committee for 
Refugees, 1991). 
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US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from the Hmong hill tribes in Laos and to 
Cambodian opponents of the Vietnamese -installed regime in Phnom Penh. More 
recently, the Burmese refugee camps in Thailand have been attacked by the Rangoon - 
sponsored Democratic Karen (Kayin) Buddhist Army for allegedly assisting insurgents 
from the Karen National Liberation Army.'3 Refugee camps to the east of Papua New 
Guinea's border with the Indonesian province of Irian Jaya have also provided sporadic 
sanctuary to resistance fighters from the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua 
Movement)." 
In the Americas, Guatemalan camps were attacked in Mexico for allegedly harbouring 
insurgents, and Costa Rica housed Nicaraguan refugees and rebels. Honduras was also a 
compliant host to Nicaraguan contras fighting the Sandinista regime in Managua, but 
was a reluctant sanctuary for insurgents opposed to the US- backed regime in El 
Salvador. 
Clearly the role of refugee camps in conflict is an important issue which warrants closer 
analysis due to its implications for stability, and for humanitarian action. Edward 
Luttwak's recent indictment of the role of humanitarian assistance in war, and his call 
for a reduction in humanitarian activity, was based largely on observations of the 
Palestinian, Cambodian and Rwandan refugee camps.15 Such allegations feed into a 
larger debate in the humanitarian realm about the negative consequences of 
humanitarian action. Hence this study traverses the distinct yet overlapping fields of 
refugee studies and humanitarian affairs to shed light on the issues. 
12 Karen Jacobsen with Steven Wilkinson, `Refugee Movements as Security Threats in Sub -Saharan 
Africa', in Myron Weiner (ed.), International Migration and Security (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1993), pp. 201 -227 at p. 214. 
t3 Hazel Lang, doctoral candidate in the Department of International Relations, Australian National 
University, writing on the Burmese refugees in Thailand. Personal communication, 11 August 1999. 
14 See Alan Smith and Kevin Hewison, `1984: Refugees, "Holiday Camps" and Deaths', in R.J. May 
(ed.) Between Two Nations: The Indonesia -Papua New Guinea Border and West Papua Nationalism 
(Bathurst: Robert Brown & Associates, 1986), pp. 200 -217, and Edward P. WoIfers, `Foreword', in 
Edward P. Wolfers (ed.), Beyond the Border: Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, Southeast Asia and 
the South Pacific (Waigani and Suva: The University of Papua New Guinea Press and the Institute of 
Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, 1988), pp. 13 -39. 
15 Luttwak, `Give War a Chance', pp. 41 -44. 
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1.1 Refugees and Humanitarian Action 
Of the vast literature covering political, Iegal and social aspects of refugee movements, 
asylum and protection,16 the most concerted attention to the issue of refugee -warriors is 
found in the legal field. As the body responsible for refugee protection, the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) deliberated on the 
ramifications of refugee camps harbouring, or being suspected of harbouring, 
combatants following South African Defence Force attacks on refugee camps in 
neighbouring countries from the late 1970s, and the massacre of Palestinian refugees in 
the Sabra and ChatilIa camps in Lebanon in September 1982. The Executive Committee 
of UNHCR addressed the issue between 1982 and 1987, debating the responsibility of 
states vis-a-vis their obligations to norms of refugee asylum and respect for state 
sovereignty.'' The literature identifies the inadequacy of existing mechanisms to ensure 
the physical, as opposed to legal, protection of refugees, but does not address how 
refugee camps provide a support base for combatants, or the implications for 
humanitarian action. 
The militarisation of refugee camps is raised elsewhere in the refugee literature as one of 
several implications of migration and refugee flows for security;'$ in relation to the 
instrumentation of refugees as `freedom fighters' for foreign policy purposes during the 
Cold War;t9 or as one aspect of specific studies of the international response to refugee 





The refugee literature covers a vast array of works in the fields of legal analysis; historical and case 
studies; emergency assistance; politics and policies of asylum; the causes and consequences of 
refugee flows; and refugees and international politics. Some of the main works include: Guy 
Goodwin -Gill, The Refugee in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Gil 
Loescher and Laila Monahan (eds), Refugees and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1989); B.E. Harrell -Bond, Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1986); Gil Loescher, Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global 
Refugee Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Leon Gordenker, Refugees in 
International Politics (London: Croom Helm, 1987); UNHCR, State of the World's Refugees 1993: 
The Challenge of Protection (NY: Penguin, 1993); and Zolberg et al., Escape from Violence. 
See Elly- Elikunda Mtango, `Military and Armed Attacks on Refugee Camps', in Gil Loescher and 
Laila Monahan (eds), Refugees and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 
pp. 87 -121, and M. Othman -Chande, `International Law and Armed Attacks in Refugee Camps', 
Nordic Journal Of International Law 59, Nos 2 &3 (1990): 153 -177. 
See chapters in the edited volume by Myron Weiner, International Migration and Security, and 
Loescher, Refugee Movements and International Security. 
See, for example, Gil Loescher, `Introduction: Refugee Issues in International Relations', in Gil 
Loescher and Laila Monahan (eds), Refugees and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1989), pp. I -33 at pp. 13 -15. 
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of the latter.20 Although these studies contribute to illuminating how refugee camps and 
humanitarian aid can be manipulated by belligerent parties, and provide important 
background for this study, they do not examine wider aspects of the process. 
The first work to address the broader issue of why and how refugee camps and the aid 
distributed therein become assets for guerrilla movements as humanitarian sanctuaries 
was Jean -Christophe Rufin's 1986 book, Le Piège Humanitaire (The Humanitarian 
Trap)?' This was complemented by Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo's Escape from 
Violence in 1989. Both works identify the refugee -warrior phenomenon as a by- product 
of the simultaneous emergence of an effective international refugee regime with the rise 
of democratic nationalism. Humanitarian aid became a means through which to secure 
the legitimacy and support of civilians. Rufin's study, as the more developed of the two, 
provides some elements of the analytical framework for this thesis, linking the three 
main areas of interest: strategies of insurgency warfare; the legal status and 
administrative organisation of refugee camps; and the broader side- effects of 
humanitarian action. However, while providing a framework through which to examine 
the relationship between conflict, refugees and humanitarian action, Rufin does not 
explore the role and attitudes of the aid organisations in the process. This issue needs 
addressing to shed light on why refugee camps and humanitarian aid have continued to 
assist combatants despite awareness of the problem among aid agencies. Some of the 
literature on humanitarian action is informative in this regard. 
There are obvious overlaps in the fields of refugee studies and humanitarian affairs. 
Humanitarian concerns are a subset of the broader political, legal, social and economic 
aspects of the study of refugees, and refugee issues are one subset of the humanitarian 
domain that also extends to victims of natural disasters, human rights abuses and 
political crises within states. The loss of the political appeal of refugees as people 
`voting with their feet' in the 1990s has increasingly led to their portrayal as a 
20 See William Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy: Cambodia, Holocaust and Modern Conscience (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1984); Linda Mason and Roger Brown, Rice, Rivalry and Politics: 
Managing Cambodian Relief (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983); and Josephine 
Reynell, Political Pawns: Refugees on the Thai -Kampuchean Border (Oxford: Refugee Studies 
Programme, 1989). 
21 Jean -Christophe Ruffin, Le Piège Humanitaire suivi de Humanitaire et politique depuis la chute du 
Mur, revised and updated edition (Paris: Jean- Claude Lattès, 1993). 
The, onsivw. 94 h'on Was totted bea- Chns4opht kAin Le Pius' Guano( l'a,de humonOaiít 
itmptac4 la ,querít Cearis bea,- Clalate. 
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humanitarian issue, exemplified by the subtitle of the latest UNHCR publication, The 
State of the World's Refugees 1997 -98: A Humanitarian Agenda" 
Adam Roberts remarks that 'in the 1990s, humanitarian issues have played a historically 
unprecedented role in international politics'.23 Indeed, it is certainly the case that issues 
and events are labelled `humanitarian' with unparalleled frequency. This trend has 
coincided with the rise of the notion of `complex emergencies'24 as a euphemism for 
war, genocide and other manifestations of `disrupted states'25 in the post -Cold War 
environment, as well as for the required international multi- faceted response. A growing 
academic industry26 has joined governments, UN departments and non -government 
organisations (NGOs) in studying the characteristics and effects of the alleged `new 
world disorder',27 and the combined civil-military," responses to these. 
Within the literature on humanitarian issues, the writings most pertinent to this inquiry 
are those addressing the negative impacts of humanitarian action and reappraising the 
raison d'être and effectiveness of aid organisations at responding to crises around the 
22 UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees 1997 -98: A Humanitarian Agenda (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997). 
23 Adam Roberts, `The role of humanitarian issues in international politics in the 1990s', International 
Review of the Red Cross 833 (March 1999), pp. 19-43 at p. 19. 
24 Variations on this term include `complex humanitarian emergencies', 'complex political 
emergencies', and `complex disasters'. The term has also been accorded acronyms - CHEs or CPEs. 
25 The term 'disrupted states' refers to states which are disintegrating through the erosion of government 
authority and structures, and states which, through committing crimes against their own people, forfeit 
their right to legitimacy. This term is preferable to 'collapsed' or `weak' states since they preclude 
crises provoked by the strength of the state, such as the Rwandan genocide in 1994, and the Kosovo 
crisis in 1999. 
26 
`Complex emergencies' have become a distinct subject of analysis, even inspiring the formation of 
departments dedicated to their study such as the Complex Emergencies Unit of the Centre for 
Defence Studies, Kings College London. 
27 `Complex emergencies' in the 'new world disorder' were the theme of a 1999 edition of Third World 
Quarterly (20, No. 1). Together the articles represent some of the lucid, but also the simplistic, 
generalisations of post -Cold War conflict and the international response to these. 
28 A selection of the vast literature on 'humanitarian intervention' that is indicative of the main themes 
may include: Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary 
Conflict: A Reconceptualization (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1996); Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle 
A. Thayer (eds), A Crisis of Expectations: UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1995); the special issue of International Political Science Review 18 No. 1 (January 1997), dedicated 
to 'The Dilemmas of Humanitarian Intervention'; François Jean (ed.), Life, Death and Aid: The 
Médecins Sans Frontières Report on World Crisis Intervention (London: Routledge, 1993); Sean D. 
Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, I996); Laura W. Reed and Carl Kaysen (eds), Emerging Norms of 
Justified Intervention (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1993); Jonathan 
Moore, Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention (Lanham, Md: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1998); and Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss, Mercy Under Fire: War and the Global 
Humanitarian Community (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995). 
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world. Although several excellent studies29 of the negative effects of humanitarian relief 
preceded it, the November 1994 Africa Rights Discussion paper, Humanitarianism 
Unbound? is widely considered to have `opened the debate on humanitarianism' as it 
assertively declares.30 Other significant works emerged in the 1990s that analyse the 
relationship between aid and the dynamics of conflict,3' and evaluations of the impact of 
humanitarian action have become a growing component of the work of UN agencies and 
government donors.32 
Several prescriptive works aimed at reducing the negative impact of humanitarian action 
have recently gained ascendancy, the most renowned of which commandeered the 
slogan of the Hippocratic Oath of Western medicine, `First, do no harm' (primum non 
nocere).33 Embraced as a response to the growing criticism of humanitarian action, it has 
29 Morris Davis (ed.), Civil Wars and the Politics of International Relief Africa, South Asia, and the 
Caribbean (New York: Praeger, 1975); Rufin, Le Piège Humanitaire; Mary B. Anderson and Peter J. 
Woodrow, Arising from the Ashes: Development Strategy in Times of Disaster (Boulder; Westview 
Press, 1989); Larry Minear, Humanitarianism Under Siege: A Critical Review of Operation Lifeline 
Sudan (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1991); François Jean (ed.), Populations in Danger (London: 
John Libbey, 1992); Alain Destexhe, L'Humanitaire Impossible ou deux siècles d'ambiguïté (Paris: 
Armand Colin, 1993). 
3° Humanitarianism Unbound? Current Dilemmas Facing Multi- Mandated Relief Operations in 
Political Emergencies (London: Discussion Paper No. 5, Africa Rights, 1994), pp. 36 -39. Thomas 
Weiss also credits this paper with having initiated the debate. Thomas G. Weiss, `Principles, Politics, 
and Humanitarian Action', Ethics and International Affairs 13 (1999): 1 -28 at p. 2. 
3' The volume edited by Joanna Macrae and Anthony Zwi, War and Hunger: Rethinking International 
Responses to Complex Emergencies (London: Zed Books in association with Save the Children Fund 
(UK), 1994) contains excellent articles by David Keen and Ken Wilson, 'Engaging with Violence: A 
Reassessment of Relief in Wartime', pp. 209 -221; Mark Duffield, 'The Political Economy of Internal 
War: Asset Transfer, Complex Emergencies and International Aid', pp. 50 -69; and Joanna Macrae 
and Anthony Zwi, 'Famine, Complex Emergencies and International Policy in Africa: An Overview', 
pp. 6 -36; See also Alex de Waal, Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa 
(Oxford and Bloomington: Africa Rights & the International African Institute in association with 
James Currey and Indiana University Press, 1997); Gayle E. Smith, 'Relief Operations and Military 
Strategy', in Thomas G. Weiss and Larry Minear (eds), Humanitarianism Across Borders: Sustaining 
Civilians in Times of War (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), pp. 97 -116; François Jean, 'Aide 
Humanitaire et Économie de Guerre', in François Jean and Jean -Christophe Rufin, Économie des 
Guerres Civiles (Paris: Hachette, 1996), pp. 543 -589; and John Prendergast, Frontline Diplomacy: 
Humanitarian Aid and Conflict in Africa (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996). 
32 The Rwandan crisis, for example, spawned at least five separate evaluations by UN agencies in 
addition to the comprehensive five- volume multi-donor evaluation. See Comprehensive Report on 
Lessons Learned from United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), October 1993 - 
April 1996 (New York: Lessons Learned Unit, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 1996); 
Antonio Donini and Norah Niland, Rwanda: Lessons Learned: A Report on the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Activities (New York: United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1994); Sue 
Lautze, Bruce D. Jones, and Mark Duffield, Strategic Humanitarian Coordination in the Great Lakes 
Region 1996- 1997:An Independent Study for the Inter- Agency Standing Committee (New York: 
IASC, 1998); Report of the Tripartite (UNICEF/UNHCR/WFP) Lessons Learned Study of the Great 
Lakes Emergency Operation since September 1996 (n.p.: United Nations, 1998); and Lessons 
Learned from the Burundi and Rwanda Emergencies (Geneva: Eval/04 /96/Rev.1, Inspection and 
Evaluation Service, UNHCR, 1996). 
33 This dictum is associated with the work of American aid consultant, Mary Anderson. The idea 
developed through several stages in almost complete isolation of the work of British or French writers 
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been received as a `new paradigm' of aid in some quarters," joining other 
reconceptualisations of the purpose and priorities of aid in the era of `complex 
emergencies'." Yet for all the attention given to mitigating the negative effects of aid, 
and the `lessons learned' units formed within UN agencies, government donors and 
NGOs, Larry Minear notes that there is little scholarly analysis of the dynamics of 
institutional behaviour and change within humanitarian institutions.36 He points to 
aspects of organisational culture that impede learning by aid organisations, ideas that 
Mark Walkup elucidates in more detail through analysing how such culture develops." 
Although recognising that the problems faced in the Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire 
were a `rerun of problems unaddressed in Cambodian refugee camps along the Thai 
border years before',38 Minear restricts his analysis to the post -Cold War period, as do 
the majority of works analysing humanitarian action. 
This thesis demonstrates that one of the reasons for the persistence of the paradoxes of 
humanitarian action is the emphasis placed on the Cold War /post -Cold War dichotomy. 
The prevailing discourse laments `how much more complex humanitarian work was 
now than it had been in the past',39 based on clichés about a new world `disorder'. This 
study challenges the images underpinning `complex emergencies', arguing that it is not 







on the same subject. For its genesis see Anderson and Woodrow, Rising from the Ashes; Mary B. 
Anderson, `International Assistance and Conflict: An Exploration of Negative Impacts', (n.p: mimeo, 
1994), Mary B. Anderson, Do No Harm: Supporting Local Capacities for Peace through Aid 
(Cambridge, MA: Local Capacities for Peace Project, Collaborative for Development Action, 1996); 
and Mary B. Anderson, Do No Harm: How Aid can Support Peace - or War (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 1999). 
A recent article claimed that the `Do no harm' maxim emerged in 1996 as 'a new development in the 
thinking behind relief aid'. Barry Munslow and Christopher Brown, `Complex emergencies: the 
institutional impasse', Third World Quarterly 20, No. 1 (1999): 207 -221 at p. 210. 
For critiques of the current paradigms in the literature see Cindy Collins, `Critiques of 
Humanitarianism and Humanitarian Action', paper prepared for OCHA Seminar on Lessons Learned 
on Humanitarian Coordination, Stockholm, 3 -4 April 1998; Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict 
(Bergen: Report Prepared for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chr. Michelsen Institute, 
1997); and Weiss, `Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action'. 
Larry Minear, `Learning to Learn', paper prepared for OCHA Seminar on Lessons Learned on 
Humanitarian Coordination, Stockholm, 3 -4 April 1998, p. 4. 
Mark Walkup, `Policy Dysfunction in Humanitarian Organizations: The Role of Coping Strategies, 
Institutions, and Organizational Culture', Journal of Refugee Studies 10, No. 1 (1997): 37 -60. John 
Prendergast also discusses the `seven deadly sins' committed by aid organisations that exacerbate the 
negative effects of aid. See Prendergast, Frontline Diplomacy, pp. 1 -15. 
Minear, `Learning to Learn', p. 8. 
Emma Bot ino, comments attributed in the Final Report from an ECHO -ICRC seminar, 
`Humanitarian Action: Perceptions and Security', Lisbon, 27 -28 March 1998, p. 6. 
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Before outlining the analytical framework of this study, it is useful briefly to discuss 
general aspects of the refugee regime, humanitarian action, and the actors involved in 
the provision of international humanitarian aid, since these are central themes of this 
study. 
2. The International Refugee Regime 
2.1 Refugees and Refugee Camps 
The recognition of individuals and groups as `refugees' is implicitly value -laden, and 
the appropriateness of the legal definitions, and their ambiguous application, have been 
the subject of much discussion.'° It is not necessary to delve into this issue here; suffice 
it to note that the granting of refugee status to individuals under the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and 1967 Protocol, or to groups under the broader 1969 Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU) Convention, confers rights on individuals that are not extended to 
asylum seekers outside the definition, or to persons displaced within their own country. 
The central tenet of the 1951 definition is that a refugee must have `a well- founded fear 
of being persecuted' in his or her country of origin, which the 1969 OAU Convention 
extended to include people who fled more generalised `external aggression, occupation, 
foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order'. Some of the issues 
related to the refugee concept and the notions it implies will be raised in more detail in 
the case studies. 
Although evidence suggests that refugees who settle among the local population 
generally fare better than those confined to camps,' the establishment of refugee camps 
`was invented as the most efficient method of distributing aid to a constituency that has 
been labelled as requiring ií'.42 Systems for delivering aid and conducting 




See, for example, Zolberg et al., Escape from Violence, pp. 3 -33; Yéfime Zarjevski, A Future 
Preserved: International Assistance to Refugees (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1988), pp. 49 -72; 
Loescher, Beyond Charity, pp. 140 -143; Roger Zetter, 'Labelling Refugees: Forming and 
Transforming a Bureaucratic Identity', Journal of Refugee Studies 4, No. 1 (1991): 39 -62. 
See, for example, Wim Van Damme, `Do refugees belong in camps? Experiences from Goma and 
Guinea', The Lancet 346 (5 August 1995): 360 -362. 
Eftihia Voutira and Barbara E. Harrell -Bond, 'In Search of the Locus of Trust: The Social World of 
the Refugee Camp', in E. Valentine Daniel and John Chr. Knudsen (eds), Mistrusting Refugees 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 207 -224 at pp. 209 -210. 
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governments often prefer to confine refugees to camps to control the impact of their 
presence on the local population, social services and environment. Moreover, the 
temporal image portrayed by camps sustains the hope among refugees and host 
governments that the refugees will return one day to their country of origin. Refugees 
living in closed camps depend entirely on external assistance whereas those in open 
camps can interact and trade with the local community and engage in income -generating 
activities. 
Refugee camps give rise to a complex web of relationships between the host nation 
authorities, the local population, the refugees, UNHCR, NGOs, donor governments, and 
within each of these groups. The host government is responsible for security in refugee 
camps and often deploys police, military or paramilitary forces to maintain law and 
order. The host country is also responsible for recognising or denying refugee status to 
asylum seekers and can invite UNHCR to assist in this process and to administer the 
refugee camps but is not obliged to do so under international law. The mandate of 
UNHCR is contained in its 1950 Statute, but this is recommendatory and not binding on 
states. Hence UNHCR's authority `is moral and entails no significant legal sanctions' .43 
The management of refugee camps and the coordination of services are usually 
undertaken by UNHCR. UNHCR enlists the assistance of NGOs to implement projects 
in the essential sectors of food and nutrition, water and sanitation, health, shelter and 
site maintenance, assistance to `vulnerable groups', and in other fields such as 
education, training, agriculture, and environmental management. Other UN agencies 
such as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Programme 
(WFP) are usually present under their respective mandates for children's rights and food 
aid, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) might also provide 
assistance in accordance with its mandate conferred by international humanitarian law. 
NGOs do not have formal mandates specifying their responsibilities. Rather they operate 
under self -designated charters, or organisational statements of objectives and goals. 
Humanitarian NGOs tend to espouse the common objective of alleviating the suffering 
of vulnerable populations, but beyond this general objective they exhibit as many 
43 P. D. Maynard, `The Legal Competence of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees', 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 31 (July 1982): 415 -425 at p. 416. 
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differences as similarities in ideology and approach to their operations." Some were 
formed to proselytise, some to espouse a particular cause, and others to specialise in 
technical assistance. They vary enormously in size, competence and commitment. NGO 
attitudes to relationships with governments are one of the areas in which they differ 
most. During much of the Cold War humanitarian aid was tied to the foreign policy 
interests of donor governments and many NGOs were allegedly direct45 and indirect 
vehicles of such policy. The US Government was particularly consistent in this strategy: 
Eugene Douglas, while US Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, wrote that `refugee policy 
has always been in fact a component of foreign policy'.46 Nevertheless, some NGOs 
accepted, and still accept, high levels of government funding, rejecting the idea that this 
necessarily ties humanitarian action to the foreign policy of governments. But as 
Barbara Harrell -Bond points out, `it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a 
humanitarian agency that receives substantial amounts of government money to act as 
an advocate for an oppressed group whose interests contradict those of either donors or 
hosts'.47 Other NGOs retain greater independence from governments through securing 
funds from the public. 
Among the refugees themselves there may be considerable differences in status, 
religion, ethnicity, education, and political persuasion that can affect, and be affected by, 
the administrative procedures of a refugee camp. The local `leaders' are usually sought 
out to liaise between refugee communities and aid organisations, but the dynamics of 
camp management can alter social relationships significantly. Refugees with 
qualifications recognised by aid organisations are favoured in employment over those 
without, and skills in European languages, and logistical functions such as vehicle 
operation and maintenance, are highly valued. Relations of power and authority exist at 
all levels in refugee camps 48 
44 For a detailed discussion of the history and purposes of humanitarian NGOs see Yves Beigbeder, The 
Role and Status of International Humanitarian Volunteers and Organisations: The Right and Duty to 
Humanitarian Assistance (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991). 
45 The International Rescue Committee (IRC) was allegedly part of the covert network of the CIA 
throughout the Cold War. See Eric Thomas Chester, Covert Network: Progressives, the International 
Rescue Committee and the CIA (Armonk, NY: M.E.Sharpe, 1995). 
46 Eugene Douglas, `The Problems of Refugees in a Strategic Perspective', Strategic Review (Fall 
1982): 11 -20 at p. 13. 
47 Harrell -Bond, Imposing Aid, p. 17. 
48 For an excellent discussion of the power relations in a refugee camp see Voutira and Harrell -Bond, 
`In Search of the Locus of Trust: The Social World of the Refugee Camp'. 
Introduction 16 
2.2 Humanitarian Action 
Despite its importance as a normative concept in international relations and international 
law, the term `humanitarian' has eluded definition by the UN or the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ).49 The term is laden with a multitude of meanings from its broad 
dichotomous use as the opposite of `political' to its specific use, for example, to classify 
goods deemed essential to life which may be exempted from an economic embargo. 
Of course, charitable acts and benevolence are evident in all cultures and societies.50 The 
origins of Western humanitarian activity, however, are embedded in two main 
traditions: religion, and 18th Century European Enlightenment philosophies. Distinctions 
between these approaches are still evident today: some aid organisations profess a 
charitable `duty' to assist the less fortunate, while others base their action on the `rights' 
of people to certain minimum standards. The contemporary framework for humanitarian 
action owes its origins to the Red Cross movement and the first intergovernmental 
agreement signed in 1864, which aimed to `humanise' war through limiting its 
consequences. Based on a respect for humanity, it was the first treaty applicable to inter- 
state conflict at all times and in all circumstances, to which any state could adhere; 
previous rules to protect the victims of war and regulate permissible conduct were 
specific to particular conflicts." 
Concerned with preserving the dignity and essence of humanity, `humanitarian' 
encompasses constraints, or things that individuals and governments must not do, and 
obligations, or things that they should do. International humanitarian law imposes limits 
on permissible behaviour during war; human rights law sets the minimum standards to 
which individuals are entitled by virtue of their membership of humanity; and 
humanitarian action seeks to restore some of those rights when individuals are deprived 
of them by circumstance. The `humanitarian imperative' that drives the work of most 
49 For a more detailed discussion of the definitional void and the issues involved, see Ramsbotham and 
Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict, pp. 8 -32; and Minear and Weiss, 
Mercy Under Fire, pp. 18 -22. 
5° See Ephraim Issac, `Humanitarianism Across Religions and Cultures', in Thomas G. Weiss and Larry 
Minear (eds), Humanitarianism Across Borders: Sustaining Civilians in Times of War (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 1993), pp. 13 -22; and Bhikhu Parekh, `Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention', 
International Political Science Review 18, No. 1 (1997): 49 -69, esp. pp. 54 -55. 
51 The Lieber Code of the American Civil War was the first modem codification of the laws of war to be 
officially adopted by a warring party in a civil war, the Union Army in 1863. See Chris of Jochnick 
and Roger Normand, `The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War', 
Harvard International Law Journal 35, No. 1 (1994): 49 -95 at pp. 65 -66. 
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aid organisations declares that there is an obligation to provide humanitarian assistance 
wherever it is needed, and is predicated on the right to receive, and to offer, 
humanitarian assistance 52 This right of humanitarian initiative is recognised under 
international law in times of conflict, provided that such assistance is impartial and 
receives the consent of belligerent parties." 
Humanitarian action posits a universal ethic founded on the principle of equal dignity 
for al1.56 The impartiality of humanitarian action is one of three fundamental principles 
of humanitarianism that embodies this maxim and promotes its universal acceptance55 
Impartial assistance is based solely on need without any discrimination among 
beneficiaries based on nationality, race, religion or other factors. The second principle, 
neutrality of humanitarian action, denotes a duty to refrain from taking part in hostilities, 
or from undertaking any action which furthers the interests of one party to the conflict or 
compromises those of the other. And the third principle, independence, ensures that 
humanitarian action is exclusively concerned with the welfare of humanity and free of 
all political, religious or other extraneous influences. These principles, particularly 
neutrality, are the subject of considerable debate: is it morally acceptable to remain 
neutral when faced with grave abuses of human rights ?56 
The purpose of these principles is firstly to facilitate access by aid organisations to 
victims of conflict, repression or other circumstances - to create a `humanitarian space' 
which is `detached' from the political stakes of the context; and secondly, to ensure that 
the assistance given is unconditional, that it is not used as a tool to induce political or 
52 See the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in 
Disaster Relief http: / /www.ifrc.org/oubs /code/ 
73 See Article 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. 
56 Rony Brauman, `L'assistance humanitaire internationale', in Monique Canto -Sperber (ed.) 
Dictionnaire de Philosophie Morale et Politique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France (PUF), 
1996), pp. 96 -101 at p. 96. 
ss Most observers list the first three principles of the Red Cross, humanity, neutrality and impartiality, as 
the fundamental principles of humanitarian action. However, `humanity' denotes respect for the 
human being, which I consider is the core idea of `humanitarian' rather than one of several principles 
underpinning it. 
56 For discussions of the debate see Denise Planner, `ICRC neutrality and neutrality in humanitarian 
assistance', International Review of the Red Cross 311 (March 1996): 161 -179; Hans Haug, 
`Neutrality as a fundamental principle of the Red Cross', International Review of the Red Cross 315 
(November 1996): 627 -630; Larry Minear, `The theory and practice of neutrality: Some thoughts on 
the tensions', International Review of the Red Cross 833 (March 1999): 63 -71; Humanitarianism 
Unbound: Current Dilemmas Facing Multi- Mandated Relief Operations in Political Emergencies, 
pp. 24 -36; Rony Brauman, Devant le Mal: Rwanda. Un Génocide en Direct (Paris: Arléa, 1994), pp. 
21 -28. 
lntroduc6on I8 
religious compliance. The term `humanitarian space' is often used to invoke a space 
`separate from the political',57 but, as later chapters will iIIustrate, such a separation is 
seldom possible in practice. The term is used here to imply the existence of certain 
operational standards or conditions that permit humanitarian aid to be given in 
accordance with its purpose. These include the freedom to assess independently the 
needs of the population; retain unhindered access to the population; conduct, monitor 
and evaluate the distribution of aid; and obtain security guarantees for expatriate and 
local personnel, and property. 
In some circumstances, the principles of humanitarian action and their operational 
standards clash. When this occurs, choices must be made about which receives priority. 
The hierarchy of principles established by each aid organisation varies according to the 
perceptions of the primary purpose of humanitarian action. Aid organisations have 
adopted very different perceptions of their role, purpose and their understanding of what 
constitutes `humanitarian assistance'. In its most common usage, it denotes emergency 
assistance provided to populations to alleviate life threatening situations, but variations 
in its reach and interpretation abound. For the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, Sadako Ogata, for example, humanitarian assistance is `essentially and above 
all else about protection - protection of victims of human rights and humanitarian 
violations'.58 Others suggest that humanitarian action should promote equitable 
economic development and peace initiatives,59 and some aid organisations advocate 
`employing humanitarian action as part of a comprehensive strategy to transform 
conflict'.fi0 By contrast, Rony Brauman, former president of Médecins sans Frontières 
(MSF) contends that the role of humanitarian action, contrary to that of development, is 
not to transform a society, but to assist it to endure a period of crisis and regain its 
57 Daniel Warner, The politics of the politicalhumanitarian divide', International Review of the Red 
Cross 833 (March 1999): 109 -118. 
58 Sadako Ogata, Speech to the Conference on Conflict and Humanitarian Action, Princeton, October 
22 -23, 1993, as cited in Weiss and Minear, Mercy Under Fire, p. 21. 
59 See Anderson and Woodrow, Arising from the Ashes, and Mary B. Anderson, `Development and the 
Prevention of Humanitarian Emergencies', in Thomas G. Weiss and Larry Minear (eds), 
Humanitarianism Across Borders: Sustaining Civilians in Times of War (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
1993): 23 -38. 
fio Weiss, `Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action', p. 3. This article and responses solicited to it 
provide an interesting insight into aspects of the contemporary debate about the scope of 
humanitarian action. The responses, in the same volume (Ethics and International Affairs 13, 1999) 
are: Cornelio Sommaruga, 'Humanity: Our Priority Now and Always', pp. 23 -28; Joelle Tanguy and 
Fiona Terry, `Humanitarian Responsibility and Committed Action', pp. 29 -34; and David Rieff, 
`Moral Imperatives and Political Realities', pp. 35-42. 
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previous balance. He defines humanitarian action as `that which aims, without any 
discrimination and with peaceful means, to preserve life and human dignity and to 
restore people's ability to choose' .61 
Henry Shue raises some additional ideas about what constitutes `humanitarian' action 
and the assistance that is offered under this banner.fi2 First, he notes that to be 
humanitarian, assistance must be in response to a crisis that was not caused by the 
provider of the aid. If the donor caused or had complicity in causing the disaster, then 
any aid offered is compensation for the harm wrought, rather than humanitarian 
assistance. Similarly, what is owed in justice cannot be given in charity. Humanitarian 
assistance must be freely given; the transfer of financial or material resources cannot be 
considered humanitarian if it was already owed to the recipients. Second, humanitarian 
assistance must be intended for victims: `the question is not what one gives - it is to 
whom one gives ít'.63 Food, water and clothing intended for an army cannot be labelled 
humanitarian (as such assistance to the US- backed Nicaraguan guerrillas in Honduras 
was in the mid- 1980s); it is logistical support for the military. But he argues that a rifle 
might constitute humanitarian assistance if provided to viIIagers who suffered from 
attack by wild animals. Shue notes that: 
if an army cannot afford both guns and food, giving it food is providing 
military assistance... the question is: is the food preventing a victim of poverty 
from starving, or is it enabling an invasion force to move forward ?64 
This thesis explores what happens when humanitarian action makes it possible to do 
both. The interpretation given to the purpose of humanitarian action under such 
circumstances, and the extent to which aid organisations are willing and able to uphold 
the core principles of humanitarianism are explored in the following chapters. One of 
the findings to emerge from this study is that broadening the role and interpretation of 
humanitarian action will increase its potential for manipulation by political powers. 
61 Bony Brauman, L'Action Humanitaire (Paris: Dominos, 1995), p. 9. All translations from French are 
mine, unless otherwise stated. 
62 Henry Shue, `Morality, Politics, and Humanitarian Assistance', in Bruce Nichols and Gil Loescher 
(eds), The Moral Nation: Humanitarianism and US Foreign Policy Today (Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1989), pp. 12 -40 at pp. 21 -24. 
63 ibid., p. 23 (emphasis in original). 
6a ibid., p. 24. 
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3. The Scope and Method of the Study 
This dissertation explores the interconnected questions concerning humanitarian action 
and war in five refugee contexts located in four host countries across three continents: 
the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan; the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran refugee camps in 
Honduras; the Cambodian refugee camps in Thailand; and the Rwandan refugee camps 
in Zaire. It explores why the paradoxes of humanitarian action recurred in the Rwandan 
refugee camps when aid organisations had prior knowledge and experience of the 
refugee -warrior phenomenon. The cases chosen to precede Rwanda were those likely to 
have generated experience and knowledge applicable beyond their individual contexts, 
and in which refugees attracted the support of a representative range of aid 
organisations. They also cover a broad geographical area to reflect the widespread 
nature of the phenomenon of humanitarian sanctuaries, and each case offers similarities 
and differences to justify its inclusion. 
The Afghan, Nicaraguan and Cambodian cases have a common thread in their centrality 
to the so- called `Reagan Doctrine', that initiated a change in US foreign policy from one 
of `containing' communism, to actively supporting insurgent movements fighting to 
overthrow Soviet -backed regimes in the Third World. Although each of the insurgency 
movements was allegedly in receipt of US covert assistance prior to 1986, the US House 
of Representatives in June and July of that year gave formal approval to the US 
Administration to support forces opposing communist regimes in each of these conflicts 
(and in AngoIa).6' Thus the cases provide an opportunity to compare variations in the 
degree to which the refugees and the camp structures served to legitimise and facilitate 
such support, and provide an interesting comparison with the post -Cold War Rwandan 
refugee crisis which was devoid of superpower rivalry. 
The Cambodian case shares an important characteristic with the Rwandan refugee 
camps in Zaire: the main armed group benefiting from the humanitarian sanctuary had 
perpetrated widespread and massive war crimes, crimes against humanity and acts of 
genocide among the civilian population before its exile.56 Such crimes are unjustifiable 
65 The Reagan Doctrine was first articulated at President Reagan's State of Union address in February 
1985. For a good analysis of the Reagan Doctrine see Stephen S. Rosenfeld, The Guns of July', 
Foreign Affairs 64, No. 4 (1986); 698 -7I4. 
ss While what occurred in Rwanda is widely recognised as genocide, there is debate over whether the 
Khmer Rouge atrocities constitute genocide under the strict definition of the 1948 Genocide 
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in any circumstances and are recognised and codified as such under international Iaw. 
This factor sharpened the ethical dilemmas posed to aid organisations working in the 
camps. Furthermore, the Cambodian analogy was publicly invoked as a precedent 
during the Rwandan refugee crisis. 
The inclusion of Honduras as a host state in the study provides some insight into 
variations in the treatment of refugees and guerrilla movements according to their 
political value and the message implicit in their flight. Eastern Honduras sheltered 
refugees fleeing a left -wing government in Nicaragua, while in the west resided refugees 
fleeing a right -wing government in El Salvador. The domestic and international 
responses to them were markedly different. Examining the Salvadoran refugee camps 
also permits a test of the proposition put by Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo that, to exist, 
refugee -warrior communities `require sanctuary in a neighboring country permitting 
military operations from its territory'. They claim that `without a friendly base, the 
community in exile can only be refugees' and they mention the case of the Salvadoran 
refugees in Honduras as evidence of thís.n' 
The Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan introduce two unique factors to the thesis: first, it 
is the only case examined in which a superpower was directly involved on the ground; 
and second, the refugees were of Muslim faith and interpreted the notion of `exodus' 
and `refuge' in a different way from that of the international refugee regime. The 
Afghan case highlights issues of refugee agency in their exile and return, and the 
appropriateness of Western understanding of cultural and religious difference. 
The Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire are the final case study examined to determine 
how and why the paradoxes of humanitarian action persist. Occurring in the post -Cold 
War period and falling outside the spheres of national concern of the major powers, the 
Rwandan genocide and refugee crisis solicited the opposite response from states to that 
Convention. The majority of killings were conducted on a political basis rather than an ethnic or 
religious basis specified in the Convention. For aspects of the debate see Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its 
political Use in the Twentieth Century (New Haven, Yale University Press, I981); David Hawk, `Pol 
Pot's Cambodia: Was it Genocide ?', in Israel W. Chamey (ed.), Toward the Understanding and 
Prevention of Genocide: Proceedings of the International Conference on the Holocaust and 
Genocide (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 51 -59; Ben Kiernan (ed.), Genocide and Democracy 
in Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge, the United Nations, and the International Community (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1993); Steven R. Ratner and Jason S. Abrams, Accountability for Human 
Rights Atrocities in International Law: Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997). 
67 Zolberg et al., Escape from Violence, p. 276. 
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of crises in the past. Rather than a product of political interference, the refugee -warriors 
and paradoxes of aid resulted from a lack of interference, and were ironically more 
significant. They also resulted in the worst consequences for the refugees of all cases 
examined. 
The Rwandan case is analysed in more detail than the other cases for two reasons. First, 
the egregiousness of the Rwandan case highlights the multiple failures of the 
international refugee regime to apply experience gained in the past. Very little was 
without precedent in the Rwanda crisis, yet aid organisations were unable to avoid the 
same pitfalls that had plagued refugee relief operations previously. Thus the attitudes of 
aid agencies are explored more deeply in this chapter to identify the constraints they 
faced to mitigating the negative effects of their assistance. 
Second, the quality and quantity of information available on the militarisation of the 
Rwandan refugee camps is unprecedented. The defeated Rwandan regime fled the 
country with extensive assets and established an administrative structure of a 
government -in -exile in the refugee camps. The military and civil authorities documented 
many aspects of their organisation in Zaire, some of which were found by journalists 
once the camps were abandoned in anticipation of the Zairean rebel and Rwandan 
government attacks in late 1996.68 These documents provide rare insight into the 
machinations of a military force ensconced in refugee camps and the logic behind the 
propaganda and other methods of control to keep the refugees from returning to their 
homes. This in itself justifies more detailed attention. 
Length constraints preclude the addition of further case studies: had another been 
possible, the role of the refugee camps in the Sudan in relation to the insurgency in 
Eritrea and Tigray would have been examined. This case would have provided 
interesting new insights into the organisation of guerrilla movements, but was unique in 
many of its facets, and arguably too idiosyncratic to warrant inclusion. Only about 40 
percent of the Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees in eastern and central Sudan received 
68 I am greatly indebted to Sam Kiley of the London Times, Massimo Alberizzi of the Italian newspaper 
Corriere Della Sera, Christian Jennings of Reuters and Chris Tomlinson of Associated Press for 
sharing these documents with me. 
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international assistance,ó9 and the two main insurgency movements, the Eritrean 
People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), ran their own 
camps equipped with hospitals, schools, communication and training centres, and 
facilities to repair captured weapons and manufacture ammunition." International 
humanitarian aid arguably played a more significant role in the cross -border relief 
program, as opposed to programs for the refugees, run by a consortium of NGOs called 
the Emergency Relief Desk, through indigenous relief associations in collaboration with 
the Fronts." So, although the cross -border program shares similarities with the situation 
in Afghanistan, the relative absence of international aid in supporting the refugee camps 
in the Sudan rendered the case less pertinent to this inquiry than the contexts that were 
selected. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the reasons why some camps 
become humanitarian sanctuaries while others do not.7Z 
This study examines how humanitarian action becomes a political and economic 
resource for combatants in each of the case studies by using a framework adapted from 
Rufin's Le Piége Humanitaire. Examining the economic strategies employed by 
69 Gaim Kíbreab, `Refugees in the Sudan: Unresolved Issues', in Howard Adelman and John Sorenson 
(eds), African Refugees: Development Aid and Repatriation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 
43 -68 at p. 45. 
70 Zolberg et al., Escape from Violence, p. 115. 
71 For a detailed discussion of the activities of the Emergency Relief Desk see Mark Duffield and John 
Prendergast, Without Troops & Tanks: The Emergency Relief Desk and the Cross Border Operation 
into Eritrea and Tigray (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1994). Also see John Sorenson, 
`Refugees, Relief and Rehabilitation in the Horn of Africa: The Eritrean Relief Association' in 
Howard Adelman and John Sorenson (eds), African Refugees: Development Aid and Repatriation 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 69 -93. For more information about Eritrean refugees in the 
Sudan, see John R. Rogge, Too Many, Too Long: Sudan's Twenty -Year Refugee Dilemma (Totowa, 
NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985), and Judy A. Mayotte, Disposable People? The Plight of Refugees 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1992), pp. 217 -301. 
72 This issue is dealt with to some extent by Howard Adelman in `Why Refugee -Warriors are Threats'. 
Adelman disputes the idea posited by Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo that the reasons why refugees 
become warriors resides in the rationale for their exodus. Adelman suggests instead that the 
explanation lies in the treatment of the refugees by regional and international actors - that refugee - 
warriors are not a product of root causes but failures, sometimes deliberate, in conflict management. 
Adelman's thesis, however, leaves little room for refugee agency, and does not seem to be applicable 
to, for instance, Mozambican refugees. Their lack of militancy appears to be due to the fact that they 
were overwhelmingly fleeing the tyranny of Renamo (Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana - 
Mozambique National Resistance) forces, rather than the central government. If the refugees wanted 
to fight Renamo they did not need to do it from a neighbouring state but could join the national army. 
For a survey of the reasons for the refugee exodus see Robert Gersony, Summary of Mozambican 
Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict -Related Experience in Mozambique (Washington: Report 
submitted to Ambassador Jonathan Moore, Director, Bureau for Refugee Programs and Dr Chester A. 
Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, April 1988). For more information about the 
atrocities perpetrated by Renamo, see Fabrice Weissman, `Mozambique: la "Guerre du ventre"', in 
François Jean and Jean- Christophe Rufin (eds), Economie des guerres civiles (Paris: Hachette, 1996), 
pp. 299 -340. 
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guerrilla movements to sustain an insurgency, Rufin identifies the use of refugee camps 
as the most successful of three organisational arrangements. 
The first and least sustainable strategy is via a `closed' war economy, following the 
dictum articulated by Mao Zedong that the people are for guerrillas what the sea is for 
fish. In a closed economy the guerrillas are dependent upon the local population to fulfil 
their material needs; hence the strategy is sustainable only as long as food is plentiful 
and the population is supportive. While successful in China, the failures of the Biafran 
secessionists in Nigeria, the Mau Mau in Kenya and the Aux in the Philippines illustrate 
the limitations of this mode of functioning." 
The second and more successful strategy to sustain an insurgency is through establishing 
a military base in a neighbouring country. Norms of state sovereignty protect guerrillas: 
the pursuit of combatants to a neighbouring state risks interstate confrontation. Resupply 
and rearmament arrangements are also facilitated through the host nation. This strategy 
has limitations, however, primarily because of the vulnerability of the movement to 
political fluctuations in the host country. The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), 
for example, was expelled from Jordan in `Black September' of 1970, and the bases of 
the ANC in Mozambique were disbanded after the Frelimo (Frente Libertacao 
Mocambicana - Mozambique Liberation Front) government signed the Nkomati 
agreement with South Africa in 1984. 
Refugee camps in neighbouring countries provide the most successful organisational 
strategy for guerrillas. These offer three major advantages over a military base. First, 
they provide additional protection since an attack against a refugee camp draws 
international condemnation. Second, refugee camps attract humanitarian assistance that 
provides the guerrillas with an economic resource independent of external patron states. 
Third, the refugee camp structures provide mechanisms through which the guerrilla 
movement can control the civilian population and legitimise its leadership. In direct 
contrast to military sanctuaries, which are militarised, secret and political, humanitarian 
sanctuaries are civilian, public and `neutral' .74 
73 Rufin, Le Piège Humanitaire, p. 118. 
74 ibid., p. 121. 
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This framework provides an effective mechanism through which to examine how 
humanitarian action becomes a political and economic resource for combatants, and to 
assess the relative importance of humanitarian sanctuaries compared with the host state 
as a purely military sanctuary. By contextualising the role of refugee camps within the 
overall insurgency strategy employed by guerrillas - albeit within the confines of 
available data - an assessment of whether humanitarian action might have prolonged 
conflict in the refugee- generating state can be attempted. The thesis does not profess to 
provide a detailed description of the total support received by guerrilla movements; it 
would be impossible given the length constraints. Instead it aims to situate humanitarian 
action in its broader context to avoid the aid- centricity of most studies in this field. 
The benefits that Rufin attributes to humanitarian sanctuaries fit well within the broader 
context of the negative consequences of humanitarian assistance. International legal 
norms protecting refugees provide a secure base for combatants ensconced among them, 
and the camp administrative structures facilitate control of the refugee population. The 
aid distributed therein provides an economic and material resource, and the images 
conveyed by the presence of refugees and international aid agencies can confer 
legitimacy to political causes, guerrilla movements and individual leaders. 
Thus the analysis of each case study follows the same format, comprising three parts. 
The first two employ Rufin's framework: Part One examines the host state as a military 
sanctuary, and Part Two examines the host state as a humanitarian sanctuary. Part Three 
of each chapter explores the main attitudes manifest among the aid agencies towards the 
use of the refugee camps and humanitarian aid by the resistance forces. It highlights the 
extent of knowledge and experience gained by the aid agencies about the unintended 
consequences of aid, and analyses how individual organisations reconciled competing 
principles of humanitarian action. 
This study is based on information gathered while working in Rwanda and in the 
Rwandan refugee camps in Tanzania, and from research undertaken in Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, the US, and Europe. Extensive interviews were conducted with staff of UN 
agencies, NGOs and with refugees, and the libraries of several aid organisations and 
research centres were consulted. Preference has been accorded to published or written 
sources over verbal testimony in citations in the text where the same or a similar point is 
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made in both; thus few interviews of refugees or aid officials are included in the final 
text although they influenced the overall product. 
The availability of information varied greatly among cases. Since I was granted 
complete access to MSF archives in Pans and access to the Rwanda files of UNHCR, 
the amount of information from these sources is biased accordingly. The inconsistency 
of available information is also reflected in the different level of detail provided in the 
maps in each chapter: rather than reduce each to the lowest common denominator for 
the sake of uniformity, they remain different. 
When conducting research of this kind and making judgements about the ways in which 
individuals and aid organisations made and rationalised decisions, it is useful to 
consider how such judgements are made, and the perspective in which they are 
embedded. Michael Walzer explains the former: 
The moral point of view derives its legitimacy from the perspective of the 
actor. When we make moral judgments, we try to recapture that perspective. 
We reiterate the decision -making process, or we rehearse our own future 
decisions, asking what we would have done (or what we would do) in similar 
circumstances.75 
Obviously such judgements are easier to make with the benefit of hindsight. It is 
interesting to note that writings about the Rwandan camps were far more critical after 
1996 once the outcome was known. As the Rwanda chapter illustrates, some of the 
observers who denounced the manipulation of aid the most vehemently once the camps 
were destroyed were those who had the best chance of stopping it earlier, but chose not 
to. 
All the judgements made in this thesis also benefit from knowledge of the consequences 
of the aid programs, and from information that might not have been available at the time 
to influence decisions. The Rwanda chapter, however, tries to reflect the positions of aid 
organisations at the end of 1994 when the French section of MSF withdrew from the 
camps and lobbied publicly to try to generate change. As the head of the MSF team in 
the Rwandan camps in Tanzania at that time, I was deeply involved in the debate. It was 
difficult to reconcile the conflicting opinions of head office personnel, team members, 
75 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York; 
Basic Books, 1992), pp. 8 -9. 
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local staff, refugees, Tanzanian authorities, UNHCR, NGOs, and other national 
branches of MSF with personal views of the best course of action to pursue. Intense 
debates occurred in MSF over whether the organisation should meet the humanitarian 
imperative and remain in the camps, or should withdraw and protest publicly about the 
abuse of the humanitarian system. We questioned whether the greater responsibility of 
aid organisations to refugees is to participate or to refuse. The French section of MSF 
decided to Ieave and the Spanish, Dutch, Belgian and Swiss sections decided to remain. 
Which section was `right' remains a fiercely contested debate to the present. 
The second point, which follows from the first, is that observations and analyses are 
embedded in the culture from which the author originates. As Robben and Nordstrom 
note with reference to Western anthropologists: 
The sheer force of Western enculturation blinds even declared egalitarians to 
the destructive beliefs they carry and impart to those they study. We depart for 
the field bowing under the weight of our own culture, propped up and propelled 
by Western assumptions we seldom question, shielded from the blaze of 
complex cultural diversity by a carefully crafted lens of cultural belief that 
determines as much as clarifies what we see." 
This observation is compounded in the case of aid workers by the institutional culture of 
the organisation to which they are attached. This study is no exception: it is influenced 
by the culture in MSF and particularly by the work of Braman, Rufin, François Jean 
and Alain Destexhe. This is not to say, however, that institutional culture determines 
attitudes in a reductionist fashion. 
The risk when writing about the negative repercussions of humanitarian action is that it 
will provide ammunition to critics advocating less foreign aid, or using the failures of 
aid to pursue other agendas. That portion of the literature that consists of `highly 
polemical exposés of the iniquities of aid donors, usually based on a series of anecdotes 
presented by the author',n is often confused with highly thoughtful critiques of aid by 
6 Antonius C.G.M. Robben and Carolyn Nordstrom, `The Anthropology and Ethnography of Violence 
and Sociopolitical Conflict', in Carolyn Nordstrom and Antonius C.G.M. Robben (eds), Fieldwork 
Under Fire: Contemporary Studies of Violence and Survival (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1995), pp. 1 -23 at p. 11. 
Carol Lancaster, Aid to Africa: So Much to Do, So Little Done (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1999), p. 8. Graham Hancock's Lords of Poverty (London: Mandarin, 1989) and Michael 
Maren's The Road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid and International Charity (New 
York: Free Press, 1997) are two examples of this type of genre. While these books do serve a useful 
purpose in exposing corruption and blatant mismanagement, and in sending shock -waves through the 
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authors like Alex de Waal and Rakiya Omaar. One author, for example, combined 
criticisms of the relief effort in Somalia contained in professional reports with a critique 
published in Penthouse to justify the military intervention in Somalia." 
Although potentially serving such arguments, this purpose of this thesis is to deepen 
understanding of why the paradoxes of aid persist in the hope that aid organisations will 
accept more responsibility for the consequences of their actions. De Waal notes the 
`extraordinary capacity' of the aid system `to absorb criticism, not reform itself, and yet 
emerge strengthened', and argues that when written from the inside and aimed at the 
authors' peers, critiques `seem to have the effect of enriching the moral capital of these 
same humanitarian institutions'.' While this is a valid point, it has another side. Many 
aid organisations and individuals reject criticism from the outside for being detached 
from the realities of the field. It is easier to advocate withdrawing or withholding aid 
when one is not face to face with people suffering. The humanitarian impulse is far 
stronger in the field than away from it, and thus aid practitioners are less likely to accept 
criticisms from authors who have not attempted to confront the dilemmas from where 
they stand. De Waal focuses on the systemic problems of humanitarian relief from the 
outside. This study aims to understand some of the systemic problems from the inside. 
The thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter I examines * *the dominant discourses 
that emerged to explain the `new world order' of the 1990s, and identifies common 
misconceptions that predominate in the literature with regard to the complexity and 
originality of the post -Cold War environment. The chapter unravels some of the genuine 
changes in the nature of conflict in the 1990s and the repercussions of these for the 
industry, their anecdotal nature in isolation of deeper analysis leads to their dismissal by the audience 
which should take note, and their embrace by advocates of a cessation of foreign aid. 
" M. Maren, `A Different Kind of Child Abuse', Penthouse (December 1495), cited by Michael Kelly, 
Peace Operations: Tackling the Military Legal and Policy Challenges (Canberra: Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1997), paragraphs 715 -723. Even from the professional reports, 
Kelly is highly selective of the details he employs, and those he ignores, to back up his argument. He 
claims, for example, that ICRC hired 20,000 armed guards in Somalia, `making them the Iargest 
armed faction in Somalia', yet provides no documentation or evidence of this. Yet in a report by the 
Refugee Policy Group that he selectively used elsewhere it is noted that ICRC employed a total of 
25,000 Somalis directly, and many others indirectly, citing a draft Dutch Government Aid Evaluation 
as the source. The final Dutch Evaluation report mentioned 24,000 Somalis employed by ICRC. It 
was not possible for ICRC to have worked with 20,000 armed guards and only 4,000 other staff 
during their massive operation in Somalia. See Humanitarian Aid to Somalia: Evaluation Report 
1994 (The Hague: Operations Review Unit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands, 1994), p. 
129 and John Sommer, Hope Restored? Humanitarian Aid in Somalia, 1990 -1994 (Washington: 
Refugee Policy Group, 1994), p. 84. 
De Waal, Famine Crimes, p. xvi. 
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provision of humanitarian assistance. It then analyses four of the paradoxes that have 
characterised humanitarian action over the last 30 years, to situate them within the broad 
humanitarian arena before they are examined in the case studies. Chapter 1 also 
discusses the reconceptualisation of humanitarian action stimulated by perceived 
changes in the post -Cold War environment, and notions of responsibility for the 
consequences of humanitarian action. 
Chapters 2 to 5 present the case studies. Chapter 2 examines the Afghan refugee camps 
in Pakistan and demonstrates the complementarity of refugee camps to a military 
sanctuary for combatants. The chapter highlights the legitimising role of humanitarian 
action in strengthening some segments of the Afghan resistance over others, the legacy 
of which continues to the present. 
Chapter 3 investigates the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran refugee camps in Honduras. It 
illustrates the different standards of asylum and care offered to refugees according to the 
political messages conveyed by their presence, and demonstrates the extent to which aid 
organisations conformed to ideological preferences over humanitarian principles. This 
chapter also demonstrates that refugee camps can be of benefit to guerrilla movements, 
even when on hostile territory. 
Chapter 4 examines the Cambodian refugee camps in Thailand. It demonstrates that 
unlike elsewhere, the negative consequences of aid were not an unintended side- effect 
of the relief effort but were orchestrated by donor governments. No humanitarian space 
existed along the Thai- Cambodian border or inside Cambodia, and aid organisations 
compromised even the most basic humanitarian principles. This case provided the most 
stark precedent to the Rwandan crisis, yet the paradoxes of aid recurred in spite of the 
warnings. 
Chapter 5 analyses the Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire. It demonstrates that the 
paradoxes of aid were, for the first time, not in the interests of the vast majority of aid 
organisations and government donors, yet ironically served the guerrillas more 
effectively than in the other cases when they were either tolerated or intended. The 
chapter argues that aid organisations must assume responsibility for the consequences of 
their actions, and consider withdrawal as a tangible option when faced with 
unacceptable compromise of humanitarian principles. 
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Chapter 6 concludes by drawing together the main findings of the case studies and 
analyses the extent to which humanitarian action can be said to have prolonged the 
conflicts that generated the refugee flows. It analyses the divergent attitudes of the aid 
organisations to the negative consequences of their actions and relates this to questions 
of responsibility raised in Chapter I. It argues that the paradoxes of aid are inherent in 
humanitarian action but are exacerbated by institutional behaviour of aid organisations. 
Rather than imagining that humanitarian action could `do no harm', and advocating the 
expansion of humanitarian action into peace -building activities, it suggests that aid 
organisations should ensure that the primary aims of humanitarian assistance are upheld. 
It argues that aid organisations must assume responsibility for the consequences of their 
actions, not deflect these elsewhere, and that a bottom line of acceptable compromise 
should be established beyond which aid organisations would refuse to go. 
CHAPTER 1 
THE PARADOXES OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION 
Before discussing the paradoxes of humanitarian action, this study commences with a 
discussion of the views that pervade the contemporary humanitarian milieu, typified by 
the notion of `complex emergencies'. This term is associated with a multitude of ideas 
about the nature of the post -Cold War international environment and the role of 
humanitarian action therein. Although the term first appeared in 1989,' its adoption in 
the late 1990s as a euphemism for all manner of political crises and their humanitarian 
consequences is symbolic of a change in attitude from optimism at the dawn of the new 
world order, to cynicism and emphasis on international `disorder' at the end of the 
decade. Nostalgia for an imagined `golden age' of humanitarian action and the `crisp 
and simple concepts of the Cold War era" permeates much of the contemporary 
discourse on humanitarian action. 
It is important at the outset of this study to distinguish between the myth and reality of 
changes in the post -Cold War setting in order to establish the relevance of examining 
cases from the Cold War period. The Cold War /post -Cold War dichotomy has assumed 
virtually unquestioned status in the literature, with the changes rather than the 
continuities emphasised. Events and aid operations prior to 1990 are seldom mentioned: 
the Kurdish, Somali, Yugoslav and Rwandan crises have become the new benchmarks. 
Hence the first part of this chapter describes the preponderant images of the post -Cold 
War environment and the major developments that influenced their rise to prominence. 
It then identifies some of the genuine changes between the two periods that have 
impacted on humanitarian action. The proliferation in the number and type of actors in 
the field, and their differing perceptions of the role of humanitarian action, contribute to 
the perception of `complexity' in contemporary conflicts. 
Having challenged some of the assumptions about the changes in the post -Cold War 
context, the second part of the chapter examines four paradoxes of humanitarian action 
Alex de Waal, Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa (Oxford and 
Bloomington: Africa Rights and the International Africa Institute in association with James Currey 
and Indiana University Press, 1997), p. 69. 
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that have permeated humanitarian relief operations for the past thirty years. Although 
often depicted as a by- product of the `new world disorder', the difficult choices and 
dilemmas confronting humanitarian aid organisations from the negative consequences of 
aid are essentially the same as in the past. The first paradox is the protection to 
combatants that refugee camps, `safety zones', and camps and settlements for internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) can provide. The second is the contribution of aid to the 
economy of war. The third is the legitimacy accorded to belligerents through the 
presence and actions of humanitarian organisations, and the fourth is the role of 
humanitarian action in the control of populations. These unintended repercussions of 
humanitarian action are explored in an historical and broader context than refugee 
camps to illustrate their applicability to the wider humanitarian realm. 
The third part of the chapter explores ideas about the contemporary role of humanitarian 
action that have emerged in response to increased criticism levied at humanitarian 
assistance and the introspection of aid agencies. There are conflicting views about the 
role and significance of aid in conflict and the most appropriate ways in which aid 
organisations can mitigate the negative impact of their assistance. The purpose of 
humanitarian action and the relevance of the founding principles described in the 
Introduction are also the subject of debate. Providing a glimpse of contemporary thought 
on humanitarian action provides some context from which to explore the various 
reactions of aid organisations to the impact of aid in the case studies in Chapters 2 to 5. 
1. `COMPLEX' EMERGENCIES: A NEW PHENOMENON? 
1.1 Contemporary Images of a New World Disorder 
It has become the norm in writings and speeches about humanitarian action in the 1990s 
to stress the complexity of the circumstances to which aid organisations respond. 
Encapsulated by the label `complex emergency', contemporary crises are depicted as 
more difficult than in the past, and are associated with a host of assumptions about the 
nature of conflict and `state disruption' in the post -Cold War period. In an influential 
2 Antonio Donini, `Beyond Neutrality: On the Compatibility of Military Intervention and Humanitarian 
Assistance', The Fletcher Forum (Summer/Fall 1995): 31-45 at p. 31. 
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essay published in 1994, Robert Kaplan initiated a trend that suggests that barbarism is 
on the rise in many parts of the world, particularly Africa, leading a descent into 
anarchy.' Other observers reinforce the perception of the `senselessness' of post -Cold 
War conflicts, stating that they `appear to be little more than rampages by groups within 
states against one another with little or no apparent ennobling purpose or outcome'.° 
Donald Snow labels them `uncivil wars'. Jonathan Goodhand and David Hulme further 
emphasise the distinctiveness of modern conflicts, arguing in an article subtitled 
`understanding conflict and peace -building in the new world disorder', that this century 
has seen a transition from `an era of "wars" to one of "complex political emergencies "' 
characterised by the `complexity and diversity of contemporary violent conflict' s 
The aid community appears to have embraced this rhetoric as an explanation for a 
perceived increase in `humanitarian crises' and increased difficulties in providing 
humanitarian assistance. The second paragraph of the United Nations (UN) Secretary - 
General's 1998 report on the protection of humanitarian assistance exemplifies the 
central suppositions associated with `complex emergencies'. It insists on the need to 
address protection issues in the `ever more violent and volatile environments in which 
refugees, displaced persons and other victims of conflicts find themselves and in which 
the United Nations and other humanitarian organizations are expected to operate.'6 It 
then states that: 
Erosion of respect for humanitarian norms has led to an increase in the number 
of civilian casualties, aggravated the protection and assistance needs of 
refugees and others in conflict situations, complicated the task of providing 
humanitarian assistance and increased the risks faced by humanitarian 
personnel. Ensuring peace and reconciliation in post -conflict societies has also 
become more difficult in the wake of massive suffering and cruelty, often 
leading to renewed tensions and fighting. 
Similar ideas are echoed among other leading humanitarian institutions. At a conference 
on `Humanitarian Action: Perception and Security' in 1998, the Director of the 
3 Robert Kaplan, `The Coming Anarchy: How scarcity, crime, overpopulation and disease are rapidly 
destroying the social fabric of our planet', Atlantic Monthly 273, No. 2 (1994): 44 -76. 
Donald Snow, Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conflicts (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 1996), pp. 1 -2. 
5 Jonathan Goodhand and David Hulme, `From wars to complex political emergencies: understanding 
conflict and peace -building in the new world disorder', Third World Quarterly 20, No. 1 (1999): 13- 
26 at p. 23. 
6 Report of the Secretary- General on Protection for Humanitarian Assistance and Others in Conflict 
Situations (New York: S/1998/883, United Nations, 22 September 1998), paragraph 2. 
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European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), Alberto Navarro, stated that 
`humanitarian aid workers [are] forced to work against an escalation of barbarity and 
lack of respect for Geneva Conventions', and the former European Commissioner, 
Emma Bonino added that `combatants no longer considered humanitarian aid to be 
sacred... shooting at the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] used to be 
unthinkable'.' The Vice -President of ICRC agreed: 
Armed violence was increasingly prevalent along with dwindling respect for 
human values - coming to grips with these trends is a major challenge for the 
21' century. Conflicts had fundamentally changed in nature. The objective of a 
conflict was often to exterminate the other party on the grounds of race or 
creed. Civilians had become the main targets. Humanitarian workers were also 
targeted as unwanted witnesses to mass crime. Organized crime and banditry 
were often an integral part of destructured military operations.' 
Reports by non -government organisations (NGOs) assert similar claims: the 1996 
Annual report of the International Rescue Committee (IRC) notes the `increased 
complexity of refugee emergencies' as a dominant theme of the period,' and an 
influential aid consultant, Mary Anderson states: 
In the Post -Cold War days of the late twentieth century, more and more groups 
who once lived together are engaged in civil warfare... No one is exempt. The 
line between combatants and civilians is blurred... Motivated, first, by a 
humanitarian concern, assistance agencies face increasingly complex 
circumstances. Not only do they work under conditions of urgency where 
suffering is acute and extreme, they also work in settings where systems of 
governance are disrupted or absent, where battlelines are unclear and shifting, 
where humanitarian codes have collapsed and aid workers are subjected to 
threats and killing.'6 
These assertions emphasise the originality of the contemporary context, distinguishing it 
from the Cold War period. The summary of an international workshop on the crisis in 
the Great Lakes Region noted that `today, humanitarian assistance has to operate in a 
very different context', and that `though plainly unintended, humanitarian assistance has 
Alberto Navarro and Emma Bonino, comments attributed in the Final Report from an ECHO -ICRC 
seminar, `Humanitarian Action: Perceptions and Security', Lisbon, 27 -28 March 1998, p. 4 and 6 
respectively. 
' Eric Roethlisberger, comments attributed in the Final Report from an ECHO -ICRC seminar, 
`Humanitarian Action: Perceptions and Security', Lisbon, 27 -28 March 1998, p. 4. 
9 Robert P. DeVecchi, `The President's Report', International Rescue Committee Annual Report 1996 
http: / /www.intrescom.ore/intro.html, (09/08/99). 
10 Mary B. Anderson, Do No Harm: Supporting Local Capacities for Peace Through Aid (Cambridge, 
MA: Local Capacities for Peace Project, Collaborative for Development Action, 1996), p. 3. 
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de facto become highly politicized'.11 Assertions of the aberrance of the contemporary 
context even extends to refugee issues: the Special Envoy of the European Union to the 
Great Lakes Region, Ambassador Aldo Ajello, said that in the Great Lakes crisis, `we 
were confronted with a situation which was completely abnormal: the coexistence in the 
[UN]HCR camps of civilian refugees and military forces'.12 
Two main themes emerge from the representations above. The first suggests that the 
1990s environment is more complicated than in the past: the behaviour of combatants is 
more barbaric; conflicts incur more civilian casualties; battlelines are blurred; and the 
rules and purposes of warfare are more obscure. The second theme suggests that this 
increases the risk to aid workers; complicates the task of providing aid; and creates 
unprecedented challenges to the humanitarian aid community. 
Despite the ubiquity of these notions of a `new world disorder', a cursory glance at 
history raises doubts about the originality of the evidence underpinning these themes. 
The refugee -warrior communities discussed in the Introduction refute the `completely 
abnormal' status of the Rwandan refugee camps, and shooting at the Red Cross was not 
previously unthinkable: ICRC ambulance units were deliberately targeted and destroyed 
by Italian planes in Ethiopia in 1935 -36.13 The distinction between combatants and non- 
combatants disappeared with the advent of aerial warfarea4 bombs dropped on cities 
throughout the Second World War did not discriminate between targets. 
Even more serious than the collective historical amnesia is the failure of international 
observers to recognise that the international system is experiencing a period of relative 





Winrich Kühne, 'Executive Summary and Recommendations', in Winrich Kühne (ed.), Improving 
African and International Capabilities for Preventing and Resolving Violent Conflict: The Great 
Lakes Region Crisis. 2nd International Workshop, Berlin July 3 -5, 1997 (Ebenhausen: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft and Politik, 1997), pp. 13 -27 at p. 14 (my emphasis). 
Aldo Ajello, 'Opening Statements', in Winrich Kühne (ed.), Improving African and International 
Capabilities for Preventing and Resolving Violent Conflict: The Great Lakes Region Crisis. 2nd 
International Workshop, Berlin July 3 -5, 1997 (Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft and Politik, 
1997), pp. 35 -39 at p. 35 (my emphasis). 
See Marcel Junod, Warrior without Weapons trans. by Edward Fitzgerald (Geneva: International 
Committee of the Red Cross, 1982), pp. 22 -83. 
In fact some observers argue that the combatant/non-combatant distinction blurred as far back as the 
19`r century, when small, professional armies were replaced by enormous conscript armies, and 
casualty rates among non -combatants rose dramatically. `Those who remained at home were no 
longer safe from war's destructive reach'. See Chris of Jochnick and Roger Normand, `The 
Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War', Harvard International Law 
Journal 35, No. 1 (1994): 49 -95 at fn 52, p. 63. 
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Peace show that the rates of global warfare, ethno -political rebellion, and incidence of 
autocratic authority around the world have steadily declined since 1992, as has the 
number of people forcibly displaced from their homes.15 The Center clearly shows that 
`the magnitude of violence in the world has decreased very sharply and steadily since 
the Cold War ended.'16 
A combination of distinct but related factors helps to explain why these misleading 
images of a new world `disorder' emerged and persist within the aid community in spite 
of evidence to the contrary. First, the Cold War /post -Cold War dichotomy assumed 
axiomatic status in analyses of the international scene of the 1990s, downgrading local 
determinants of conflict. Second, rather than occupying a central place in the new world 
order as was widely anticipated, humanitarian action has become a palliative, deployed 
by politicians to mollify public demands for action. Ineffective when deployed in 
isolation from political or diplomatic efforts to address the roots of the problem, 
humanitarian action is increasingly criticised. Aid organisations generally respond to 
such criticism by emphasising the complexity of the environment. Each of these factors 
is elaborated briefly below. 
1.2 The `Complex' Environment 
The end of the Cold War generated contending images of future international security in 
humanitarian and security circles. Optimists celebrated the removal of the threat of total 
nuclear war and the marginalisation of nuclear weapons through renewed commitment 
to nuclear test -ban treaties and arms agreements.° The collapse of the bipolar system 
removed the constraints imposed on the UN through the veto power of its five 
permanent members, and the Gulf War (1990 -91) saw the Security Council reach 
unprecedented consensus over collective enforcement action,° The enthusiasm was 
exemplified in former UN Secretary -General Boutros Boutros -Ghali's An Agenda for 
15 The analysis is based on data by the Minorities at Risk Project, US Committee for Refugees, the 
Polity Project and work by Ted Robert Gun, see Center for Systemic Peace, Global Conflict Trends 
http: // members .aol.com /CSPmgm /conflict.htm (16/10/99). 
16 ibid. 
l' Adam Rotfeld, `Introduction: The Emerging International Security Agenda', in Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Yearbook 1997 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997), pp. 1 -14 at p. 2. 
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Peace, in which he declared that `an opportunity has been regained to achieve the great 
objectives of the Charter - a United Nations capable of maintaining international peace 
and security, of securing justice and human rights and of promoting, in the words of the 
Charter, "social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom "' .79 
The possibility of global cooperation was embraced as some of the rigid pillars of the 
old world order were challenged.20 The passage of Security Council Resolution 688 in 
April 1991 overrode Iraqi sovereignty and authorised the deployment of military forces 
in support of humanitarian ideals. The withdrawal of Soviet and Vietnamese forces from 
Afghanistan and Cambodia respectively, and the resolution of conflicts in Central 
America, were promising developments in an imagined new era of peace. There was 
hope that the loyalty of dictators to the Eastern or Western bloc would no longer 
supersede concerns for human rights and good governance, and economic aid would no 
longer be squandered by self- serving leaders manipulating Cold War rivalry to their 
advantage.' Some even believed that global disarmament would lead to higher flows of 
development assistance to poorer countries?' 
Optimism began to wane, however, as the number of major armed conflicts23 around the 
world did not continue to decrease in line with earlier trends,24 and rose with the number 
of minor armed conflicts2s in the immediate post -Cold War period. New conflicts 
's The closest the UN had come in the past was in Korea in 1950. See Ramesh Thakur, `UN 
Peacekeeping in the New World Disorder', in Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer (eds), A Crisis 
of Expectations: UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s (Boulder: Westview, 1995), pp. 3 -22 at p. 4. 
° Boutros Boutros -Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace- 
keeping (New York: Report of the Secretary- General pursuant to the statement adopted by the 
Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, United Nations, 1992), paragraph 3. 
2° See, for example, Gareth Evans, Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and 
Beyond (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1993). 
2t Alvin Z. Rubinstein, `Lessons of the Cold War',. Security Dialogue 25, No. 3 (1994): 295 -306 at p. 
302. 
22 UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees 1997 -98: A Humanitarian Agenda (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), p. 23 and p. 25. 
23 A major armed conflict is defined as contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or 
territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of 
a state, results in more than 1,000 battle- related deaths recorded during the course of conflict. See 
Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, `Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination and Peace 
Agreements, 1989 -96', Journal of Peace Research 34, No. 3 (1997): 339 -358 at p. 339 and p. 354. 
24 The number of major armed conflicts reduced for the first time in 1988 from 33 at the beginning of 
the year to 28 at the end. Karin Lindgren, Kenneth Wilson and Peter Wallensteen, `Major Armed 
Conflicts in 1988', in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Yearbook 
1989: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 339 -355 at 
p. 339. 
25 A minor armed conflict is defined as incurring more than 25 but less than 1,000 battle related deaths 
in the course of the conflict. Wallensteen and Sollenberg, `Armed Conflict 1989 -96', pp. 339 -340 and 
Chapter I The Paradoxes of Humanitarian Action 38 
emerged from the remnants of the Eastern bloc, and the viability of several Third World 
states was thrown into question. States that relied upon economic and military aid 
supplied by the superpowers according to their perceived or real strategic importance 
were weakened when the rationale for support disappeared. And as challenges to 
weakened central authorities proliferated, the ramifications of the arms flows to client 
states during the Cold War, and the possibility of reduced control over nuclear weapons 
in the former Soviet Union, heightened concerns of increased violence. Disillusioned 
observers sought explanations for the perceived change from a world order characterised 
by high military threat and high stability to one of low military threat and low stability," 
and began to embrace the views of the pessimists. 
Cynical observers of international order argue that superpower rivalry either froze or 
limited conflicts during the Cold War, thereby imposing `order' on the international 
system. Fears of escalation into nuclear confrontation allegedly constrained the extent to 
which conflicts were permitted to evolve by the superpowers. Predictions of a `situation 
far more chaotic than the world of the Cold War' followed the demise of the old 
system.27 In the words of one influential critic, `the world appears to be at the beginning, 
not of a new order, but of a new nightmare'.28 `Ethnicity' was assumed to have replaced 
`ideology' as the principal cause of post -Cold War conflicts," exacerbated by what 
George Bush described as `age old animosities' in regions such as the former 
Yugoslavia. Bill Clinton also subscribed to this stereotype, asserting that the end of the 
Cold War `lifted the lid from a cauldron of long simmering hatreds.'30 Scott MacDonald 
captured the main sentiments: 
p. 354. While these figures are useful to highlight the trends of armed conflicts around the globe, they 
tell us little about the incidence of repression, genocide, civilian massacres or forced population 
movements since these events do not fit the definitions regarding `battle- related deaths'. They 
exclude, for example, the 1994 Rwandan genocide from their analysis, stating that militias and 
civilians did the killing. Seep. 352. 
26 Rotfeld, 'Emerging Security Agenda', p. 4. 
27 Stanley Hoffmann, `Watch Out for a New World Disorder', International Herald Tribune, 26 
February I991, p. 6. 
29 Charles WiIIiam Maynes, `Containing Ethnic Conflict', Foreign Policy 90 (Spring 1993): 3 -21 at p. 
6. 
29 See, for example, Remi Russbach and Daniel Fink, `Humanitarian Action in Current Armed 
Conflicts: Opportunities and Obstacles', Medicine and Global Survival I, No. 4 (1994): pp. 188 -199 
at p. 192. 
30 Both are quoted in Michael E. Brown, `Introduction', in Michael E. Brown (ed.), The International 
Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 1 -31 at p. 12. 
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The 1990s will be one of humankind's most violent decades... the massive 
upheaval of the current economic changes, together with a thawing of ethnic 
and regional conflicts suspended by the Cold War, make the parameters of the 
new world order disruptive and possibly devastating." 
The centrality of the Cold War /post -Cold War dichotomy in optimistic and pessimistic 
analyses of the international environment understated the local rationale of many 
`proxy' wars. Conflicts in `peripheral' states did not disappear with the end of 
superpower patronage, but continued to be waged over contested political, economic 
and social claims. `Ethnic rivalry' is commonly invoked as a rationale for post -Cold 
War conflicts, but as Jan Nederveen Pieterse states, `it is not an explanation but rather 
that which is to be explained. The terminology of ethnicity is part of the conflict and 
cannot serve as a language of analysis.'32 Furthermore, conflicts are rarely expressions of 
`ancient hatreds' but are rather the result of deliberate, manipulative policies promoted 
by political actors for specific purposes." 
A number of recent studies on the phenomenon of state disruption and the political 
economy of internal wars provide more lucid explanations of the logic of conflict 34 The 
loss of external revenue has led warring factions to increasingly resort to patterns of 
predatory appropriation of local resources and the criminalisation of economic activity, 
defined as the production, exploitation or illegal commercialisation of goods and 
31 Scott B. MacDonald, `The New "Bad Guys ": Exploring the Parameters of the Violent New World 
Order', in Max Manwaring (ed.), Grey Area Phenomena: Confronting the New World Disorder 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 33 -60 at p. 57. 
32 Jan Nederveen Pieterse, `Sociology of Humanitarian Intervention: Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia 
Compared', International Political Science Review 18, No. 1 (1997): 71 -93 at p. 71. 
33 See, for example, René Lemarchand, `Rwanda: The Rationality of Genocide', Issue: A Journal of 
Opinion 23, No. 2 (1995): 8 -11; Espen Barth Eide, "`Conflict Entrepreneurship ": On the "Art" of 
Waging Civil War', in Anthony McDermott (ed.), Humanitarian Force (Oslo: International Peace 
Research Institute, 1997), pp. 41 -69; Russell Hardin, One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Human Rights Watch, Slaughter among 
neighbors: the political origins of communal violence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995). 
34 Paul Richards, Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone (Oxford and 
Portsmouth, NH: The International African Institute in association with James Currey and 
Heinemann, 1996); François Jean and Jean- Christophe Rufin (eds), Economie des Guerres Civiles 
(Paris: Hachette, 1996); David Keen, The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine and 
Relief in Southwest Sudan, 1983 -89 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Jean- François 
Bayait, Stephen Ellis and Béatrice Hibou, The Criminalization of the State in Africa trans. by Stephen 
EIlis (Oxford and Bloomington: The International African Institute in association with James Currey 
and Indiana University Press, 1999); Mark Duffield, `The Political Economy of Internal War: Asset 
Transfer, Complex Emergencies and International Aid', in Joanna Macrae and Anthony Zwi (eds), 
War and Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies (London: Zed Books 
in association with Save the Children Fund (UK), 1994), pp. 50 -69; and Lionel Cliffe and Robin 
Luckman, 'Complex political emergencies and the state: failure and the fate of the state', Third World 
Quarterly 20, No. 1 (1999): 27 -50. 
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services for private, as opposed to state, benefit." The erosion of ordered war economies 
into `fragmented patterns of violence and asset stripping'36 has particular implications 
for humanitarian assistance as it becomes integrated within the dynamics of conflict. 
Predatory practices are not a recent development; the looting of property has been a 
characteristic of wars for centuries. Medieval battles involved widespread pillage and 
were allegedly fought primarily for material profit." Contracts signed by British military 
commanders in the Hundred Years War between Britain and France included the `spoils 
of war' as a payment of service, and pillage was a key source of finance for armies in 
17th century France.36 In the past, however, such practices could not sustain war 
indefinitely; once stripped of assets, the local population was of little value. But the 
advent of humanitarian assistance into the heart of conflicts provides a renewable source 
of exploitation. There are winners and losers of famines and emergencies, and more than 
just a weapon of war, `food and sustenance can also be a necessary goal of conflict' 39 
Armed movements have also turned increasingly to criminalisation techniques to ensure 
their survival 30 Production and trade in internationally banned goods such as opium in 
Afghanistan,' cocaine in Colombia, and ivory from Mozambique earn revenue for 
factions. The uncontrolled exploitation of legal goods like diamonds in Sierra Leone and 
Angola, gems and timber in Cambodia, and rubber and timber in Liberia42 also bring 
3s Jean- Christophe Rufin, `Les économies de guerre dans les conflits internes', in François Jean and 
Jean -Christophe Rufin (eds), Économie des Guerres Civiles (Paris: Hachette, 1996), pp. 19 -59 at p. 
41. 
36 Mark Duffield, `Complex Emergencies and the Crisis of Developmentalism', IDS Bulletin 25, No. 4 
(1994): 37 -45 at p. 42. 
37 P. Condamine, War in the Middle Ages (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), p. 219 as cited in David Keen, 'A 
Rational Kind of Madness', Oxford Development Studies 25, No. 1 (1997): 67 -75 at p. 69. 
33 Keen, 'A Rational Kind of Madness', p. 69. 
39 Mark Duffield and John Prendergast, Without Troops & Tanks: The Emergency Relief Desk and the 
Cross Border Operation into Eritrea and Tigray (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1994), p. 165. 
a° Criminalisation practices are not unique to non -state actors but have also become a feature of the state 
in Africa, defined as `the routinization, at the very heart of political and governmental institutions and 
circuits, of practices whose criminal nature is patent, whether as defined by the law of the country in 
question, or as defined by the norms of international law and international organizations or as so 
viewed by the international community, and most particularly that constituted by aid donors'. Jean - 
François Bayart, Stephen Ellis and Béatrice Hibou, `From Kleptocracy to the Felonious State ?', in 
Jean- François Bayart, Stephen Ellis and Béatrice Hibou, The Criminalization of the State in Africa 
trans. by Stephen Ellis (Oxford and Bloomington: The International African Institute in association 
with James Currey and Indiana University Press, 1999), pp. 1 -31 at p. 16. 
41 In early 1992, Afghanistan became the largest producer of opium in the world. See Asger 
Christensen, Aiding Afghanistan: The Background and Prospects for Reconstruction in a 
Fragmented Society (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 1995), pp. 84 -87. 
az For analyses of the war economy in Liberia see: William Reno, 'Foreign Firms and the Financing of 
Charles Taylor's NPFL', Liberian Studies Journal 18, No. 2 (1993): 175 -188; Philippa Atkinson, The 
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lucrative profits. Within six months of commencing his offensive in Liberia, Charles 
Taylor earned over $3.6 million from timber exports to the European Union.43 Since 
capturing the Cuango Valley in Angola in 1992, rebels from the National Union for the 
Total Independence of Angola (Uniño Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola - 
UNTTA) have generated some $3.7 billion in revenue from the high -quality diamonds 
the region produces." The battles for control of Kisangani in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC) in September 1999 are largely motivated by the clandestine diamond 
and timber trade, which has helped finance the military operations of Uganda and 
Rwanda in the DRC, according to Oxford Analytíca.SS 
As reliance on external support gave way to the exploitation of local resources, political 
movements have tended to fragment and compete for control of resources. Some of the 
fiercest battles are no longer over the spoils of government but over control of mines, 
airports, seaports and communication facilitates needed to export the spoils of war. 
Humanitarian aid is also a target of this wave of criminalisation of legal and illegal 
economic commodities, both directly and indirectly. This will be discussed further in the 
next section. 
The fragmentation of structures of authority has left aid organisations with fewer 
reliable interlocutors in the field to ensure their safety. Acceptable conditions and 
security guarantees may be successfully negotiated with faction leaders, traditional 
elders and local government representatives, but their control may not extend to all 
armed elements. These changes legitimately cause new concerns for aid agencies in the 
field. But pursuing the discourse associated with increased barbarity, irrational warfare, 
and the erosion of respect for humanitarian norms neglects the fact that aid is now 
injected into the heart of disintegrating states in which authority and the state's 
War Economy in Liberia: A Political Analysis (London: Paper 22, Relief and Rehabilitation Network, 
Overseas Development Institute, May 1997); Fabrice Weissman, L'Aide Humanitaire Dans la 
Dynamique du Conflit Libérien (Paris: Fondation Médecins sans Frontières, May 1996). 
43 
`Britain helps turn logs into rebel arms', The Guardian, 25 June 1991, p. 9 as cited in Max Ahmadu 
Sesay, `Collective Security or Collective Disaster ?: Regional Peace -keeping in West Africa', Security 
Dialogue 26, No. 2 (1995): 205 -222 at p. 215. 
44 A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan Conflict (London: Global 
Witness, 1998). Also see `Angola headache for De Beers', The Australian, 25 August I998, p. 31 for 
the repercussions of the uncontrolled exploitation on attempts by De Beers to regulate the world 
market. 
45 Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) for Central and Eastern Africa, IRIN -CEA Update 
752 for the Great Lakes (Nairobi: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs, 7 September 1999). 
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monopoly of violence is contested, giving it greater prominence as a potential source of 
exploitation. More aid workers have. been killed and injured in the 1990s than 
previously, but aid organisation and resources are present in greater numbers than ever 
before. Much of the `complexity' of contemporary crises resides in the changed 
response to crises. 
1.3 The `Complex' Response 
Apart from a small number of clandestine relief operations undertaken in Afghanistan, 
parts of Central America, and Ethiopia/Eritrea during the 1980s,46 aid organisations 
predominantly operated in refugee camps on the periphery of conflicts during the Cold 
War. Aid organisations that entered conflict zones did so under the protection of the 
guerrilla faction in control of the territory. Humanitarian access into conflict zones 
expanded with the advent of `negotiated access', pioneered by Operation Lifeline Sudan 
(OLS) in 1989, which was replicated in Angola and Ethiopia in 1990.67 
The emergence of the droit d'ingérence (the right to intervene) in northern Iraq in 1991 
heralded a new era of humanitarian concern, challenging the norm of state sovereignty 
and expanding humanitarian access. The notion of `humanitarian intervention' emerged 
to encompass military involvement beyond enforcement or traditional peacekeeping 
roles, to establish `a secure environment for non -military operations, such as electoral 
monitoring, refugee repatriation, and the distribution of humanitarian relief supplies by 
civilian agencies' .48 Bernard Kouchner, one of the strongest advocates of the droit 
d'ingérence, celebrated this `extraordinary development in our century of horrors and 
massacres', claiming that Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq marked `the first 
time the international community prevented genocide, for the first time it permitted a 
population which was expelled to return to their villages and land'.49 
46 For a detailed discussion of the cross -border relief program from Sudan to Eritrea and Ethiopia which 
began in 1981, see Duffield and Prendergast, Without Troops & Tanks. 
47 De Waal, Famine Crimes, pp. 145 -146. For more information on OLS, see Larry Minear, 
Humanitarianism Under Siege: A Critical Review of Operation Lifeline Sudan (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea 
Press, 1991); and Francis M. Deng and Larry Minear, The Challenges of Famine Relief.. Emergency 
Operations in the Sudan (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1992), esp. pp. 83 -119. 
4d Mats Berdal, Wither UN Peacekeeping? (London: Adelphi Paper 281, International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 1993), p. 11. 
a9 Bernard Kouchner, 'Sauver les corps' in `Action Humanitaire Devoir d'Ingérence: Naissance d'un 
nouveau droit', Les Cahiers de l'Express (March 1993), pp. 6 -7 at p. 6. 
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The euphoria, however, was short- lived. The emptiness of promises to intervene in 
defence of victims of human rights abuses was apparent less than one year later as 
powerful states remained paralysed when confronted with aggression and atrocities in 
the former Yugoslavia. A Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) publication captured the 
mood: `the "new world order" and the "right to intervene" died somewhere along the 
road from Vukovar to Sarajevo' 50 The military débâcle in Somalia and the death of US 
soldiers, followed by the murder of Belgian peacekeepers in Rwanda, crushed 
enthusiasm for military involvement in so- called `humanitarian crises', and the failure to 
stop genocide in Rwanda ended the last vestiges of optimism held by aid organisations 
in a new humanitarian world order. States retreated to their spheres of national concern, 
as exemplified by the unilateral military interventions conducted by the French in 
Rwanda, the US in Haiti, and the Russians in Georgia, and the multinational 
interventions by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Kosovo, and the 
UN- authorised, Australian -led INTERFET forces in East Timor. 
Yet the declining optimism of aid organisations in a humanitarian world order did little 
to curb humanitarian activities. In fact, the aid industry expanded, in part because of the 
declining interests of states to engage in conflict resolution activities outside their 
spheres of direct concern. Aid organisations proliferated as the niche broadened and 
funding for humanitarian relief increased as a proportion of overall overseas 
development assistance. Some 250 NGOs were present in Rwanda in the wake of the 
1994 genocide, working beside at least 8 UN agencies, three branches of the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent movement, and military contingents from eight different countries.5' 
Humanitarian action as a highly visible but low -risk remedy for human suffering 
commends itself to politicians throughout the world. The deployment of humanitarian 
assistance mollifies the intense yet short-lived impulse of the general public to `do 
something' in response to images of suffering. But implying `good' work and apolitical 
intent, the deployment of a `humanitarian response' can conceal one of three ulterior 
motives of politicians: first, it can be used as an instrument to pursue military or 
s° François Jean (ed.), Populations in Danger (London: John Libbey, 1992), p_I8. 
Si John Borton, Emery Brusset and Alistair Hallam, `Humanitarian Aid and Effects', Study 3 in David 
Millwood (ed.), The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda 
Experience (Copenhagen: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to 
Rwanda, 1996), p. 159. 
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political objectives; second, it can camouflage an absence of political will to address the 
causes of problems in regions deemed beyond the `national interest'; and third, it can 
mask a conscious policy of disengagement designed to avoid interfering in the course of 
a conflict or political development. 
Briefly illustrating each in turn, the 'humanitarian' response to the plight of Iraqi Kurds 
fleeing oppression by Saddam Hussein was driven by mixed motives. Having incited the 
Kurds to revolt during the Gulf War, the US- allied forces shared responsibility in their 
fate. Recalling Henry Shue's distinction between `compensation for harm caused' and 
`humanitarian aid', the intervention to assist the Kurds was in reality the former, 
although it was loudly proclaimed to be a triumph of humanitarian concern. This 
perception also disguised the important political and strategic considerations involved: 
the influx of millions of Kurds into Turkey threatened to destabilise the region. Thus the 
'humanitarian' operation returned the Kurds to their villages and supplied them with 
aid, while effectively denying their rights to asylum and contributing nothing to 
resolving the political issues at the root of their troubles. 
The second and most common deployment of humanitarian action by politicians in the 
1990s is as a palliative to cover an absence of political will to become involved in crises 
outside direct national concern. This policy was exemplified in the Rwandan crisis, 
when UN member states ignored the genocide which required a political response, but 
appeased public consciences through mounting an elaborate `humanitarian' response to 
a cholera epidemic among refugees. This is examined in more detail in Chapter 5. 
The third diversionary function of humanitarian action is similar to the second, except 
that instead of disguising an absence of a political strategy to address the crisis, 
humanitarian action can disguise a conscious decision of non -interference. One example 
of this strategy was provided by former French President François Mitterrand, who 
allegedly believed in 1992 that a Serb victory in Bosnia -Hercegovina was the least bad 
available option. Thus to avoid interfering, yet to appease the public pressure to act, 
Mitterrand played a humanitarian card, flying to Sarajevo and successfully negotiating 
with the Bosnian Serbs for the reopening of the airport to humanitarian supplies 52 He 
52 See David Rieff, `The Lessons of Bosnia: Morality and Power', World Policy Journal 12, No. 1 
(1995): 76 -88 at pp. 86 -87; and Jean -Christophe Rufin, `The Paradoxes of Armed Protection', in 
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appeared to assist the victims of aggression, but did nothing to stop the advance of the 
Bosnian Serbs. 
The `humanitarian' label given to events and responses in the 1990s has been an 
important factor in permitting this obfuscation to occur. As the `lowest common 
denominator' in negotiations among states, the term has seen unprecedented use in UN 
Security Council resolutions since 1990 53 But the situations that create a need for 
humanitarian assistance, the context in which this is provided, and the resolution of the 
causes of human distress are determined in the political sphere. Unless the political 
parameters of crises are addressed, humanitarian action is doomed to failure. Although 
aid organisations are aware of this and frequently lament `the humanitarian alibi' of 
politicians, the language that they engage assists the deception. 
Although the term 'complex emergency' has acquired prominence as a descriptive 
category in the literature, and is the subject of typologies54 and numerous attempts at 
definition,55 it blurs rather than illuminates the contemporary context. It confuses the 
specificities of war, famine, epidemics, drought, population displacement, massacres, 
and genocide, and renders irrelevant the precedents from the `simple' past. One observer 
recently remarked that the vogue for labelling crises `complex emergencies' is a means 
with which to conceal `that one does not know what is going on' se But more insidious 
than this, the term actually distorts understanding, making no distinction between the 
causes of suffering, instead defining the crisis in terms of the required `multi- faceted 
François Jean (ed.), Life, Death and Aid: The Médecins Sans Frontières Report on World Crisis 
Intervention (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 111 -123 at p. 120. 
53 Adam Roberts, Humanitarian Action in War: Aid, Protection and Impartiality in a Policy Vacuum 
(Oxford: Adelphi Paper 305, IISS /Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 15 -16. 
54 It is difficult to see the point of these typologies. One produced by Raimo Väyrynen is at odds with 
conventional usage of the term, arguing that Bosnia was a `simple humanitarian emergency' because 
it only contained two of the four criteria of `complex emergencies', being war, displacement, disease, 
and hunger. The typology of Cliffe and Luckman is more insightful in illuminating the characteristics 
of contemporary conflicts, but as they admit, the exercise represents a simplification of specific 
complex realities. See Raimo Väyrynen, The Age of Humanitarian Emergencies (Helsinki: World 
Institute for Development Economics Research, United Nations University, 1997) and CIiffe and 
Luckman, `Complex political emergencies and the state'. 
55 Some authors favour a causal definition while others emphasise the complex response required. 
Prendergast, for example, defines a complex emergency as a `multicausal political crisis with major 
humanitarian repercussions' whereas Donini suggests that the new wave of emergencies became 
`complex', mixing the political, the military and the humanitarian'. See John Prendergast, Frontline 
Diplomacy: Humanitarian Aid and Conflict in Africa (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p. 1, and 
Antonio Donini, `The Future of Humanitarian Assistance' (Tokyo: Paper Presented at the UNU 
Symposium on the UN System in the 21st Century, 21 -22 November 1995), p. 6. 
56 Gwyn Prins, `Modem Warfare and Humanitarian Action', Final Report of ECHO -ICRC Seminar 
`Humanitarian Action: Perceptions and Security', Lisbon, 27 -28 March 1998, p. 13. 
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response'. The causes of these crises are political, some consequences may be 
humanitarian. But labelling them `complex emergencies' and `humanitarian crises' 
disconnects the consequences from the causes and permits the international response to 
be assigned - and confined - to the humanitarian domain. 
The following section examines some paradoxical consequences that have accompanied 
humanitarian action since its inception, and illustrates that many of the contemporary 
problems confronting aid organisations are the same as in the past. 
2. THE PARADOXES OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION 
The profound paradox of humanitarian action is its potential to contradict its purpose: it 
can sustain the source of the suffering that it was deployed to mitigate. The potential for 
humanitarian action to prolong war is in fact inherent in the foundation of modern 
humanitarian activity." The idea of providing protection and assistance to wounded 
soldiers on the battlefield was at the heart of the birth of contemporary humanitarian 
action, proposed by the founder of the Red Cross, Henri Dunant, after he witnessed the 
aftermath of the Battle of Solferino in 1859. His idea, and its codification in 
international law, created a protected space in war to limit unnecessary suffering by 
permitting the protection and treatment of wounded combatants. But the inter- 
governmental agreement that ensued made no provision to prevent the return of the 
wounded to combat. Thus the sanctuary is imbued with a fundamental contradiction: the 
treatment of combatants, although a humanitarian act, enables them to return to battle, 
hence potentially prolonging the war and the suffering that humanitarian action seeks to 
alleviate. 
In addition to this inherent and inevitable contradiction in humanitarian activity, the 
creation of a protected space in conflict and the provision of material assistance to 
civilians and others deemed hors de combat is immediately open to manipulation by 
combatants. It is these functions that Rufin identifies as the major advantages of refugee 
camps over a purely military sanctuary for guerrilla movements, and they are prevalent 
57 Of course prolonging a `just war' is not necessarily a bad thing, and may preserve human dignity and 
alleviate longer -term suffering if freeing people from tyranny and oppression. Even `just wars' cause 
the death and suffering of innocents, however, and the purpose of humanitarian action is to assist 
members of humanity on that basis alone, and not according to their political, religious or other 
convictions. We will return to this question later in the thesis. 
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to varying degrees whenever humanitarian action is provided in times of conflict. Four 
of the unintended negative consequences of humanitarian action are examined in a 
broad context below. The significance of each is then assessed in the case studies in 
Chapters 2 to 5. 
The protection to belligerents that refugee camps, `safe areas' and camps for 
internally displaced populations provide; 
The contribution of humanitarian assistance to the economy of war; 
The legitimation of belligerent parties, individuals, and political causes through the 
presence and actions of aid organisations; 
The role of humanitarian action in establishing and maintaining control over 
populations.58 
2.1 Protection 
Combatants benefit from refugee camps, `safety zones' and other humanitarian 
sanctuaries in times of war by virtue of the `protected' status of the area, or of the 
civilians residing therein, under international humanitarian law and refugee law. Their 
presence in such places is violative of the Iaw that inadvertently protects them. As 
Michael Walzer remarks, `if civilians had no rights at all, or were thought to have none, 
it would be of small benefit to hide among them' a The notions of `humanitarian 
sanctuaries' and `refugee -warriors' are `a contradiction in terms and proscribed'60 in 
international law, but in the absence of enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance 
with the law, the `protected space' can be manipulated to serve military purposes. This 
abuse violates the principles on which the protected space is based, to the detriment of 
the civilians it is created to protect. This section briefly examines some of the provisions 
of international humanitarian law and refugee law pertaining to the protection of 
Henceforth, this phrase will be shortened to 'population control', despite its quite different meaning 
in popular parlance. 
n Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: 
Basic Books, 1992), p. 186. 
6° Aristide R. Zolberg, Astri Suhrke and Sergio Aguayo, Escape from Violence: Conflict and the 
Refugee Crisis in the Developing World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 276. 
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civilians before turning to some of the constraints faced in ensuring the civilian nature 
of protected areas, from which combatants benefit. 
All provisions of international humanitarian law as codified in the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949 and Additional Protocols of 1977 hinge on the fundamental distinction between 
`combatants' and `protected persons'.fi1 During international armed conflict the latter 
group includes wounded, shipwrecked and sick members of the armed forces and 
civilians; prisoners of war; civilians on the territory of the enemy; and civilians in 
occupied territories. During non -international armed conflict, the distinction is between 
those using force and those who do not or who no longer can. Civilians, as 'non- 
combatants', are entitled to protection under international humanitarian law as long as 
they remain civilians and do not take part in hostilities. Not only are attacks against 
civilians forbidden, but so are `acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which 
is to spread terror among the civilian population' .62 Indiscriminate attacks, reprisals 
against the civilian population, and the use of civilians as a shield from attack or to 
shield military operations, are also prohibited.ó3 In addition to individuals, the Fourth 
Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol I contain measures designed to protect 
areas or institutions, including demilitarised zones, medical establishments, and neutral 
zones that might be instituted by agreement or an ad hoc declaration.ó4 
Combatants are obliged under international law to distinguish themselves from the 
civilian population, except `where, owing to the nature of hostilities an armed combatant 
cannot so distinguish himself'.65 According to Hans -Peter Gasser, this refers to 
exceptional situations of belligerent occupation and wars of national liberation in which 
case combatants are permitted to `go underground' and hide among civilians as guerrilla 
61 Hans -Peter Gasser, `International Humanitarian Law: An Introduction', Separate Print from Hans 
Haug, Humanity for All (Geneva: Henry Dunant Institute/Haupt, 1993), p. 24. (In the early 1870s, 
Henri Dunant began spelling his name with a `y', hence the inconsistency. See Caroline Moorehead, 
Dunant's Dream: War, Switzerland and the History of the Red Cross (London: HarperCollins, 1998), 
p. 127. 
62 Additional Protocol I, Article 51, para. 2 
63 Additional Protocol I, Article 51, para. 4, 5 and 7. 
6a See Frédéric Maurice and Jean de Courten, `ICRC Activities for Refugees and Displaced Civilians', 
International Review of the Red Cross 280 (January- February 1991): 9 -21 at p. 12. 
65 Additional Protocol I, Article 44, para. 3. 
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fighters.ó6 However, they are required to carry arms openly preceding an offensive and 
during each military engagement so that they are recognisable as combatants." 
International humanitarian law is applicable during times of international and internal6 
armed conflict, and extends to refugees as long as they flee to a belligerent or occupied 
country, or one that is beset by an internal conflict. International humanitarian law does 
not protect refugees who flee armed conflict to the territory of a state that is not taking 
part in armed conflict.69 Jean -Philippe Lavoyer notes that this was the case with, inter 
alia, the Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran; Iraqi refugees in Iran after the Gulf War, 
and Rwandan refugees in Zaire, Burundi and Tanzania.7ó 
Refugees are protected under refugee law, although protection is predominantly framed 
in legal rather than physical terms.71 The refugee regime is premised on the principle that 
if a state cannot or will not uphold its responsibility to provide protection to its 
nationals, then a country of asylum, with the assistance of UNHCR if requested, will 
provide such protection. The core principle of protection is non -refoulement, the 
obligation of host governments to refrain from returning refugees to their countries of 
origin against their will. The right to seek asylum is also recognised in Article 14 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
The distinction between combatants and non -combatants is also a central tenet of 
refugee protection, and the concept of a refugee and the mandate of UNHCR are 
embedded in a humanitarian, apolitical and civilian discourse. The granting of asylum 
by a state has been pronounced 'a peaceful and humanitarian act and that, as such, it 
66 Gasser, `International Humanitarian Law', p. 55. 
67 ibid. 
66 The provisions relevant to internal armed conflict are contained in Article 3 common to the 1949 
Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol II. See Denise Platiner, `The protection of displaced 
persons in non -international armed conflicts', International Review of the Red Cross 291 (November - 
December 1992): 567 -580. 
69 Jean- Philippe Lavoyer, 'Refugees and internally displaced persons: International humanitarian law 
and the role of the ICRC', International Review of the Red Cross 305 (March -April 1995): 162 -180 
at p. 168. 
'0 ibid., fn 22, p. 168. 
71 International refugee law is predominantly based on the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees; 
the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees; the 1969 Convention of the Organisation of 
African Unity Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa; the 1984 Cartagena 
Declaration on Refugees; and resolutions adopted by the Executive Committee of UNHCR and the 
UN General Assembly. 
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cannot be regarded as unfriendly by any other State'," and refugee camps should have 
an `exclusively civilian and humanitarian character'.' Exclusion clauses contained in 
the 1951 and 1969 Conventions disqualify from refugee status persons alleged to have 
committed inter alia war crimes, serious non -political crimes, and acts `contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations', and the OAU Convention prohibits the 
engagement of refugees in subversive activities against their home countries. The 
protection bestowed on refugee camps is also derived from broader norms of state 
behaviour, particularly respect for state sovereignty." 
The lack of protective provision in international Iaw for civilians displaced within their 
national borders has been the subject of increased attention in the 1990s. Although 
protected by international humanitarian law during times of armed conflict and by 
international human rights law at other times, specific initiatives have been proposed to 
enhance protection, in particular the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement that 
were presented to the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1998 by the UN 
Representative for Internally Displaced Persons, Francis Deng.75 The 1990s have also 
seen the advent of `safety zones' created in conflict areas, designed to protect victims in 
situ, and facilitate humanitarian access to them. Such `safety zones' include the `safe 
haven' established in northern Iraq in 1991; the `open relief centres' in Sri Lanka that 
provide protection, shelter and relief to people displaced temporarily by military action; 
the French military Zone humanitaire sure (Safe Humanitarian Zone) in south -west 
Rwanda in 1994; and the `safe areas' established by the UN Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR) in Bosnia and Hercegovina in 1993 (see Box 1).76 Other variations 
72 Noted in the Preamble of the United Nations Declarations on Territorial Asylum, UN General 
Assembly Resolution 2312 (XXII) of 14 December 1967 and reaffirmed in Article 2 (2) of the 
Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa of 1969. 
73 In 1987 the Executive Committee of UNHCR urged host and other states to do all within their 
capacity to ensure the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps. See `No. 48 (XXXVIII) 
Military or Armed Attacks on Refugee Camps and Settlements' (Executive Committee - 38th Session, 
1987) in Conclusions on the International Protection of Refugees Adopted by the Executive 
Committee of the UNHCR Programme (Geneva: UNHCR, 1991), pp. 109-111. 
'a See Note on the Protection of Refugees in Armed Conflict Situations (Geneva: EC /SCP /25, Sub- 
committee of the Whole on International Protection, Executive Committee of the High 
Commissioner's Programme, 33rd session, 4 October 1982). 
75 See Roberta Cohen, `Recent trends in protection and assistance for internally displaced people', in 
Janie Hampton (ed.), Internally Displaced People: A Global Survey (London: Earthscan and 
Norwegian Refugee Council, 1998), pp. 3 -9. 
For further discussion on `safety zones' see Yves Sandoz, `The Establishment of Safety Zones for 
Persons Displaced within their Country of Origin', in Najeeb Al- Nauimi and Richard Meese (eds), 
International Legal Issues Arising under the United Nations Decade of International Law 
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include `corridors of tranquillity' negotiated between the warring parties in Sudan, and 
`humanitarian corridors' to protect relief supplies. 
Although refugee camps and `safety areas' must, according to the law, retain a purely 
civilian or demilitarised nature, in practice this has seldom been assured. The previous 
chapter noted the widespread incidences of refugee -warrior communities over the past 
40 years, and `safety zones' have similarly harboured insurgents. Box 1 discusses the 
use of `safe areas' in Bosnia and Hercegovina by the Bosnian government in spite of the 
presence of international forces, and the `safe humanitarian zone' established by the 
French Opération turquoise also hosted a military force. The presence of militia among 
civilians continued in camps for the internally displaced in south -west Rwanda once the 
unilateral military operation became a UN peacekeeping effort. 
The infiltration of refugee camps and safety zones by combatants has generated violent 
consequences on many occasions. Some 4,000 displaced persons were massacred at the 
Kibeho camp in south -west Rwanda in April 1995 as a result of the violent forced 
closure imposed on the camps because of strong suspicions of insurgents inside." 
Radovan Karadizic imposed a blockade of `safe areas' in Bosnia, declaring that `if the 
Muslims continue to use the enclaves, the UN Safe Havens, to attack us, we shall cut off 
all humanitarian aid, and they may count on counter- attacks'.n Srebrenica and Zepa 
were over -run in 1995. Many refugee camps have been subjected to armed attacks, the 
majority from colonial armies in Africa. Rhodesian forces attacked Zimbabwean refugee 
camps in Mozambique and the South African Defence Forces attacked camps housing 
South African and Namibian refugees in Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe and 
Angola. 
77 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), pp. 899 -927; B.S. Chimni, `The Incarceration of 
Victims: Deconstructing Safety Zones', in Najeeb Al- Nauimi and Richard Meese (eds), International 
Legal Issues arising under the United Nations Decade of International Law (Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), pp. 823 -854; Karin Landgren, `Safety Zones and International Protection: 
A Dark Grey Area', International Journal of Refugee Law 7, No. 3 (1995): 437 -458; Andrew 
Shacknove, `From Asylum to Containment', International Journal of Refugee Studies 5, No. 4 
(1993): 516 -533; UNHCR, State of the World's Refugees 1997 -98: A Humanitarian Agenda, pp. 
128 -140. 
This is discussed further in Chapter 5. 
78 As cited in Stephan Oberreit and Pierre Salignon, `Bosnia: In Search of a Lasting Peace', in Médecins 
sans Frontières, World in Crisis: The politics of survival at the end of the twentieth century (London: 
Routledge, 1997), pp. 122 -143 at p. 130. 
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Box 1: `Safe Areas' in Bosnia -Hercegovina 
The `safe areas' created during the Bosnian War (1992 -1995) to protect predominantly Muslim 
civilians from Serb attack served an important role for Bosnian Government forces as a 
strategic base in the midst of enemy territory. Six safe areas were established by the UN in 
April and May 1993 in the towns of Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac. 
The creation of protected areas was prompted by the Bosnian Serb siege of Srebrenica in 
early 1993 that cut off all humanitarian supplies to the town, resulting in many deaths. 
These safe areas were located in Bosnian Serb -held territory and surrounded by artillery, but 
placed under the protection of UNPROFOR. Security Council Resolution 836 of 4 June 
authorised UNPROFOR `to use force in self- defense or in deterring attacks against the safe 
areas', and authorised UN member states, acting nationally or through regional organisations, 
to use all necessary means, including airpower, to support UNPROFOR. The Resolution also 
charged the peacekeepers with promoting the withdrawal of military and paramilitary units 
from the safe areas other than those of the Bosnian Government. However, since the removal 
of forces from only the Bosnian Serb side would have been considered a hostile military act, 
the UNPROFOR Force Commander preferred a negotiated demilitarisation of the safe areas." 
In reality, however, UNPROFOR had neither the capacity to demilitarise or to defend the safe 
areas. Of the 34,000 troops requested by the Force Commander to implement the protection 
scheme, only 7,600 materialised after one year. The Bosnian Government allegedly used the 
safe areas as bases for rest, recuperation and resupply of troops, and launched attacks from 
the enclaves into the surrounding territory, such as the Bihac offensive in November 1994. 
Susan Woodward claims that these offensives were aimed at provoking Serbian artillery fire to 
invoke NATO air attacks against Serb positions, and to `reinforce their propaganda strategy of 
being the victims of Serb aggression and deserving military assistance' .° There were also 
reports that the Bosnian Government did not assist in the defence of Gorazde in order to 
encourage increased NATO involvement in the conflict a' 
To the Bosnian Serbs, these safe areas were not humanitarian enclaves, but strategic zones 
of the Bosnian Muslims, and in July 1995 two of the safe areas, Srebrenica and Zepa, were 
over -run by Serb forces. Thousands of civilians died in Srebrenica; up to 20,000 people were 
killed in or around safe areas in 1995 ' Woodward says that, `the creation of safe zones, 
motivated largely by the humanitarian objective, thus made possible an escalation of the war 
and further exposure of civilians to bombardments'.' The obvious lack of demilitarisation of 
the safe areas gave the Bosnian Serbs a pretext to attack. They knew that, even if bombed as 
a consequence, they would either regain the territory or pressure the UN to ensure the 
neutrality of the safe areas, thereby depriving the Bosnian Government of strategic bases. But 
Adam Roberts claims that there was no way that the zones could have been neutralised since 
neither the Bosnian Government nor the civilian inhabitants would have been willing to trust 
their security to the UN forces.°° 
79 Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict: A 
Reconceptualization (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1996), p. 185. 
8° Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War (Washington: The 
Brookings Institute, 1995), pp. 320 -321. 
SL Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict, p. 186. 
82 Report of the Secretary- General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35: The fall of 
Srebrenica (New York: UN General Assembly Document A/54 /549, November 1999). This report 
states that there is no credible evidence to substantiate claims that the attack was provoked by 
Bosnian Muslim attacks from the enclave. 
83 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 321. 
84 Adam Roberts, `The role of international issues in international politics in the I990s', International 
Review of the Red Cross 833 (March 1999): 19 -43. 
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Enforcing compliance with the law to prevent the use of refugee camps and safety zones 
by combatants, and to prevent attacks against them by belligerent forces, is the major 
constraint on effective protection of civilian populations. `Safety zones' have 
predominantly been declared by the UN Security Council and 'protected' by 
international troops, thereby giving the responsibility of enforcing the rules to the 
international force in accordance with its mandate, capabilities and political will to act. 
In fact, if imposed upon the parties, rather than the result of consent, the protected zones 
fail to meet the requirements of international humanitarian law 85 
The issue of armed attacks on refugee camps, by contrast, is a more complicated 
question, principally because of contending views as to whether the primary onus Iíes 
with asylum countries to ensure the exclusively civilian nature of refugee camps, or with 
states to abstain from attacking them. This debate paralysed attempts in the Executive 
Committee of UNHCR between 1982 and 1987 to forge a consensus in favour of 
prohibiting armed attacks against refugee camps, with asylum states advocating 
categorical condemnation of attacks under all circumstances, and the `Western caucus' 
arguing that camps harbouring military elements may constitute a legitimate target of 
attack.86 The Conclusion reached in 1987 was a compromise based on `reciprocal 
concessions': it was expressly recognised that attacks against refugee camps cannot be 
justified, but the Conclusion was predicated on the assumption that refugee camps and 
settlements had an exclusively civilian and humanitarian character.87 
Embedded in this debate were opposing claims of a `just war' waged by the refugees to 
secure a return home versus the right of states to respond in self- defence to external 
85 Lavoyer, `Refugees and internally displaced persons', p. 176. 
86 In 1981 Ambassador Felix Schynder was appointed by the Executive Committee of UNHCR to 
survey the problem of armed attacks on refugee camps in the hope that this `would lead to the 
adoption of measures which would make refugee camps and settlements safer from military attacks 
than they so far have been'. `No. 27 (JAI) Military Attacks of Refugee Camps and Settlements in 
Southern Africa and Elsewhere (Executive Committee - 33rd Session, 1982)' in Conclusions on the 
International Protection of Refugees Adopted by the Executive Committee of the UNHCR 
Programme, p. 61. The polarised discussion of Schnyder's report is contained in Informal Meeting on 
Military Attacks on Refugee Camps and Settlements in Southern Africa and Elsewhere (Geneva: 
EC/SCP /27, Sub -committee of the Whole on International Protection, Executive Committee of the 
High Commissioner's Programme, 6 June 1983). For comprehensive discussions of the debate see 
Elly- Elikunda Mtango, `Military and Armed Attacks on Refugee Camps', in Gil Loescher and Laila 
Monahan (eds), Refugees and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 
87 -121, and M. Othman- Chancle, `International Law and Armed Attacks in Refugee Camps', Nordic 
Journal Of International Law 59, Nos 2 &3 (1990): 153 -177. 
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aggression. Camps housing refugees and combatants who had fled colonial repression 
were generally perceived to have a just cause, and attacks on them generated 
condemnation, as exemplified by the outrage which followed the 1958 French bombing 
of the camp at Sakiet -Sidi -Youssef in Tunisia.88 The fact that the camps provided 
sanctuary to combatants from the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale garnered little 
sympathy for the actions of the French Government. Under the African Charter for 
Human and Peoples' Rights, in fact, African states are obliged to support armed 
struggles conducted by national liberation movements, and the clauses of the OAU 
Convention prohibiting subversive activities were not intended to contradict this 
commitment.R9 `Freedom fighters' were considered to be one of three categories of 
refugee recognised by the OAU: in the inaugural address to a conference on African 
refugees in 1979, President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania stated that `the OAU recognises 
their [the `freedom fighters'] right to pursue the struggle for liberation, and the right of 
the host country to aid them with the full approval and support of the OAU if its 
Government so decides.'90 The right of refugees to become militarised when holding 
`legitimate grounds for opposing a regime under which they had been persecuted' was 
recently reiterated by a participant at a workshop on refugee return held at Princeton 
University." 
The protective function of refugee camps relies heavily upon the influence of 
international opinion to condemn armed attacks against camps and settlements. Hence 
perceptions of the `justness' of the refugee -warrior cause, the popularity of the victims, 
and the international standing of the perpetrating regime are important variables. States 
already alienated internationally as `pariahs', such as the apartheid regime in South 
Africa, the Heng Samrin Government in Cambodia and to a lesser extent the Israeli 
87 `No. 48 (XXXVIII) 1987: Military or Armed Attacks on Refugee Camps and Settlements', in 
Conclusions on the International Protection of Refugees. 
88 According to Rufin, the bombing polarised public opinion in France, caused an international stir and 
led to a French ministerial crisis, the last of the `IVth Republic' before Charles de Gaulle came to 
power. Jean- Christophe Rufin, Le Piège Humanitaire suivi de Humanitaire et politique depuis le 
chute du Mur, revised and updated edn (Paris: Jean- Claude Lattès, 1994), pp. 119 -120. The event 
received widespread attention and was mentioned in Franz Fanoñ s classic The Wretched of the Earth 
trans. Constance Farrington (Middlesex: Penguin, 1983 (1961)), p. 224. 
89 Mtango, `Military and Armed Attacks on Refugee Camps', p. 88. 
90 Julius K. Nyerere, `Inaugural Speech', in L -G. Erikson, G. Melander and P. Nobel (eds), An 
Analysing Account of the Conference on the African Refugee Problem, Arusha, May 1979 (New 
York: Africana Publishing Company, 1981), 65 -71 at p. 67. 
9` Anne Bayefshy and Michael Doyle, Emergency Return: Principles and Guidelines (Princeton: Centre 
for International Studies, Princeton University, 1999), p. 28. 
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Government, had less reason to fear the moral wrath of the `international community', 
than states with reputations to protect. Each of these regimes conducted attacks on 
refugee camps. Similarly, during the Bosnian war shaming the parties through publicly 
denouncing human rights violations was one of the major tactics employed by 
international agencies to try to curb such abuses. But as Woodward notes: 
Those parties who already had widespread international support were more 
vulnerable to international opinion but less likely to be exposed, whereas those 
who were most accused of such atrocities and on whom media attention 
focused -the Bosnian Serbs in the case of Bosnia -Herzegovina -were far Iess 
susceptible because they had little international support to lose or to try to 
maintain 92 
The refugee -warrior phenomenon and the military use of `safety zones' create strong 
tensions between the competing obligations of civilians, combatants, host governments, 
the UN, donor governments, international aid organisations and peacekeepers. At the 
field level, the difficulty of reconciling the legitimate desire of refugees or oppressed 
populations to fight for their freedom with the need to ensure the physical safety of 
civilian refugees is compounded by practical constraints. Even if the purely civilian and 
humanitarian nature of refugee camps and `safety zones' is assured in theory, can it be 
in practice? Host states and UNHCR are urged to establish refugee camps `a reasonable 
distance' from international borders," but the cost of moving camps, opposition from 
refugees, and fears of permanent settlement held by host governments, often make this 
impossible.9a Thus the practicalities of implementing the law are complicated. 
2.2 Humanitarian Aid and the Economy of War 
The relationship between accumulation and power is basic to societies throughout the 
world. Jean- François Bayart noted in The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly that 
in many African countries political power is expressed in terms of food and 
accumulation: the authors of Nigeria's constitution even defined political power as `the 
opportunity to acquire riches and prestige, to be in a position to hand out benefits in the 
92 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 322. 
93 
`No. 48 (XXXVIII) Military or Armed Attacks on Refugee Camps and Settlements', in Conclusions 
on the International Protection of Refugees, p. 111. 
9' For some of the constraints to physical protection which endured after the 1987 Conclusion see Note 
on International Protection (New York: General Assembly document A/AC.96 /7, Executive 
Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme 39th session, 15 August 1988). 
Chapter I The Paradoxes of Humanitarian Action 56 
form of jobs, contracts, gifts of money etc to relations and political allies'." 
Development aid, largely channelled bilaterally through government structures in 
previous decades, has long been prone to misappropriation and diversion. As the 
strategic importance of many Third World states declined, or international donors no 
longer countenance the corruption permitted in the past in the name of the fight against 
communism, humanitarian aid has come to be `the North's principal means of political 
crisis management in a now marginal South'.96 Channelled directly to beneficiaries 
rather than through local structures of government or authority, humanitarian assistance 
becomes integrated in power struggles and conflict at many different levels. 
Table 1, adapted from Philippa Atkinson's typology of the war economy in Liberia,97 
illustrates three levels at which humanitarian aid contributes to the war economy, in 
legal and illegal forms. The macro denotes central government departments or the 
administrative equivalents of factions; the meso represents regional or local government, 
local commanders, or traditional authorities or elders; and the micro signifies activities 
organised by individual combatants, civilians and merchants. Many of the contributions 
of humanitarian aid to the war economy occur in a legal sense, neither violating laws of 
the country nor international laws. Some fall into a `grey area', indicating that precise 
laws may not apply, but the activity `forms a relatively unthreatening part of Iocal 
survival strategies',98 and other activities are illegal. The theft of humanitarian assistance 
is increasingly specified as violative of the law: in the Abuja II peace agreement of 
August 1995 in Liberia, for example, adverse interference with relief constituted a 
cease -fire violation, and UN Security Council Resolution 794 affirmed that those who 
deliberately impeded the delivery of food and medical supplies in Somalia would be 
held individually responsible." 
95 Jean-François Ba art, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly y fil (London: Longman, 1993), p. 
xvii. 
96 Duffield, 'Complex Emergencies and the Crisis of Developmentalism', p. 40. 
97 Atkinson, The War Economy in Liberia, p. 8. 
9s ibid., p. 7. 
99 For a discussion of S/Res /794 declaring 'a right to humanitarian relief' in Somalia see David P. 
Forsythe, 'Choices More Ethical Than Legal: The International Committee of the Red Cross and 
Human Rights', Ethics and International Affairs 7 (1993): 131 -151 at p. 146. 
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Table 1: The Contribution of Humanitarian Aid to the Economy of War 
Macro Meso Micro 
Legal import taxes 
Immigration fees 
Warehouse rental 
Purchase of food 







Purchase of locally 
manufactured products 
Taxation of salaries 
Assistance to local 
authorities 
Purchase of local raw 
materials 
Taxation of salaries 
Grey Area Obligatory employment of 
certain staff 
Obligatory employment of 
certain staff 
Aid channelled through 
`humanitarian branch' of 
faction 
Taxation of beneficiaries 
Employment of guards 
Provision of fuel for local 
escorts 
Taxation of beneficiaries 
Illegal Government misuse of aid 
Bribery and corruption 
Black- market purchase 
and currency exchange 
Checkpoint extortion 






Looting beneficiaries after 
distribution 
Trading in looted goods 
Although taxing local salaries is legal - and a lucrative revenue earner at the macro level 
during large operations - the taxing of aid beneficiaries is categorised as `grey area' here 
to indicate that the practice might be for legitimate purposes or might be predatory. Aid 
organisations do not generally compensate for taxation, thus the practice potentially 
deprives recipients of a minimum acceptable ration. Beyond a certain point `taxation' is 
simply theft and is illegal. Similarly the compulsory employment of certain staff falls 
into a `grey area' while it is innocuous, but becomes illegal if applied, for example, to 
the hiring of armed guards as part of a protection racket (See Box 2). The development 
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of security rackets like those of Somalia can multiply the number of employees hired by 
agencies. One NGO in Baìdoa paid $28,000 per month for security in 1993.10° 
Directing aid through the `humanitarian branch' of a local faction can also have 
beneficial or harmful consequences. During the 1980s, the Consortium of aid agencies 
called the Emergency Relief Desk had a successful partnership with the Relief Society 
of Tigray and the Eritrean Relief Association that were affiliated to the Tigrayan 
People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) 
respectively. The Fronts had a strong commitment to the public welfare of civilians in 
their areas of control.101 The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLA), by contrast, 
has a predatory relationship with the local population, and its humanitarian branch, the 
Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (SRRA) is much the same. Officially 
empowered by OLS to participate in the targeting and distribution of humanitarian 
assistance, the misappropriation of aid and the discriminatory distribution practices 
employed by the SRRA during the 1998 famine were major constraints to reducing 
mortality, according to MSF.102 
At the macro level, exchange rates imposed on local currency are one of the largest 
areas of revenue earnings. In the relief operation for the Kurds in northern Iraq, for 
example, the UN was required to conduct all transactions at the official exchange rate, 
generating some $250 million profit for the central government in 1992 alone.103 Import 
duties, visas, airport and port charges, travel permits, licences and other `administrative 
fees' can also generate substantial sums of money for authorities, from the 5,000 
Liberian dollars ($10) berthing fee for boats at the port of Greenville in south -east 
Liberia104 to the $150 per tonne levied on aid flights to the interior of Mozambique.'°5 







The NGO administrator specified that this payment was for 178 guards at $160 per month to guard 2 
warehouses, 30 vehicles, 7 houses, and 2 offices. See John Sommer, Hope Restored? Humanitarian 
Aid in Somalia, 1990 -1994 (Washington: Refugee Policy Group, 1994), 85 and fn 93 on p. 108. 
For a comparison between the EPLF and TPLF and the SPLA see Duffield and Prendergast, Without 
Troops & Tanks, pp. 164 -167. 
A Review of the famine in Southern Sudan and the organization of relief assistance (Paris: Médecins 
sans Frontières, January 1999). 
P. Vallely, `How he is Getting Cash', Daily Telegraph, 25 August 1993 as cited in François Jean, 
`Aide Humanitaire et Économie de Guerre', in François Jean and Jean- Christophe Rufin, Économie 
des Guerres Civiles (Paris: Hachette, 1996), pp. 543 -589 at fn 2, p. 568. 
Weissman, L'Aide Humanitaire Dans la Dynamique du Conflit Libérien, p. 45. 
Conspicuous Destruction: War, famine and the reform Process in Mozambique (Africa Watch, 1992) 
as cited in Jean, `Aide Humanitaire et Économie de Guerre', p. 570. 
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revenue for local contractors, companies and individual merchants and feed into systems 
of patronage. 
Box 2: MSF and the Economy of War in Somalia 
The Paris office of MSF conducted a detailed evaluation of activities undertaken in Somalia 
between January 1991 and May 1993,i06 and specifically questioned the extent to which MSF 
activities potentially contributed to the war economy. Somalia was not the first country in which 
MSF had worked with armed guards; clandestine missions into Afghanistan were undertaken 
with Afghan mujahideen fighters who guarded against Soviet attack. It was, however, the first 
time such security had been paid for. 
Arriving in Mogadishu for the first time in January 1991, MSF commenced working in the Digfer 
General Hospital which was under government control until Said Barre was forced to flee 
Mogadishu at the end of that month. General insecurity and shots fired at the team forced MSF 
to evacuate twice in January, but by early February security guarantees from the victorious 
Hawiye forces enabled a return, this time to Medina Hospital. Insecurity was rife: in the hospital 
patients were armed; vehicles mounted with a machine gun (known as a `technicals') drove into 
hospital grounds, right to the operating theatre; and MSF were forced at gunpoint to tend to the 
wounds of certain patients in preference to others. The team decided that it was impossible to 
continue unless a system of security was established to control entry to the hospital and, since 
the Hawiye had divided into two opposing sub -clans, one under Ali Mandi (Abgal) and the other 
under Mohammed Farah Aidid (Habir Gedir), both were approached to provide protection. Aidid 
provided 'police' at the entrance to the hospital, but when this proved ineffective, MSF accepted 
the proposal of Osman Ato, one of Aidid's top officials, to supply armed guards. 
Armed guards had previously been employed by humanitarian organisations in Somaliland, and 
the only other organisations present in Mogadishu at that time, ICRC and SoS also found it 
impossible to protect lives and property without resort to this method. But what started as a 
concession to enable MSF to operate the only surgical facility in the war zone developed into an 
entire security industry, not only contributing to the war economy, but creating a vicious circle of 
dependence from which it was difficult to escape. The need for armed guards extended to 
vehicles once the first MSF car was stolen in April 1991 and became a permanent fixture from 
July. The question of whether such guards should be paid arose, but what other method could 
ensure reliability and give some element of independence from their political source? But the 
revenue gained by Osman Ato made him dangerous; if MSF tried to organise a trip without his 
security, the team risked attack from his very men. The racket had commenced. Guards 
demanded higher pay and NGOs had no recourse to alternative sources of protection. This 
problem amplified in July /August 1992 when scores of new agencies and the media arrived in 
earnest, launching an entire security industry. Lack of coordination and agreement on salary 
scales among NGOs led to exorbitant salary demands and some organisations were literally 
held hostage by their own guards. 
MSF estimates that in the 3 -month period from October to December 1991, the organisation 
paid some $60,000 to Osman Ato in the form of house and 'technical' rental, truck hire and 
guards. Excluding inflation caused by the fluctuation of the Somali Shilling, this figure can be 
extrapolated to surmise that some $400,000 was paid to Ato by MSF in Somalia. 
106 Virginie Raisson and Serge Manoncourt, MSF -France en Somalie: Janvier 1991 - Mai 1993: 
Evaluation de la mission (Paris: Médecins sans Frontières, 1994). 
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The principal impact of humanitarian assistance on the economy of war at the meso and 
micro levels occurs through the pillage, diversion and extortion of aid supplies by local 
authorities, militias, bandits and merchants. At the simplest level, the direct theft of food 
and non -food items before, during and after distribution is a common occurrence during 
times of conflict. Food and medical supplies can be used directly by combatants or sold 
locally or in a neighbouring country. Woodward says that more than half of all aid in the 
former Yugoslavia supported the war effort through feeding and supplying soldiers,107 
whereas much of the food and medical supplies looted in Somalia were sold across the 
border in Kenya. 
Vehicles and equipment belonging to aid organisations are valuable commodities for 
individuals or factions. In 1994, aid organisations in Liberia had more than $5 million 
worth of materials stolen during inter -factional clashes, including 74 vehicles, 27 trucks, 
18 motorcycles, communication equipment, computers, and thousands of tons of food.106 
This was surpassed in 1996 by the loss of $20 million in equipment during clashes in 
Monrovia.i09 Aid organisations curtailed their operations after each incident and several 
debated continuing assistance to the country when aid supplies so blatantly reinforced 
the operational capacity of the warring factions.'" 
Other methods used to divert aid supplies include demanding payment as a condition of 
access, and inflating beneficiary numbers. Charles Taylor demanded 15 percent of all 
aid entering the territory he controlled in Liberia in 1995, to be paid in cash or in kind. 
In the zone controlled by the regional peacekeeping force, ECOMOG (Economic 
Community of West Africa Monitoring Group), the numbers of displaced persons was 
exaggerated by the local authority responsible for registration, the Liberian Refugee 
Repatriation and Resettlement Commission. The World Food Programme (WFP) and 
Catholic Relief Services (CRS) distributed food in camps around Buchanan for 200,000 
persons although the epidemiological information collected by the medical organisations 
suggested that no more than 130,000 resided in the camps. Empty trucks were in 
evidence at the outskirts of the camp during each distribution, waiting to collect the 
107 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 319. 
oa Weissman, L'Aide Humanitaire Dans la Dynamique du Conflit Libérien, p.48. 
109 Atkinson, The War Economy in Liberia, p. 21. 
110 See, for example, Jean -Daniel Tauxe, `Liberia, la logistique humanitaire en question', Revue 
Internationale de la Croix Rouge 819 (May -June 1996): 379 -381. 
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excess food and resell it in Monrovia. "' Furthermore, a food -basket monitoring survey 
undertaken by MSF in 1995 found that the displaced did not receive the ration to which 
they were entitled, but on average 20 percent less. Fabrice Weissman estimated that 
between 47 and 60 percent of aid was diverted in the camps of Buchanan.12 
The banditry in Somalia took the diversion of food aid to unprecedented levels. 
Beneficiary numbers were not just inflated by local factions or authorities, but fictitious 
villages were registered for distribution. According to Alex de Waal, false committees 
were also formed to represent real villages and divert the food, and real villages were 
coerced into signing for receipt of aid that did not or only partially arrived.13 Estimates 
of the quantity of food stolen in Somalia vary from 20 percent to 80 percent: most 
Somali Red Crescent staff interviewed by de Waal believed that half of the food 
distributed by the Red Cross was looted, diverted or extorted.14 
In spite of the increased attention in the literature concerning the implication of aid in 
the dynamics of conflict, aid organisations and donors rarely attempt to quantify the 
contribution of aid to the war economy. A guide to evaluating humanitarian assistance 
produced by the Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Development (OECD) in 
1999 notes that: 
reliable empirical evidence of the degree to which humanitarian assistance is 
diverted is often lacking even though such knowledge may be fundamental to 
understanding the impact of the assistance provided either on the intended 
target group or in potentially providing warring factions with additional 
resources.1' 
In fact some evaluations ignore the broader impact of the war economy altogether. The 
Dutch Government's relatively detailed evaluation of their $42 million of aid to Somalia 
between 1991 and 1993, for example, specifically addresses the side- effects of the aid 
delivered through various UN agencies, NGOs and ICRC, yet concludes that the largest 
negative side- effect of aid was `the slow return to food production because relief 
11 Personal observations in 1995. 
lz Weissman, L'Aide Humanitaire Dans la Dynamique du Conflit Libérien, p. 71. 
13 Alex de Waal, `Dangerous Precedents? Famine Relief in Somalia 1991 -93', in Joanna Macrae and 
Anthony Zwi (eds), War and Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies 
(London: Zed Books in association with Save the Children Fund (UK), 1994), pp. 139 -159 at p. 146. 
14 ibid. 
ils Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies (Paris: Development 
Assistance Committee, Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Development, 1999), p. 8. 
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supplies had flooded the market'.16 Although mentioning security payments made to 
factions, the wider repercussions of this were excluded from the assessment of the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the aid provided. 
Considering the amount of aid money and supplies that directly contributed to the 
arsenal of waning factions in Liberia and Somalia, aid organisations are understandably 
reluctant to publicise such information. Not only might it jeopardise the `good' image of 
aid among individual donors in the public, but it provides fuel to arguments against 
giving aid or in favour of military intervention. Claims of 80 percent losses in food aid 
in Somalia by senior officials of the UN and CARE were a major influence in the US 
decision to intervene. The intervention occurred several months after the peak of deaths, 
and, at the cost to the US alone of over $1.5 billion, "'saved between 10,000 and 25,000 
lives. Aid organisations saved some 90,000 Iives prior to December 1992, "6 yet the 
failings of the aid organisations are still invoked to justify the intervention. According to 
Michael Kelly: 
The point being made in relation to the NGO effort prior to the UNTTAF 
deployment is that, without military intervention, relief efforts in Somalia were 
not effective enough. In many ways they were counterproductive... The 
military intervention was justified, necessary and extremely successful in 
reducing and preventing excess mortality from famine, war and genocide. The 
debate over where the military intervention went wrong goes to matters beyond 
this fundamental core of the mission."9 
16 Humanitarian Aid to Somalia: Evaluation Report 1994 (The Hague: Operations Review Unit, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands, 1994), p. 302. Mention is made of the accusation that 
ICRC acted as a resource for so- called `warlords' thus potentially prolonging the conflict, but it is 
dismissed in three short paragraphs of text. The report only considers the claim in light of the 
diversion of food aid and concludes that: `the scale of the military arsenal stored in Somalia was such 
that the commodification of food supplies relieved the warlords of a social responsibility, but did not 
affect the military balance'. p. 173 
117 The US spent $1.5 billion on military expenditure, as opposed to $311 million on humanitarian 
assistance, and $470 million on UN contributions (paid and unpaid) between April 1992 and July 
1994. The incremental costs of Operation Restore Hope were estimated at $1.97 billion in Defense 
Department spending and assessments for subsequent UN military efforts. Sommer, Hope Restored ?, 
p. 72 and Appendix C5. 
18 One of the most comprehensive evaluations of the international response in Somalia, conducted by 
the Refugee Policy Group, estimated that some 50,000 lives were saved between 1991 and August 
1992; 40,000 were saved between September and December 1992; and 10,000- 25,000 from 
December to March 1993. Steven Hansch, et al., Lives Lost, Lives Saved: Excess Mortality and the 
Impact of Health Interventions in the Somalia Emergency (Washington: Refugee Policy Group, 
1994), pp. 28 -32. 
19 Michael Kelly, Peace Operations: Tackling the Military Legal and Policy Challenges (Canberra: 
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1997), paras 722 -723. 
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Notwithstanding the use of information about the impact of aid on war economies by 
opponents of aid, quantitative evaluations are essential if aid organisations are to 
minimise their negative effects. Whether of direct military benefit to combatants or 
indirect through its fungibility in releasing resources for military use, humanitarian aid 
has the potential to prolong conflict. 
2.3 Legitimacy 
Humanitarian action, through its media appeal and the services it brings, can bestow 
legitimacy on individuals, organisations, rebel movements and governing regimes. This 
can occur from the local village level to the international arena. While much of the 
legitimacy conferred through the provision of aid may pass unnoticed by the aid 
organisations, and be genuinely unintended, the political credibility that accompanies 
the provision of aid has long been recognised by governments. 
The reluctance of the US to recognise the Bolshevik regime in 1921, for example, 
delayed decisions to provide aid in spite of the catastrophic famine that threatened 40 
million lives. Lenin overcame his initial reticence to request external assistance and 
issued an appeal in July 1921 amid reports of mass starvation, cannibalism and the sale 
of human flesh. In contrast to the European aid organised by famous Norwegian 
explorer Fridtjof Nansen, the US attached conditions to the aid to minimise the support 
this would lend to the Bolsheviks and Red Army.120 Nevertheless, the famine relief 
bolstered the regime, enabling the resumption of export of Russian cereals in 1922, 
while `disloyal' areas like the Ukraine were still affected by famine. Main Destexhe 
argues that Western aid not only permitted the Soviet regime to survive and overcome 
the most difficult point of its brief history, but it `opened the way for the resumption of 
commercial and diplomatic exchanges with the West, which had always been the 
principal objective'12' of the Soviet regime. The Biafran leadership similarly exploited 
the Iegitimising qualities of humanitarian action during the Nigerian Civil War (1967- 
70), as Box 3 explains. 
20 See Alain Destexhe, L'Humanitaire Impossible ou deux siècles d'ambiguïté (Paris: Armand Colin, 
1993), pp. 40-46 for a more detailed discussion of aid to Russia at this time. 
12' ibid., p. 45. 
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Obtaining local and international legitimacy and recognition are important objectives of 
any political movement, whether holding power or contesting the authority of a 
governing regime. Humanitarian action can legitimise movements and individuals in 
several ways. First, negotiations undertaken by aid organisations with faction leaders 
and local commanders to secure access and security guarantees implicitly recognise their 
authority over a territory or population. The need to gain the consent of local 
commanders for aid shipments entering regions of the former Yugoslavia, for example, 
reinforced the authority of the faction over that territory. Woodward says that the 
Bosnian Serbs had few other sources of legitimacy, having been branded as aggressors 
by the international community.122 The recognition of military leaders is magnified if the 
international media are present. When US Special Envoy to Somalia, Robert Oakley, 
shook hands with Mohammed Farah Aided and Ali Mandi in front of the international 
press, he accorded them recognition as the legitimate representatives of the Somali 
people. In doing so, Oakley undid months of thoughtful negotiation by the former 
representative of the UN Secretary- General, Mohamed Sahnoun, who was promoting 
traditional elders and grassroots associations as alternative sources of authority.123 
Second, by participating in relief activities, individuals and political movements can 
gain local and international kudos. Gayle Smith says that in the Horn of Africa 
liberation movements gained international status, `not because their claims or demands 
have been accepted, but because they became active players in international relief 
operations'.' 24 Local leaders can claim credit for attracting a health centre, water supply 
or food to an area, and may direct aid towards supporters and away from opponents, to 
consolidate political power. Channelling food through the `humanitarian branch' of a 
rebel faction helps to legitimise the force. 
Third, the presence of an international organisation in itself can accord legitimacy to a 
faction or regime, whether it publicly comments on humanitarian concerns or remains 
122 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 319. 
123 Before his resignation in October 1992, Sahnoun attempted to create an environment for serious 
peace talks, `not so much between the faction leaders as between new leaders being promoted by the 
grassroots process'. Sahnoun was attending talks of Somali intellectuals in the Seychelles when he 
received the message from Boutros -Ghali that provoked his resignation. Mohamed Sahnoun, 
Somalia: The Missed Opportunities (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994), p. 40. 
124 Gayle E. Smith, 'Relief Operations and Military Strategy', in Thomas G. Weiss and Larry Minear 
(eds), Humanitarianism Across Borders: Sustaining Civilians in Times of War (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 1993), pp. 97 -116 at p. 108. 
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discreet. One party to justify its own acts, for example, can exploit public denunciations 
of the actions of an opposing party: labelling `victims' creates `perpetrators'. But 
remaining silent about atrocities and abusive policies can also lend countenance to them: 
as organisations professing to uphold certain principles of humanity, the presence and 
participation of international aid agencies can be a strong propaganda tool in the service 
of governments or insurgents. This is particularly true of ICRC whose mandate, 
reputation and discretion imbues its presence with a particularly affirming quality. The 
guided visit of ICRC to the `model' Nazi concentration camps at Theresienstadt during 
World War II raises harsh questions about the relationship between silence and 
complicity. But ICRC frequently confronts more subtle contexts in which it must weigh 
up the legitimacy its presence bestows upon a regime or faction against the benefits of a 
presence for individuals in needs of protection and assistance. David Forsythe discusses 
the compromise that ICRC made in South Africa between 1969 and 1987, where ICRC 
was granted access to prisoners like Nelson Mandela, but not to prisoners under 
interrogation and awaiting trial.125 Noting that prisoners are usually subjected to worse 
treatment in military or police detention facilities immediately after arrest than when 
transferred to the normal penal system, Forsythe points out that ICRC was unable to 
visit the prisoners with the highest risk of mistreatment. Yet ICRC's presence in South 
Africa accorded the government some respectability, implying that the regime 
cooperated with international inspection. Mandela remarked in his autobiography that 
the prison authorities respected and feared ICRC because `avoiding international 
condemnation was the authorities' principal goal'.126 In 1987 ICRC withdrew from 
South Africa, considering that the limitations imposed on its actions outweighed the 
benefits of remaining. But as Forsythe says, `that took a quarter of a century, during 
which time the government was allowed both to claim cooperation with the ICRC and to 
torture and mistreat prisoners, sometimes fatally - as in the case of Steve Biko'.127 
The fourth way in which humanitarian action bestows legitimacy on, and potentialIy 
sustains a state or local authority, is through fulfilling the social obligations normally 
required of a regime towards its citizens. This problem was recognised at the birth of 
humanitarian action: Florence Nightingale disagreed with Henri Dunant's proposal to 
125 Forsythe, `Choices More Ethical Than Legal', pp. 139 -140. 
126 Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1994), p. 396. 
127 Forsythe, `Choices More Ethical Than Legal', p. 139. 
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create a civilian medical service, arguing that it would relieve states from part of the 
burden of going to war.128 Walzer explains the importance of the social contract: 
The moral standing of any particular state depends upon the reality of the 
common life it protects and the extent to which the sacrifices required by that 
protection are willingly accepted and thought worthwhile. If no common life 
exists, or if the state doesn't protect the common life that does exist, its own 
defense may have no moral justification. `29 
The increasing `internationalisation of public welfare', as it is referred to by Mark 
Duffield130 has seen a transfer of `state' responsibilities for the welfare of citizens to the 
international community, particularly NGOs. Not only does this process have 
repercussions for post- emergency state building, but by fulfilling such responsibilities, 
humanitarian action potentially allays local dissent that might otherwise arise to 
challenge the legitimacy of the local power. It is not unreasonable to suggest that 
without the presence of NGOs in Afghanistan to meet the basic needs of the population 
in Kabul and the south, for example, the Taliban might have faced earlier opposition to 
their rule when the populations under their control, particularly widows and children of 
`martyred' warriors, were not cared for. 
The legitimacy that humanitarian action can inadvertently bestow upon warriors or local 
officials is in many respects the negative side of the popular development notion of 
`empowerment'. Authors like Anderson advocate empowering local players during 
emergency relief operations, and criticise the contemporary relief system for making aid 
recipients `passive dependents on the competence of outsiders' through relying upon 
external aid providers to establish, manage, and control the emergency response.131 
Although she recognises the bestowal of Iegitimacy on warriors as a negative 
consequences of aid in her Iater work Do No Harm132 she overlooks the subjectivity 
inherent in labelling one action `empowerment' and the other 'legitimacy'. Calls for 
125 Dunant's proposal threatened to undermine the efforts of Nightingale to improve British army 
medical services after her return from the Crimea. After reading his book, A Memory of Solferino, she 
wrote to him expressing her opposition to the establishment of a volunteer corps. See Moorehead, 
Dunant's Dream, pp. 29 -32. 
129 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 54. 
13° Duffield, `The Political Economy of Internal War', p. 57. 
131 Anderson, `Development and the Prevention of Humanitarian Emergencies', p. 30. 
132 Mary B. Anderson, Do No Harm: How Aid can Support Peace - or War (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
1999), pp. 50 -53. 
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local empowerment assume that aid organisations arriving at the scene of a crisis have 
the capacity and right to judge who merits legitimacy and power and who does not. 
Box 3: Humanitarian Action and Legitimacy in Biafra 
The Nigerian Civil War (1967 -70) provides one of the most insidious examples of the use of 
suffering and humanitarian action to gain international legitimacy. In May 1967, Colonel 
Odumegwu Ojukwu, Governor of the oil -rich province of Biafra declared independence, 
provoking a secessionist war with Nigerian Government forces. The Nigerian Government 
imposed a blockade of the territory, effectively employing starvation as a weapon of war given 
Biafra's inadequate productive capacities. Widespread famine resulted. By the time news of the 
famine was broadcast internationally in mid -1968 in what was the world's first televised famine, 
the Federal forces had defeated the secessionists militarily. But by using the famine to mobilise 
international public opinion in Biafra's favour, the struggle for independence continued, and 
engaged humanitarian action as a key player in the contested sovereignty of either side. 
International opinion was important to both sides of the conflict. The Federal Government invited 
international observer teams to Nigeria to inspect the conduct of the war; eased enforcement of 
the blockade on relief supplies following international pressure; and sought international 
reinforcement of its claims by insisting that relief organisations recognise Nigeria's sovereignty 
over Biafra, and submit relief flights to inspection in Federal territory before entering Biafra. For 
the Biafran leadership, however, international opinion constituted the key to its primary objective, 
sovereign independence, and was 'assiduously courted'.' While using the plight of his people to 
gain international sympathy and attention, Ojukwu hindered efforts to bring relief to Biafra. Not 
only was it in his interests to keep the starvation issue alive, but he preferred to receive arms 
and politically supportive assistance rather than just humanitarian relief. 
Aid organisations devised complicated programs of relief delivery to circumvent the prohibitions 
of the Federal Government and the Biaf ran leadership. Ojukwu refused a Federal proposal to 
establish a relief corridor through the blockade, arguing that this might weaken Biafra's claim to 
sovereign status; facilitate Nigerian attacks once roads and bridges were repaired; and that the 
Nigerians might poison the food.'° Thus all supplies had to be airlifted in and land at night since 
the Federal authorities did not grant approval. Concerned that aid flights provided cover to arms 
shipments, the aid organisations requested different landing times, but the Biafran leadership 
refused. Moreover, the Biafrans imposed charges for landing rights for relief flights and local 
supplies and services, which constituted a major source of the secessionist's foreign exchange; 
$3.5 million according to one official.' 
The intransigence of Ojukwu increased with the extent of external support. Aid organisations and 
activists flew to the defence of the Biafran cause, accusing the Nigerian Government of 
genocide, although 7 million Ibo people lived without persecution in government -held regions. At 
the height of the famine, which claimed over 1 million victims, Ojukwu chose to print new legal 
tender and stamps while aid organisations struggled to save starving civilians. He appeared on 
television stating in the long term we have achieved quite a lot. No matter what one says, 
indeed, if the 14 million people, Biafrans, are killed, the notion of Biafra will persist until the end 
of time. That is an achievement'.' The flight of Ojukwu to the Ivory Coast in January 1970 put 
an end to the fighting. 
133 Alvin Edgell, 'Nigeria/Biafra', in Morris Davis (ed.), Civil Wars and the Politics of International 
Relief. Africa, South Asia and the Caribbean (New York: Praeger, I975), pp. 50 -73 at p. 53. 
36 ibid. 
135 John de St. Jorre, The Nigerian Civil War (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1972), p. 250 as cited in 
Edgell, 'Nigeria/Biafra', p. 68. 
136 As cited in La Pitié Dangereuse, a French Documentary by Rony Brauman and François Margolin, 
Arte, 85 minutes, June 1996. 
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Thus the presence and actions of international aid organisations and the media, and the 
provision of humanitarian assistance, can confer international and internal legitimacy on 
regimes, rebel factions and individuals in a variety of ways. Legitimacy and the next 
paradox of humanitarian action examined, population control, are two sides of the same 
coin. The legitimacy of authority is an important aspect in gaining influence and control 
of civilian populations, and having control and influence over civilian populations is an 
important aspect of gaining legitimacy. 
2.4 Population Control 
The fourth paradox of humanitarian action is its role as a tool in the control of civilian 
populations. The exercise of power and influence over a population can take three 
forms: a coercive form through the use of force; a manipulative form through the 
dispensation of material rewards; and a normative form through the use of shared values 
and symbolic rewards. Humanitarian aid is a useful instrument in the second form, 
particularly to influence population movements and to win the `hearts and minds' of 
civilians. 
The control of populations and territory is a key objective of conflict, and food has been 
used as a weapon of war for thousands of years. Just as destroying food supplies in a 
region will force the occupants to move, so providing or denying humanitarian relief can 
control the movement of civilian populations. The converse is also true: detaining a 
malnourished population in a particular location attracts humanitarian assistance to that 
locale, which may serve strategic, political or economic objectives. Charles Taylor's 
demand of 15 percent of aid supplies entering his territory in Liberia mentioned 
previously, for example, came after he invited NGOs to witness the malnutrition among 
segments of the population under his control. Aid organisations had been absent from 
his territory since the massive theft of aid supplies the year before. Another Liberian 
faction, the Kromah branch of the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in 
Liberia also used this tactic in July 1996, detaining 350 civilians without food in a camp 
30 kilometres from Monrovia to attract humanitarian assistance to the region.137 
137 Civilians Trapped in Hunger Camp: Abuse of humanitarian aid by Liberian warlords must stop 
(Monrovia and Brussels: Médecins sans Frontières Press Release, 10 July 1996). 
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The use of humanitarian assistance as a lure was illustrated starkly in Ethiopia during 
the devastating famine of 1983 -1985 (Box 4), where food distribution sites became traps 
at the service of the Ethiopian Government. Aid also influenced population movements 
in the former Yugoslavia, where forced migration was an essential feature of the war. 
While less a tool of population control per se, the provision of humanitarian aid to 
towns encouraged the occupants to stay, while depriving them of aid forced the 
occupants to leave. Aid organisations faced a quandary whether to assist the residents to 
remain, thereby risking their physical safety, or assist them to Ieave, thereby aiding the 
policy of ethnic expulsion. 
In Bosnia, forced population displacements are not simply the consequence of 
war, they are its main purpose, and the relief organisations are not only reduced 
to impotence by this strategy of tenor, they are actually trapped into becoming 
its unwilling accomplices, as they sometimes endeavour to evacuate those 
whose lives are most at risk.13s 
Aid organisations were divided over the best strategy to pursue with regard to the 
evacuation of civilians. According to Kathleen Newland, UNHCR was reluctant to 
evacuate any but sick or injured civilians from conflict zones to avoid assisting the 
racial objectives of the belligerents, advocating bringing safety to people rather than 
taking people to safety.139 ICRC, by contrast, argued that this was a secondary concern to 
the humanitarian imperative to alleviate suffering. Neither position was without 
repercussions: ICRC was accused of having participated in ethnic expulsions by the 
Bosnian authorities,140 and the UN `safe areas' gave a false sense of security, shattered 
by the fall of Srebrenica and the disappearance of over 7,000 of the town's residents. 
Humanitarian assistance can be most effectively used as a tool of control when the 
civilian population is dependent upon it. Refugee camps provide effective mechanisms 
through which to manipulate civilians, containing a `captive' population which is 
dependent on regularly distributed supplies. Eftihia Voutira and Barbara Harrell -Bond 
discuss the various social relationships present in refugee camps and the power grids 
I3S François Jean (ed.), Populations in Danger 1995: A Médecins Sans Frontières Report (Rushcutters 
Bay, NSW: Halstead Press, 1995), p. 80. 
139 Kathleen Newland, `Ethnic Conflict and Refugees', Survival- 35, No. 1 (1993): 81 -101 at p. 98. 
140 Alain Maillard, `Nous sommes arrivés aux limites du tenable', L'Hebdo 16, 18 April 1996, pp. 16 -18 
at p. 16. 
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that evolve in the distribution of aid.14' The transfer of goods and principles of 
reciprocity bind refugees in relationships of power that increase in strength with the 
proximity of the assistance to its recipients. They state that `the ultimate authority in the 
chain of distribution lies with the person, whether foreign aid worker or refugee, who 
performs the penultimate act in the chain of handlers, "tipping" the grain into the sack of 
the kneeling beneficiary'.162 Aid becomes an important tool of control; reducing or 
withholding food and other rations pressures refugees to conform to the wishes of the 
aid distributors. 
Text book prescriptions of refugee camp management stress that `the level of refugee 
participation will determine the success or failure of a project'.ta3 Refugees are 
encouraged to elect or appoint representatives to speak on their behalf, and competition 
for such a role can be fierce. The social hierarchy can change in refugee camps as 
humanitarian aid becomes a source of patronage, and refugees with a western education 
are sought to advise and work with aid organisations. Voutira and Harrell -Bond state 
that there is rarely a sense of political solidarity among refugee populations despite the 
apparent commonality of their experience in the country of origin.'°° The refugees are 
often highly factionalised, and control of the aid distribution channels can be an 
essential mechanism with which to secure support for one faction over another. 
Information networks such as radio broadcasts, newspapers, and community meetings 
are also avenues through which to disseminate messages and propaganda, and the 
education curricula at schools can indoctrinate the younger generation with a particular 
version of history and events. Refugee camps also provide an environment conducive to 
recruitment of combatants. At the time of writing, Tanzanian officials report that 
Burundian rebels are recruiting refugees from five refugee camps in western Tanzania 
and slipping them out of the country for military training.145 
141 Eftihia Voutira and Barbara E. Harrell -Bond, 'In Search of the Locus of Trust: The Social World of 
the Refugee Camp', in E. Valentine Daniel and John Chr. Knudsen (eds), Mistrusting Refugees 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 207 -224 at p. 211. 
1d2 ibid., pp. 211 -212. 
'43 Médecins sans Frontières, Refugee Health: An approach to emergency situations (London: 
Macmillan, 1997), p. 31. 
64 Voutira and Harrell -Bond, 'In Search of the Locus of Trust', p. 218. 
145 Rodrigue Ngowi, `Burundi Rebels Recruiting Refugees', Associated Press, 19 January 2000. 
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Box 4: Famine and Population Control in Northern Ethiopia 
Contrary to the prevailing views of the time, the principal cause of the devastating famine in 
northern Ethiopia in 1983 -85 was the counter -insurgency campaign of the Ethiopian army and 
air force directed against opponents of the government of Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam. 
Famine was a weapon of war; drought, harvest failure and unsound government agricultural 
policies were secondary causes." Although the regime was initially reluctant to allow Western 
aid organisations and media into the country, this changed as it turned the international 
humanitarian action to its economic, diplomatic and military advantage. Relief was thoroughly 
manipulated, denied to non -government held areas and used as a weapon to control 
populations in the north. 
Relief supplies and equipment became a particularly effective tool in the government 
resettlement plan. Ostensibly designed to relocate northerners away from the 'famine- prone' 
region for their benefit, it served to deprive the opposition movements of a base of local 
support, and to advance the government policy of collectivisation. Humanitarian aid and 
equipment was used to orchestrate this plan. Food distribution centres became traps, 
attracting populations to a central location from which many were forcibly recruited into the 
army, or signed up for transfer to the south in accordance with quotas set by Addis Ababa.'°' 
Aid was the bait, and the presence of international NGOs imbued the program with an element 
of legitimacy and security; some NGOs and UN agencies even assisted in the deportation 
process, espousing the government rationale about preventing future famines. To facilitate the 
deportations the government requisitioned trucks and cash meant for famine relief in the north, 
and food was withheld from those who refused to leave. Jason Clay noted that 'in some 
camps the Ethiopian government did not allow children to receive food from Western agencies 
until their parents agreed to be resettled. MSF eventually left Ethiopia after an estimated 6,000 
children died in a camp where they had adequate materials for assistance but were not 
allowed to distribute them because, according to government officials, a sufficient number of 
adults had not agreed to be resettled. "' 
The populations were transported in deplorable conditions to the south. No effort was made to 
keep families, villages or ethnic groups together. Many died en route. Almost all destination 
villages lacked infrastructure, and the new arrivals were required to clear land and construct 
their shelter. Due to the lack of health care and sanitation, tropical disease inflicted a high toll 
on the weakened population. A US Agency for International Development (USAID) survey in 
two sites in Pawe found mortality rates to be 7 -15 /10,000 /day from illness and malnutrition, 
and subsequent data indicated that between October 1985 and January 1986, nearly one 
quarter of the 85,000 people in Pawe died.'' The aid agency Concern recorded a similar 
statistic for other sites and estimated that 100,000 of the 500,000 people transferred had 
died."' Many other settlers fled to Sudan as refugees. Clay suggests that resettlement may 
have become the single most important cause of mortality in Ethiopia in 1985. "' 
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Donor governments are also not averse to using humanitarian action to influence a 
population. The US Food for Peace Program was created not to reduce hunger but to 
increase US influence abroad and reduce US agricultural subsidíes.152 Donors and host 
governments sometimes use aid to encourage refugee repatriation. Food rations are 
reduced, camp closure threatened, and assistance packages offered as incentives to 
stimulate repatriation. Pressure from the Kenyan Government to close the Somali 
refugee camps in 1993, for example, prompted UNHCR to develop a program to 
encourage refugees to return to Somalia. Combined with announcements of intention to 
close the refugee camps and the provision of a three month ration pack, issued upon 
return of the camp ration card, UNHCR funded and implemented Quick Impact Projects 
inside Somalia to create conditions conducive to refugee return. 
From the preceding discussion, it is evident that the paradoxes of humanitarian action 
are not a recent phenomenon. This section began by suggesting that modern 
humanitarian action is imbued with the potential to prolong conflict, and the ensuing 
discussion identified some of the factors that support this. The prominence of 
humanitarian issues in the 1990s has increased scrutiny of humanitarian assistance: it 
has been accused of fuelling and prolonging conflict with increased frequency, although 
not necessarily substance. Thus it is worth briefly discussing these claims before turning 
to an analysis of the perceived responsibility of humanitarian aid organisations for the 
consequences of their actions. 
2.5 Is Aid Significant to the Conduct of War? 
Debates over the impact of aid in specific conflicts have simmered within the 
humanitarian community since Biafra, where Ian Smillie claims that aid `prolonged the 
war by 18 months' De Waal argues that `the humanitarian effort prolonged the war, 
and with it human suffering' in Ethiopia in 1984 and 1985,1$3 and the organisation with 
which he is affiliated, Africa Rights, similarly claims that in the Sudan `relief is 
prolonging the war, by constraining the military strategies of each side, and contributing 
152 Smith, `Relief Operations and Military Strategy', p. 99. 
Ian Smillie, The Alms Bazaar: Altruism Under Fire - Non -Profit Organisations and International 
Development (London: Intermediate Technology Publications, 1995), p. 104. 
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to a stalemate'.155 William DeMars, however, refutes the charge with regard to Ethiopia, 
arguing that aid influenced the course of the conflict, but not the length.156 Adam Roberts 
also questions the importance of aid to belligerents, suggesting that `frequently the 
provision of humanitarian assistance is merely neutral, enabling non -combatants to 
survive, but not fundamentally affecting the duration let alone the outcome of a war'.`" 
Whether humanitarian assistance prolongs conflict is difficult to prove: one can 
ascertain how aid assisted belligerents, but how conflict would have proceeded without 
it can only be surmised. In spite of the difficulties, generalised assertions that 
`humanitarian aid is becoming a major factor in the continuation of conflicts758 are 
taken as a given in some quarters, with no substantiating evidence apparently necessary. 
Luttwak provides some elaboration: `by intervening to help, NGOs systematically 
impede the progress of their [the retreating side's] enemies towards a decisive victory 
that could end the war. Sometimes NGOs, impartial to a fault, even help both sides, thus 
preventing mutual exhaustion and a resulting settlement'. 159 But one author uses the 
same argument in reverse, arguing that relief operations `help stalemate wars by 
protecting and sustaining the populations of all warring parties, thus making a 
diplomatic settlement more probable than the total victory of one side' .164 Even 
Anderson provides little more than anecdotes to claim that `evidence from many areas 
shows that aid more often exacerbates and feeds conflict than helps to reduce it'.161 
The unsubstantiated and generalised nature of these claims has provoked a backlash 
within some sections of the humanitarian community. John Borton, for example, 
criticises the emphasis on humanitarian action in conflict in isolation from other factors: 
155 Humanitarianism Unbound? Current Dilemmas Facing Multi- Mandated Relief Operations in 
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Whilst there have been many instances where humanitarian aid has been 
hijacked and diverted to the benefit of warring factions, the empirical evidence 
is simply not available to warrant a focus upon humanitarian aid `doing no 
harm' as against harm done by, say, other states, business interests, illegal and 
semi -legal trading activities (tropical hardwoods, drugs, precious stones, etc) 
and arms traders. The manipulation and occasional diversion of relief aid have 
wrongly been equated with an analysis of the war economy. In most, if not all, 
conflicts the role of humanitarian aid as a source of support for warring 
factions has probably been slight.162 
Borton is justified in his concern about the lack of evidence to support claims that aid 
prolongs conflict - cognisant of the imbalance, this thesis situates humanitarian 
assistance within the larger context of sources sustaining conflicts in the following case 
studies. But Borton's suggestion that the relative harm of aid is slight compared to other 
factors does not in itself absolve aid organisations of responsibility for the repercussions 
of their acts. Political, business and military actors hold primary responsibility for the 
pursuit and outcome of conflicts, and their contributions are undoubtedly more 
significant than those of humanitarian actors. But the raison d'être of humanitarian 
assistance is the alleviation of suffering. Thus if such action contradicts this purpose by 
causing harm, then a focus on this issue is indeed warranted. 
3. HUMANITARIAN ACTION AND RESPONSIBILITY 
The paradoxes of humanitarian action raise important questions about the responsibility 
of humanitarian actors for the people in whose name they intervene, and for the 
consequences of their acts. To whom or what do aid agencies owe primary 
responsibility: to beneficiaries, donors, the board of directors, the membership, the 
organisational charter, or to international humanitarian law? What constitutes 
responsible behaviour when confronted with moral dilemmas ?163 What are the 
responsibilities of humanitarian aid organisations to the people under their care? If a 
refugee camp or safety zone is attacked because it harboured insurgents, who is 
responsible for the death of civilians sheltering therein? Are aid organisations 
'62 John Borton, The State of the International Humanitarian System (London: Briefing Paper, Overseas 
Development Institute, March 1998), p. 3. 
163 Hugo Slim highlights the distinction between a genuine moral dilemma and a tough choice that 
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implicated in the fate of refugees by virtue of their participation in a system that failed to 
protect them? 
Responsibility is a complex notion. These questions invoke several aspects of the term: 
responsibility as accountability and liability; responsibility as task and duty; 
responsibility as virtue in terms of behaving responsibly; and causal responsibility for a 
certain outcome.'64 The common parlance of the international relief system generally 
refers to a narrow conception of `accountability' and rarely engages in broader 
discussions of ethical responsibility beyond reference to various Codes of Conduct. 
`Responsibility' is more often used in relation to the actors outside the humanitarian 
domain. Hence for the purposes of this discussion, a distinction is made between 
institutions of accountability and broader conceptions of moral responsibility that 
encompasses duties, tasks and virtue. Reflecting on the `dark side' of aid and the moral 
dilemmas and tough choices confronting aid organisations, Hugo Slim affirms that `the 
challenge for relief agencies is to determine the proper limits of their moral 
responsibility for this dark side, and then make all efforts to mitigate against it in their 
programmes'.165 How they determine these limits is open to debate. The following 
discussion outlines the normative positions underpinning the different approaches of 
humanitarian action. 
3.1 Conceptions of Responsibility 
Ideas about the responsibility of aid organisations for the consequences of their actions 
are intrinsically linked to conceptions of the purpose and limits of humanitarian action. 
The perceived `new' complexity of the 1990s environment and failures of humanitarian 
action prompted considerable introspection by aid organisations on the role of 
humanitarian action and the appropriateness of traditional humanitarian principles to 
today's environment. A spectrum of positions has emerged, ranging from the 
between two wrongs. Hugo Slim, `Doing the Right Thing: Relief Agencies, Moral Dilemmas and 
Moral Responsibility in Political Emergencies and War', Disasters 21, No. 3 (1997): 244 -257. 
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reaffirmation of the classic approach by ICRC in its Avenir project,1b° to initiatives 
aimed at integrating humanitarian action within a broad political approach to conflict 
management.167 
Exploring the spectrum, at one end is the `humanitarian imperative', which privileges 
the duty to alleviate human suffering over all other considerations. Although recognising 
that there may be adverse side effects of the provision of humanitarian assistance, strict 
advocates of the right to give and receive aid subordinate other concerns to this 
fundamental task. Responsibility is first and foremost conceived as the fulfilment of this 
objective; what happens beyond that is the responsibility of others. Humanitarian action 
at its inception aimed to protect and heal wounded combatants, and whether they 
returned to combat, hence potentially prolonging the conflict, was for politicians and 
rule- makers to decide. The task of humanitarian action was to relieve their suffering and 
the responsibility of aid organisations was limited to accomplishing this task. 
Providing aid in a neutral and impartial manner is considered essential in the Red Cross 
movement to fulfil the humanitarian imperative. Making no adverse distinction between 
beneficiaries and basing aid entirely on need universalises the `right' to humanitarian 
assistance. Neutrality of action is deemed necessary to retain the confidence of all 
parties to a conflict and facilitate humanitarian access. Adhering to these principles and 
gaining consent of parties to the conflict are preconditions for a `right' of humanitarian 
initiative under international law. However, the appropriateness of adhering to these 
principles under all circumstances has been challenged by other aid organisations. 
At one level, acting in an impartial fashion is not compatible with retaining an image of 
neutrality. The perceptions of neutrality held by belligerents are the practical measure of 
neutrality,166 and if the needs on one side of a conflict are greater than on the other, as 
they often are, aid will be directed disproportionately to one side. Considering the 
`paradoxes' outlined above, one party to the conflict is likely to gain greater benefits 
from aid than the other. States that declare neutrality in an international conflict face a 
166 See The ICRC's Avenir project': Challenges, mission and strategy, 12 December 1997 (14/11/99) 
htt p: / /www.icrc.ore/icrcena.nsf/5... /07121 b3f3a4de9d0412565750049a1f8 ?OnenDocument 
167 For a more indepth discussion of different approaches to the ethical issues involved in humanitarian 
action see Des Gasper, 'Drawing a Line' - Ethical and Political Strategies in Complex Emergency 
Assistance (The Hague: Working Paper Series No. 302, Institute of Social Studies, October I999). 
16a Roberts, Humanitarian Action in War, p. 52. 
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similar problem. Under international law they are permitted to retain normal patterns of 
trade with both belligerents, but since trade is rarely equal between states, one side 
benefits more than another. To cease trade with both sides will simply reverse the 
advantage.'tm In situations of total war, neutrality is also impossible: `the fact of keeping 
people alive in an internal war is a political act and deserves to be recognised as such'.10 
An ICRC delegate expressed the limits of this principle in the former Yugoslavia: 
`neutrality, of which we are so proud, is for them something impossible. We hear even 
from ministers: if you are not with us, you are against us'. "' 
At another level some critics take issue with the morality of retaining a neutral position 
when faced with absolute wrong.12 Even the UN's official report on the fall of 
Srebrenica in 1995, describing it as `a horror without parallel in the history of Europe 
since the Second World War', concludes that the UN's global commitment to ending 
conflict does not preclude moral judgements, but makes them necessary. "' Can aid 
agencies be bystanders to abuses and avoid making judgements in the name of not 
taking sides? On the one hand the thoughts of the Holocaust survivor towards the man at 
the window who watched his Jewish neighbours deported in Elie Wiesel's novel The 
Town Beyond the Wall, provide a poignant reminder of the perverse side of neutrality. 
This was the thing I had wanted to understand ever since the war. Nothing else. 
How a human being can remain indifferent. The executioners I understood; 
also the victims, though with more difficulty. But the others, all the others, 
those who were neither for nor against, those who sprawled in passive patience, 
those who told themselves, "The storm will blow over and everything will be 
normal again ", those who thought themselves above the battle, those who were 
permanently and merely spectators - all those were closed to me, 
incomprehensible. And as often happens I saw all those neutrals in the features 
of a single face: the spectator across from the synagogue. " 
But aid organisations are not merely bystanders, they are active participants in attempts 
to alleviate suffering. Thus is their responsibility greater or less, if their intentions are 
good? ICRC argues that humanitarians cannot play judge and jury in the field, and 
'69 See Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 234 -238 for a discussion of neutrality in this sense. 
10 Duffield and Prendergast, Without Troops & Tanks, p. 162. 
"' Beat Schweizer as cited in Maillard, Nous sommes arrivés aux limites du tenable', p. 16. 
12 See for example, Rony Brauuran, Devant le Mal: Rwanda. Un Génocide en Direct (Paris: Arléa, 
1994). 
173 Report of the Secretary- General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35: The fall of 
Srebrenica, paragraph 506. 
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cannot hold a population collectively responsible for the actions of its leaders by 
choosing to aid only one side. Humanitarian neutrality is also an operational tool, 
deemed essential to avoid giving belligerents a pretext to prevent access and threaten aid 
workers.15 The silence that necessarily accompanies a position of neutrality has been 
criticised in the past as a form of complicity, but ICRC rejects such claims. The 
President, Cornelio Sommuruga stated, `I will never accept to hear that because we 
conduct things discreetly and with primary concern for the victims, we are accomplices 
to whatever it is'.16 ICRC does not, he maintains, stay silent at all cost, but will only 
speak publicly when it is in the interests of the victim to do so. Furthermore, Urs Boegli 
points out that publicly denouncing human rights abuses to journalists is easier than 
raising them behind closed doors with the military leaders responsible. '77 While many 
agencies engage in the former, only ICRC consistently attempts the latter. 
Questions about the possibility and pertinence of safeguarding neutrality in 
humanitarian action are key issues in the reconceptualisation of humanitarian issues in 
the 1990s. Many observers suggest that neutrality was an uncontroversial issue during 
the Cold War that has only recently become the subject of debate.'78 Forsythe went as far 
as to suggest that: 
most PVOs [private voluntary organisations] are free from any taint of 
strategic, factional, or partisan politics... there is no logical reason to assume 
that a private organization oriented to humanitarian concerns would have any 
interest in, or obligation to, U.S. strategic or economic goals.19 
The case studies presented in the following chapters, however, provide a very different 
picture, at least of the actions of aid organisations, if not the discourse. It is true that 
there was less open debate surrounding these issues in previous decades. But as many 
174 Elie Wiesel, The Town Beyond the Wall trans. by Stephen Becker (London: Robson Books, 1975), p. 
149. 
175 Statement from Urs Boegli, Head of Media Services of ICRC in `Open Forum', Humanitarian Affairs 
Review No. 3 (Autumn, 1998): 4 -6. 
176 Sommuruga in Massimo Lorenzi, Le CICR, le coeur et la raison: Entretiens avec Cornelio 
Sommaruga, Président du Comité international de la Croix Rouge (Lausanne: Favre, 1998), p. 24. 
177 Comments made by Urs Boegli, Head of Media Unit, ICRC Geneva at a conference `From the Boer 
War to Kosovo - Humanitarian Action and Media Coverage', Sydney, 14 September 1999. 
O8 See for example, Duffield and Prendergast, Without Troops & Tanks, p. 11; Thomas G. Weiss, 
`Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action', Ethics and International Affairs 13 (1999): 1 -22 at p. 
1. 
179 David P. Forsythe, `Humanitarian Assistance in U.S. Foreign Policy, 1947 -1987', in Bruce Nichols 
and Gil Loescher (eds), The Moral Nation: Humanitarianism and U.S. Foreign Policy Today (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), pp. 63 -90 at p. 83. 
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organisations shed the pretence of a neutral humanitarian past, they have embraced 
different and sometimes expanded concepts of what constitutes humanitarian action 
today, and the responsibilities that accompany it. 
Towards the middle of the spectrum lie a range of positions that assume some 
responsibility for their actions by weighing up the good versus the potential harm that 
results from humanitarian action. Whether decisions should be based on doing more 
good than harm, doing no more than a minimum amount of harm regardless of the total 
good, or ensuring that no harm is done, is open to debate. Anderson posits that it is 
possible to do no harm if aid organisations learn and employ lessons of past 
experience.180 Yet what if the harm outweighs the good? Few aid agencies are ready to 
abandon the humanitarian imperative and stop providing aid, even then. Anderson 
argues that `it is a moral and logical fallacy to conclude that because aid can do harm, a 
decision not to give aid would do no harm. In reality, a decision to withhold aid from 
people in need would have unconscionable negative ramifications'.181 Apart from the 
obvious problem with the zero -sum nature of this argument, it denies the possibility that 
in some cases aid can be turned against the people it was intended to assist. Rony 
Brauman makes a compelling argument in favour of the positive ethical implications of 
refusing to act. Recalling Solzhenitsyn's question throughout the Gulag Archipelago 
`Oh, why didn't we ever say no ?', Brauman illustrates that acquiescence may be 
submission and refusal may be courage; that `any plan of action must incorporate the 
idea that abstention is not necessarily an abdication but may, on the contrary, be a 
decision.''82 Some of the most abhorrent episodes in history have depended upon the 
silent acceptance of the status quo and mechanical obedience to authority. 
Africa Rights also criticises the aversion of aid organisations to set limits of acceptable 
compromise, instead prioritising operationality and access over considerations of human 
rights and advocacy. It argues that 'a silent witness to an abuse is necessarily a complicit 
witness'.183 Hence the organisation advocates a rights -based approach to humanitarian 
action which privileges solidarity with the victims of oppression. It calls for human 
leo Anderson, Do No Harm, p. 3. 
lsl. ibid., p. 2. 
182 Rony Brauman, `Refugees Camps, Population Transfers, and NGOs', in Jonathan Moore (ed.), Hard 
Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention (Lanham, Md: Rowman and Littlefield, 
1998), pp. 177 -193 at p. 192. 
183 Humanitarianism Unbound ?, pp. 26 -27. 
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rights objectivity and a greater sharing of risk with the people with whom solidarity is 
expressed. Whether objective solidarity is possible is open to conjecture, and needs to 
be considered in light of the case studies to follow. Furthermore, the issue of whether to 
prioritise access to victims or advocacy in favour of human rights is bound up with 
questions of duty versus impact. If the `international community' is aware that human 
rights abuses are occurring but is unwilling to stop them, should aid organisations risk 
their potential access to victims to denounce the abuses? Should advocacy be conducted 
as a good in itself, or in relation to the change it might bring? 
At the other end of the spectrum, there is an increasing number of initiatives among 
NGOs, donors and the UN to expand the scope and responsibility of humanitarian action 
into areas beyond the short -term alleviation of suffering. Initial concerns to avoid 
supplanting local capacities have extended into notions of building local capabilities and 
ensuring that humanitarian action is more in tune with development goals, even at the 
early stages of crisis intervention. Anderson and Prendergast seek to turn the harmful 
`side- effects' of aid into positive `side- effects' through programming aid to reduce 
rather than exacerbate social inequalities, and Prendergast suggests that aid should 
contribute to conflict prevention and peace -building. 
At the operational level, donors and aid agencies can move beyond treating the 
symptoms of crises and use aid to mitigate conflict and address the economic 
disruptions at the root of complex emergencies. NGOs and donor agencies must 
continue to be more flexible in removing often artificial barriers between relief 
and development activities.184 
The idea of linking humanitarian action to conflict prevention and resolution activities 
has gained currency in the mid- 1990s, particularly in areas of protracted conflict in 
which the provision of humanitarian aid seems interminable. Afghanistan is the site of 
the most ambitious attempt to link political and humanitarian strategies into a common 
`Strategic Framework' of the UN that plans to integrate humanitarian assistance into 
political endeavours aimed at `a just and sustainable peace'.185 The humanitarian 
imperative prevails in principle, but the plan states that since aid `clearly has not 
contributed, and is unlikely to contribute, to peace -building ...a more structured, 
184 Prendergast, Frontline Diplomacy, p. 111. 
185 Strategic Framework for Afghanistan endorsed by UN Agencies (Reliefweb: United Nations, 4 
January 1999 http: / /www.reliefweb.int). 
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coherent, coordinated and principled approach is required'.186 Asserting leadership of the 
international response, the UN stipulates that its international partners must agree to 
speak with one voice on all issues of principle and collectively apply human rights 
conditionality to the assistance program. Minear claims that this is to reduce the 
`cacophony of individual agency voices which in the past have undermined a unified 
and consistent message and approach', and will minimise the extent to which aid 
agencies are played off against one another by belligerents.1R7 
The Strategic Framework for Afghanistan is one initiative in a recent shift by donor 
governments towards an integrated and holistic approach to foreign aid in disrupted 
states that marks a radical shift from the limits of responsibility set by the classic ICRC 
approach to humanitarian action. The new agenda is exemplified in the policy statement 
and guidelines of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD on 
Conflict, Peace and Development,1S8 which Peter Uvin suggests is one of the clearest and 
most authoritative statements on the new mandate of aid.189 Recognising that aid has a 
political impact regardless of its intentions, this approach assumes responsibility for 
these pro -actively by steering aid towards longer -term objectives and solutions. It is, in 
effect, applying subtle and overt forms of conditionality to aid, creating incentives and 
disincentives to influence the behaviour of actors and the context in which conflict and 
peace occurs. 
Applying conditionality to aid is not new: funds given by the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank and through bilateral development programs have been used to 
influence the behaviour of governments for decades. The principles of humanitarian 
action, however, were designed to guard against the use of humanitarian assistance to 
induce political or religious compliance. Establishing a line of acceptable compromise 
and an ethic of refusal is a form of conditionality, but one based on respect of 
humanitarian principles and security guarantees. The new agenda moves beyond these 
86 ibid. 
187 Larry Minear, Report to the Headquarters Colloquium on the InterAgency Strategic Framework 
Mission to Afghanistan (Reliefweb: Brown University, 31 December 1998 htto: / /www.reliefweb.int). 
188 Development Assistance Committee (DAC), Conflict, Peace and Development Co- operation on the 
Threshold of the 21s` Century: Policy Statement (Paris: OECD, May 1997) and Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC), Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co- operation (Paris: 
OECD, 1997). 
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into areas of conflict transformation and `good governance' in the shape of government 
practices and procedures, and respect for human rights. 
Apart from the obvious impact of this expanded and openly politicised 
reconceptualisation of humanitarian action for the basic principles of neutrality, 
impartiality and independence of humanitarian action, the `good governance' agenda 
raises many other ethical issues. Assuming that donor governments have an obligation 
to their tax- payers to ensure that aid is used effectively and in accordance with its stated 
purpose, who establishes the priorities for aid and on what criteria are they based? Is 
`good governance' genuinely about accountable and humane government, or primarily 
in the interest of Western transnational capital ?1fl° How appropriate to all societies are 
the practices of popular election and the existence of formal democratic institutions that 
are implicit in the concept of `good governance'? Will such practices engender peace? 
Michael Mann recently discussed the dark side of `we the people', providing a potent 
reminder of how many modern democratic states have been `cleansed' of `the other' as 
they modernised.191 Even the broadly accepted goal of promoting human rights is not 
without ethical implications, particularly the way that such standards are inconsistently 
applied. Human rights violations in Indonesia have been tolerated far more than in sub - 
Saharan Africa.192 Determining where humanitarian action stops and development starts 
is a crucial issue in determining the principal duties of each. 
Finally, moving beyond responsibility as task and duty, deliberations about whether aid 
organisations acted responsibly and can be held to account for the consequences of their 
actions involve considerations of prior knowledge, and of capacity to have acted 
differently. Decisions are made on the basis of available information, and aid 
organisations are only fully responsible for actions made accordingly. However, if 
necessary information did exist and the agency did not obtain it when it could 
189 Peter Uvin, The Influence of Aid in Situations of Violent Conflict (Paris: Informal Task Force on 
Conflict, Peace and Development Co- operation, Development Assistance Committee, OECD, 1999), 
p. 2. 
19° Yash Tandon, `Reclaiming Africa's Agenda: Good Govemance and the Role of NGOs in the African 
Context', Australian Journal of International Affairs 50, No. 3 (1996): 293 -303. 
191 Michael Mann, `The Dark Side of Democracy: The Modem Tradition of Ethnic and Political 
Cleansing', New Left Review No. 235 (1999): 18 -45. 
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reasonably have been expected to, then it is guilty of avoidable ignorance.19; Similarly, 
aid agencies are only morally responsible for an outcome if they had the capacity to have 
acted differently. Here the full range of possible action needs to be taken into account, 
including the choice of refusal which, as noted above, is often overlooked. 
The most concerted attempts to enhance ethical responsibility across the diverse range 
of aid organisations have been through various `Codes of Conduct' to which aid 
organisations are expected to adhere.196 Designed to state publicly the standards of 
behaviour to which aid organisations commit, they have served to enhance awareness of 
humanitarian principles, and the ways in which principles are applied to field 
operations. Their value, however, is marred by several shortcomings.195 First, they do not 
discuss the type of questions that aid organisations need to consider to formulate a 
humanitarian ethos. Apart from the primacy of the humanitarian imperative, no attempt 
is made to establish a hierarchy of moral principles to provide guidance when principles 
clash. Agencies may assign different values to each, depending upon the circumstances, 
but a description of the factors to consider could assist aid organisations recognise the 
broad extent of responsibilities. Second, some of the codes, like that of the Australian 
Council for Overseas Aid, are skewed towards the rights of donors rather than the rights 
of beneficiaries. Many institutional donors have embraced the codes as a mechanism of 
accountability, requiring adherence as a pre -requisite of funding. Rather than a starting 
point from which to inspire greater responsibility within the aid community, the codes 
have in many respects become a tool of defence against external criticism. Indicative of 
the views of many aid organisations, the instructions sent by CARE Australia to 
193 Slim, `Doing the Right Thing', p. 253. 
194 The most widely acknowledged is the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, developed in 1994. National NGO umbrella 
organisations, such as the Australian Council for Overseas Aid, and the American InterAction have 
developed a `Code of Conduct' and an 'NGO Field Cooperation Protocol' respectively; and the 
World Conference on Religion and Peace drafted the Mohonk Criteria in 1994. In addition, 
academics have published guidelines such as the Providence Principles of the Humanitarianism and 
War Project of Brown University; The Ten Commandments of Prendergast; the Framework 
Principles of Ramsbotham and Woodhouse; and the Do No Harm blueprint of Anderson. In the field 
specific guidelines have been drawn up by operational agencies including the Principles and 
Protocols of Operation in Liberia in 1995; the Somali Aid Coordination Body Code of Conduct for 
International Rehabilitation and Development Assistance to Somalia; The Code of Conduct for 
Humanitarian Agencies in Sierra Leone, and Principles of Engagement for Humanitarian Assistance 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
195 For deeper discussions of the strengths and weaknesses of the codes of conduct, see Warren 
Lancaster, `The Code of Conduct: whose code, whose conduct ?', Journal of Humanitarian 
Assistance http:// www- jha.sps.cam.ac.uk/a/a645.htm (posted 18 April 1998); Nick Leader, `Codes of 
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Australian NGOs at the launch in January 1999 of the Sphere Project for minimum 
standards in emergency relief stipulated that `global cooperation' among agencies 
should be emphasised to ensure that the media does not focus on `the need for minimum 
standards'.196 An image of responsible behaviour is presented externally by signing a 
code, yet few internal mechanisms exist to ensure compliance. 
3.2 Institutions of Accountability 
Responsibility within the aid community is primarily conceptualised in terms of 
accountability. Efforts to improve the performance of humanitarian action are the central 
tenet of this focus, with emphasis on managerial `best practice', minimum technical 
standards in the provision of relief, and evaluation of aid programs to judge efficiency 
and effectiveness, and to facilitate learning. A recent paper exemplified the prevailing 
notion of accountability: `demonstrating that an agency or the system showed the best 
possible performance in a given context, and incorporated past lessons in that 
performance'. 197 
The landmark Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda provided stimulus 
to a range of initiatives aimed at enhancing `best practice' . An Active Learning Network 
on Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Assistance (ALNAP) was formed 
to `improve the quality and accountability of humanitarian assistance programmes by 
providing a forum for the identification and dissemination of best practice and the 
building of consensus on common approaches'.198 Minear considers the lack of 
accountability of aid organisations to be one of the main constraints to lessons learned,'" 
and evaluations are emerging as a primary mechanism through which the international 
relief system aims to improve accountability and performance.200 ALNAP provides a 
database of evaluations to facilitate dissemination of acquired knowledge: twenty -five 
Conduct: Who Needs Them ?', Relief and Rehabilitation Network Newsletter 13 (March 1999): 1 -4 
and subsequent critiques of specific codes in this volume. 
196 See Fiona Terry, `Code of Conduct of the Australian Council for Overseas Aid', Relief and 
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97 Koenraad Van Brabant, Organisational and Institutional Learning in the Humanitarian Sector: 
Opening the Dialogue (London: Discussion Paper for ALNAP, October 1997), p. 11. 
198 Information Note (London: ALNAP, 1998), p. 2. 
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200 Niels Dabelstein, `Foreword', in Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex 
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separate evaluations of the international response to the Kosovo crisis alone were 
planned or under way in late October 1999. 
In many respects the aid industry is 'professionalising' in recognition of the `right' of 
beneficiaries to a certain quality of care that has been overlooked in the past by zealous 
volunteers, and the need to show donors, both private and government, that their money 
has been used for the purpose it was given. While these are important developments, the 
present focus is skewed towards the effectiveness and efficiency of aid performance, 
rather than overall impact. As mentioned earlier, attempts to quantify the negative 
effects of humanitarian action are rarely attempted, and thus overlook a crucial variable 
in assessing impact. Furthermore, although the need to assess the security situation, 
protection levels, and `humanitarian space' available to aid organisations was recently 
recognised in the OECD evaluation guidelines, no indication was given as to how these 
elements could be evaluated.2ßi It is perhaps not surprising that the focus to date has 
centred on the less contentious areas of performance, particularly the technical provision 
of relief. Evaluating the way in which aid organisations negotiated `humanitarian space' 
with the potential trade -offs and compromises that accompanied efforts to obtain access 
to vulnerable populations is a more difficult task. 
One of the main purposes of evaluation is to facilitate learning in order to improve 
future practice. Most evaluations are conducted at the level of individual organisations 
(either operational agency or institutional donor), or with respect to a specific issue. 
Organisations as such do not learn; it is individuals who learn and assimilate knowledge 
into organisational memory, policies and decision -making procedures. Jack Levy 
explains: 
Organizational learning involves a multistage process in which environmental 
feedback leads to individual learning, which leads to individual action to 
change organizational procedures, which leads to a change in organizational 
behaviour, which leads to further feedback.z°z 
He points out that organisational learning can be blocked at any point in this cycle.z°3 
Learning does not necessarily lead to change and change is not necessarily derived from 
zm Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies, p. 11 and 16. 
2°2 Jack S. Levy, `Learning and foreign policy: sweeping a conceptual minefield', International 
Organisation 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994): 279 -312 at p. 288. 
zo3 ibid. 
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learning; there are a host of other factors that can influence changes in aid organisations, 
particularly the turnover of personnel. Thus evaluations as a tool of learning form only 
one part of the equation: whether they are conducted to be read and considered, or 
whether to fulfil donor requirements of accountability and transparency will be a major 
determinant. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has demonstrated that although there were some important changes 
between the Cold War and post -Cold War periods, the emphasis placed on this 
dichotomy and its associated language of `complexity' is overstated. The euphoric 
optimism at the end of the Cold War gave way to a pessimistic view of the future, and 
the idea that emergencies are more complex now than in the past was embraced as an 
explanation for the difficulties in the provision of relief. This chapter argues that the 
discourse undervalues genuine changes in the nature of conflict that impact upon the 
provision of aid, such as the fragmentation of combatant groups and the criminalisation 
of economic activity. The proliferation of actors and the insertion of aid into the heart of 
conflicts have increased the stakes of humanitarian action in disrupted states, but the 
ethical dilemmas and the choices they impose remain fundamentally the same. The stark 
choices that aid organisations faced in Biafra and Ethiopia echo to varying degrees in 
aid operations today. 
The chapter also demonstrated the need to situate humanitarian action within its broader 
political context to avoid exaggerating or underestimating the role of aid in prolonging 
conflict. Whether belligerents are supported from an external power, or derive revenue 
from local sources, it is important to have an idea of the relative contribution of 
humanitarian aid in order to assess the relative good or harm aid might be causing. How 
then to act on the basis of such knowledge depends a great deal on perceptions of 
responsibility and the extent to which consequences should be weighed against the 
humanitarian imperative. The different priorities that aid organisations have assigned to 
conflicting humanitarian principles are investigated further in the following case studies. 
Some of the questions raised in connection with the task of aid organisations and the 
primacy of principles, solidarity or pragmatism are reconsidered later in the thesis. Since 
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one of the primary aims of this thesis is to understand why the paradoxes of aid persist, 
constraints to institutional learning are also discussed further in Chapter 6. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE AFGHAN REFUGEE CAMPS IN PAKISTAN 
The preceding chapter presented some of the dominant perspectives of the contemporary 
humanitarian context, and questioned the originality of the 'complexity' that is 
emphasised in light of the negative consequences that have accompanied humanitarian 
action since its inception. The next four chapters investigate these paradoxes of 
humanitarian action more deeply in five refugee relief programs. They examine how and 
to what extent humanitarian action assisted combatants in their insurgencies against the 
refugee -generating state. Although some paradoxes were more pronounced than others 
in each case, the chapters demonstrate the persistence and recurrence of the negative 
consequences of humanitarian assistance. They also illustrate that aid organisations were 
aware of the repercussions of their actions, yet held different opinions about the moral 
implications these created. 
This chapter analyses the role of Pakistan as a sanctuary both for refugees and for forces 
resisting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Pakistan was one of the most generous 
and compliant asylum states of the 1980s. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
1979 and during the ten years of Soviet occupation, Pakistan hosted over three million 
Afghan refugees and resistance fighters. The Afghan refugee camps, situated close to 
the Afghan border, served a dual purpose as a refuge for victims of conflict, and as a 
sanctuary in which mujahideen (`Warriors in the Way of God') could rest, recuperate 
and recruit new combatants. 
Dubbed `the world's most effective refugee -warrior community' by Zolberg, Suhrke and 
Aguayo,' the Afghan case demonstrates the complementarity of refugee camps to a 
military sanctuary. Part One of the chapter illustrates that Pakistan was a major conduit 
for financial and military support to the mujahideen, and an active participant in the 
organisation and training of the resistance. The mujahideen received high levels of 
direct support from allies, particularly the United States (US) and Saudi Arabia. Given 
the importance of the military context, this case illustrates that the humanitarian relief 
Aristide R. Zolberg, Astri Suhrke and Sergio Aguayo, Escape From Violence: Conflict and the 
Refugee Crisis in the Developing World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 254. 
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program held only peripheral importance as a source of material supplies to the 
resistance. It demonstrates that the most significant contribution of the refugee camps to 
the resistance was as a source of Iegitimacy for individual Afghan leaders locally and 
internationally. 
One of the striking features of this case is that aid organisations recognised aspects of 
the dual role of the camps, yet there was little debate concerning the ethical issues this 
raised, or the implications for the safety of the refugees. Instead there was broad 
tolerance of the ambiguous camp functions by the aid community, journalists and 
academics alike.' Part Three explores the attitudes of the aid organisations, to shed light 
on the reasons why they tolerated the mujahideen using the refugee camps. It 
investigates the widespread belief among aid agencies of the justness of the Afghan 
cause, which over -rode concerns to ensure the purely civilian character of the refugee 
camps. It also examines the relevance of refugee law and norms of refugee assistance 
when applied to a Muslim population; the notion of migration and refuge in Islam is 
different to the refugee representation in international law. It argues that the level of 
refugee agency in the resistance to the Soviet- backed regime in Kabul was under- 
estimated by the aid organisations in Pakistan. 
1. PAKISTAN AS A MILITARY SANCTUARY 
The Afghan resistance movement of the mujahideen had all the necessary criteria for an 
armed insurgency. A loyal support base inside Afghanistan provided food, shelter, 
information and recruits to the resistance; the geographical terrain of Afghanistan 
favoured guerrilla warfare; ideological unity in Islam inspired the ultimate dedication of 
combatants;' external patrons financed and promoted the cause internationally; and 
neighbouring countries provided sanctuaries to which the guerrillas could withdraw and 
2 The unquestioned acceptance of the politicisation of humanitarian aid is illustrated well by its absence 
from the agenda or discussion at an international symposium held in 1987 on the domestic and 
foreign implications of the Afghan refugee crisis. The symposium attracted some 180 participants 
from 20 countries who were directly and indirectly involved in the refugee issue. See The Crisis of 
Migration from Afghanistan: Domestic and Foreign Implications (Oxford: Summary of the 
Proceedings of an International Symposium, co- sponsored by the Refugee Studies Programme and the 
Department of Ethnology and Prehistory at Oxford University, 29 March to 2 April 1987). 
3 For a detailed discussion of the history, ideology and politics of Islam in Afghanistan see Asta 
Olesen, Islam and Politics in Afghanistan (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1995). 
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resupply.' While Iran provided refuge and backing to Shi'ite resistance groups during 
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan,' it was Pakistan that comprehensively filled the 
role of sanctuary to the mujahideen. 
Pakistan harboured exiled opponents to regimes in Kabul several years before the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan. In 1973 a coup d'état led by Prince Mohammad Daoud, a 
secular Pashtun nationalist, provoked militant Islamists to exile themselves in Pakistan 
where they received training from the Pakistani military. Among these Islamists were 
two men who were to play an increasingly important role in Afghan resistance: Ahmad 
Shah Massoud and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Using Pakistan as a base, they began 
organising clandestine missions into Afghanistan in mid -1975 and tried to incite the 
people into a popular rebellion against the government. Only in the north -east, however, 
was there local support, and the uprising failed, resulting in the capture, imprisonment, 
execution or disappearance of hundreds of militant Islamists and intellectuals. Important 
lessons for future insurgencies were gleaned from this period, including the necessity of 
involving traditional leadership (`ulama) in the campaigns, increasing contacts with the 
rural population, and gaining the support of the army.' The surviving militant leadership 
established offices in Peshawar, the capital of Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), 
which borders Afghanistan (see Map 1). There they divided into two opposing groups: 
one moderate Islamist under the leadership of Burhanuddin Rabbani, and one radical 
Islamist, predominantly Pashtun, under the leadership of Hekmatyar. 
The number of exiled Afghans during this period remained low; only some 1,500 moved 
to Pakistan between 1973 and early 1978. But after a communist coup that brought Nur 
4 Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story (London: Leo 
Cooper, 1992), p. 64. 
5 Iran was also host to more than 2 million refugees, over 1 million of whom were a migrant labour 
force who declined to return to Afghanistan. Although Iran helped to establish and finance four 
Shi'ite resistance groups which operated primarily in the western and central regions of Afghanistan, 
Anwar -ul -Haq Ahady suggests that Iran played a minor role in the Afghan conflict for two reasons. 
First, the Iran-Iraq war erupted within a year of the Soviet invasion and Iran did not want to provoke 
Soviet involvement on Iraq's side. Second, radical clerics had just gained power in Iran and 
concentrated on strengthening the Shi'ite cause rather than the anti- Soviet struggle in Afghanistan. 
Anwar -ul -Haq Ahady, `Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the Conflict in Afghanistan', in William Maley (ed.), 
Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban (London: Hurst and Company, I998), pp. 
117 -134 at p. 119. Merriam also notes that Soviet bombing of villages inside Iran in 1980 probably 
dissuaded Iran from actively providing sanctuary to the Afghan resistance. See John G. Merriam, 
`Arms Shipments to the Afghan Resistance', in G.M. Farr and John G. Merriam (eds), Afghan 
Resistance: The Politics of Survival (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 71 -101 at pp. 91 -92. 
6 Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 
76. 
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Mohammed Taraki to power in April 1978, the exodus increased to 100,000, and rose to 
190,000 following an internal struggle in September 1979 which installed HafizulIah 
Amin as President. The Pakistani -based groups aided opponents of the Taraki -Amin 
regime, although their contribution was negligible in comparison with opposition within 
the country.' It was not until the 1979 Soviet invasion that opposition groups based in 
Pakistan began to play a crucial role in the resistance movement. 
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Pakistan performed three vital functions as a military sanctuary to the Afghan resistance 
following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. First, Pakistani territory was a relatively 
secure and well -equipped rear base for the resistance, and the Inter -Services Intelligence 
Directorate (ISI) of the Pakistani military coordinated and trained mujahideen units. 
Second, Pakistan was a conduit for weapons and financial support supplied to the 
Afghan resistance. And third, Pakistan facilitated political organisation among the 
resistance parties. Although actively strengthening the Afghan resistance, Pakistani 
authorities maintained almost complete control over mujahideen activities in Pakistan, 
and often pursued contradictory policies of enhancing unity among the parties on the 
one hand, and discriminatory practices to divide them on the other. 
Throughout the 1980s, Pakistan's Afghan policy was principally determined by the ISI, 
with strong influence in political matters from the main Pakistani Islamic party, 
Jama'at -e Islami. The ISI allocated weapons to the various resistance factions, and, 
according to the former head of the Afghan division of the ISI, Mohammad Yousaf, 
trained as many as 80,000 mujahideen between 1983 and 1987 on Pakistani territory.' 
Yousaf claims that that the number of training camps in Pakistan grew from two in 1983 
to seven in 1987 - four near Peshawar and three near Quetta in Baluchistan Province - 
catering for up to 20,000 mujahideen per year from 1984.E 
The bulk of arms and ammunition channelled to the mujahideen through Pakistan prior 
to 1985 were purchased in China to reduce the visibility of Western aid to the resistance. 
After 1985, supplies were augmented by shipments from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the US 
and, surprisingly, IsraeI.10 The US and Saudi Arabia were the largest financial backers of 
the resistance. As the first instance of Soviet aggression outside Eastern Europe, 
Washington viewed the invasion of Afghanistan as a prelude to Soviet expansion 
throughout Southwest Asia." The Carter Administration launched covert support to the 
Afghan resistance, and increased military aid to Pakistan. Thirty million dollars was 
$ Yousaf and Adkin, The Bear Trap, p. 117. It is possible that this figure has been inflated for political 
reasons. 
9 ibid. See pp. 115 -127 for details of the training programs. 
0 Apparently the weapons sold by Israel were captured during Israel's invasion of Lebanon. They were 
purchased with American funds in secrecy since the Arab nations would not have accepted to fight a 
Jihad (Struggle for the Faith) with weapons bought from Israel. See Yousaf and Adkin, pg. 83 -84 and 
81 -96 for more details of arms shipments to the resistance. Also see J. Bruce Amstutz, Afghanistan: 
The First Five Years of Occupation (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1986), pp. 202- 
214. 
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allocated to the mujahideen in 1980, which increased to $50 million in 1981. Under the 
Reagan Administration, this grew to $120 million by 1984; $250 million in 1985; $470 
million in 1986, and $630 million in 1987.12 Pakistan's loyalty was also assured by a 
massive injection of funds: despite the former objections of the US to Pakistan's plans 
to develop a nuclear weapons capability, Washington offered a $400 million short-term 
military aid package to President Zia ul -Haq's government, which was increased to a 
five -year $3.2 billion military aid program in 1981.'3 
Funds from Saudi Arabia to the Afghan resistance closely matched those given by the 
US.14 Saudi motives for such support were tied to concerns about Soviet intentions in the 
Persian Gulf; aggression against an Islamic state; and Saudi Arabia's leadership in the 
Muslim world which was threatened by the Islamic Revolution in Iran.t5 Actively 
financing the Afghan resistance was a way to assert Saudi leadership among Islamic 
countries, and provided an opportunity to promote the Sunni Islamist parties through 
cooperation with the Jama'at -e Islami in Pakistan. 
The ISI was predominantly concerned with Afghan military affairs, but these were 
closely linked to the political organisation of the resistance after 1983. The discovery of 
a lucrative smuggling operation involving several mujahideen commanders and the 
Quetta branch of the ISI, precipitated a major change from direct ISI allocations of 
weapons and finance to field commanders in Afghanistan, to the channelling of all 
supplies through the seven recognised political parties based in Peshawar.16 Thereafter 
mujahideen commanders were required to commit allegiance to a party in order to 
receive supplies. Few of the party leaders had ever fought in Afghanistan, however, and 
only Mohammad Yunis Khalis and Rabbani" had territorial bases to their power. Most 
11 Although declassified Soviet documents now show such fears to have been unwarranted. 
12 Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the 
International System (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 180. 
13 Ted Galen Carpenter, `The Unintended Consequences of Afghanistan', World Policy Journal 11, No. 
1 (1994): 76 -87 at p. 77. 
14 Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, p. 180. 
S Ahady, `Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the Conflict in Afghanistan', p. 118. 
16 The parties were: Jamiat -e Islami, led by Rabbani; Hezb -e Islami (H) led by Heloaatyar; Hezb -e 
Islami (K), led by Mohammad Yunis Khalis; Harakat -e Ingilab -e Islami, led by Mohammad Nabi 
Mohammadi; The National Islamic Front for Afghanistan, led by Sayyid Ahmad Gailani; and the 
Afghanistan National Liberation Front, led by Sebghatullah Mojadeddi. The seventh party, Abdul 
Rasul Sayyaf's Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan was later recognised by the ISI due to 
its significant backing from Saudi Arabia. For more information on the parties and the profiles of the 
leaders see Olesen, Islam and Politics in Afghanistan, pp. 283 -292. 
" Rabbani's relationship with Massoud accorded him a territorial base in the Panjshir Valley. 
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of the 200 or so commanders in the field were `disdainful of party officials who have sat 
out the war in Peshawar' .1e Nevertheless, they became dependent upon the parties for 
arms and finance, and their allegiances were forged on the basis of ethnic or tribal 
loyalty, religious conviction and, to a considerable extent, opportunism. 
The empowerment of the Peshawar -based political leaders with discretionary allocation 
of weapons and finance to field commanders helped forge an image of a united 
resistance while maintaining Pakistan's strong influence through government controls 
and the Jama'at -e Islami. Although more than 20 Afghan resistance parties had formed 
in Peshawar and Quetta by 1980,19 the Pakistani government only recognised the seven 
based in Peshawar. The others were incorporated in a recognised party, or disbanded. 
Four of the parties were strongly Islamist," and three were traditionalist, advocating a 
return to the clan and tribal ties of the past. Pakistan forbade any secular political parties 
to operate on Pakistani soil, and denied the exiled King, Mohammad Zahir Shah, or any 
member of the royal family access to the resistance movement or the refugees in 
Pakistan." The Pakistani government also refused to allow the resistance to form a 
government -in- exile. 
Pakistan's rationale for controlling the resistance movement on its soil was twofold. 
First, General Zia had personal experience of the potential security threat posed by a 
strong and united resistance movement to a host country, having been a military adviser 
in Jordan during Black September in 1970. The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) 
had been a unified, almost autonomous, organisation and nearly succeeded in 
overthrowing the monarch of the host nation, King Hussein. 
Second, an irredentist movement had been active in Pakistan since the 1950s which 
claimed the NWFP of Pakistan as `Pashtunistan'. Pashtun nationalism was strong 
among many in Afghanistan, and Pakistan was keen to suppress such movements. It 
refused to recognise the Pashtun Nationalist Party, Afghan Millat, and gave preference 
18 Marvin G. Weinbaum, `The Politics of Afghan Resettlement and Rehabilitation', Asian Survey 29. 
No. 3 (1989): 287 -307 at p. 291. 
i9 Edward Girardet, Afghanistan: The Soviet War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), p. 167. 
20 Roy argues that the term `Islamist' is preferable to `fundamentalist', since the latter invokes the return 
to a former state based on the pure meaning of the Koranic Scriptures, whilst the Islamists aim to 
create a modem political state based on Islamic ideology. See Roy, Islam and the Resistance in 
Afghanistan, pp. 3 -6. 
21 Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, p. 199. 
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to the Islamist parties over the traditionalist parties in the belief, inter alia, that an 
ideologically- minded Islamist regime installed in Kabul would be less supportive of the 
irredentist demands 22 Olivier Roy contends that the preference for the Islamic parties 
was due less to ideological affinities of the Pakistani government, than to the influence 
of highly placed individuals in Jama'at -e Islami.23 Nevertheless, all observers recognise 
the special position accorded by the ISI to Hekmatyar's radically Islamic party, Hezb -e 
Islami, which received a disproportionate share of military and financial aid, and 
international recognition. 
The Pakistani authorities, through according recognition to certain parties over others, 
and allocating disproportionate finance and weapons to favoured groups, were pursuing 
a policy of divide and rule to avoid `another Palestine'. For the US and Saudi Arabia, 
however, the diplomatic war against the Soviet Union was as important as the military 
one, and unification of the parties was a vital component of such a strategy. Saudí 
Arabia made funding conditional upon the formation of an alliance of unity. Hence, in 
1980, an alliance of five parties (which Hekmatyar's refused to join) formed, but soon 
disintegrated, polarising along Islamist and traditionalist lines. Other attempts to form a 
union were plagued by ethnic, tribal and religious differences among the parties, but in 
1985, under pressure from external supporters and Pakistan,2a a broad alliance was 
formed and named the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen.25 The Soviet withdrawal 
from Afghanistan demonstrated the fragility of the alliance as the parties turned their 
weapons on one another. 
Thus Pakistan performed a crucial role for the Afghan resistance as a conduit for arms 
and finance from external supporters, and in facilitating the political organisation of the 
resistance. But a crucial factor in Pakistan's ability to fulfil such a role was the presence 
of millions of Afghan refugees who had fled to Pakistan. Militarily, they provided an 





Richard P. Cronin, Afghanistan After the Soviet Withdrawal: Contenders for Power (Washington: 
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 1989), p. 12. 
Roy, Islam and the Resistance in Afghanistan, pp. 209 -210. 
According to Yousaf, President Zia personally intervened to insist. on the 1985 alliance, and imposed 
ultimatums on the parties. See Yousaf and Adkin, The Bear Trap, p. 39. 
For details about the political parties and their differences in Pakistan see Anthony Hyman, `The 
Afghan politics of exile', Third World Quarterly 9, No. 1 (1987): 67 -84. 
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Our [ISIJ interest in the camps was that they provided a safe refuge from the 
war for the families of the Mujahideen, who could fight in Afghanistan in the 
knowledge that their relatives were immune from reprisals. They also acted as 
places to which the Mujahideen could return for a rest and to see their families 
without compromising themselves. Also, inside these camps was a huge 
reservoir of potential recruits for the Jehad. Thousands of young boys came to 
the camps as refugees, grew up, and then followed their fathers and brothers to 
the war. 26 
Relative to the extent of the direct military support that the resistance received, the role 
of the refugee camps may not have been essential to the overall success of the resistance 
struggle. Nevertheless, the camps did play an important role in the resistance movement 
as illustrated by Yousaf, and also in more subtle ways than the purely military 
dimension as Part Two demonstrates. 
2. PAKISTAN AS A HUMANITARIAN SANCTUARY 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provoked a massive exodus of Afghans across the 
border into Pakistan, initially at a rate of 1,000 per day, but increasing to an average of 
4,700 per day between January and June 1981 in response to Soviet tactics aimed at 
depopulating rural areas?' According to Pakistani statistics, there were an estimated 
500,000 refugees in Pakistan in mid- January 1980; more than 1 million by July 1980; 2 
million by May 1981; and 2.5 million by December 1984. By 1989 the number was 
estimated at 3.5 million. These figures remained only a rough estimate of the real 
number of Afghans living in Pakistan, however, due to difficulties inherent in refugee 
registration, and the existence of a porous border with Afghanistan.28 On the one hand 
the United Nations (UN) thought that the numbers in the camps were inflated due to 
false or multiple registrations,29 and on the other hand an estimated 200,000 to 400,000 
refugees remained unregistered since they settled outside the government -designated 
refugee sites and thus did not qualify for registration or food and non -food rations.30 The 
`official' refugees settled in camps (or `refugee tented villages' as they were known) 
26 Yousaf and Adkin, The Bear Trap, p. 138. 
27 Louis Dupree and Nancy Hatch Dupree, `Afghan Refugees in Pakistan', World Refugee Survey: 1987 
in Review (Washington: US Committee for Refugees, 1988), pp. 17 -21 at p. 17. 
28 Nancy Hatch Dupree, `Demographic Reporting on Afghan Refugees in Pakistan', Modern Asian 
Studies 22, No. 4 (1988): 845 -865. 
29 Marvin G. Weinbaum, Pakistan and Afghanistan: Resistance and Reconstruction (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1994), p. 54. 
3° Pierre Centlivres and Micheline Centlivres -Demont, `The Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: A Nation in 
Exile', Current Sociology 36, No. 2 (1988): 71 -92 at 73. 
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which were established for an average of 10,000 inhabitants, although some camps were 
much larger. By 1986 there were 350 such camps, 72 percent of which were located in 
the NWFP, 24 percent in Baluchistan, and 4 percent in the Punjab 3i 
All the advantages that Rufin suggests guerrilla movements accrue from humanitarian 
sanctuaries were evident in the Afghan camps in Pakistan: international protection; 
diverse and neutral sources of resupply; and mechanisms through which to exert 
influence over the civilian population. The camps also served another crucial function 
described by Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo: the bestowal of legitimacy upon the 
resistance movement. 
Refugees constitute a legitimizing population for the warriors. The presence of 
a large population in exile is taken as a physical testimony of support for the 
warriors, at least in the sense that they represent a rejection of the other side in 
the conflict. ;2 
This was arguably the most important role the camps played in the Afghan conflict for 
the resistance and for Pakistan as host. The more legitimate the cause, the greater the 
justification in the West for continuing active support for the guerrilla war. 
2.1 Protection 
The Soviet forces intentionally provoked refugee flows into Iran and Pakistan to deprive 
the guerrillas of local support bases within Afghanistan for shelter, food and 
information, essential ingredients in guerrilla strategy. They pursued policies of blanket 
bombing and infrastructural destruction, particularly in the provinces bordering 
Pakistan33 These tactics compounded the general condemnation of the Soviet invasion" 
and the refugees gained widespread sympathy in the West. Other simultaneous crises 
occurring in the world, such as the thousands of Iranians fleeing to Pakistan to escape 
31 Hatch Dupree, 'Demographic Reporting on Afghan Refugees in Pakistan', p. 846. 
32 Zolberg et al., Escape from Violence, p. 277. 
33 Sliwinski notes that `from 1978 to 1981, the Soviets gave priority to isolating the resistance 
movements by creating a cordon sanitaire along the Pakistan border, and consequently this strip was 
depopulated by aerial bombings'. Marek Sliwinski, `Afghanistan: The decimation of a People', Orbis 
33, No. 1 (1989): 39 -56 at p. 50. 
34 In a special session, the United Nations General Assembly overwhelmingly adopted a resolution 
calling for `the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of the foreign troops from 
Afghanistan'. United Nations General Assembly, Resolution ES -6/2, 14 January 1980 as cited in 
William Maley, `The Geneva Accords of April 1988', in Amin Saikal and William Maley (eds), The 
Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 12 -28 at p. 
13. 
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the Khomeini regime and conscription into the war against Iraq, did not attract the same 
attention. Their case was equally life threatening, but for them there were no camps, no 
mass relief, and very little international attention." 
The international focus on the refugees in Pakistan enhanced the security of the camps, 
providing a safe -haven to the mujahideen and their families in which they could rest and 
recuperate. The presence of the refugee camps was not vital to the protection of the 
combatants as both `bachelor camps' and training camps existed in Pakistan, separate 
from the refugee camps. Nonetheless, without the presence of such a large population of 
refugees, it is doubtful that Pakistan could have provided such extensive military 
support to the Afghan resistance. The refugee camps supplied a cover for military 
activities and the involvement of Pakistan, and the international attention focused on the 
refugees reduced the chances of retaliatory attacks by the Soviet forces. Several aerial 
attacks against refugee camps did occur in early 1987 in NWFP, killing and wounding 
hundreds of refugees, mujahideen and Pakistanis,36 and cross -border incursions and 
infiltrations of the refugee camps by Soviet/Afghan government forces and agents 
occurred, particularly in mid-1984.37 But no major military reprisals were ever 
undertaken against Pakistan, although this may have had more to do with avoiding 
direct confrontation with Pakistan's allies, than with the presence of refugees among 
combatants. 
The humanitarian sanctuary was further enhanced in Pakistan by provision of treatment 
facilities for wounded mujahideen who survived the journey to the border. The 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) ran two fully equipped surgical 
hospitals, one in Peshawar and one in Quetta, for the treatment of Afghan war wounded. 
The paradox of humanitarian action rehabilitating combatants thereby enabling them to 
return to battle can be seen at health posts in Afghanistan today, as men wearing 
prostheses fitted in the 1980s come for treatment of their latest war wound. 
' Zolberg et al., Escape from Violence, p. 154. 
36 See By All Parties to the Conflict: Violations of the Laws of War in Afghanistan (New York: Helsinki 
Watch/Asia Watch, March 1988), pp. 81 -83. 
37 See Allen Jones, Afghan Refugees: Five Years Later (Washington: US Committee for Refugees, 
1985), p. 13. 
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The contribution of humanitarian aid to the war economy in Afghanistan is difficult to 
assess. Several sources allege that millions of dollars of funds for the refugee program 
were diverted by resistance parties and Pakistani officials,38 but whether these funds 
flowed to combatants or lined the pockets of Afghan party members and Pakistan 
officials is impossible to gauge. Material supplies meant for the refugee camps might 
also have crossed the border into Afghanistan, although the significance of the volume 
was limited by logistical constraints: all materials were carried personally or transport 
by animal across the mountains. As there was a cross -border aid program, it probably 
contributed more to the war economy than aid from the refugee camps. Helga 
Baitenmann noted that inside Afghanistan `humanitarian aid has frequently been stolen 
before reaching the intended beneficiaries, reports have been falsified, and... some 
rebels have given the right to work in their areas to the highest- bidding NGO [non - 
government organisation]'.a 
Aid to the refugee camps did indirectly benefit the resistance, however, through easing 
the responsibility of combatants to provide for their families, thereby permitting more 
energy and resources to be committed to the war effort. The aid distribution system in 
the camps was also structured to support the resistance. Recruits who left the camps to 
participate in Jihad did not lose their entitlements to food rations, even if they were 
away for months at a time. A specific Jihad book registered absences and allowed a 
designated local official to act on behalf of the mujahid, collecting all the commodities 
distributed in his absencea0 Humanitarian aid also fed mujahideen fighters when 
quantities of food were diverted to the `bachelor' camps,4' but this was not a systematic 
or regular occurrence. 
Thus indirectly the humanitarian sanctuaries aided the resistance through the provision 





ibid., p.67. Also See Edward Girardet, `Corrupt Officials Reap Spoils of Afghan War', Christian 
Science Monitor, 7 September 1988 as noted in Weinbaum, Pakistan and Afghanistan: Resistance 
and Reconstruction, p. 59. 
Helga Baitenmann, `NGOs and the Afghan War: the Politicisation of Humanitarian Aid,' Third World 
Quarterly 12, No. 1 (1990): 62 -85 at p. 73. 
Centlivres and Centlivres -Demont, `The Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: A Nation in Exile', p. 83; and 
Amstutz, Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Occupation, p. 229. 
Pierre Centlivres and Micheline Centlivres -Demont, `The Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: An 
Ambiguous Identity', Journal of Refugee Studies 1, No. 2 (1988): 141 -152 at p. 150. 
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political rather than the military realm that the refugee camps made their greatest 
contribution to the guerrilla war. 
2.3 Legitimacy 
Pakistan was the first beneficiary of the legitimacy that often flows from international 
humanitarian action. As host to million of refugees, the Pakistani government became 
pivotal as interlocutor between the international community and the refugees. The 
Pakistani president, General Zia, rapidly capitalised upon this and, like Mobutu Sese 
Seko of Zaire 15 years later, Zia was turned by the refugee flow from an international 
pariah to a `respectable' statesman. Prior to the refugee influx, Zia was ostracised by 
many countries for Pakistan's poor human rights record, particularly the 1979 execution 
of the former Prime Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, at the directive of Zia. But Pakistan's 
public image greatly improved as a result of its role as host to some three million 
refugees, and the hospitality accorded to the predominantly Pashtuna2 refugees helped to 
defuse the Pashtunistan issue. Moreover, the loyalty accorded to Zia by the refugees 
under the Pashtun tribal code, Pashtunwali, obliged the refugees to defend their host in 
times of difficulties or hostilities. Pierre Centiivres and Micheline Centlivres - Demont 
reported that several Afghan leaders affirmed their commitment to fight for Zia if 
conflict with India arose.ó3 
General Zia' s political power was also enhanced by the financial package offered by the 
US which enabled Zia's government to modernise the Pakistani military with 
sophisticated weaponry." Furthermore, the flood of refugees provided a pretext for 
maintaining the domestic `state of emergency', thereby restraining political opponents, 
who were forbidden to operate their own political parties or run a free press.ó5 Many 
Pakistani opposition members thus deeply resented the government tolerance of 
42 Until 1984, 80 -94 percent of refugees were from the Pashtun ethnic group. See Hatch Dupree, 
`Demographic Reporting on Afghan Refugees in Pakistan', p. 848; and Centlivres and Centlivres- 
Demont, `The Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: A Nation in Exile', p. 73. 
a3 Centiivres and Centiivres- Demont, `The Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: An Ambiguous Identity', p. 
147. 
44 Dupree and Hatch Dupree. `Afghan Refugees in Pakistan', p. 21. 
45 Jones, Afghan Refugees: Five Years Later, p. 16. 
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Afghans operating exile resistance organisations, publishing newspapers and holding 
meetings on Pakistani territory.46 
Zia also gained stature in the Muslim world through supporting the more Islamic 
resistance parties operating in Pakistan, and as mentioned earlier, US objections to 
Pakistan's pursuit of a nuclear program were repeatedly postponed in the face of the 
more pressing issues of Pakistan's loyalty to the US. Thus the Afghan resistance 
benefited from having such a compliant host, and General Zia benefited through the 
international recognition and military support that accompanied the roles of host to the 
world's Iargest refugee population, and bastion of opposition to communist oppression. 
Whilst international sympathy towards the Afghan refugees helped to legitimise General 
Zia and the mujahideen, it was through the refugees in Pakistan that the leaders of the 
Afghan political parties gained Iegitimacy; legitimacy which they might not have 
otherwise been accorded, due to their general absence of military prowess or territorial 
bases inside Afghanistan. And, as with the military aid to the resistance, it was the 
strong arm of Pakistan that created the conditions through which the political parties 
could utilise the mass of humanity to their political advantage. Pakistan was not a 
signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention or 1967 Protocol, and invited United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) participation only in the coordination of 
relief activities. Pakistani authorities were appointed to administer the camps. A 
Pakistani Chief Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees was assigned to supervise the 
overall refugee situation, and Pakistani officials held various positions in the 
administrative apparatus of the camps. To assist in the camp management, they 
established committees of public order (Islahi komite) and appointed a refugee 
representative (malik) in each camp to distribute relief goods to the families he 
represented. Although maliks were supposed to be traditional representatives of the 
Afghan refugees, the individuals chosen to fulfil this role were often the choice of the 
Pakistani authorities, since the Pakistanis preferred an interlocutor with whom they were 
assured cooperation.07 Thus the Pakistani government exercised authority in the camps 
46 Girardet, Afghanistan: The Soviet War, p. 207. 
47 Lynn Carter and Kerry Connor, 'A Preliminary Investigation of Contemporary Afghan Councils' 
(Peshawar: Agency Coordination Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR mimeo, 1989), pp. 18 -19 as cited 
in Weinbaum, Pakistan and Afghanistan: Resistance and Reconstruction, p. 57. 
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at every level and also met approximately half of the cost of the refugee assistance, 
estimated in excess of $1 million per day in 1984.6$ 
The Peshawar -based political parties used the refugees to gain international recognition 
and funding by posing as their legitimate representatives. The more `support' the parties 
could show, the more weight they carried in their fundraising and diplomatic sojourns 
abroad. Hence the parties obliged the refugees arriving from Afghanistan to become 
affiliated to one of the Pakistani -recognised parties in order to be certified as refugees.ó9 
Edward Girardet describes how party activists waited at the frontier villages and enlisted 
entire families, clans and tribes into political parties.50 Those who were not affiliated in 
this way joined parties through the malik, and many refugees were registered by more 
than one party. Unable, for the most part, to read, they initially had little idea of what 
they had joined,51 but camp life soon rectified that; in the course of research conducted 
by Centlivres and Centlivres -Demont, they met hardly anyone who did not have 
allegiance to a party and did not know the name of their party leader. They found that 
allegiance had little to do with ideology, being rather a result of the intense propaganda 
in the camps in the form of posters, iconography, martyr worship, religious schools, and 
the distribution of membership cards." 
Pakistan collaborated fully in this process. Party affiliation was imperative to receive a 
refugee identity card, without which an Afghan could be suspected of being a KhAD" 
agent and have constant problems with the Pakistani police."' Travel within Pakistan and 
abroad was impossible without an identity card, and employment in Pakistan, even for 
highly- educated Afghans, could only be found through the political parties, particularly 
Hekmatyar's Hezb -e Islami. Even Western aid organisations accepted the party card as 
the refugee identity card, so entrenched was the practice." In addition, the revenue 
collected from membership fees was a source of income for the parties. 
4s Girardet, Afghanistan; The Soviet War, p. and Hatch Dupree, Demographic Reporting', p. 845. 
o9 A Helsinki/Asia Watch report noted that this system gave political parties `a veto over whether a 
refugee will receive assistance and turns refugee aid into a political patronage plum'. By All Parties to 
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The legitimacy of the political leaders thus derived from their assumed representation of 
the refugee population. Since support from the West was proportional to the 
representation claimed, factional competition for refugee allegiance was strong. The 
refugee camp structures, therefore, became useful tools in gaining influence over the 
refugee population. 
2.4 Population Control 
Unlike many other refugee camps around the world, the influence exerted over the 
refugee population was more normative than coercive." The Afghan resistance had the 
overwhelming support of the refugees and pictures of martyrs from the Jihad adorned 
various buildings throughout the refugee camps. Recruitment of combatants, for 
example, was not forced, but expected of male refugees. A survey conducted in the 
camps of the NWFP in 1991, found that 83 percent of people who had visited 
Afghanistan since becoming a refugee had returned for Jihad.57 
Every family is obliged to send a member to take part in the Jihad who is 
expected to spend up to three months at the battle front. When the three months 
are over, the Mujahed returns and is replaced by another member of the family, 
his brother, father or cousin.58 
Enjoying universal refugee support, the resistance did not need to manipulate the relief 
distributions in the camps to that end per se, but to cultivate support for one faction over 
another. The Islamic parties, particularly Hezb -e Islami, benefited from preferential 
access to the aid programs between 1980 and 1983, due to the influence of the Pakistani 
Refugee Commissioner, Sheikh Abdullah Khan." Educational programs became a 
primary instrument of indoctrination, and some 250 schools with 43,000 students and 
1,500 teaching and administrative staff were operated by the Hezb -e Islami. The 
56 Although after the Soviet withdrawal, the increased tension between the parties spilled over to their 
supporters, and increasingly coercive means were employed, particularly by the extremist Islamic 
parties against refugees aligned with the relatively secular parties. See Afghanistan: The Forgotten 
War. Human Rights Abuses and Violations of the Laws of War Since the Soviet Withdrawal (New 
York: Asia Watch, February 1991), pp. 99 -123. 
Mamoona Taskínud -Din, UNHCR -IRC Survey of Socio- economic Conditions of Afghan Refugees 
Living in NWFP Camps (Peshawar: UNHCR Sub -office, February 1992), p. 45. 
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Afghanistan: Resistance and Reconstruction, p. 59. Abdullah was replaced with an apolitical official 
by General Zia in I983, after relations between his government and the Jama'at -e Islami became 
strained. See Roy, Islam and the Resistance in Afghanistan, p. 210. 
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graduates of these schools formed the new generation of Hezb, including the majority of 
the soldiers of Hekmatyar's military force, the Army of Sacrifice (Lashkar-e Isar).60 
School curricula included paramilitary training and emphasised concepts surrounding 
Jihad and anti -Soviet sentiment.' Hezb -e Islami also had its own police, courts and 
prisons, and opponents were `persecuted, criminals tried and convicted, and the 
infrastructure maintained, all on the alien territory of Pakistan'." 
The food distribution system initially conducted by the maliks was also instrumental in 
the control of refugees, enabling the establishment of patron- client relationships 
between the maliks and refugee families. The maliks kept the ration books between 
distributions, charged a fee for facilitating distributions, and accumulated extra rations 
for their favoured clients.b3 UNHCR considered these practices corrupt and discontinued 
distributions through the malik, instead giving rations directly to the heads of families in 
the camps. Nevertheless, the maliks retained influence through acting as interlocutor 
between the refugees and the Pakistani authorities or aid organisations, and remained 
involved in the transportation of supplies. In many areas they also conducted a 
redistribution of relief goods after the official distribution was complete.ó4 
The refugee camp structures thus empowered certain elements of society, often to the 
detriment of the traditional leaders. In rural Afghan villages there was traditionally no 
single malik, but a collective leadership of elders through a village council, each having 
a different area of responsibility.ó5 But in the refugee camps the maliks possessing 
liaison skills became prominent through dealing with the Pakistanis and aid 
organisations, as did the maliks appointed by the Pakistani authorities. Consequently, 
competition erupted between the new maliks (called `ration' or `rupiyah' maliks among 
the refugees) and the traditional Afghan leadership. The political parties that sought to 
60 Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, p. 215. 
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66 Centlivres and Centlivres- Demont, `The Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: A Nation in Exile', p. 82. 
65 For a more detailed discussion of the societal changes see Louis Dupree, `Cultural Changes Among 
the Mujahidin and the Muhajerin', in Bo Huldt and Erland Jansson (eds), The Tragedy of 
Afghanistan: The Social, Cultural and Political Impact of the Soviet Invasion (London: Croom Helm, 
I988), pp. 20 -37. 
Chapter 2 The Afghan Refugee Camps in Pakistan 105 
optimise their influence in the camps through appointing as their representative either 
the respected ulema or the young educated militant exacerbated this competition.óó 
A survey published by the Afghan Information Centre Monthly Bulletin suggested that 
legitimacy of leaders was not widely accepted, with more than 70 percent of Afghan 
refugees interviewed preferring the King to any of the political leaders as a future head 
of state of Afghanistan. Barnett Rubin, however, suggests that the survey methodology 
was not accurate and, although representative of the position of the elders, it did not take 
into account that the younger generation would not have contradicted the elders in front 
of strangers whether they agreed or not 67 Either way, it was Pakistan that determined the 
political orientation of the refugees through obliging adherence to one of the Pakistani - 
recognised political parties, and by denying the royal family entry into Pakistan. 
In summary, the refugee camps served several purposes in the resistance to Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan. They provided a military sanctuary in which combatants 
could receive protection, food, medical attention, and security for their families, and the 
presence of three million refugees provided a shield behind which the Pakistani 
government could channel military aid and training to the mujahideen fighters. With 
military means, General Zia and the Peshawar -based political parties were empowered, 
and with humanitarian means they were legitimised. Without this support, the political 
parties may have remained on the fringes of Afghan political life. But as Ted Carpenter 
argues, with the backing of the US and the Pakistanis `they were not only able to 
dominate the Afghan exile community, they acquired even more influence than many of 
the military commanders who were waging the armed struggle against the Soviet and 
Afghan communist forces' 68 
Overt manipulation of the refugee community through the aid structures empowered the 
party leaders at the expense of the traditional leadership, the repercussions of which are 
visible in the continuing civil war. It is interesting to note that many of the Taliban that 
hold power in Afghanistan today were born in the refugee camps in Pakistan and 
66 Centlivres and Centiivres- Demont, `The Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: A Nation in Exile', p. 83. 
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educated in their particularly repressive brand of Islam69 in Pakistani madrassas (Islamic 
colleges). The rival Islamic party in Pakistan, the Jama'at -e Ulema -i Islami was largely 
behind the creation of the Taliban movement, having built up a support base in 
Baluchistan and NWFP by `opening up madrassas and carrying out relief work in the 
refugee camps'?° 
Humanitarian aid was instrumental in the political manipulation of the refugee 
population. While most actors accepted this in the name of a just cause during the 
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the repercussions of the absence of humanitarian 
space were increasingly realised when the Soviet army withdrew. 
3. THE RELIEF RESPONSE: IN THE NAME OF A JUST CAUSE 
In an article entitled `Military and Armed Attacks on Refugee Camps', Elly- Elikunda 
Mtango wrote that clear evidence of what occurred in the refugee camps in Pakistan is 
difficult to obtain." In condemning an attack in Kurram district of Pakistan in 1987 
which killed 42 people, the majority of whom were Afghan refugees, he states that 
`there is no justification for attacking refugees on the mere suspicion that (from time to 
time) some guerrilla fighters may be living among the civilian refugees' 72 Similarly, 
Asia Watch denounced such attacks stating that `even if the mujaheddin were present in 
the camps in force... the rule of proportionality requires the DRA [Democratic Republic 
of Afghanistan] to refrain from striking there because of the large number of civilians 
present.'" 
Now that clearer evidence of the involvement of the refugee camps in the war is 
available, can such attacks be legally justified as self- defence? Knowing that Soviet and 
Afghan agents infiltrated the camps, it is perhaps surprising that more attacks did not 
occur. But whether the attacks were legal or illegal is of less interest here than the fact 
69 For a discussion of the origins and doctrine of the Taliban see William Maley, `Interpreting the 
Taliban', in William Maley (ed.) Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban (London: 
Hurst & Company, 1998), pp. 1 -28. 
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that they did occur as a consequence of the presence of mujahideen fighters among the 
refugees. Why was there so little discussion of the potential repercussions of the role of 
the refugee camps in the war? 
Two main factors help to explain the acceptance of the status quo in the camps by the 
humanitarian community. The first concerns the persuasions of the aid organisations 
working in the refugee camps which can be divided into two forms, politically- oriented 
and technically- focused. The second explanation stems from the first and relates to the 
difference between the normative perception of the refugee community held by the 
international aid organisations, and the way in which the refugees perceived themselves. 
3. 1 Different Approach, Same Ends 
The Afghan resistance was idealised in the Western public, and the notion of a `just 
war' was emphasised in the minds of many aid workers operating in the camps. 
Nineteen international NGOs were formed specifically to respond to the Afghan crisis, 
the majority of which were `solidarity NGOs' with an overtly political focus.'° Some of 
them restricted their activities to lobbying, but most became operational in either the 
refugee camps or in the cross -border program, or both. These `solidarity' NGOs joined 
approximately 50 established international NGOs which had programs in other parts of 
the world. With humanitarian relief activities predominantly restricted to the periphery 
of conflicts during the Cold War, most humanitarian activity was undertaken in refugee 
camps, assisting, for the most part, refugees who had been uprooted from their homes by 
oppressive policies and human rights abuses carried out by totalitarian regimes. Hence 
the 1980s saw some aid organisations taking an increasingly active stance on the side of 
the `victims' over the `oppressors' and directed their relief aid accordingly. For 
Médecins sans Frontières (MSF), which worked in the refugee camps and was the first 
NGO to work clandestinely inside Afghanistan in 1980,'5 this was certainly the case: `in 
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Afghanistan, MSF never sought to take a neutral stance... we had implicitly picked our 
side' .16 
Even if other organisations did not feel or express their opinion so bluntly, the fact that a 
superpower had engaged brutal and disproportionate strength to crush a popular 
resistance movement into submission invoked a moral imperative to aid the victims. The 
Soviet forces razed villages and hospitals, and dropped napalm and explosive devises, 
some of which resembled toys, to terrorise, maim and kill civilians and combatants 
alike. The resistance was armed with only basic weapons until the 1986 introduction of 
the Stinger anti -aircraft missile. Thus the majority of aid organisations felt assistance to 
the resistance was just. 
The `justness' of the resistance cause was further enhanced by restrictions placed on aid 
to the civilian populations in Afghanistan by the government in Kabul. The Kabul 
regime occupied Afghanistan's seat at the UN, and any proposal for UN relief agencies 
to intervene in the mujahideen areas faced an effective veto from the Soviet Union. UN 
agencies and ICRC were restricted to working in areas approved by Kabul which were 
predominantly around major cities, not in rural and resistance -held areas. As a 
consequence, a few NGOs mounted clandestine missions into these areas from Pakistan. 
Most, like MSF, Aide Médicale Internationale and the Swedish Committee for 
Afghanistan provided medical assistance to casualties of war, but some like American 
Aid for Afghans, also engaged in the provision of clothing, boots and equipment for the 
clandestine Radio Free Kabul." Until 1986, only some 10 -15 NGOs conducted cross - 
border operations from Pakistan, and they were limited in the scale of activities that they 
could undertake.78 But numbers rose significantly once the introduction of the Stinger 
missile reduced the risk from air attack, and once the US provided funding for cross - 
border activities." 
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Not all aid agencies chose to `politicise' their work, and particularly prior to 1986, the 
majority focused on the technical aspects of relief provision in the camps, turning a 
blind eye to the use of the camps by the Afghan resistance. Girardet states that some 
agencies restricted their activities to `official' areas for fund -raising purposes, and cited 
a CARE official as stating that `we are not into clandestine relief'.B0 However, the extent 
to which they acknowledged the vested interests of many of their institutional donors, 
and reduced their dependence on them accordingly, varied. UNHCR, for example, was 
limited in its capacity to guarantee the `civilian character' of the camps since its 
leverage with Pakistan was weakened by Pakistan's not being a party to the 1951 
Refugee Convention. UNHCR did, however, try to prohibit the carrying of arms in the 
refugee camps and attempted, sometimes in vain, to prevent the diversion of aid to 
`bachelor' camps of the mujahideen.81 In addition, UNHCR became aware of the 
obligation of refugees to join political parties in 1982, but strong pressure was allegedly 
placed on the organisation by the US to avoid interfering in Pakistani policy." As the 
largest donor of what they termed `non -lethal' aid, providing one -third of UNHCR's 
special budget for Afghanistan, and one -half of the commodities of the World Food 
Programme (WFP),u the US had considerable leverage over aid policy. 
UNHCR was not the only agency to be strongly influence by US funding; many NGOs 
were direct tools of US foreign policy. Whether they believed they were neutral or not, 
NGOs that received US funding either in Pakistan or for cross -border operations were 
assisting the foreign policy strategy of the US Government. In Pakistan, US aid aimed to 
placate Pakistan to avoid, in the words of a US State Department cable, `the chances 
that Pakistan might abandon its stalwart opposition to the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan in favour of accommodation with the USSR.'84 The US Administration 
provided funding to American NGOs such as CARE, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), 
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the International Rescue Committee (WC), and Church World Services in the camps, 
many of which coordinated their relief efforts with US policy in return." 
The US cross -border program of non -lethal aid was even clearer in its aims: to bring 
essential supplies to Afghans living in resistance -controlled regions so that the 
resistance would be able to organise genuine base areas.86 Baitenmann argues that NGOs 
were direct instruments of this policy: `when the USA has wanted to strengthen certain 
commanders, it has done so through NGOs'.fl7 She cites Afghanaid as an example, 
stating that it received 65 -70 percent of its funding from US government sources, 
including State Department funding specifically for aid to the Panjshir Valley where 
General Massoud was based.88 Some NGOs refused US Government finance to retain 
some measure of independence from government policy. These NGOs, however, were 
the exception rather than the rule, and aid served to bolster the prestige and legitimacy 
of certain commanders inside Afghanistan over others. `Aid resources were after all, an 
important means by which these leaders expected to insure the loyalty of groups and 
individuals'." 
Thus whether NGOs adopted a position of solidarity with the mujahideen, became 
channels of US anti- communist policy, or simply focused on the technical provision of 
humanitarian assistance, it was difficult to remain apart from the highly political context 
of the Afghan refugee camps. The direct involvement of Pakistani authorities in all 
levels of the relief apparatus exacerbated the constraints of providing impartial relief to 
the refugee population. 
3.2 Contending Images of Refugeehood' 
The difference in the way the aid organisations perceived the refugees and the way in 
which the refugees saw themselves provides the second explanation for the lack of 
condemnation of the violation of the refugee camps; the majority of organisations never 
acknowledged it. The normative definition of refugees constructed by aid organisations 
is of dependent, dispossessed victims who are forced to flee their homeland. Fundraising 
as Baitenmanm, 'NGOs and the Afghan War: the politicisation of humanitarian aid', p. 69. 
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imperatives exacerbate the `victim discourse', generally portraying the recipients of aid 
as helpless and deprived, and in need of immediate Western aid. Images such as that 
painted by Yousaf are typical. He characterised the refugee camps as: 
squalid places, teeming with humanity. Overcrowding has put impossible 
strains on rudimentary water, sanitation, and medical facilities. Refugees arrive 
weak and exhausted, many are sick or wounded, all are virtually destitute.9° 
Without trivialising the suffering that the refugees underwent, the conceptualisation of 
the refugees as dependent, vulnerable, victims masked the reality that they were also a 
highly politicised population, many of who chose to flee an infidel government, and 
who above all wanted to return to their homeland. 
For the Afghan refugees, fleeing a communist regime in Kabul held a different 
connotation from that of non -Muslim populations escaping communist regimes 
elsewhere. According to Islamic teachings, Muslims are encouraged to leave Muslim 
territory which is occupied by infidels or in which the free practice of Islam is 
forbidden. Following the practice of the Prophet Mohammad, who fled from Mecca to 
Medina in 622 AD when persecuted for his beliefs and teachings, the Koran states that 
`those who believed and left their homes and strove for the cause of Allah... these are 
the believers in truth'.n 
The term in Arabic for refugee is mohajir and has the same root as the word hejra which 
refers to Mohammad's flight into exile. A mohajir is a person who voluntarily takes 
exile and has severed ties with relatives and possessions, thus denoting courage for 
sacrificing comfort and family, rather than shame at taking flight. Nazif Shahrani states 
that the original hejra was an obligation: `not joining the migration resulted in exclusion 
from the society' 92 
In Medina, Mohammad built up his support base and prepared for war, marching 
victoriously into Mecca several years later. Accordingly, for the Afghans, `the 
conditions of refugee does not imply renunciation of armed battle, but on the contrary, 
E9 Weinbaum, Pakistan and Afghanistan, p. 60. 
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falling back temporarily to make preparations for a reconquest.'93 Mohajir is thus the 
other side of mujahed, and the resistance movements regularly cited passages from the 
Koran to this effect: `those who believe and have emigrated, and have struggled in the 
way of God with their possessions and their selves are mightier in rank with God; and 
those - they are the triumphant'." As Centlivres and Centlivres -Demont argue, the 
conception of mohajir was a powerful motivational force in the construction of identity: 
`from a personal point of view, it renders a refugee almost a fighter and, from a 
collective point of view, it binds the group to the very sources of Islam' .95 
Thus for the refugees, the humanitarian and the political were inseparable: `what 
distinguishes the Afghan refugee -warriors' situation in Pakistan from refugees 
elsewhere is the recognition of and respect for the mutually reinforcing relationship 
between the humanitarian and political dimensions of their refugee life.'96 The notions 
of choice and refugee agency were for the most part overlooked by the Western refugee 
regime operating in Pakistan. Moreover, the images of refugeehood depicted in 
fundraising campaigns deny such a role. Understanding the political nature of refugees 
would have necessitated the recognition of a dilemma and the reconceptualisation of the 
applicability of Western refugee norms to the Afghan case. It may also have prompted a 
search for a way of preserving a purely humanitarian space in a context in which the 
lines between the political and the humanitarian were obviously blurred. It was in the 
interests of very few aid organisations to do so. The cause was just. 
CONCLUSION 
Pakistani, Western and Arab interest in the mujahideen was insignificant prior to the 
Soviet intervention of Afghanistan, but this event galvanised anti -communist and 
Islamic support for Afghan self -determination. The invasion of an independent Islamic 
state by a communist superpower and the flight of millions of refugees provided a 
potent mix of incentives. While the presence of refugees generated sympathy in the 
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Chapter 2 The Afghan Refugee Camps in Pakistan 113 
West, thereby giving stronger public rationale for supporting the resistance than solely 
fears of communist expansionism, the direct financial support to the mujahideen from 
the US and Saudi Arabia ($1 billion combined in 1986) and the logistical, training and 
material support from Pakistan rendered aid a complementary, but in no way 
determinant, role in the conflict. The humanitarian sanctuaries assisted the resistance 
through supporting the mohajir and mujahideen when in Pakistan, but cannot be said to 
have prolonged the Afghan conflict. 
Nevertheless, humanitarian action fuelled aspects of the conflict, the effects of which 
still reverberate in Afghanistan. With the benefit of hindsight, the role that the camps 
played in Iegitimising and empowering the Peshawar political leaders, and the 
importance of Pakistani influence in this can be fully appreciated. The Western policy of 
tying funding to the proportional representation among the refugee population inevitably 
implicated the refugees in the power politics among leaders, and the aid program was 
manipulated to this end. The primary beneficiary of the influence generated through the 
refugee camps was Hekmatyar's Hezb -e Islami, the party whose attacks on the post - 
communist Rabbani government in Kabul wrought more destruction on the capital than 
during the entire Soviet period. 
The legitimacy gained by Pakistan as host to the refugees and resistance and the 
profound role that the country assumed in Afghan affairs during the period of Soviet 
occupation entrenched Pakistani interference to this day. Although other neighbouring 
states such as Iran, Uzbekistan, and Russia are implicated in the continuing Afghan 
conflict through their support for various Afghan factions, Pakistan's support for the 
Taliban `has unquestionably been broader in its scope and ultimately far more ambitious 
in its goals than that of other regional powers for their Afghan candidates' .97 
Humanitarian aid organisations operating in the refugee camps in Pakistan in the 1980s 
had little scope to reduce the influence of Pakistani authorities in the relief effort. It is, 
after all, primarily the responsibility of the host state to care for refugees on its territory. 
But the extent to which they accepted conditionalities imposed both by Pakistan and the 
mujahideen while there was a just cause against an identifiable `oppressor', haunted the 
aid agencies once the Soviet army left. 
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The aid organisations involved in the cross -border program of assistance into 
Afghanistan were clearly supporting one side of the conflict. Claiming that only ICRC 
and, later, the UN agencies were consistently present on both sides, Antonio Donini 
remarked that `although the civilian populations in the government -held cities suffered 
from the effects of the war, none of the NGOs based in Peshawar felt a humanitarian 
imperative to provide aid to these innocent victims'." He is critical of the way in which: 
the humanitarians usually operated in a political space instead of actively 
promoting humanitarian space and respect for humanitarian values. While this 
course of action may have been understandable but not excusable during the 
years of the Soviet invasion, the absence of a peace discourse remained a 
distinguishing feature of the Afghan scene well after the Soviet departure.4° 
While some of this criticism is valid for reasons discussed further below, Donini 
overlooks the fact that the Afghan context generated a clash of humanitarian principles, 
which obviated the possibility of respecting the two most fundamental tenets of 
humanitarian action. Applying strict neutrality to aid operations was not consistent with 
applying the proportionality prescript embedded in the principle of impartial relief. 
Impartiality requires that aid be given without discrimination, but in accordance with the 
greatest need. The needs of the civilian populations on the mujahideen side were greater 
than those on the government -held side and no aid agency was officially authorised to 
operate in mujahideen areas. ICRC's `presence on both sides' entailed working in 
Pakistan with war wounded and in government -held areas after 1988. Before then ICRC 
was unable to obtain satisfactory agreements from all parties to the conflict to 
commence programs in Afghanistan.1" Thus aid agencies venturing to provide aid 
across the border were meeting a profound humanitarian need and providing the civilian 
populations with a choice of whether to seek refuge outside the country or remain in 
their homes. 
The lack of neutrality in cross -border relief was less problematic than the compromises 




Antonio Donini, The Policies of Mercy: UN Coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique and Rwanda 
(Providence: Occasional Paper No. 22, Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown 
University, 1996), p. 54. 
ibid. 
See John Borton with Nigel Nicholds, Charlotte Benson, Sanjay Dhiri, NGOs and Relief Operations: 
Trends and Policy Implications (London: ESCOR Research Study R47774, Overseas Development 
Institute, 1994), p. 45. 
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and assistance of the mujahideen, and negotiations for the practical application of 
humanitarian values, such as ensuring that aid reached the most needy, were tainted by 
support for the cause'. But the absence of standards and ground -rules led to the rapid 
manipulation of aid as it became a source of conflict among the factions in the wake of 
the Soviet withdrawal. Each faction tried to maximise territorial claims in anticipation 
of a post -Soviet carve -up of the country, and aid was an important source of legitimacy. 
Disillusionment crept into aid organisations as the idealised view of the resistance was 
tempered by factional in- fighting, and the `freedom fighters' became `warlords' as the 
moral crusade against communism was replaced by `ethnic conflict'. 
Thus Donini makes a valid point when he asserts that `humanitarian activities have 
played into the fragmentation of Afghanistan society rather than promoting 
reconciliation'. But given the intensely political context in Afghanistan and in the 
refugee camps, it appears to be overly ambitious to expect humanitarian action to have 
served as a tool of peace. The forging of a humanitarian space in which aid could fulfil 
its humanitarian purpose with minimal negative consequences would have been a major 
achievement in itself. While this was not achieved, humanitarian aid continued to fuel 
aspects of the conflict. Thus the primary responsibility of aid organisations was to curb 
the negative consequences of aid, not to engage in the discourse of peace. 
The Afghan context raises interesting questions about the attachment of humanitarian 
aid to the foreign policy goals of governments, and the role of non - government aid 
organisations as vehicles of such policy. The case also poses the question of whether the 
`good' guerrillas benefiting from the humanitarian sanctuary one day will still be the 
`good' movement, faction or government of tomorrow. These questions recur in the 
following chapters. Most Western observers believed that aiding the resistance was just, 
not necessarily in terms of the objectives of the Reagan Doctrine, but because of the 
Afghan right to self -determination. Richard Falk, for example, argues that of two of the 
theatres of the Reagan Doctrine, Afghanistan and Nicaragua, `helping the Afghan 
resistance has been a contribution to self -determination, whereas helping the Contras is 
an obstruction to self -determination'. 101 
101 Richard A. Falk, The Afghanistan `Settlement' and the Future of World Politics', in Amin Saikal and 
William Maley (eds), Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), pp. 142 -170 at p. 146. 
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While American policy may have appeared to support Afghan self -determination during 
the period of Soviet occupation, the reality became apparent after the Soviet withdrawal: 
`the United States made little effort to link its anti -Soviet stand to a commitment to 
ensure a viable resolution of the Afghan conflict'.102 Afghanistan Iost its strategic value 
to the United States, and the NGOs which had been conduits of US policy through 
accepting large amounts of funding were suddenly left with limited financial support. 
The US Agency for International Development (USAD) withdrew funding from 
hundreds of health clinics, a medical supply system and training programs in rural 
Afghanistan.iO3 Other donors were sought to continue to assist Afghan civilians plagued 
by a conflict which the US and Pakistan had a large role in fuelling. 
The following chapter examines another highly political refugee context of the Cold 
War period, which was also heavily influenced by US policies to contain communism. 
Central America was awash with refugees fleeing both left -wing and right -wing 
regimes, and Honduras played an unusual role as host to both groups. The next chapter 
demonstrates the extent of ideological polarisation of the aid community according to 
contending images of a `just war'. The paradoxes of humanitarian action were evident to 
varying degrees in refugee programs for Salvadoran and Nicaraguan refugees, largely 
with the acquiescence of the aid organisations operating in the camps. 
102 Amin Saikal, `The UN and Afghanistan: A Case of Failed Peacemaking Intervention ?', International 
Peacekeeping 3, No. 1 (1996): 19 -34 at p. 26. 
1°3 Donini, The Policies of Mercy: UN Coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique and Rwanda, p. 51. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE NICARAGUAN AND SALVADORAN REFUGEE CAMPS IN 
HONDURAS 
Central America was the scene of large refugee movements from the late 1970s to the 
end of the 1980s as state repression, guerrilla warfare and human rights abuses drove 
millions from their homes to become internally displaced within their own countries, or 
asylum seekers in neighbouring states. El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala were the 
three main refugee -producing countries, and the United States (US), Mexico, Honduras 
and Costa Rica were the principal countries of asylum. 
This chapter focuses on the refugee context in Honduras. The case has a number of 
distinctive features, the most salient of which was the divergent standards of asylum 
accorded to refugees depending upon the message conveyed by their flight. Sharing 
borders with three countries torn by civil strife, Honduras housed refugees fleeing US- 
backed regimes in El Salvador and Guatemala in the west of the country, and refugees 
fleeing the Sandinista' regime in Nicaragua in the east (see Map 2).2 As an ally of the US 
in a region enmeshed in superpower rivalry, Honduras welcomed Nicaraguan refugees 
and contra' insurgents opposing Managua, but was reluctant host to Salvadoran and 
Guatemalan refugees, and opposed to the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front 
(Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional - FMLN) in El Salvador. 
Refugees throughout the region were intensely politicised, their presence considered as 
`evidence' to leftists and rightists alike of the brutality and injustice of the opposing 
regime, and refugees were treated according to the political representations their 
presence implied. 
The highly politicised context had repercussions for refugee protection. Most refugee 
settlements in Central America were accused of posing a security threat either to the 
host nation or to the regime from which they fled, through providing sanctuary for 
The Sandinistas were named after a Nicaraguan nationalist, Augusto Cesar Sandino. 
2 For a discussion of the history and politics of the governments and opposition movements in Central 
America see John A. Booth and Thomas W. Walker, Understanding Central America (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1989). 
i The term `contras', short for contrarevolucionarios, denotes the various groups opposing the 
Sandinista government in Nicaragua from bases in Honduras, Costa Rica and within Nicaragua. 
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subversive forces and being sources of political organisation and ideological contagion. 
The Costa Rican authorities alleged that camps housing Salvadoran refugees `may have 
served as training grounds for extremists who return to EI Salvador as well trained 
guerrillas',` and harassed the 6,000 refugees present, while concurrently permitting 
Nicaraguan guerrilla forces to train and operate on Costa Rican soil.' Refugee camps in 
Mexico were attacked by the Guatemalan military,6 and the Salvadoran Armed Forces 
(SAF) attacked refugee camps in Honduras, alleging that they harboured members of the 
FMLN. The contras openly lived among refugees along the Honduran -Nicaraguan 
border. 
This case is instructive in illustrating that the humanitarian aid community was not 
impervious to the politically charged environment of Central America, even if their 
charters proclaimed neutral and impartial intent. Just as the refugees were tainted by the 
ideological identification of the regimes they were fleeing, so the aid agencies were 
tainted by the refugees with whom they chose to work. And while for some this 
categorisation may have been an unfortunate by- product of the provision of 
humanitarian assistance in conflict, for most, humanitarian assistance was a tool in a 
`just' war against tyranny, whether communist or conservative. With the acquiescence 
or support of the aid community, the refugees became pawns in a highly politicised 
context which Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo considered was an `instance of the most 
extreme use of refugees as policy objects'.' 
Part One of the chapter examines the role of Honduras as a military sanctuary for the 
Nicaraguan and Salvadoran opposition forces to contextualise the relative importance of 
the refugee camps to the contras and the FMLN. The US invested heavily in ensuring 
that Honduras served as a bulwark against the spread of communism in the region, and 
the contra war against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua was mainly directed 
from Honduras. 
Quote from La República (San Jose, Costa Rica), October 7, 1982 as cited in Liisa North and 
Canada -Caribbean- Central American Policy Alternatives (CAPA), (eds), Between War and Peace in 
Central America: Choices for Canada (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1990), p.147. 
5 North and CAPA, Between War and Peace, p. 148. 
6 See Gil Loescher, `Humanitarianism and Politics in Central America', in Bruce Nichols and Gil 
Loescher (eds), The Moral Nation: Humanitarianism and U.S. Foreign Policy Today (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), pp. 154 -191 at p. 158. 
Aristide R. Zolberg, Astri Suhrke and Sergio Aguayo, Escape from Violence: Conflict and the 
Refugee Crisis in the Developing World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 218. 
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Part Two analyses the contributions of the refugee camps housing Nicaraguans at one 
end of Honduras and Salvadorans at the other, to the guerrilla insurgencies in their 
respective countries. The Salvadoran camps provide insights into the capacity of refugee 
camps to provide a humanitarian sanctuary to guerrilla forces within hostile territory. 
Part Three explores the attitudes of the aid organisations working in the camps vis -à -vis 
the subversive functions of humanitarian aid. A spectrum of views are identified from 
overt political convictions to a pragmatic acceptance of the status quo based on a 
perceived inability to change the situation. 
It is necessary to note at the outset that most of the literature on the Central American 
conflicts and the refugee context is tainted with ideological bias. Value -laden language 
and the distortion of facts permeate the literature. Marc Edelman states that even 
prestigious foreign policy journals were not immune to such bias and asserts that they 
`contributed significantly to the Reagan Administration's efforts to shape a consensus 
around its Central America policies by lending what otherwise would be transparently 
tendentious arguments an appearance of scholarly legitimacy'.a The availability of 
information is also skewed; while the democratic process in the US permitted scrutiny 
of its activities in the region, facts about the involvement of Eastern bloc countries are 
scant. 
1. HONDURAS AS A MILITARY SANCTUARY 
The complexity of the refugee situation in Honduras was intrinsically linked with 
historical relations in the region. Honduras traditionally viewed El Salvador as its 
principal security threat,' and tensions caused by population density and migration issues 
led to an outbreak of conflict in 1969. Atrocities committed by Salvadoran soldiers 
during the conflict exacerbated public hostility towards Salvadoran nationals, and the 
two countries remained officially at war one decade after the combat ceased. Despite 
strong US encouragement to settle the border dispute, the Honduran military remained 
8 Marc Edelman, `Soviet -Cuban Involvement in Central America: A Critique of Recent Writings', in 
Bruce D. Larkin (ed.), Vital Interests: The Soviet Issue in U.S. Central American Policy (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 1988), pp. I41 -167 at p. 142. 
9 Loescher, `Humanitarianism and Politics in Central America', p. 168. 
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reluctant to cooperate with the Salvadoran military, even in their common fight against 
communist insurgencies. 
Map 2: The Nicaraguan and Salvadoran Refugee Camps and Settlements in Honduras 
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Nicaragua, by contrast, was not viewed as a security threat to Honduras, despite border 
clashes in the 1950s and 1960s. Nevertheless, Honduras was implicated in much of the 
conflict in Nicaragua, first providing a military sanctuary for the forces which overthrew 
the Somoza regime (1933- 1979), and then ironically hosting the contra opposition to 
those same forces once they had come to power. In fact, the Sandinista National 
Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional - FSLN) was founded in 
Honduras in 1961, and according to a State Department document, conducted the first 
armed incursions into Nicaragua in 1962.10 But it was when the US in 1979 lost 
Nicaragua, its closest ally in Central America, to a regime which favoured ties to 
Havana and Moscow over Washington, that Honduras was transformed into a `Pentagon 
Republic'," a military sanctuary from which to launch a covert war against Nicaragua. 
lo 
11 
"Revolution Beyond Our Borders ": Sandinista Intervention in Central America (Washington: 
Special Report No. 132, United States Department of State, September 1985), p. 3. 
Richard Lapper and James Painter, Honduras: State for Sale (London: Latin American Bureau, 
1985), p. 88. 
Chapter 3 The Nicaraguan and Salvadoran Refugee Camps in Honduras 121 
1.1 The Nicaraguan Opposition Forces 
The Nicaraguan contras consisted of a diverse range of combatant groups whose only 
shared objective seems to have been the overthrow of the Sandinista Government. The 
initial core of this resistance were members of Somoza's former National Guard who 
managed to flee the country in the wake of the overthrow of the government.12 They 
were later joined by combatants who had opposed Somoza but became disaffected with 
the Sandinista regime; and by indigenous Indian opposition groups. Despite efforts to 
unite the assemblage into a coherent opposition force, the contras remained far from 
homogeneous, plagued by internal rivalry and corruption. 
US support to the contras began towards the end of President Jimmy Carter's term in 
office in response to suspicions that the Sandinistas were supplying arms to the FMLN 
in El Salvador.13 This support expanded markedly when Ronald Reagan assumed the US 
presidency in 1981; by December, $19.5 million had been allocated to assemble, train, 
arm and direct a commando force of 500 mostly Cuban exiles to conduct paramilitary 
operations against Nicaragua from Honduras.'' According to a former contra 
spokesperson, US support ensured the existence of the contras and transformed the 
fighters from `a collection of small, disorganized and ineffectual bands of ex- National 
Guardsmen... into a well -organized, well -armed, well- equipped and well -trained 
fighting force of approximately 4,000 men.'15 
The US assistance enabled daily raids from Honduras by the end of 1982, which were 
aimed at political, economic and military targets in Nicaragua. The extent of these 
attacks raised questions in the media concerning the intentions of the US Government, 
and prompted the US Congress to pass a bill in December prohibiting government aid to 
' The US military helped to evacuate commanders of the Nicaraguan National Guard by disguising a 
DC -8 jet with Red Cross markings and landing it in Managua. See Peter Kornbluh, `The Covert War', 
in Thomas W. Walker, Reagan versus the Sandinistas: The Undeclared War on Nicaragua (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1987), pp. 21 -38 at p. 21. 
13 Marlene Dixon, ' Reagan's Central America Policy: A New Somoza for Nicaragua', in Marlene Dixon 
(ed.), On Trial: Reagan's War in Nicaragua. Testimony of the Permanent Peoples' Tribunal 
(London: Zed Books, 1985), pp. 111 -152 at pp. 116 -117. 
14 William M. LeoGrande, `The Contras and Congress', in Thomas W. Walker (ed.), Reagan versus the 
Sandinistas: The Undeclared War on Nicaragua (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 202 -227 at p. 
203. 
15 Affidavit of Edgar Chamorro at International Court of Justice (ICJ) case Nicaragua v. United States, 
as cited in Holly Sklar, Washington's War on Nicaragua (Boston: South End Press, 1988), p. 117. 
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paramilitary groups for the purpose of overthrowing the Nicaraguan Government.1ó The 
Reagan Administration denied that this was the purpose of the contra support, instead 
justifying the attacks as necessary in order to `turn their [the Sandinista's] attention 
away from subversion beyond Nicaragua's borders and reduce the availability of 
material to be sent to the FMLN'.' Although arms shipments, some of which were 
obtained from Cuba, are widely believed to have been shipped from Nicaragua by air, 
sea or overland via Honduras in preparation for the failed `final offensive' of the FMLN 
in El Salvador,18 no credible evidence of shipments after early 1981 was ever provided." 
Nevertheless authors such as Robert Zimmerman still contend that it is unlikely that El 
Salvador or Honduras would have survived the insurgencies had the US not resisted the 
Sandinista efforts to export their revolution.20 
Military operations from Honduras intensified in 1983 and by June the contra force was 
8,000 strong.2' Military offensives included the invasion of Nicaragua by some 2,000 
contras in March 1983;22 the bombing of Managua in September 1983; and air and sea 
attacks against oil storage tanks and pipelines in September and October 1983 in which 
the CIA played a direct role." Between February and April 1984, mines were laid in or 
close to three Nicaraguan harbours upon the written authorisation of President Reagan, 
an act which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled was in violation of the 
principles of customary international law'4 The harbour mining ignited a debate which 
16 For a detailed discussion of the US Congressional debates over Central American policy from the late 
1970s to the late 1980s, see Cynthia J. Arson, Crossroads: Congress, the Reagan Administration, 
and Central America (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989). 
17 Revolution Beyond Our Borders', p. 23. 
18 See Edelman, 'Soviet -Cuban Involvement in Central America', p. 152. 
19 The Washington Post (June 13 1984) reported that after 4 years of trying, the Reagan Administration 
was unable to prove its case or produce evidence of arms shipments to El Salvador. David 
MacMichaeI, a former CIA analyst testified that there was no successful interdiction or verified report 
of arms movement since April 1981. See Dixon, 'Reagan's Central America Policy', p. 131, and the 
Testimony of David MacMichael, 'The Involvement of the CIA', in Paul Ramshaw and Tom Steers 
(eds), Intervention on Trial: The New York War Crimes Tribunal on Central America and the 
Caribbean (New York: Praeger, 1987), pp. 82 -84. 
20 Robert Zimmerman, Dollars, Diplomacy and Dependency: Dilemmas of U.S. Economic Aid 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), p. 129. 
21 According to CIA figures, the force grew from 500 in 1981 to 4,000 by December 1982, 5,500 by 
February 1983 and 8,000 by June. See Edward Best, US Policy and Regional Security in Central 
America (Aldershot: International Institute of Strategic Studies and Gower Publishing, 1987), p. 58. 
22 New York Times, March 23 I983 and Washington Post, March 24 1983, as cited in Dixon, Reagan's 
Central America Policy', p. 118. 
73 New York Times, 18 April 1984 and Washington Post, 18 April 1984, as cited in Dixon, 'Reagan's 
Central America Policy', p. 119. 
24 For a detailed account of proceedings before the ICJ, see Terry Gill, Litigation Strategy at the 
International Court: A Case Study of the Nicaragua v. United States Dispute (Dordrecht: Martinus 
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had been simmering in Congress since the beginning of US support to the contras, and 
culminated in a vote banning all direct and indirect aid to the guerrilla force in October 
1984. 
Anticipating the financial obstruction to his foreign policy goals, earlier that year 
President Reagan had authorised the National Security Council (NSC) to create a 
surrogate supply network to continue aiding the contras, which operated from the 
basement of the White House 25 Oliver North, an aide to the NSC Chief Robert 
McFarlane, worked with retired senior US military officials to establish a covert 
network consisting of three key components. First, the governments of Saudi Arabia, 
Israel, South Korea, South Africa and Singapore became surrogate suppliers of weapons 
and funds to the guerrillas. From July 1984 to May 1986 the Saudi Government alone 
contributed $32 million to the contras26 Funds from allied governments were 
augmented by profits from the secret US arms sales to Iran that had secured Iranian 
assistance in the release of US hostages held in Lebanon. 
Second, a covert supply system was established by former US military officials, 
purchasing arms in Portugal and Poland with false documents provided by the 
Guatemalan military, through real and fictitious companies in Canada, the US and 
Switzerland. Over 800 tonnes of weapons were allegedly supplied to El Salvador and 
Honduras in 1985 and 1986 for the covert war from these sources.27 The third 
component of the covert network consisted of private American organisations whose 
activities ranged from fundraising and charity drives to paramilitary activities, often 
under the guise of `humanitarian' support. These will be discussed in more detail below. 
Through having Honduras as a compliant host for the contras, the Reagan 
Administration was also able to circumvent some of the restrictions imposed by 
Congress in other ways. The US and Honduran military undertook annual joint 
manoeuvres which involved the construction of military facilities, the allocation of 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1989), Part 2 (pp. 123 -346). For a summary of the ICJ Judgement of June 1986, 
see World Court Digest. Volume 1 1986 -1990 (Berlin: Max -Planck Institute for International Law, 
Springer -Verlag, 1993), pp. 264 -274. 
25 See Peter Kornbluh, `Test case for the Reagan Doctrine: the covert Contra War', Third World 
Quarterly 9, No. 4 (1987): 1118 -1128 at p. 1121. 
26 See ibid., pp. 1121 -1122 for details of these transfers. Also see Sklar, Washington's War on 
Nicaragua, pp. 223 -233 for details of the arms and finance pipelines. 
27 Kombluh, `Test case for the Reagan Doctrine: the covert Contra War', pp. 1122 -1123. 
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communication equipment and the expansion of airstrips in Honduras. Much of these 
facilities and equipment were left in Honduras for use by the contras once the exercises 
terminated.28 Furthermore, direct US aid to the contras continued through increasingly 
veiled forms, such as designating military equipment `surplus to requirements' thereby 
avoiding the imposition of a dollar value and hence approval by Congress.29 
Congress reversed its ban on funding for the contras in June 1985, approving $27 
million of so- called `humanitarian assistance' in the wake of a visit by Nicaraguan 
President Daniel Ortega to the Soviet Union and Soviet -allied states. The `humanitarian' 
proviso, described by Henry Shue as `one of the most shameful episodes of mendacity in 
recent American politics',30 appeased those members of Congress opposed to resuming 
contra support by limiting aid to `food, clothing, medicine and other humanitarian 
assistance'. It specifically excluded `the provision of weapons, weapons systems, 
ammunition or other equipment, vehicles or material which can be used to inflict serious 
bodily harm or death' .31 Debasing the term `humanitarian' by using it to describe non- 
lethal, logistical support to a military force was bad enough. But even then the funds 
were not spent as specified by Congress. 
The Nicaraguan Humanitarian Aid Office that was established to manage and disperse 
the $27 million became a vehicle for supplies to the contras." In addition to paying for 
arms flights to the contras,33 a General Accounting Office (GAO) audit conducted in 
1986 found a trail of corruption, including one bribe of $450,000 which had been given 
to the Honduran Military Commander -in Chief.34 Two -thirds of the money had vanished, 
much of it into bank accounts in the Cayman Islands,35 and the funds were also linked to 
cocaine running activities of the contras 36 Despite the tabling of the GAO Report in 
2s United States -Honduran Relations: A Background Briefing Packet (Central American Historical 
Institute, May 1994), p. 1 as cited in Dixon, 'Reagan's Central America Policy', p. 125. 
29 Sklar, Washington's War on Nicaragua, p. 147. 
3o Henry Shue, `Morality, Politics, and Humanitarian Assistance', in Bruce Nichols and Gil Loescher 
(eds), The Moral Nation: Humanitarianism and US Foreign Policy Today (Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame Press, I989), pp. 12 -40 at p. 23. 
31 Sklar, Washington's War on Nicaragua, p. 268. 
3z Kombluh, `Test case for the Reagan Doctrine', p. 1126. 
33 New York Times, 15 August 1987 as cited in Sklar, Washington's War on Nicaragua, p. 269. 
34 Investigation of US Assistance to the Nicaraguan Contras (Washington: Hearings and Markup before 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Subcommittee on West Hemisphere Affairs, House of 
Representatives, April 9, May 1, May 8 and June 11, 1986), p. 64. 
35 Leslie Cockburn, Out of Control (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1987), p. 45 and p. 159. 
3s ibid., pp. I59 -I67. 
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Congress and attempts by some members to halt all payments to the contras until the 
full $27 million was accounted for, fund allocations continued, culminating in the 
congressional decision in June 1986 to approve Reagan's request for an additional $100 
million for the contras. Burns estimates that some $200 million had been allocated in 
public and private funds to the Nicaraguan opposition in the previous seven years, thus 
bringing the total in 1986 to $300 million 37 By the time the contra camps began to be 
dismantled in February 1989, the guerrilla force had received an estimated $400 
million 38 
Like Pakistan during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Honduran authorities greatly 
benefited through playing the role of sanctuary to US- backed guerrilla forces. Economic 
aid to Honduras doubled from $24 million to $50.7 million between 1979 and 198039 
following the overthrow of Somoza, and by 1982 Honduras became the second highest 
recipient of US military aid in Latin America (receiving $31.3 million in 1982 compared 
with $32.5 million for the entire period 1946 -81).40 By 1984, military aid to Honduras 
reached $78.5 million, and economic aid $168.7 million.41 The Honduran military also 
received training with the aid of US military personnel, whose numbers stationed in 
Honduras rose from 25 in 1980 to between 700 -800 in 1983.62 In addition, the joint 
military exercises undertaken between 1982 and 1984 contributed some $150 million to 
air and naval bases on the Atlantic Coast,ó3 and involved some 4,000 US combat 
troops" Individuals within the Honduran military also gained personally through the 
corruption surrounding contra activities. 
The role of Honduras in the war against Nicaragua was, thus, of crucial importance to 
the Nicaraguan resistance movement, providing a secure base through which resupply, 
training and rearmament could be comprehensively undertaken by the US and its allies. 








E. Bradford Burns, At War in Nicaragua: The Reagan Doctrine and the Politics of Nostalgia (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1987), p. 61. 
Booth and Walker, Understanding Central America, p. 66. 
US Congressional Hearing on Honduras, February 1985 as cited in Lapper and Painter, Honduras: 
State for Sale, p. 87. 
Lapper and Painter, Honduras: State for Sale, p. 88. Also see Best, US Policy and Regional Security 
in Central America, pp. 59 -60 for details of US support to Honduras. 
Lapper and Painter, Honduras: State for Sale, p. 87. 
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New York Times, July 23 1983 as cited in Dixon, 'Reagan's Central America Policy', p. 125. 
Best, US Policy and Regional Security in Central America, p. 60. 
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portray the Nicaraguans as the aggressors while displaying the full weight of American 
backing to the contras and Honduras. One of the primary roles of the contras was to 
`provoke border attacks by Nicaraguan forces and thus serve to demonstrate Nicaragua's 
aggressive nature'.45 Then, when in hot pursuit of contras, Sandinista forces did cross 
the border, as occurred in early 1986, US troops and helicopters mobilised with the 
Honduran military in a large and threatening show of force.46 Under the umbrella of the 
US military Honduras was a well protected military sanctuary. 
1.2 The Salvadoran Opposition Forces 
It is difficult to assess the extent to which Honduran territory played the role of military 
sanctuary to Salvadoran guerrillas opposing the US- backed government. Richard Lapper 
and James Painter suggest that Honduras was a staging post for arms supplies to the 
guerrillas which were bought in Europe and landed on Honduras' Atlantic Coast," but 
whether or not this was with the complicity of members of the Honduran armed forces is 
unclear. Historical animosities between the armed forces of the two countries are alleged 
to have split the Honduran military into two camps. US- trained soldiers perceived the 
left -wing guerrillas to be the greatest threat to Honduran stability, while veterans of the 
`Soccer War' considered the Salvadoran army to be the greater danger.'$ Hence 
individuals in Honduras may have assisted the FMLN maintain a constant pressure on 
the Salvadoran military forces in order to reduce the potential threat posed to Honduras. 
As mentioned earlier, shipments of arms may have crossed Honduras from Nicaragua in 
the early days of the Sandinista regime, but no evidence exists of transfers after early 
1981. Edelman surmises that the Nicaraguans stopped after this time due to the failure 
of the FMLN offensive.49 Scant information exists concerning support to the Salvadoran 
guerrillas, and what is available is mostly conjecture and speculation. This lacuna is 
illustrated by the number of times an article by Jiri Valenta was reprinted,50 even though 
45 David MacMichaeI's testimony before the World Court, 13 September 1985, p. 8 of transcript as 
cited in Kombluh, `The Covert War', p. 23. 
46 Eva Gold, `Military Encirclement', in Thomas W. Walker, Reagan versus the Sandinistas: The 
Undeclared War on Nicaragua (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 39 -56 at p. 51. 
47 Lapper and Painter, Honduras: State for Sale, p. 76. 
48 Loescher, `Humanitarianism and Politics in Central America', p. 168. 
49 Edelman, `Soviet -Cuban Involvement in Central America', p. 153. 
o Jiri Valenta, `The U.S.S.R., Cuba, and the Crisis in Central America', in Bruce D. Larkin (ed.), Vital 
Interests: The Soviet Issue in U.S. Centrai American Policy (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988), pp. 321- 
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it did not substantiate claims that `the Cuban orchestration of the supply of armaments 
from Soviet allied countries has been significant', and that `Soviet- backed involvement 
of Cuba has significantly strengthened the guerrillas in El Salvador' S1 A better idea of 
the source of weapons for the FMLN was provided in 1984 by the US Under -Secretary 
of Defense, Fred lldé, who conceded that official estimates suggested that half the 
guerrillas' arms were captured from the SAF.» 
Several factors militate against the conclusion that Honduras was used to any great 
extent as a military sanctuary for the Salvadoran guerrillas. First, crossing the border 
into Honduras did not ensure protection, either from the host country which was 
officially opposed to their cause, or from incursions by the SAF. Such incursions by the 
SAF and the notorious `death squads' are well documented." Second, the guerrillas held 
considerable territory within El Salvador from which they Iaunched attacks on the 
capital, and they therefore had less need of an external base. The FMLN strategy 
consisted of establishing `zones of control' or `liberated zones' which, by 1984, 
constituted over 20 percent of the country and contained some 250,000 inhabitants.54 
Although Honduras was unlikely to have been beneficial as a purely military sanctuary 
for the FMLN, a humanitarian sanctuary has several advantages over the former, and the 
refugee camps in Honduras were able to perform some functions for the guerrilla forces. 
2. HONDURAS AS A HUMANITARIAN SANCTUARY 
The Salvadoran Refugee Camps 
UNHCR officials maintain today that no proof ever surfaced to confirm that the 
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filtered to the FMLN in El Salvador.55 From a visit to Colomoncagua camp in 1986, Gil 
Loescher also concluded that it was physically impossible to smuggle significant 
quantities of aid past the Honduran military that patrolled the border.56 Honduran and 
US officials, by contrast, firmly asserted that such activities were occurring, and 
advocated relocating the camps further inland accordingly." Examining each of the 
potential sources of support provided by the refugee camps it is evident that in 
comparison with refugee camps based on friendly territory, the Salvadoran camps did 
not perform significant functions as a source of resupply or protection to the guerilla 
forces. Nevertheless, norms of refugee asylum and the presence of aid organisations 
provided some benefits, outlined below. 
2.1 Protection 
The hostility of at least an important segment of the Honduran military towards the 
Salvadoran guerrillas and refugees limited the effectiveness of refugee camps as a 
protected zone. Animosity towards the refugees was evident from the outset, with the 
military repelling all but the first refugee influx of 2,000 Salvadorans in 1980. The first 
refugees settled with the border populations with whom they had retained good relations 
in spite of the 1969 conflict. But the Honduran army brutally prevented further influxes 
and in one incident in May 1980, hundreds of refugees were killed by combined 
Salvadoran and Honduran troops as they crossed the Sumpul River.S5 By 1981, the 
government's policy changed to permit refugees to enter Honduras, but the newly 
formed National Refugee Commission was effectively placed under the jurisdiction of 
the military through the appointment of a retired army colonel, Abraham Turcios.59 
n Personal interviews with UNHCR officials, Geneva, March 1998. 
56 Loescher, `Humanitarianism and Politics in Central America', p. I70. 
57 Different accounts in the literature of the Honduran attitude towards camp relocation suggests that the 
military was divided over the issue. Stanley, for example, claims that the Honduran military 
`consistently opposed' US proposals to move the refugee camps further from the border due to fears 
of political contagion of radical political ideology among Honduran peasants. Weiss Fagen and 
Aguayo, however, cite Honduran support for such a move. See William Stanley, 'Blessing or 
Menace? The Security Implications of Central American Migration', in Myron Weiner (ed.), 
International Migration and Security (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 229 -260, at p. 245 and 
Patricia Weiss Fagen and Sergio Aguayo, Fleeing the Maelstrom: Central American Refugees 
(Baltimore: Occasional Paper No. 10, Central American and Caribbean Program, School of 
Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1986), p. 64. 
58 North and CAPA (eds), Between War and Peace in Central America, p. 133. 
59 Mandy Macdonald, `Salvadorean Refugees in Honduras', Appendix 3 in Lapper and Painter, 
Honduras: State for Sale, p. 130. 
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The proximity of the refugee camps to the border - in some cases only a few kilometres 
away - and suspicions of guerrilla infiltrations of the area, provoked heavy military 
surveillance of the border. Frequent searches of the camps were undertaken and the 
military stationed around Colomoncagua camp were allegedly ordered to shoot and kill 
anyone leaving the camp after 5 p.m.60 The refugees had no freedom of movement 
outside the camps and no possibility of working. But in spite of the constant patrols and 
military surveillance, the geographical terrain and unfenced perimeter of the camps 
made movements in and out impossible to fully control. 
Numerous incidences of violence were perpetrated against refugees and aid personnel, 
including the killing of two members of the Catholic aid organisation Caritas, by the 
Salvadoran military in La Virtud reception centre in 1981; the discovery of the bodies of 
14 Salvadorans 25 kilometres from Mesa Grande camp in 1984; the killing of at least 20 
refugees by Honduran troops between January and July 1984; and the shooting of a 
Spanish doctor and two Salvadorans in June 1984 61 The most publicised violent 
incident took place in August 1985 when a Honduran military raid on Colomoncagua 
camp resulted in the death of two refugees, the injury of 13 others, and the arrest of 10 
more. Such incidents illustrate that the camps did not provide a `safe haven' in which 
combatants were immune from attack. But the outrage expressed by international 
organisations following military incursions into the camps limited the impunity of the 
military, and in that sense did provide some form of protective function to the refugee 
camp inhabitants. Indeed, some international personnel were sent to live in the camps by 
their organisations specifically to provide protection by confronting death squad 
members who entered the camps to abduct and kill camp occupants.62 
The most significant indication that the camps did play a role for the Salvadoran 
insurgents was provided by the reaction of the refugees to attempts to relocate the camps 
further inland and away from the insecurity of the border. The United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was strongly in favour of such a move since in 
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camps, the proximity of some camps to the border (La Virtud camp in particular) 
subjected them to `collateral damage' from heavy fighting in El Salvador. But in spite of 
the danger to the camp inhabitants, the forced closure of La Virtud camp in early 1982 
and the relocation of the refugees to Mesa Grande camp, the furthest from the border, 
provoked vehement protest from the refugees, aid agencies and human rights 
organisations working in the area. Their stated opposition was twofold. First, they 
claimed that the motive for such a move was to militarise the border and prevent the 
influx of more Salvadorans, which violated the refugees' rights to asylum. Second, they 
claimed that the proposed relocation sites were unacceptable to the refugees and aid 
workers for reasons of security and refugee well- being. Mesa Grande camp, to which 
further transfers were proposed, was overcrowded, and alternative sites in the interior 
departments of Olancho and Yoro were allegedly populated by Hondurans who had 
persecuted Salvadoran migrants following the 1969 war. Agencies insisted that there 
was a high degree of hostility to Salvadorans in the interior, and cited the return of 4,000 
refugees from La Virtud to El Salvador to avoid the move to Mesa Grande as proof of 
refugee fears of the interior." 
This sudden repatriation, however, can just as readily support the claim that the camps 
housed Salvadoran guerrillas and their supporters since any relocation further from the 
border would have reduced the utility of the camps for the insurgents. The camps 
provided protection to the guerrillas if only in deterring the further militarisation of the 
border: a US State Department `Non -policy Paper' stated that the closure of 
Colomoncagua camp would make the border area more secure and render it `easier for 
the Honduran military to make sweeps of the area and to disrupt any regional insurgency 
activity there'.6' To counter claims that the refugees would receive less harassment away 
from the border, aid agencies argued that at Mesa Grande camps, accusations of 
guerrilla infiltration by the Honduran military abounded despite the camp's distance 
from the border.ó5 But despite the opposition, UNHCR remained firm in its support for 
the relocation of the camps, stressing that as long as the camps remained where they 
63 Weiss Fagen and Aguayo, Fleeing the Maelstrom, p. 64. 
63 US State Department Non -Policy Paper, February 1985 as cited in Macdonald, `Salvadorean 
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65 The remarks of the Oxfam representative, as noted in Jennifer Waugh and Flora Liebich, `Debriefing 
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the File' Mimeo, 17 September 1985), p. 4. 
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were, the Honduran authorities `have ample justification in their view to act as they had 
[in the August 1985 raid on Colomoncagua camp]'.66 Moreover, a senior UNHCR 
official asserted that `UNHCR could do little to prevent the Honduran authorities from 
exercising their Iegitimate right to carry out policing operations in the camps, especially 
when they maintained that national security was at stake' .67 Nevertheless, the support of 
international agencies and the readiness of the refugees to resist relocation at all cost, 
prevented any further camp relocations. UNHCR recognised that any new attempts to 
move the refugee camps forcibly would result in loss of life since the camps were 
sufficiently well organised to ensure the solidarity of the entire refugee population. 
The vehement aversion to camp relocation by the refugees despite incursions by 
Salvadoran and Honduran forces, together with the enduring accusations that the camps 
sheltered guerrilla fighters, suggests that the camps did serve a dual purpose. Through 
mixing with the refugee population, many of whom were family members,ó6 guerrillas 
were impossible to distinguish from the civilians. Despite the heavy patrols, the camps 
were not impenetrable and the presence of international aid workers inhibited the ability 
of the military to pursue counter -insurgency operations free from scrutiny. Hence the 
camps served to protect the FMLN forces to a certain extent. Once penetrated, the 
camps became a source of provisions to the rebel forces in El Salvador. 
2.2 War Economy 
The raid on Colomoncagua camp in August 1985 was allegedly undertaken after a 
deserter from the FMLN testified that substantial amounts of food and medicine 
routinely left the camp for EI Salvador. He also alleged that the camp was a rest and 
recreation facility for the guerriIlas.69 The plausibility of a testimony reported by the 
Honduran military is questionable, but the allegation is supported by the experiences of 
Médecins sans Frontiéres (MSF), which worked in the camps from 1980 to 1988. Dr 
Bernard Pécoul, who was medical coordinator for MSF in Honduras, confirms that the 
66 Waugh and Liebich, `Debriefing for NGOs on Situation in Honduras', p. 4. 
67 Robert Muller, Head of the Regional Bureau for the Americas and Europe, LNNHCR, as cited in 
Waugh and Liebich, `Debriefing for NGOs on Situation in Honduras', p. 2. 
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camps were a source of resupply for the guerrillas, often with the assistance of the aid 
organisations. He claims that most organisations were `infiltrated' to varying degrees by 
expatriate volunteers who were highly politicised and considered the insurgency to be a 
just war against the brutal Salvadoran government and military. A Spanish doctor who 
arrived in Honduras for MSF, for example, disappeared with medical supplies across the 
border into El Salvador to assist the FMLN. She reappeared six months later but was 
killed by the Honduran military before reaching safety.'° 
The strong ideological convictions of many aid agency employees influenced the relief 
system and levels of aid in the camps, to which the experience of MSF in the health 
sector attests. MSF assumed responsibility from Caritas for the medical coordination of 
all the camps in 1986, and tried to standardise the quantity and type of medical 
assistance in accordance with public health guidelines used in refugee camps throughout 
the world. MSF was concerned by the elevated drug consumption rate and the IeveIs of 
health care and caloric consumption which were higher in the camps than for the 
surrounding population. Data were produced to substantiate these concerns, including a 
census, not survey, of the nutrition level of the children in the camps, from which not 
one child was found to be malnourished." MSF recommended that the feeding centre, 
which was operated by Concern, be closed, but Concern refused, arguing that the need 
still existed. MSF met intense opposition from the refugee committees in the camps 
who, far from accepting reduced levels of assistance, demanded that larger quantities 
and a wider range of drugs be made available to the Salvadoran heath staff, and sought 
an increase in the training of local health workers. Cognisant of the disappearance of 
trained personnel into the guerrilla forces, and the superior health status in the camps, 
MSF refused to meet these demands. 
Hence although difficult to quantify, evidence suggests that food, medical supplies, and 
health staff trained in the refugee camps routinely left for the Salvadoran guerrillas. 
Humanitarian assistance was provided by many non -government organisations (NGOs) 
in excess of requirements to enable a portion to be skimmed off and sent across the 
border. As the total Salvadoran refugee population in Honduras was only 20,000, 
7Ó Bernard Pécoul, former MSF Medical Coordinator in Honduras, personal interview, 25 April, 1998 
71 ibid. Ordinarily it is deemed sufficient to conduct a survey to attain a representative sample of the 
nutritional status of the population, but in this case all children were measured to avoid any doubt 
concerning the results. 
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however, the overall quantities of aid leaving the camps was limited in its potential 
impact on the war economy. 
2.3 Population Control and Legitimacy 
The most important contributions of the Salvadoran refugee camps to the guerrilla 
insurgency were the mechanisms the camps provided to optimise the benefits derived 
from the civilian population. As alluded to above, sectoral committees of refugee 
leaders were formed in each of the camps, and their control over the aid distribution 
channels enabled them to exert considerable influence over the refugee population. 
Committee members were approved by the guerrilla leadership and assisted in 
conscription for the guerrilla forces,72 allegedly coercing women to give up their children 
once they reached the age of ten, through threats to reduce their food rations, harassment 
and punishment." All correspondence in the camps was controlled by the committees, 
and refugees were prevented from repatriating since their presence was imperative to 
ensure the continuation of humanitarian assistance. While some refugees requested help 
from the aid agencies to escape the Ieaders, Bataillon suggests that the majority 
recognised the authority of the guerrillas as legitimate, or at least tolerated it as the least 
bad to expect.'° UNHCR, unable to assure the protection of the refugees in such an 
environment, resorted to extreme measures: `we have had to conduct departures at night 
in the hope of escaping the vigilance of the committees. We have ourselves, as a 
consequence, been physically threatened at the committees' orders'." 
The refugee committees were also accused of exploiting the suffering of the refugees for 
propaganda purposes. In an article in the French newspaper La Croix, Rony Brauman 
cited two occasions in which refugees injured by the Honduran military had their 
dressings and intravenous drip removed by members of the committees. He argued that 
`for their propaganda, a dead refugee is more useful than an injured refugee', and 
accused the committees of having hidden dehydrated children to exacerbate the gravity 
72 Bataillon, `L' action humanitaire des ONG francaises en Amérique centrale', p. 69. 
73 Bertrand de la Grange, `L'organisation Médecins sans frontières renounce à assister les réfugiés 
salvadoriens au Honduras', Le Monde, 16 November 1988, p. 8. 
76 Bataillon, `L' action humanitaire des ONG francaises', pp. 69 -70. 
75 De la Grange, `L'organisation Médecins sans frontières', p. 8. 
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of their affliction." Brauman considered the committees had a `totalitarian hold' over 
the camps reminiscent of the Khmer Rouge, and instrumentalised humanitarian aid to 
that end." His views were not broadly supported, however, due to the political 
allegiance of aid workers who tolerated or even supported this system; disagreement that 
the committees posed a problem; or due to the reluctance of aid agencies to challenge 
the status quo.7S When questioned about the diversion of aid supplies to the guerrilla 
forces in El Salvador, for example, Patrick Ahem, Country Director of Catholic Relief 
Service (CRS) in Honduras said: 
It's the price of our success. The refugees become actors in their own 
development. By respecting their form of organisation, we are accused of 
serving the forces supposedly hidden behind the committees. It's very serious 
for our security and that of the refugees.79 
The risk of opposing the system was far greater than accepting it: MSF' s refusal to meet 
the demands of the committees, and Brauman's sharp criticisms of the transformation of 
the camps `into small gulags'âß provoked the committees to organised hostile protests 
against MSF's `insensitivity'. In 1988 the committees blocked access of MSF personnel 
to the refugee camps and demanded their replacement by an organisation `more 
sympathetic'. MSF decided to withdraw from the camps in November 1988.ß1 
To further complicate the possibility of objective discussions about the camp structure, 
the dispute immediately assumed the discourse of the dominant Cold War polemic, and 
accusations that MSF were mercenaries at the service of American imperialism ensued. 
Once UNHCR publicly backed the position of MSF, they too were accused of a US 
agenda, this time to force the refugees to return to El Salvador.82 Only four years earlier, 
the Heritage Foundation published a report accusing UNHCR of sympathising with the 
FMLN guerrillas, and recommended that US funding be withheld as a consequence.8i 
76 Alain Hertoghe, `Des limites supposées de l'aide humanitaire', La Croix I'Evenement, 25 -26 
December 1988, p. 6. 
7 Rony Brauman, `Les camps de réfugiés salvadoriens au Honduras', Letter to the editor, Le Monde, 26 
November, 1988, p. 6. 
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79 Hertoghe, Des limites supposées de l'aide humanitaire', p. 6. 
B0 As cited in de la Grange, `L'organisation Médecins sans frontières', p. 8 
81 A chronological account of events in 1988 can be found in Magdi Ibrahim, `Rapport de Mission: 
Honduras' (Paris: Médecins sans Frontières mimeo, December 1988). 
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83 Juliana Geran Pilon, Are the United Nations Camps Cheating Refugees in Honduras? (Washington: 
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Such accusations of political allegiance abounded in Central America, but ironically 
MSF and UNHCR were two of only four organisations,84 which worked with both the 
Salvadoran and Nicaraguan refugees. For UNHCR, such action was required under its 
mandate, but for MSF, working with both sides was an attempt to assert neutrality and 
impartiality to humanitarian action in the region. Hence when continued access to the 
Salvadoran camps was denied, MSF decided also to terminate its work with the 
Nicaraguan refugees in the east of the country, phasing out through transferring 
activities to other aid organisations. 
The Nicaraguan Refugee Camps 
As a major sponsor and base of contra rebels, Honduras was naturally a welcoming host 
to Nicaraguan refugees, whose very presence bolstered convictions that the Sandinistas 
were an unpopular regime. In contrast to the treatment of Salvadoran and Guatemalan 
refugees as security threats in Honduras, the two groups of Nicaraguan refugees, the 
Ladinos and the indigenous Miskito, Rama and Suma Indians,85 were accorded freedom 
of movement and employment opportunities.86 The Miskito population was even 
permitted to settle permanently, if desired, in the sparsely populated region of Gracias a 
Dios. 
The creation of refugee flows from Nicaragua generally followed the pattern described 
by Rufin:87 guerrilla attacks provoked government reprisals against the local population, 
and provoked the flight of civilians across the border. In the case of the Miskitos, this 
process was superimposed on a simmering issue of minority rights which identified the 
local population with the cause of the rebel forces, and gave them added legitimacy in 
the eyes of international observers. Conflict between the Sandinistas and the Miskitos 
began in the early days of the Sandinista regime when a campaign for Atlantic Coast 
autonomy provoked clashes, and several indigenous leaders were arrested. Upon release 
these leaders exiled themselves in Honduras, and joining the growing contra forces, 
B6 The other two organisations were CRS and Caritas. See Fagan and Aguayo, Fleeing the Maelstrom, 
pp. 58 -62 for the locations and programs of the NGOs in the camps in Honduras. 
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conducted incursions into Nicaragua. To deny the guerrillas a sympathetic population, 
the Sandinistas forcibly moved 8,500 Miskito and Suma Indians eighty kilometres to the 
south, and destroyed their villages and crops. As a consequence 10,000 refugees crossed 
into Honduras in 1981 and by the end of 1983, 13,500 Miskitos were living in six 
settlements along the Mocorón, Patuca and Warunta Rivers.8ß This figure had grown to 
an estimated 25,000 by 1987.ß9 Although some of the Miskitos joined the contras, the 
vast majority were bona fide refugees fleeing repression by the Sandinista regime. 
The majority of the Nicaraguan Ladino population in Honduras, by contrast, fled 
Nicaragua to avoid conscription into the Sandinista armed forces,90 and constituted the 
bulk of the contra forces. Only half of those estimated to have resided in Honduras lived 
in the UNHCR- assisted refugee camps, the rest choosing to stay along the border. By 
1987 the total population of Ladinos in Honduras was estimated by UNHCR to be 
18,000 91 
Equipped with a secure base in Honduras, the contras did not require the presence of 
refugee camps to provide cover and international protection for the combatants. The 
refugees were given the choice of whether to remain at the border, Iiving in ad hoc 
settlements initially without any humanitarian aid, or be transported inland to a 
UNHCR- assisted refugee camp. The refugees were only accorded refugee status and 
hence legal protection if they moved to one of the UNHCR camps;9'- nevertheless many 
chose to reside along the border. The presence of the refugees did, however, contribute 
in other ways to the contra insurgency, primarily through the legitimacy they bestowed 
upon the contra cause and the propaganda potential this induced, and through their 
ability to attract `humanitarian' aid to the border regions. The UNHCR- assisted camps, 
through concentrating populations together and offering humanitarian support, also 
gained the attention of the guerrillas, although to a lesser extent than seen elsewhere. 
88 Fagen and Aguayo, Fleeing the Maelstrom, p. 53. 
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2.4 Population Control and Legitimacy 
The decision of UNHCR to locate the refugee camps away from the border reduced the 
ability of the contra forces to control the refugee populations. UNHCR deployed 
protection officers to the camps and although they were unable to prevent refugees from 
leaving the camps to fight or to hide, they did try to prevent forced recruitment. UNHCR 
personnel also tried to isolate the aid distribution system from the political agendas of 
the refugee leadership." Nevertheless, recruitment drives were undertaken by both the 
Ladino and Miskito contra groups, and local coordinators were appointed by the contras 
to take charge of the relief supplies provided by the international agencies." 
As an important symbol of Sandinista oppression, the refugees became pawns in the 
propaganda campaign waged by the Reagan Administration to generate support for the 
contra war with the American public and in Congress. Although Reagan attained high 
opinion poll ratings for his overall performance as President, his Nicaragua policy did 
not enjoy widespread support, frequently losing in the polls by a two -to -one margin." 
Hence Reagan went to great lengths to convince the American public and Congress that 
the US engagement was vital to protect US interests from the communist scourge. The 
Sandinista regime was thoroughly demonised with the assistance of a biased press,96 and 
the refugees were the visible embodiment of the Administration's rhetoric. The litany of 
alleged Sandinista crimes included genocide against the Miskito Indians; anti- Semitic 
pogroms that drove the Jewish community into exile; massive and widespread human 
rights abuses; drug smuggling to poison the youth of America; and host of international 
terrorism.97 By emphasising the oppressiveness and communist leanings of the 
Sandinistas, and continually assaulting the regime's character, the Administration 
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managed to shift attention away from the debate over the merits of Reagan's policy, and 
the abuses and corruption committed by the contras. 
The predicament of the refugees was exploited to influence the Congressional debate on 
aid to the contras. Americas Watch documented one such instance in 1986 which was 
timed to coincide with a Congressional vote.98 The US Embassy in Honduras invited 60 
journalists to visit the Mosquita region, and allegedly staged a new refugee influx to 
coincide with the visit. Americas Watch claims that the refugee flow was not the result 
of repressive activities of the Sandinistas as alleged by US authorities, but the result of a 
deliberate campaign by one of the contra organisations to spread fear in parts of 
Nicaragua to encourage the exodus. Reporters from the Boston Globe and the 
Philadelphia Inquirer concurred with this analysis, saying that the refugees were 
obviously coached in their testimonies and were rarely left unaccompanied when 
speaking to journalists.99 Americas Watch concluded that: 
Coming at a moment when the U.S. Congress is voting on aid to the contras, 
the flight of thousands of Indians across the border gives a very bad impression 
of Sandinista -Miskito relations, which were supposed to be on the mend... The 
picture that has already been painted by the Reagan Administration is that 
serious new abuses provoked this massive exodus, although Americas Watch 
has not learned of such abuses. The exodus gives the Congress more reasons to 
vote for aid to the contras especially `humanitarian' aid which could be 
thought to benefit these refugees.' 
The symbolic importance of the refugee population made their repatriation undesirable, 
and coercive measures were employed by the contras to ensure that the refugees 
remained in Honduras. In one such incident in December 1984, a group of 35 refugees 
who had registered for repatriation with UNHCR were confronted by 300 fellow 
refugees armed with machetes.101 The US was also implicated in this process: members 
of the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) visiting Honduras witnessed 
three of the most prominent members of the contra leadership conducting rounds of the 
refugee camps in a military helicopter accompanied by CIA and US State Department 
98 With the Miskitos in Honduras (New York: Americas Watch, 1986). 
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personnel to dissuade the refugees from repatriating.102 Spreading rumours of an 
imminent new offensive against the Sandinistas was another method employed to 
encourage the refugees to remain in Honduras. 
Thus in the Nicaraguan refugee camps it was not the presence of aid organisations or the 
assistance that they provided that lent legitimacy to the guerrilla cause, but the presence 
of the refugees, manipulated to exaggerate images of suffering. Once successfully 
enticed to the region, however, the aid served the guerrillas in other ways. 
2.5 War Economy 
Since UNHCR would only provide assistance to refugees in the camps located away 
from the border, thus catering to bona fide refugees who warranted protection and not to 
combatant forces, the Nicaraguans living along the border had no initial access to 
humanitarian relief. Some 3,000 Nicaraguans lived among the contra groups.103 But in 
1984, Congress authorised the US Agency for International Development (USAID) to 
spend $7.5 million for Miskito and other Indians living outside the UNHCR camps, and, 
seriously undermining the UNHCR program, actually stipulated that the funds be 
administered `independently from United Nations relief agencies'.104 A large proportion 
of the funds was allocated to infrastructural improvements to roads and bridges which 
inevitably served more than just the relief community along the border. Budget 
allocations were also made to health care in the border area, and seeds and tools were 
allegedly distributed through a right -wing American private aid organisation, Friends of 
the Americas (FOA).tos 
The sudden infusion of aid to the border region and the promise of jobs through the 
USAID projects came at a time when UNHCR was reducing humanitarian assistance in 
the camps to encourage refugee self -sufficiency. Some 2,000 -3,000 refugees abandoned 
crops and houses to move back to the border region. The policy was clearly intended to 
1°2 Hansruedi PepIinsky and Martin Diskin, Report of the ICVA Mosquita Mission (Geneva: International 
Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) mission report, 1987), pp. 9 -10. 
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support the contra effort since neither the promised jobs on road works nor the 
assistance offered by FOA were sustainable: `nobody pretends that this organization 
[FOA] is interested in, or capable of, administering a long -term refugee settlement 
project... The presence of a large civilian population helps to attract assistance which, in 
reality, is intended for the contras'.106 In a similar vein, a report by CRS concluded: `the 
border relief programs are not designed to meet the long or short-term interests of the 
Miskitos, but rather are designed for political purposes as a conduit of aid to the 
contras'.107 
But while many of the established aid organisations opposed such a misuse of aid for 
political objectives, other organisations were more than willing supporters of such 
policies. As mentioned above, the 1984 US congressional ban on aid to the contras 
prompted the establishment of private aid networks in the US to channel private 
assistance to the contras. Some of these groups were openly military, supplying arms, 
equipment and financial support to the contra groups in Honduras. Others, however, 
established a `humanitarian' front to avoid openly violating the Neutrality Act,' or to 
benefit from legislation loopholes and public support. The United States Council for 
World Freedom (USCWF), which is a paramilitary group associated with the World 
Anti -Communist League, for example, benefited from tax- exempt status as an 
`educational' organisation to recruit people with skills in intelligence and psychological 
warfare to train the contras and the Salvadoran police and military.109 Refugee Relief 
International adopted a `humanitarian' persona but advertised for donations in Soldier of 
Fortune, a magazine which also advertises mercenary services. Other groups which 
allegedly supported the contras included the relief branch of the Christian Broadcasting 
Network (Operation Blessing), World Medical Relief, FOA, the Knights of Malta, 
Americares, and the Reverend Sun Myung Moon's Unification Church, through their 
affiliates, the Confederation of Associations for the Unity of the Societies of America, 
1°6 Fagen and Aguayo, Fleeing the Maelstrom, pp. 87 -88. 
1 °7 Nicaraguan Miskito and Sumo Indian Refugees in Honduras: A Report (CRS, March 14 1985) as 
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and the Nicaraguan Freedom Fund.10 A 1985 report of the Congressional Arms Control 
and Foreign Policy Caucus stated that 
close to 20 privately incorporated US groups have reportedly sent (or plan soon 
to send) aid, supplies or cash contributions to Nicaraguan refugees in Honduras 
and to the contras themselves... [The] driving forces behind the major groups 
are a small group of about half a dozen men, most of whom have military or 
paramilitary backgrounds or mercenary experience... While many of the 
groups work closely together, they have different stated purposes... Most 
groups call their aid `humanitarian', but either privately or publicly 
acknowledge that some of it (e.g. medical supplies and food) ends up at contra 
camps. These groups also have conceded that their `humanitarian' aid to 
refugees (which include families of the contras) may indirectly aid the contras 
by freeing up the contra accounts to purchase weapons and pay combatants. "' 
Some of the aid, such as the `Shoeboxes for Liberty' shipped to Honduras by FOA, had 
more to do with propaganda than fuelling the war effort, as did the aerobic instructor 
sent by one group to `cheer the wretched in their squalid camps' .12 Nevertheless, Leslie 
Cockburn estimates that these groups shipped over $5 million in `humanitarian' aid to 
the contras between April 1984 and March 1985 alone, "' a significant contribution to 
the economy of war, if only through diversifying sources of support to the contras and 
permitting contra finances to concentrate on purely military expenses. 
Why such blatant manipulation of a vulnerable population for propaganda and material 
gain in a situation of undeclared war did not generate more condemnation from the 
established humanitarian community remains to be addressed. 
3. THE RELIEF RESPONSE: THE NEUTRALITY VOID 
The limited humanitarian space in Central America in which humanitarian organisations 
could operate was caused largely by the US Iabelling of Salvadoran refugees as 
`guerrillas' and the Nicaraguan refugees as `freedom fighters'. But the vast majority of 
aid organisations were also driven by political and ideological impulses which, through 
10 For a description of these groups see Sklar, Washington's War on Nicaragua, pp. 233 -242. 
"' Who Are the Contras? An Analysis of the Makeup of the Military Leadership of the Rebel Forces and 
of the Nature of the Private American Groups Providing them Financial and Material Support 
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compromising the humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality, reduced the 
space further. 
The perspectives and motivations of the various aid organisations followed three general 
tendencies: political according to Cold War doctrine; ideological following notions of a 
`just war'; and pragmatic focus on practical concerns. Deviations from the three 
tendencies, of course, occurred, particularly within NGOs which, as a collection of 
private individuals professing a self- imposed mandate, were prone to divergent opinions 
and motivations among their members. According to Gilles Bataillon, the perspectives 
of some aid organisations shifted in Central America during this period from what could 
be termed a politically -based to a rights -based approach to humanitarian assistance. 
3.1 Politically- oriented 
Most of the European NGOs were driven by a strong political motivation, almost 
exclusively to the left. In the early 1980s the Salvadoran guerrillas were a particularly 
strong symbol for the left in Europe, and financial support and volunteers were readily 
available to NGOs which were seen to be assisting the victims of right -wing oppression. 
As mentioned earlier, many NGOs were `infiltrated' by some hard -line volunteers, some 
of whom used the organisations for the plane ticket and Honduran visa, but disappeared 
upon arrival to join the FMLN. In spite of the general political Ieaning of the 
organisations, however, they were generally established NGOs which, at least at the 
organisational level, tried to adhere to humanitarian standards and modes of operation, 
unlike the private groups operating outside the parameters of the aid operation on the 
other side of the country. 
It is surprising that the use of the term `humanitarian' to describe the conservative US 
groups which emerged in response to the postponement of government aid to the 
contras in 1984 did not cause more consternation among the established NGO 
community in the US. The open espousal of partisan support for the contras by these 
groups, and their association with paramilitary organisations while operating under a 
`humanitarian' banner, compromised the reputations of the genuine humanitarian 
agencies. Furthermore, the new groups potentially absorbed a share of private and public 
funds. But opinion was divided over the provision of humanitarian aid to the contras 
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among mainstream NGOs. From a meeting in the US organised in 1985 to review the 
`first principles' of humanitarian assistance, Minear reported that: 
while PVO [private voluntary organisation] alarm over the politicization of aid 
in Central America helped provide a place on the crowded Inter Action agenda 
for the issue of humanitarian assistance, the process did not, as some PVOs had 
feared and other PVOs had hoped, line up the PVO community in opposition to 
Contra aid. "4 
Several US aid organisations did, however, unite in opposition to the US Government's 
misuse of the term `humanitarian' to describe aid to a military force. Eleven NGOs 
issued a joint communique to this effect;15 senior NGO executives wrote letters to 
Congress; and a full -page advertisement was published in the New York Times by 
another coalition of NGOs, stating that there was `nothing humanitarian about providing 
direct aid to the combatants in this tragic conflict' ."6 Oxfam America followed this with 
further lobbying, unfazed by the Government's consequent refusal to issue the agency 
an export license for aid to Nicaragua, while granting such a license to the USCWF to 
export a helicopter to the region. However, rather than focusing on the violation of the 
notion of humanitarian action, the lobbying took the inverse political stand, advocating 
an end to aid for the contras and renewed aid to the Sandinistas. As Bruce Nichols 
notes: 
in pursuing the fight against the government's abandonment of first principles 
in humanitarian aid, the private agencies had themselves been forced into 
equally partisan stances which also went far beyond traditional humanitarian 
doctrine. "' 
The aid organisations engaged in the public debate to counter views like that of a 
Washington Post editorial: 'anyone who examines the historical record of communism 
must conclude that any aid directed at overthrowing communism is humanitarian aid'.118 
But Nichols says that they were unable to generate serious public debate over the misuse 
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of the term.19 Had they united in advocating a respect for humanitarian principles rather 
than engaging in the polemics of the war, they might have been more successful. 
3.2 Rights -oriented 
The second type of aid organisations working in Honduras were those for whom 
motivation stemmed from an ideological belief in a `just war' against tyranny, regardless 
of the political doctrine espoused by the victims or the oppressors. Particularly for those 
working in the Salvadoran camps, the brutality of the Salvadoran armed forces and 
death squads in the deliberate bombing of civilians; the perpetration of human rights 
violations; and the use of napalm, white phosphorous and chemical weapons,120 
generated deep sympathy for the victims and support for the guerrilla forces. Influential 
segments of the Catholic Church were adherents to this perspective, advocating the right 
to insurrection within the Christian theological tradition. The message of the murdered 
Salvadoran Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero y Galdames was highly influential: 
When a dictator seriously violates human rights and attacks the common good 
of the nation, when it becomes unbearable and closes all channels to dialogue, 
of understanding, of rationality - when this happens, the church speaks of the 
legitimate right to insurrectional violence?' 
Thus through a conviction to assist the poor and promote social change, a blend of 
radical Christian, Marxist and nationalist currents permeated the opposition to the 
Salvadoran government. More conservative Christian groups, however, opposed any 
concession to communism, and tensions among the religious NGOs were clearly 
apparent in the camps. World Vision was accused by other NGOs of collaborating with 
the Honduran and Salvadoran forces against the refugees, espousing anti -communist 
beliefs, and pressuring the refugees to adopt fundamentalist religious beliefs as a 
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By early 1982, the church relief societies had become strongly polarized along 
lines determined by support or rejection of U.S and Honduran refugee policies. 
Supporters of the government's refugee policies - evangelical agencies such as 
the California -based World Vision or conservative churches represented within 
CEDEN [National Evangelical Committee for Emergencies and Development] 
- were judged by Catholic and mainline Protestant groups to be naïve 
accomplices in governmental plans, trading their compliance with military 
authorities for government approbation.123 
The controversy forced World Vision to leave Colomoncagua camp in 1981 and Mesa 
Grande in 1982. 
Experiences like that of MSF in the Salvadoran camps, confronting the coercive 
domination and exploitation of the refugees by the camp committees, tempered the 
political opinion of some organisations over time. Bataillon argues that it was the 
experience of the French NGOs in Central America which shifted the basis for 
intervention from one of political motivation to one of solidarity with victims, 
recognising that they could be found on both sides. He suggests that one of the 
imperatives faced by these NGOs during this period was to convince their base of 
support, mainly progressive and leftist, that the Nicaraguan refugees fleeing the 
Sandinista revolution and the Salvadoran peasants fleeing the Salvadoran army had the 
same right to receive aid and the protection of UNHCR.124 The NGOs also needed to 
convince their volunteers: Bernard Pécoul faced a strike by members of MSF when he 
deployed a doctor to assist with an influx of Nicaraguan refugees to the camps near 
Danlí, since the strikers were opposed to aiding any group which could have been 
associated with the contras. Individual convictions were difficult to moderate, and 
Bataillon notes that MSF staff increased their acts of friendship to the Salvadorans when 
the organisation commenced work with the Nicaraguans, lending their vehicles to the 
health authorities during the weekends and financing activities more associated with 
political indoctrination than medical efficiency.1i5 
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3.3 Pragmatically -oriented 
The third type of response identifiable among the aid community was one of 
pragmatism in the sense that the practical concerns of the provision of relief to the 
refugees took precedence over a political analysis or understanding of the political 
dimensions and ramifications of humanitarian assistance. The pragmatic approach can 
serve to justify an acceptance of the status quo which is serving a political or ideological 
cause, but is more often associated with a perceived inability to influence the political 
context, and hence a focus on the practical aspects of relief provision. This is 
characterised by adherence to performance indicators associated with, for example, 
income -generation projects, refugee self -sustainability and adequate services in the 
camps while ignoring the `political' issues associated with security and protection. The 
aforementioned quote of the CRS country director, Patrick Ahern, typifies this 
approach: for the benefits of perceived social cohesion, and an efficient relief 
distribution system, Ahern accepted the domination of the refugee population by the 
camp committees, and the diversion of relief supplies. 
The pragmatic perspective is also common in the realm of NGOs for which the 
development of the organisation is more important than the task of assisting vulnerable 
populations. The delivery of aid becomes the end in itself, and the drive to 
professionalise and compete with other NGOs to be bigger and better supersedes other 
considerations. This was well illustrated by the reaction of US NGOs to an offer by the 
US Department of Defence (DoD) of collaboration in 1987. The Director of the Office 
of Humanitarian Assistance of the DoD, Dr Robert Wolthuis, explained to an audience 
of NGOs that the DoD was authorised to provide aid organisations with excess US 
government property and transport for relief supplies on a space -available basis. Despite 
his disclosure that most of the first -year shipments had been for FOA, and that NGO 
eligibility was not restricted to those registered with USAID, the ensuing discussion 
generated as many questions pertaining to procedural and availability issues as to 
concerns about the appropriateness of the involvement of the DoD in `humanitarian 
assistance'.`26 A group of interested NGOs was formed to `explore improved and 
expanded cooperative arrangements with DoD',127 apparently indifferent to the 
126 See Minear, Helping People in an Age of Conflict, pp. 38 -40. 
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likelihood that their relief supplies would be transported in US government aircraft 
beside military equipment and supplies. 
3.4 UNHCR 
Dependent upon discretionary funding from UN member states, UNHCR was 
intrinsically tied to the political context and, as such, does not fit well into the 
categorisation above. Throughout the conflict in Central America, the organisation was 
constrained in the fulfilment of its mandate through its financial dependence upon the 
US, which contributed about one -third of UNHCR's regional budget.128 The US used 
this financial leverage to improve conditions for Nicaraguans in Honduras and to 
pressure UNHCR over issues concerning the relocation or repatriation of Salvadoran 
refugees.129 
The position of UNHCR was further weakened by the failure of Honduras to become a 
party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol. Although the principle of 
non - refoulement was included in domestic law, UNHCR's effectiveness in providing 
protection was compromised by the limitations imposed by the local authorities, who in 
turn were strongly influenced by the US. Although the Honduran government depended 
upon UNHCR to meet the humanitarian needs of the refugees, their relief program was 
undertaken at the discretion of the Honduran authorities. The fragility of the relationship 
curbed UNHCR protests to the government about military infractions into the camps. 
UNHCR was vulnerable to criticism for any action it undertook to improve protection of 
the refugees on both sides of Honduras. Further attempts to relocate the Salvadoran 
border camps would have resulted in the likely injury and death of refugees, and would 
have been strongly denounced by the aid community, human rights organisations, 
church groups and the refugees. Moreover, the refugee leadership may have compelled 
many of the refugees to return to El Salvador rather than move further inland, where 
their safety was far from assured. In the east of the country, UNHCR's attempts to keep 
refugees a safe distance from the border were undermined by the policies of its principal 
donor. UNHCR had to weave a prudent path between ensuring protection for refugees 
and respecting the political imperatives of the US Government. The agency also had to 
128 Comptroller General, Report to the Congress of the United States, p. 2. 
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consider the impact that its actions in Honduras would have on operations elsewhere 
and in the future. The Central American refugee crisis clearly illustrated the 
contradiction implicit in upholding a humanitarian mandate while dependent upon 
funding from politically- interested states. 
CONCLUSION 
Several significant points emerge from the Central American refugee context. First and 
most importantly, this case illustrates that conceptions of what constituted a `just cause' 
among most humanitarian actors was highly subjective. Rather than applying 
humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality to the refugees on both sides of the 
country, aid agencies tended to work with the refugees with whom they sympathised. 
Although preference given to the Nicaraguan refugees by the Honduran authorities 
provided some justification for agencies to focus on the Salvadoran camps according to 
the proportionality precept of impartiality, few argued in terms of humanitarian 
principles in the highly politicised context. 
Second, as aid agencies discovered in the Afghan context, espousing a `just' political 
cause was no guarantee of responsible leadership by the refugee warriors, and concern 
for the welfare of the civilian population. Organisations working with both the 
Salvadoran and Nicaraguan refugees permitted aid to serve the political agenda of the 
refugee Ieaders, despite its use as a coercive tool of refugee control. Some aid 
organisations considered that the political ends justified the means, and tolerated the 
practices in the refugee camps. Others, however, refused to accept that aid was 
manipulated in this way. 
Third, circumstantial evidence from the Salvadoran refugee camps cast doubt on the 
claim that refugee warriors can only exist on the territory of a host state sympathetic to 
their cause. An international presence in the camps, even when on hostile territory, 
provides some protection in a similar fashion to `safe areas' inside countries in conflict 
in the 1990s. Furthermore, although not significant in quantity, the elevated levels of aid 
in the camps permitted materials to be siphoned off to the guerrillas, and the camps 
structures facilitated influence over the refugee population. The value of the camps to 
129 Loescher, `Humanitarianism and Politics in Central America', p. 181. 
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the guerrillas was illustrated through the attitudes of the refugee leadership to camp 
relocation and refugee repatriation. 
In fact in many respects, the Salvadoran camps played a more important role for refugee 
warriors than the Nicaraguan camps. In comparison with the extent and nature of direct 
military support to the contras, the latter played a relatively minor role in the 
insurgency. The most significant contribution of the Nicaraguan refugees to the conflict 
was in a propaganda role to influence US public opinion in favour of the contra cause. 
This in turn generated assistance from right -wing private aid groups and US 
Government programs to the border region, which brought economic benefits to the 
guerrilla forces. But the refugee camps and border settlements were not significant in the 
conflict; most of the literature on the contra war does not even mention the Nicaraguan 
refugees. 
Finally, this case starkly illustrates that the US subjugated humanitarian concerns to 
foreign policy interests, hence highlighting the conflict for aid agencies between 
accepting government funds and undertaking independent, impartial humanitarian 
activity. This was nowhere more apparent than with UNHCR, and demonstrates the 
difficulty of reconciling a mandate to protect refugees with a role of providing 
assistance. As Loescher remarks, 
effective protection requires operational independence; but setting up camps, 
generating assistance efforts, and raising money necessitate dependence on 
national governments... No refugee agency can simultaneously be independent 
for the purpose of protection and dependent for the purpose of relief)" 
The US Embassy in Honduras refused to even recognise the Salvadorans as refugees, 
classifying them as `economic migrants' in order to deny the possibility that they fled 
human rights abuses by the Salvadoran military that the US supported. The opposite 
image was portrayed of the Nicaraguan refugees, whose flight was exploited as `proof' 
of the oppressive nature of the Sandinista regime. The refugees were pawns of foreign 
policy objectives. 
The next chapter examines an equally politically- charged refugee context, but one that 
caused much deeper dilemmas to the aid organisations working with the refugees and 
"° Gil Loescher, Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis (New York: 
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inside the refugee -generating state. Caught between the political imperatives of three 
superpowers, an army of occupation and one of the most brutal regimes in history, the 
Cambodian refugees in Thailand and the aid operation mounted to assist them became a 
vital part of the ensuing conflict. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE CAMBODIAN REFUGEE CAMPS IN THAILAND 
The Cambodian' refugee crisis along the Thai -Cambodian border, which unfolded in 
1979, arguably posed the greatest challenge to the international humanitarian system of 
the Cold War period. Victims and oppressors, at the outset indistinguishable in their 
needs, became bound together in a symbiotic relationship by the relief operation and the 
politics which determined its path. Seemingly powerless to change the political context 
in which the aid operation was embedded, aid agencies had to confront the probability 
that their aid was reviving one of the most brutal regimes in modern history, the Khmer 
Rouge.' 
Unlike the other case studies, the Cambodian refugee camps3 were widely recognised by 
aid organisations, academics and the press as fuelling one side of the conflict. Critical 
works about the politicisation of the aid program appeared from the early 1980s, the 
seminal being William Shawcross' The Quality of Mercy.' Aid workers published 
detailed accounts of the evolution and problems of the aid operation,' and in -depth 
academic studies ensued.' All works highlight the vivid manipulation of the refugee 
population for political ends and the dilemma this posed to aid organisations as 
unwilling accomplices. The press openly questioned the role of the camps. An article in 
the New York Times Magazine stated: 'If the camps in Thailand are closed, the Khmer 
Rouge will be denied its prime source of sanctuary and supplies'.' 
The Khmer Rouge adopted the Khmer phonetic rendition for Cambodia, Kampuchea, in 1975, but the 
United Nations decided in 1984 to reverted to the name Cambodia as the accepted common -usage 
designation for the country and its people. 
2 The `Khmer Rouge' was the nickname for the Communist Party of Kampuchea. 
3 The Thai Government did not confer refugee status on inhabitants of the border camps and referred to 
them as `displaced persons camps'. Nevertheless the term 'refugee camp' will be used 
interchangeably with 'border camp' and 'holding centre' throughout this chapter. 
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Political Pawns: Refugees on the Thai -Kampuchean Border (Oxford: Refugee Studies Programme, 
1989). 
Steven Erlanger, 'The Endless War', New York Times Magazine, March 5, 1989, p. 52. 
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Thailand played a vital role in supporting the resistance forces on Thai territory, but 
managed to blend its roles of military and humanitarian sanctuary more closely than 
Pakistan or Honduras. Thailand officially proclaimed neutrality in the conflict between 
the Vietnamese- installed government in Cambodia and the Khmer resistance groups 
opposing it, but used the latter and the hundreds of thousands of refugees under their 
control as a buffer against the Vietnamese forces. The Thai government restricted the 
Cambodian refugees to the border area to engage their services as a humanitarian 
sanctuary for the resistance forces, and facilitated the transfer of arms and finance to the 
guerrilla factions. 
In the refugee camps a thin veneer of humanitarian concern was applied through the 
presence of aid organisations, but the numerous attacks perpetrated against the border 
camps in the ensuing years testify to their limitations as protected humanitarian 
sanctuaries. In the intensely political context aid incurred extreme paradoxes in 
contributing to the war economy, conferring legitimacy on political players, and in 
permitting the domination and control of the civilian population. Rather than being 
unintended consequences of the relief effort, however, these `paradoxes' were carefully 
orchestrated by the aid donor nations and the Thai Government to pursue foreign policy 
goals. 
The pervasiveness of the political context necessitates commencing this chapter with a 
brief sketch of the political alliances and interests of the major players in the Cambodian 
refugee crisis. An attempt is then made to distinguish the role of Thailand as a purely 
military sanctuary to forces opposing the Heng Samrin Government in Phnom Penh, 
before analysing the role of the refugee camps in the conflict. Part Three then examines 
the attitude of the aid agencies operating along the border for which the paradoxical 
consequences of the aid they supplied was overt and widely recognised. 
1. THAILAND AS A MILITARY SANCTUARY 
From the outset, the Cambodian refugees were an integral part of the shifting political 
alliances and conflict which had enveloped the Indochinese region since the 1950s. As 
in Central America, the region was the scene of intense superpower rivalry, not only 
between capitalist and communist camps, but also between China and the Soviet Union 
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once these former allies became enemies. The Cambodian crisis was not the result of the 
classic Cold War bipolar conflict, but a tripartite power struggle involving socialist 
forces on either side. 
Thailand, never having been colonised, escaped the turmoil of nationalist -communist 
independence struggles in Indochina, and retained a firm footing in the Western camp 
throughout the Cold War. Thailand became an ally of the United States (US) from the 
time of the Korean War (1950- 1953), and provided military bases for American forces 
during the US war in Vietnam (1965- 1975), as well as combat troops.' The US military 
also assisted the Thai Government suppress internal communist movements through the 
provision of economic and technical assistance in counter -insurgency. 
Cambodia, by contrast, vacillated in its Cold War loyalties, courting all three major 
powers at various times. Declared a neutral state upon independence in 1954, both right 
wing and left wing movements formed in opposition to Prince Sihanouk' s regime; the 
Khmer Serei (Free Khmer) in 1956 representing the former, and the Khmer Rouge 
during the same period, the latter. The US provided economic and military aid until 
Sihanouk initiated ties with the Soviet Union and China in 1965. The US then shifted its 
support to the conservative Khmer Serei guerrillas. Relations between the two 
governments resumed in 1969, but Sihanouk continued to court both sides of the Cold 
War divide, permitting North Vietnamese forces to establish supply Iines inside 
Cambodia, and turning a blind eye to US bombing of these routes. The overthrow of 
Sihanouk in 1970 in a military coup lead by his conservative Prime Minister, Lon Nol, 
permitted an intensification of US bombing of the communist supply lines for the next 
three years. Nearly half of the 540,000 tons of bombs fell in the last six months' 
The indiscriminate bombing of the Cambodian countryside generated considerable 
opposition to the Lon Nol regime and thousands of peasants joined one of the resistance 
groups, whether pro- Sihanouk, pro -Vietnamese communist, moderate, or hardline 
Khmer Rouge. According to Ben Kiernan, US bombing particularly contributed to the 
rise of the Khmer Rouge to power, providing Pol Pot's forces with `an excuse for its 
3 See Ramesh Thakur, Peacekeeping in Vietnam: Canada, India, Poland and the International 
Commission. (Alberta: University of Alberta Press, 1984), p. 192. 
9 Ben Kiernan, `Roots of Genocide: New Evidence on the US Bombardment of Cambodia', Cultural 
Survival Quarterly 14, No. 3, (1990): 20 -22 at p. 20. 
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brutal, radical policies and its purge of moderate communists and Sihanoukists'.'Ó 
Having decimated or forced into exile other opposition groups, the Khmer Rouge 
marched on Phnom Penh and secured the surrender of the Lon Nol Government on 17 
April 1975. Thereafter ensued one of the most brutal periods in modern history, a period 
of violent socialist rule which, through policies of radical reforms and terror, resulted in 
the death of more than one million people by starvation, disease and execution." 
Thailand joined other members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) in recognising the Khmer Rouge government, and despite their ideological 
differences, closure of their common border, and numerous violent border incidents, the 
two governments maintained cordial relations. The Vietnamese government, however, 
was less tolerant of Khmer Rouge border incursions, and tension escalated into open 
conflict following a Khmer Rouge attack against a Vietnamese provincial town in April 
1977. Vietnamese forces invaded Cambodia in early 1978 and by December some 
100,000 Vietnamese troops and 20,000 Cambodian guerrillas conducted an assault on 
the capital, which fell on 7 January 1979. The Vietnamese forces installed a government 
headed by a former Khmer Rouge official, Heng Samrin. 
Very few countries recognised the new Vietnamese- backed government. Superpower 
politics and regional realignments overshadowed the removal of a regime responsible 
for widespread and massive human rights abuses and crimes against humanity. 
Following the Sino- Soviet split, China developed closer links with ASEAN nations, and 
although supporting the North Vietnamese during the US- Vietnam War, began to 
withdraw aid to Vietnam in 1975. Vietnam strengthened ties with China's principal foe, 
the Soviet Union, and China increased support to the Khmer Rouge, and began to thaw 
relations with the US. The ASEAN nations, towards which Vietnam's policy had been 
hostile since 1975, unified in opposition to Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, 
particularly Thailand which claimed that Vietnam posed a direct threat, on account of 
10 ibid. 
" Estimates of the number of deaths caused by the Khmer Rouge regime range from several hundred 
thousand to several million. Mass graves discovered by the Yale University Genocide Program, under 
the directorship of Ben Kiernan, in Cambodia in 1996 suggest that the death toll may have been 
closer to two million than one million. See Seth Mydans, `Cambodian Killers' Careful Records Used 
Against Them', New York Times, 7 June 1996, p. Al and p. A8. 
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having troops in both Laos and Cambodia." Thus despite the record of the Khmer 
Rouge, political deals were struck among regional nations, largely on the basis of `the 
enemy of my enemy is my friend'. Opposition to Vietnam and the USSR united former 
adversaries, the most remarkable of which was Prince Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge, 
an alliance which was brokered by China. The Chinese Government was to have 
increasing influence in the ensuing years in sustaining the anti -Vietnamese resistance 
through diplomatic and military means. 
In what was a political and moral compromise of expediency, the governments of the 
US, Australia, Malaysia, Singapore, Japan and the European Economic Community 
pledged financial backing in support of China's attempts to forge a united opposition 
front among all opposition movements in Thailand, including the Khmer Rouge." The 
Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), discussed further below, 
was formed in 1982 from a tripartite agreement between the Khmer Rouge, the Khmer 
People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) and Prince Sihanouk's United National 
Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (Front uni 
national pour un Cambodge indépendent, neutre, pacifique et coopératif - 
FUNCINPEC). The alliance served to dilute the visibility of the Khmer Rouge, thereby 
providing Western nations with a façade through which any means could be pursued to 
oppose the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. 
The role of Thailand as a military sanctuary for Cambodian resistance movements was 
limited prior to China's involvement in the creation of the opposition to the Vietnamese 
backed regime in Phnom Penh. The border region north of Aranyaprathet had been the 
site of several resistance camps run by right -wing guerrillas opposing Sihanouk since 
the 1950s, but these bases facilitated smuggling as much as military activities.'° During 
the 1970s, many former officers and soldiers in Lon Nol's army also held bases in this 
region, but again these were predominantly used for black market trade in teak, gems, 
'2 Tony Jackson points out that there is a dearth of evidence to substantiate claims that Vietnam had 
expansionist aims. He suggests that these fears were exaggerated to justify the high levels of military 
spending by the West. Personal communication, 28 May 1999. 
" Craig Etcheson, `The Khmer Way of Exile: Lessons from Three Indochinese Wars', in Yossi Shain 
(ed.), Governments -in -Exile in Contemporary World Politics (New York: Routledge, 1991), pp. 92- 
116 at p. 106. 
6 Reynell, Political Pawns, p. 32. 
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gold and silver.15 The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the presence of Vietnamese 
forces in Laos, however, was perceived as a direct threat to Thai security, and 
Thailand's role in the conflict grew from one of initially granting temporary refuge to 
Khmer Rouge troops, to one of a base for the resistance forces. 
Thailand fulfilled several functions of a classic military sanctuary to the Cambodian 
resistance. First, safe passage through Thai territory was granted to Khmer Rouge 
soldiers retreating from Vietnamese army advances. Herding civilians with them, 
combatants passed through Thai territory to avoid Vietnamese attack; some 50,000- 
80,000 soldiers and civilians traversed the region near Aranyaprathet in April 1979 en 
route to rejoin Khmer Rouge units inside Cambodia.16 When facing defeat, the Khmer 
Rouge retreated to the Cardamom Mountains in the southwest of Cambodia from which 
they had access to sanctuary in Thailand. But although Thai authorities permitted safe 
passage to Khmer Rouge troops and civilians, they were initially reluctant to allow these 
groups to remain on Thai territory. In late April many Cambodians fled to the border as 
starvation and an outbreak of cerebral malaria began to decimate the Khmer Rouge base 
populations. The Thai authorities blocked their entry into Thailand and forced those who 
had crossed the border to return to Cambodian territory. By October, however, the Thai 
Prime Minister had softened his stance, driven by a combination of the media images of 
dying Cambodians along the border, and a warning from the Thai military that the 
collapse of the Khmer Rouge as a fighting force would leave no opposition to the 
Vietnamese in Cambodia." The military recommended that the Khmer Rouge be 
permitted sanctuary in Thailand to escape annihilation and to regain troop strength. 
Hence Thailand became host to the demolished fighting force and its civilian entourage. 
The Government announced an `open -door' policy to Cambodian `refugees' following 
Western pledges of humanitarian aid and refugee resettlement opportunities. 
The mixture of security and humanitarian concerns of the Thai Government towards the 
Cambodian conflict permeated every aspect of Thai response in the ensuing years. 
Under the `open door' policy, the early refugees and Khmer Rouge soldiers were 
15 Judy A. Mayotte, Disposable People? The Plight of Refugees (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1992), 
43. p. 
New York Times, 30 April 1979 as cited in Joseph Zasloff , Kampuchea; A Question of Survival (Part 
II, The Political Dimensions) (n.p: American Universities Field Staff Reports, No. 47, 1980), fn 4, p. 
13, and Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy, p. 85. 
" Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy, p. 172. 
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transported to holding centres inside Thailand, one at Sa Kaeo, 60 km from the border 
and the other at Khao I Dang, 12 km from the border. But by February 1980, security 
considerations came to the fore, and the open door policy came to an abrupt halt. The 
strategic value of the refugees as a buffer along the border and as a source of support for 
the re- emerging resistance movement determined refugee policy thereafter. The Thai 
military began to transfer refugees forcibly from the holding centres to the border during 
the night. Henceforth Cambodian asylum seekers were relegated to make -shift border 
camps where they comprised a humanitarian sanctuary par excellence for the resistance 
forces, which will be discussed further in the next section. 
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The second classic role Thailand played as a military sanctuary was as host to a network 
of secret military camps, the majority of which were operated by the Khmer Rouge, in 
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addition to the `refugee' camps which were assisted by the aid community. The network 
of military camps traversed both sides of the Thai -Cambodian border and most housed 
civilians and soldiers since the Khmer Rouge ideology did not differentiate between 
combatants and non -combatants. Norah Niland makes a distinction between several 
types of camps: `remote camps' which were militarised but to which aid organisations 
had limited access; `hidden border camps' which contained civilians but to which no 
international access was permitted; and `satellite camps' which included front -line 
camps, military training camps, and rudimentary hospital camps, to which aid 
organisations also had no access.18 Up to 100,000 Cambodians were estimated to have 
lived under Khmer Rouge control in the inaccessible satellite camps." From these bases 
the Khmer Rouge were able to launch attacks into the interior of Cambodia, engaging 
Vietnamese troops and destroying infrastructure. The Khmer Rouge also operated bases 
inside Cambodia (see Map 3), which were supplied from Thailand. Sihanouk suggested 
that the Vietnamese tolerated the presence of these camps since the visible threat of the 
Khmer Rouge in Cambodia helped to justify the presence of Vietnamese troops.20 
The scant information available about the Khmer Rouge military camps renders an 
assessment of the relative importance of humanitarian aid vis -à -vis military aid to the 
resistance difficult. Direct Chinese Government support to the Khmer Rouge has been 
widely acknowledged, although the full extent of this support is hard to determine. With 
the assistance of Thai authorities and institutions, the Chinese allegedly provided 
finance, medical supplies, food and small arms to the bases," and operated hospitals in 
some of the military camps.22 One American observer remarked that the Khmer Rouge 
bases were `amply armed by China with basic infantry weapons, rocket propelled 
grenades, and mortars... in excess of its needs,23 and Tony Jackson claims that an 
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Thailand each month.24 The Thai military provided logistical support for the transfer of 
arms supplies and even provided transport for soldiers to and from the civilian refugee 
camps for family visits.25 Furthermore, Thai banks facilitated the transfer of funds. The 
Thai Government benefited considerably from the use of Thai territory for Khmer 
Rouge resupply. Shawcross states that in exchange, the Chinese Government pledged to 
decrease support for communist insurgents operating in Thailand; to guarantee 
Thailand's security in case of Vietnamese attack; and to sell the Thai Government oil at 
subsidised prices." 
The US also allegedly provided significant funds to the Khmer Rouge arsenal, although 
the US Government denies such support. However, a document produced by the US 
Congressional Research Service in 1986 documented the transfer of $85 million from 
the US Government to the Khmer Rouge between 1980 and 1986, $73 million of which 
was granted in 1980 and 1981.27 If accurate, such support would have constituted a 
major contribution to the revival of the Khmer Rouge. By comparison, one US estimate 
of the annual financial needs of the two non -Khmer Rouge resistance forces suggested 
that $15 to $20 million would `significantly increase the size of their order of battle' 28 
The US National Security Adviser Brzezinski, also admitted that the US Government 
had assisted the Khmer Rouge in 1979: `I encouraged the Chinese to support Pol Pot. I 
encouraged the Thai to help the D.K. [Democratic Kampuchea]'.29 Yet while pursuing 
this covert support, the US publicly espoused anti -Khmer Rouge rhetoric, couching 
justifications for increased financial support to the non -communist forces in terms of 
preventing a return of the Khmer Rouge to power in Phnom Penh in the event of a 
Vietnamese withdrawal? Thus whether from China alone or with additional funds and 
24 Tony Jackson, `Just Waiting to Die? Cambodian Refugees in Thailand' (Oxford: Research and 
Evaluation Unit, Oxfam, July 1987), p. 18. 
25 Reynell, Political Pawns, p. 57. 
26 Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy, p. 126. 
27 These figures come from a letter sent to Senator John Kerry's office from the US Congressional 
Research Service in October 1986. See Reynell, Political Pawns, footnote 5, p. 41 and Eva 
Mysliwiec, Punishing the Poor: The International Isolation of Kampuchea (Oxford: Oxfam, 1988), 
p. 146. 
28 Senator Robert Kaster, Opening Remarks at US Policy Towards Anti- Communist Insurgencies 
(Washington: Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States 
Senate, 8 May 1985), p. 7. 
29 Elizabeth Becker, When the War was Over (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 440 as cited in 
Etcheson, `The Khmer Way of Exile', p. 105. 
3° Kaster, Opening Remarks at US Policy Towards Anti -Communist Insurgencies, pp. 7 -8. 
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supplies from the US, the Khmer Rouge were rehabilitated as a strong fighting force 
within two years of their defeat by the Vietnamese army. 
Many of the Khmer Rouge military camps to which aid organisations had little or no 
access also derived some indirect assistance from the humanitarian relief effort through 
their location in the vicinity of a United Nations (UN)- assisted refugee camp. Asia 
Watch, through interviewing escapees from the camps, was able to piece together an 
outline of four main `clusters' of Khmer Rouge camps along the border in 1990.31 
Table 2: Khmer Rouge Camp Clusters in 1990 
UN Camp No. of Satellite Civilian Population Civilian Population Military 
Camps Assisted Unassisted Population 
O Traom 7 16,000 24,000 9,000 
Site 8 3 40,000 20,000 7 -8,000 
Borai 2 4,400 15,000 7,000 
Site K 6 12,000 13,000 8 -9,000 
Efforts to access the military camps were undertaken by several aid agencies since they 
were aware that many camp inhabitants were Cambodian peasants, confined to the 
military camp against their will and forced to perform military functions. But access was 
rarely granted. Instead of freeing the civilians from their captors, the proximity of the 
military camps to the UN- assisted camps put the latter squarely under the influence of 
the former, and refugees were forcibly transferred to the military camps whenever 
required by the Khmer Rouge leadership.34 In 1987, for example, over 1,000 men, 
women and children were forcibly moved from the UN- assisted Site 8 to one of the 
closed Khmer Rouge camps on the northern border with Cambodia, despite protests 
from international agencies." 
The Khmer Rouge allegedly treated the military camp inhabitants in much the same way 
as they had treated the population of Cambodia during their reign. All camp inhabitants 
were expected to contribute to the war against the Vietnamese and Heng Samrin forces. 
31 Violations of the Rules of War by the Khmer Rouge, pp. 4 -8. 
32 O'Trao camp was formed in 1988 from an amalgamation of Huay Chan and Natrao camps, shown in 
Map 5. 
33 Thai authorities established Site K in 1989 for the inhabitants of Ta Luan, Borai and their satellite 
camps. The Khmer Rouge in Borai resisted the move, however, and forced many camp residents 
across the border in 1990. 
34 Mayotte, Disposable People, p. 99. 
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Able- bodied men were coerced into becoming fighters, and women and men were 
engaged as porters carrying war materiél to the front lines. Young children and the 
elderly were forced to work around the camps in support functions such as maintenance, 
wood collection, road clearance and food production, and children as young as ten were 
deployed as porters. Many combatants and porters succumbed to enemy attack, malaria 
or injuries inflicted by anti -personnel mines which littered the areas through which they 
were forced to march. Carrying heavy loads of military hardware, medicine and 
supplies, the porters would undertake trips into Cambodia which could last up to a 
month, and risked being killed if they refused such tasks. 
The Khmer Rouge employed various techniques to enforce compliance by the camp 
population to the leadership's demands, including disinformation and propaganda 
sessions, fear, retribution, and the denial of essential services. Food and medical 
assistance were not granted but earned; food rations were allocated according to the task 
performed. A fighter received the highest ration, porters received less, and camp 
labourers received less than half the ration of porters which was inadequate to survive.36 
In this way the Khmer Rouge assured that there would be people willing to undertake 
the more dangerous tasks, and complete food denial was used to punish insubordination. 
Some of the Khmer Serei factions also had satellite military camps, part of the revenue 
for which came from taxes levied on black marketeers who came to the border to buy 
gold and gems from smugglers, or to set up markets to sell goods to refugees. But the 
largest resource at the disposal of the non -Khmer Rouge leaders was provided by the aid 
program. Similarly, although China is known to have supplied many of the Khmer 
Rouge military camps with food and medical supplies, a significant amount of food 
came from the humanitarian relief effort, through the Thai military. The World Food 
Programme (WFP) had discreetly agreed to deliver food to Thai army warehouses for 
onward delivery to `various populations of Khmer refugees and displaced Thai 
villagers'? Shawcross states that internal WFP documents show that officials were 
aware that this food went to feed the Khmer Rouge and other resistance groups.38 While 
35 Reynell, Political Pawns, p. 67. 
36 For the testimonies of former Khmer Rouge captives, see Violations of the Rules of War by the 
Khmer Rouge. 
37 Mason and Brown, Rice, Rivalry and Politics, p. 165. 
38 Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy, p. 229. Also see Mason and Brown, Rice, Rivalry and Politics, pp. 
140 -142. 
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no one doubted the existence of Thai villagers displaced by the refugees, a census was 
never conducted of the number of affected Thais, but rations for 85,000 people were, on 
average, supplied between 1979 -1983.39 
Thailand's role as a military sanctuary also extended into the political domain, 
permitting the establishment of a `government -in- exile' on Thai territory. As mentioned 
earlier, China brokered the formation of the anti -Vietnamese alliance among the factions 
opposed to the Heng Samrin regime: Prince Sihanouk's FUNCINPEC, Son Sann's4° 
KPNLF, and the Khmer Rouge. Such an alliance was crucial for the international image 
of the Cambodian resistance, particularly once evidence of the brutality of the Khmer 
Rouge regime began to circulate. Despite public statements of abhorrence at the 
behaviour of the Khmer Rouge, Western nations considered it to be an integral 
component of the resistance forces, having a troop strength of 40,000 with a militia of 
another 10,000 -15,000, compared with KPNLF's 12,000 troops and the Sihanoukist 
National Army's 3,000 -5,000 combatants.' Hence the notion of a `government -in- exile' 
presided over by Prince Sihanouk was a way of reducing the visibility of the Khmer 
Rouge to make the Cambodian resistance palatable to international opinion. Neither Son 
Sann nor Prince Sihanouk was comfortable with the alliance, however, resisting its 
formation until 1982, and then limiting the arrangement to that of a coalition instead of a 
united force as proposed by the Chinese.42 An image of unity was further enhanced when 
Thailand pressured the various Khmer Serei guerrilla groups to align under the banner 
of the KPNLF. 
Thailand thus played an important role as a military sanctuary for the forces opposing 
the Vietnamese -installed regime in Phnom Penh, providing territory on which the 
factions could construct bases, facilitating the flows of finance and arms to the guerrilla 
39 Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy, p. 229. A UN document covering the period 1979 -1991 mentions 
relief and rehabilitation assistance delivered to 200,000 affected Thai villagers, `in cooperation with 
the Thai Government and Army'. Cambodian Humanitarian Assistance and the United Nations 
(1979 -1991) (Bangkok: Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United 
Nations for Coordination of Cambodian Humanitarian Assistance Programmes (OSRSG), 1992), p. 
28. 
w Son Sann was a former Prime Minister during the time of Sihanouk, but the two men were not allies. 
d1 Washington Post, November 22 1983 as cited in W. Courtland Robinson, Double Vision: A History 
of Cambodian Refugees in Thailand (Bangkok: Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkom University, 
1996), p. 113. By 1989, American intelligence estimates put troop strength at between 28,000 and 
60,000 for the Khmer Rouge, compared with 16,000 soldiers under Sihanouk and 11,000 under the 
KPNLF. Erlanger, `The Endless War', p. 27. 
°2 Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy, p. 340. 
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groups, and enhancing the diplomatic legitimacy of the resistance through hosting a 
`government -in- exile'. The extent to which these functions were performed, however, 
was markedly enhanced by the large humanitarian sanctuary provided by the refugees 
and the aid organisations assisting them. Unlike the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan 
and the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan camps in Honduras which played important but not 
crucial roles in support of resistance movements, the next section illustrates that the 
existence of the Thai -Cambodian border refugee camps was an integral component of 
the insurgency against Phnom Penh. The role of Thailand as a purely military sanctuary 
was limited; it was the humanitarian aid effort which sustained the resistance through 
the direction of the major donors and the complicity of the aid organisations. 
2. THAILAND AS A HUMANITARIAN SANCTUARY 
The Cambodian refugees housed along the Thai -Cambodian border were crucial to the 
efforts of Thailand, ASEAN, and Western nations to mount a resistance to perceived 
Vietnamese expansionism though Asia. The presence of the refugees enabled support to 
the Khmer Rouge to be disguised, not so much from the Vietnamese and the Heng 
Samrin Government in Phnom Penh, but from the public as details of Khmer Rouge 
atrocities surfaced in the West. The presence of refugees was also the main source of 
legitimacy for the CGDK, without which the notion of a government -in -exile would 
have been more difficult to sustain. The refugees attracted massive quantities of 
humanitarian aid to the border in the decade they resided there, which was a significant 
resource for the guerrilla movements. And, most importantly, the refugee camp 
structures enabled the resistance leaders to control the civilian population. The only 
function of a typical humanitarian sanctuary that the camps did not fulfil was that of 
physical protection for the guerrilla forces, particularly prior to 1985 when the camps 
were on the Cambodian side of the border. 
2.1 Protection 
The confinement of Cambodian refugees to the border area between Cambodia and 
Thailand was intended to fulfil three principal objectives: to provide a buffer of 
humanity between the Vietnamese -affiliated forces and Thailand; to constitute a base of 
support for the resistance forces along the border; and to minimise the destabilising 
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effects that hundreds of thousands of refugees could have produced inside Thailand. 
Hence the notion that the refugees would provide an element of protection from the 
Vietnamese forces for both Thailand and the resistance factions was implicit in this 
strategy. The presence of civilians alongside combatants did not, however, deter the 
launching of attacks against the border camps, although whether such attacks would 
have been more severe had the refugees not been present is impossible to predict. As 
Rufin pointed out, the protective function of a humanitarian sanctuary is mainly a result 
of the international condemnation that an attack against a refugee community might 
incur. But when the aggressor is already condemned internationally, as was the case in 
Cambodia and South Africa, the importance of international respectability diminishes. 
Phnom Penh was already deprived of the seat at the UN and was internationally isolated: 
what more could the West have done? Furthermore, the authorities in Phnom Penh 
would have been aware of the lack of distinction between civilians and combatants 
under the control of the Khmer Rouge, and thus may have considered all Cambodians 
along the border to be legitimate targets. 
The first attack launched against the refugee camps occurred in June 1980 in response to 
the repatriation of refugees from Sa Kaeo and Khao I Dang to the border area, in which 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had participated in an 
attempt to halt the forced night transfers by the Thai army. Phnom Penh viewed the 
repatriation for what it was, a way of strengthening the resistance along the border. Hun 
Sen, Heng Samrin's foreign minister, sent a letter to the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees, Poul Harding, in which he labelled the move `an attempt to introduce into 
Kampuchean territory armed bands of the Pol Pot -Ieng Sary and Sereika clique, supplied 
and trained in Thailand by the Peking expansionists in collusion with the American 
imperialists'" The artillery attack and Thai counter -attack killed some 400 refugees and 
wounded 900 others. 
63 As cited in Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy. p. 318. 
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Each dry season an offensive was launched against the border camps which drove the 
camp population into temporary sites inside Thailand. The UN agency established to 
coordinate activities along the border, the UN Border Relief Organisation (UNBRO) 
supervised 85 such camp evacuations between 1982 and 1984, 65 of them under fire.`° 
At the end of 1984, the Vietnamese launched a particularly devastating offensive against 
the camps, but one which ultimately improved conditions for the refugee population. 
Following the attack and subsequent evacuation, the Vietnamese and Heng Samrin 
forces occupied the camps and sealed the border, preventing the refugees from 
returning. As a result, the Thai Government was obliged to give UNBRO permission to 
construct new camps inside Thailand (see Maps 4 and 5), providing the opportunity to 
Jackson, Just Waiting to Die? p. 4. 
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reorganise the camp populations to separate the military from civilians. As illustrated in 
the previous section, however, the resistance forces were still able to benefit from the 
presence of the refugees as each of the camps was officially affiliated to one of the 
CGDK factions and remained in close proximity to the military camps. Furthermore, 
civilian camps were located between one and six kilometres from the border and were 
thus within shelling range of the Vietnamese guns. So although security did improve 
and annual evacuations were no longer necessary, both military and civilian camps were 
still vulnerable to sporadic shelling, and refugees continued to be injured and to die as a 
result of mortar fire over the next four years. 
Thus the refugee camps along the Thai -Cambodian border did not incur to the same 
extent the paradox of refugee camps elsewhere in providing legal and physical 
protection to armed movements. The presence of refugees seems to have done little to 
discourage Vietnamese attacks against their opposing forces along the border area. Not 
only did the refugee population suffer attacks by the Vietnamese- backed forces in 
Cambodia, but also from the CGDK factions under whose control they were forced to 
live. They suffered from a lack of physical protection against organised violence of the 
factions; criminal activities associated with any large concentration of dispossessed and 
under -employed people; and violence and disciplinary measures inflicted upon them by 
Thai military and paramilitary forces.45 Furthermore, most refugees were denied any 
form of legal protection as Thailand only accorded refugee status to a few thousand 
refugees in Khao I Dang holding centre who were eligible for resettlement in a third 
country.46 Access of international agency personnel to the hidden border camps and 
other military camps of the various factions was forbidden except on rare occasions, 




The Thai Government deployed a combined paramilitary and intelligence unit called Task Force 80, 
supposedly to protect the Cambodian population, but in reality to enforce the closed nature of the 
camps to prevent the refugee population from seeking sanctuary further in Thailand. See Reynell, 
Political Pawns, p. 143. 
Khao I Dang, which was managed by UNHCR and the Thai Ministry of the Interior and Supreme 
Command, was the holding camp for refugees scheduled to be resettled in a third country. It was 
officially closed to new arrivals in 1980, but Cambodians continued to arrive through bribing officials 
or smuggling themselves in. Any unregistered camp occupants present after 1985 were considered to 
be 'illegal immigrants' and were transferred back to the border. Robinson, Double Vision, p. 119 and 
Reynell, Political Pawns, pp. 136 -138. 
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Map 5: The Cambodian Refugee Camps on the Thai -Cambodian Border, 1986 
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From the outset of the relief program, humanitarian aid made a substantial contribution 
to the war economy of the various Khmer factions along the border. For the factions 
affiliated to the KPNLF, the revenue gained from the relief program and the refugees, 
together with smuggling and extortion activities, constituted the bulk of the resources at 
their disposal, at least before the formation of the CGDK. The Khmer Rouge, as 
illustrated previously, received covert support from China and allegedly the LES, but also 
received considerable supplies through the humanitarian relief program, supplies which 
did not have to be misappropriated as in the case of the KPNLF groups. Similarly it 
seems that Prince Sihanouk's faction did not need to divert resources from the refugees 
to finance the war economy. The prestige and personal influence of the former royal 
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ruler of Cambodia facilitated successful fund -raising trips abroad, which enabled him to 
supplement resources in Greenhill camp, which he controlled." Nevertheless, a survey 
of the occupation of camp inhabitants conducted in 1986 found that 50 percent of the 
men in Greenhill considered themselves to be soldiers." Thus aid played a fungible role, 
releasing resources for military activities that would have otherwise been used to feed 
soldiers. 
The diversion of food aid by camp Ieaders was a particularly grave problem in the 
Khmer Serei camps in the first years of the humanitarian relief effort. Through inflating 
beneficiary numbers and distributing rations inferior to those calculated by the aid 
organisations, the camp leaders were able to amass considerable quantities of rice, oil 
and other items to resell or transfer to military camps hidden along the border. Mason 
and Brown" document two camps in which this process is well illustrated, Mak Mun 
camp which was controlled by Van Seren, a rogue anti -Khmer Rouge military leader, 
and Nong Samet camp, controlled by In- Sakhan, Ieader of one of the bands of Khmer 
Serei guerrillas. Food distributions to both camps commenced in late 1979 and were 
conducted by the `Joint Mission' of UNICEF and ICRC, which was the first 
arrangement established to coordinate relief along the border. In both sites, camp leaders 
offered their services to facilitate distributions to camp residents, suggesting that food be 
delivered to a central location from which camp administrative staff would ensure its 
delivery to the household level. The initial confidence in these leaders diminished when, 
after three months, the Joint Mission discovered that the population of Mak Mun was 
closer to 50,000 than the 300,000 that Van Saren had specified. Similarly, the Joint 
Mission revised its delivery figures from 180,000 to 60,000 rations in Nong Samet once 
reports that the camp administration was selling relief goods reached aid organisations. 
The diversion of aid supplies through inflated beneficiary numbers continued 
throughout the ensuing decade; a census conducted in Site 2 in July 1989 reduced the 
beneficiary numbers from 180,000 to 140,000." 
" Reynell, Political Pawns, p. 60. 
48 Survey results from Site 2 indicated that 37 percent of men were soldiers, compared with only 2 
percent of men in the Khmer Rouge Site 8, although 13 percent in the latter camp described 
themselves as ammunition porters. See Reynell, Political Pawns, pp. 102 -103. 
69 The Mak Mun case is described on pp. 47 -59 and the Nong Samet case on pp. 65 -74 of Mason and 
Brown, Rice, Rivalry and Politics. 
so Niland, `The Politics of Suffering', p. 137. 
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In spite of the vast profits made in the initial months through inflated beneficiary 
numbers, even further food was diverted from the camp population through reducing 
ration entitlements. A survey conducted in Nong Samet in December 1979 revealed that 
49 percent of all rice delivered to the camp was taken to the military section, and that 46 
percent of all water delivered was used by the military and privileged classes even 
though these comprised only 16 percent of the populations' Another monitoring report 
in February 1980 disclosed that 64 percent of the rice delivered to the camp never 
reached the household level, as persistently high levels of malnutrition in Nong Samet 
testified. Similarly in Mak Mun, despite the efforts of aid officials to bypass the central 
distribution IeveI and deliver supplies directly to camp quarters, monitoring exercises 
undertaken in February 1980 revealed that 89 percent of the rice and 80 percent of the 
oil delivered to the quarter level distribution committee never reached the households 52 
Not all relief diverted in these camps went to support the war economy; both Van Seren 
and In -Sakhan were concerned as much with personal enrichment as with the fight 
against Vietnamese communists, which was common among the undisciplined elements 
of the Khmer Serei guerriIIas. The same cannot be said for Khmer Rouge guerrillas, 
however, whose discipline and organisation was so apparent in comparison with the 
corrupt system in Khmer Serei camps that the Joint Mission was impressed with the 
efficiency," in spite of the historical implications of such discipline. 
Whereas efforts to monitor distribution of supplies and restrict diversion to the military 
were attempted in Khmer Serei camps, very little monitoring of Khmer Rouge camps 
was undertaken. At the outset of the relief effort, considerations of the nature of the 
Khmer Rouge leadership were superseded by concerns to address the desperate needs of 
the population under their control. Since the Khmer Rouge camps were situated in 
dangerous terrain on the Cambodian side of the border, food was delivered to points on 
the Thai side from which Khmer Rouge porters would collect it and distribute it to the 
cooperatives around which the camps were organised. Aid personnel only had 
occasional access to monitor the way in which food was distributed,54 but the few times 
5` Mason and Brown, Rice, Rivalry and Politics, p. 67. 
52 UNICEF Monitoring Report, 22 February, 1980 as cited in Mason and Brown, Rice, Rivalry and 
Politics, p. 55. 
53 Mason and Brown, Rice, Rivalry and Politics, pp. 138 -139. 
54 Reynell states that even after the 1985 camp move, four out of five Khmer Rouge camps were closed 
to relief officials. Political Pawns, p. 59. 
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these visits were undertaken, the system was found to be highly organised and efficient, 
with record -keeping systems and a relatively equitable distribution of goods. UNICEF 
personnel were particularly impressed in the early months of the border program, 
asserting at a food coordination meeting in March 1980 in Bangkok that the Khmer 
Rouge operation was a success and should be continued or even augmented, despite 
recognising that food went to the Khmer Rouge military. A monitoring report of Khao 
Din on 5 February 1980 stated that `of the food delivered to Khao Din, 30 percent goes 
directly to the Khmer Rouge soldiers nearby.'66 ICRC, by contrast, was concerned by the 
prospect of feeding Khmer Rouge military, and in an internal document wrote: `despite 
our incessant efforts to make these people understand that this food is not for the Khmer 
Rouge army, we can state once again that our distribution criteria are not respected. I 
believe that here also, we must soon take more severe measures.'S6 By April, as the 
health of Khmer Rouge camp inhabitants improved and the military agenda of the 
guerrilla group became clearer, UNICEF began to share the concerns of ICRC, and the 
Joint Mission started to search for ways to end their involvement in feeding Khmer 
Rouge camps. 
The same concerns were not apparently shared by WFP which, as mentioned earlier, 
provided food to the Thai army for Khmer Rouge camps which were not serviced by the 
Joint Mission, and for Thai displaced villagers. Such food was delivered to Thai military 
warehouses and the only monitoring mechanism which existed was monthly warehouse 
inventories and distribution records which were completed by the Thais. This food also 
arrived at night in the Joint Mission -administered camps, which undermined the efforts 
of UNICEF to distribute food only to women and children in the camps. ICRC withdrew 
from the feeding program in mid -1980 and from the Joint Mission at the end of that 
year, but UNICEF continued food deliveries to Khmer Rouge camps for another 12 
months, with ad hoc distributions also made by two American non -government 
organisations (NGOs), Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and World Relief, both of which 
had offered to undertake all Khmer Rouge camp distributions. UNICEF was pressured 
ss UNICEF Monitoring Report, 5 February, 1980 as cited ìn Mason and Brown, Rice, Rivalry and 
Politics, p. 139. 
s6 ICRC internal document, 7 -13 January, 1980, translated from French, as cited in Mason and Brown, 
Rice, Rivalry and Politics, p. 140. 
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into continuing its role feeding the Khmer Rouge camps, for reasons which will be 
discussed in the section on Iegitimacy. 
The distribution of food and non -food items to Khmer Rouge camps was the main way 
in which humanitarian aid contributed to the war economy of the Khmer Rouge. In the 
Khmer Serei camps, however, revenue gained through the diversion of food aid was 
supplemented by systems of taxation and extortion levied on refugees. Refugees 
interviewed by the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights reported, for example, that 
KPNLF officials charged asylum seekers 400 baht ($16) to cross the border area under 
their control, and a further 1000 baht ($40) to hire a KPNLF `guide' who would escort 
the refugees to Site 2.57 Cambodians unable to pay this sum were forced to stay in the 
hidden border camps until the fee was forthcoming from relatives at Site 2 or from 
abroad. A kidnapping racket was also run by KPNLF -affiliated groups and Thai - 
Cambodian syndicates, with ransoms of up to $10,000 demanded of relatives living in 
the US." Unlike Sihanouk's troops who were regularly paid, the KPNLF soldiers only 
occasionally received 30-40 baht from their commanders; hence, robbery and extortion 
were important sources of revenue.59 
Taxation of refugees and the many traders and merchants who established a black 
market in the camps was another source of revenue for the guerrilla factions and for 
Thai Task Force 80 personnel. The camp economy, conducted around the sale and 
trading of relief items, was supplemented by remittances that some of the refugees 
received from relatives in Thailand, Cambodia or abroad; some 2 million baht 
($150,000) were alleged to enter Site 2 each month." Traders were charged a toll on 
goods brought in and out of the camps, and severe punishments were inflicted on traders 
who tried to smuggle goods past the guards. Camp administrators also levied taxes on 
Cambodian staff of aid agencies; Reynell's study found that in Site 2, Greenhill and Site 
8, all workers were required to pay two tins of fish from the dozen they earned as their 
weekly payment." In Site 2 North, ordinary refugees were also taxed one tin of fish and 
57 Refuge Denied: Problems in the Protection of Vietnamese and Cambodians in Thailand and the 
Admission of Indochinese Refugees into the United States (New York: Lawyers Committee for 
Human Rights, 1989), p. 36. 
58 ibid., p. 37. 
59 Reynell, Political Pawns, p. 103. 
" ibid., p. 85. 
65 ibid., p. 66. 
Chapter 4 The Cambodian Refugee Camps in Thailand 172 
one tin measure of rice per week from their general ration. Refugees stated that the food 
was taken for the military; in Greenhill and Site 2, soldiers visiting their families were 
provided with rice and fish during their stay, and in Site 2 each soldier was given two 
kilos of rice and two cans of fish when they returned to the front. A portion of food 
grown in the camps was also sent to the military camps. 
All aid entering the border camps assisted the economy of the various factions either 
directly through the diversion of food and other relief items, taxation, theft and 
extortion, or indirectly through the provision of goods and services to the combatants 
which relieved faction leaders of this responsibility and permitted extra spending on 
military activities. In addition to feeding soldiers and their families and providing a 
location for `rest and recreation', the camps' medical and training facilities performed 
valuable support functions for the military. From February to November 1986, for 
example, 121 of 187 patients applying for prostheses in the Site 8 workshop were 
soldiers. Such injuries did not render these combatants hors de combat; many were re- 
engaged as ammunition porters once fitted with a prosthesis.ó2 Medical supplies were 
stolen from camp dispensaries for use by the military, and even sewing machines given 
to Greenhill camp were used to make clothing for the soldiers.ó2 Graduates of medical 
training courses were also coopted by the military: CRS, for instance, lost 15 of 32 
trained medics upon completion of their studies in Greenhill in 198664 Thus the 
humanitarian aid program greatly contributed to the economy of war of the Cambodian 
resistance factions. This was not, however, the most important role of the humanitarian 
sanctuary, since financial and military aid was also forthcoming from China and the US, 
and could probably have been increased to cover the economic aspects of the guerrilla 
war, had it been necessary. The crucial functions that such military support could never 
have fulfilled, however, were the most useful aspects of the humanitarian sanctuary: the 
62 Filip Werbrouck, `The Site 8 Artificial Limb Workshop: A Humanitarian or Military Programme? - A 
study of aid to a Khmer Rouge camp on the Thai -Kampuchean border', April 1987 as cited in 
Jackson, Just Waiting to Die ?, p. 13. 
63 Information Bulletin (n.p: FUNCINPEC /ANS, October 1986), p. 36 as cited in Jackson, Just Waiting 
to Die ?, p. 14. 
6a Catholic Relief Services letter to J. Lefevre, Deputy Director of UNBRO, 21 November, 1986, as 
cited in Jackson, Just Waiting to Die ?, p. 13 and Reynell, Political Pawns, p. 66. 
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legitimacy that the presence of 250,000 -300,00065 refugees along the border bestowed 
upon the self -proclaimed `government -in- exile', and the mechanisms with which to 
control the refugee population to ensure that such `legitimacy' was retained. 
2.3 Legitimacy 
The presence of Cambodian refugees along the Thai -Cambodian border was crucial to 
the legitimacy of the resistance forces, particularly the Coalition Government after its 
formation in 1982. As mentioned earlier, the CGDK itself was formed in order to lend 
some legitimacy to the Khmer Rouge, and to create an image of unity among opponents 
of the Vietnamese -installed regime. An identifiable population under the authority of the 
CGDK promoted the image of a `government -in- exile': as Yossi Shain writes of all self - 
proclaimed governments -in- exile, `the support of their alleged constituencies may be the 
most critical factor in determining the validity of their claim and the attitude of foreign 
patrons toward their struggles'.66 These claims to legitimacy in turn permitted the 
Cambodian seat at the UN to be passed from the Khmer Rouge, which had held it 
between 1979 and 1982 despite its human rights record and defeat, to the CGDK. 
The way in which Western states dealt with the issue of the UN seat exemplifies the 
political compromises and trade -offs that permeated the entire response to the 
Cambodian crisis, and the lack of regard for the welfare of the Cambodian refugees. In 
September 1979, the UN Credentials Committee recommended to the General Assembly 
that the delegation of `Democratic Kampuchea' be accepted as the recognised 
representative of Cambodia, and the recommendation was adopted by a vote of 71 to 35 
with 34 abstentions. No Western bloc country voted against acceptance of these 
65 A sample of the Thai -Cambodian Border population between 1979 and 1992 was as follows: 
Year Border camps UNHCR Holding Centres Total 
1979 396,000 135,744 531,744 
1980 164,201 147,059 311,260 
1981 207,955 97,804 305,759 
1984 240,966 41,619 282,585 
1985 237,469 31,761 269,230 
I988 300,716 17,152 317,868 
1991 352,455 14,975 367,430 
1992 112,506 6,816 119,322 
Source: Robinson, Double Vision, p. 169, drawn from UNICEF, WFP, UNBRO, UNHCR sources. 
66 Yossi Shaín, `Introduction: Governments -in -Exile and the Age of Democratic Transitions', in Shain 
(ed.), Governments -in -Exile in Contemporary World Politics, pp. 1 -17 at p. 5. 
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credentials, and only Austria, Finland, France, Ireland and Sweden abstained throughout 
the four years that the credentials were accepted. Hence until 1982 the Khmer Rouge 
held this seat, after which it was transferred to the CGDK, with the UN conveniently 
conceding that it was reprehensible for a genocidal regime to be the sole and legitimate 
representative of the Cambodian people. 
The notion that the CGDK had any more legitimacy than the Khmer Rouge, however, 
was a farce. As Ramesh Thakur observed: 
The CGDK is a total misnomer: it is not a coalition (Pol Pot' s Khmer Rouge is 
the real power); it is not a government, having neither people, territory nor 
other attributes of government; it is decidedly not democratic; and it is not in 
Kampuchea, being located rather on the Thai side of the border.ó7 
Taking each point in turn: first, the Khmer Rouge held the dominant position in the 
coalition by virtue of its military strength and shrewd negotiation in drawing up the 
formal agreement. Khieu Samphan, one of Pol Pot's top officials, had insisted on the 
inclusion of a priority clause which stipulated that the sovereignty of Democratic 
Kampuchea be preserved in the event of a coalition split: 'in the event that an impasse 
has developed which renders the coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea 
inoperative... the current state of DK led by Mr. Khieu Samphan will have the right to 
resume its activities as the sole legal and legitimate state of Kampuchea.'68 The 
important diplomatic post of Permanent Representative to the UN was also held by a 
Khmer Rouge nominee, Ambassador Thiounn Prasith, who had been a top aide in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the Khmer Rouge rule of Cambodia.ó9 Second, the 
CGDK `governed' only 300,000 of the 7 million Cambodian population, and exercised 
control over these people in camps surrounded by barbed wire and policed by Thai 
paramilitary forces. Had the refugees been given the possibility of transferring to a camp 
67 Ramesh Thakur, `The Afghan Road to Kampuchea ?', Asian Defence Journal, August 1988, p. 58, as 
cited in William Maley, 'Regional Conflicts: Afghanistan and Cambodia', in Ramesh Thakur and 
Carlyle A. Thayer (eds.), Reshaping Regional Relations: Asia-Pacific and the Former Soviet Union 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 183 -200 at p. 197. 
68 See Colin Campbell, '3 Cambodian Groups Forming Coalition', New York Times, 21 June 1982 and 
Colin Campbell, '3 Cambodian Groups Form Exile Regime', New York Times, 23 June 1982 as cited 
in Etcheson, `The Khmer Way of Exile', p. 106. 
69 Tony Jackson, 'How Pol Pot Dominates the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea' 
(Oxford: Oxfam Staff Briefing Paper, 1988), p. 5. 
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in the interior of Thailand, moving to a neutral camp, or even repatriating to Cambodia 
the majority of them undoubtedly would have done so.70 
Third, the CGDK held no territory in Cambodia, something which invalidated any 
claims to independent sovereign status, and was unable to maintain Iaw and order in the 
border area, a role which the Thai Government fulfilled through placing the region 
under martial law. And fourth, the `government' was dependent upon donors and aid 
organisations to feed the population it was supposed to represent. Thus the Cambodian 
population along the border was held hostage in order to create the fiction that there was 
a legitimate government representing an exiled state of citizens. As Josephine Reynell 
states, `without this population, continued recognition of the CGDK as a government 
would be virtually impossible'." UN member states opposed to the Vietnamese invasion 
of Cambodia did not need to vote in favour of the Khmer Rouge or CGDK to deprive 
Phnom Penh of recognition, they could have voted to leave the seat vacant. 
The repercussions of this method of isolating Phnom Penh and its Vietnamese backers 
were felt not only by the Cambodians consigned to a decade of life in refugee camps 
along the border, but also by the inhabitants of Cambodia. The bestowal of the UN seat 
to the CGDK deprived Cambodia of all but `humanitarian' assistance. UN development 
assistance was not permitted to flow to countries in which the de facto government was 
not the government formally recognised by the UN.72 Furthermore, the UN imposed a 
trade embargo on the country and in early 1982 declared the emergency period over, 
forcing the withdrawal of UN development agencies and a drastic reduction in 
assistance to the country from Western bloc nations?' The Eastern bloc continued its 
support, but until the Vietnamese troop withdrawal in 1989, the government in Phnom 
Penh remained an international pariah and Cambodia remained one of the poorest 
countries in the world. 
70 Approximately 200,000 Cambodians chose to return from the border to their homes in Cambodia in 
1981 following economic improvements in Cambodia. Charlotte Benson, The Changing Role of 
NGOs in the Provision of Relief and Rehabilitation Assistance: Case Study 2 - Cambodia/Thailand 
(London: Working Paper 75, Overseas Development Institute, 1993), p. 17. Once the border camps 
moved permanently into Thailand, however, such a choice was no longer possible. 
n Reynell, Political Pawns, p. 38. 
72 Cambodian Humanitarian Assistance and the United Nations, p. 16. 
73 See Mysliwiec, Punishing the Poor, pp. 73 -74. 
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The legitimacy conferred on the resistance factions by the international relief effort was 
further exemplified by the unsuccessful attempt by UNICEF to transfer the 
responsibility for feeding the Khmer Rouge camps to another aid organisation. As 
discussed above, towards the end of April 1980, UNICEF began to share the doubts of 
ICRC regarding the implications of feeding the Khmer Rouge, and the Joint Mission 
announced that continuing to supply the armed elements in the camps would be in 
violation of the mandates of each organisation. The Joint Mission suggested that either 
WFP and the Thai army extend the distributions they were already making, or that an 
NGO assume such a role, as CRS and World Relief had proposed. The issue, however, 
became hotly contested as Thai officials insisted that they wanted the Joint Mission to 
continue, even threatening to forbid UNICEF and ICRC involvement in the rest of the 
border program if they did not proceed. Thai authorities were not content to allow WFP 
and the Thai army to accept full responsibility for feeding the Khmer Rouge camps 
since this could create the perception that Thailand was aiding the guerrilla forces. `The 
Thais wanted an international organization specifically to distribute in these camps to 
lend credibility to the relief effort...[and they] ...preferred the Joint Mission's 
international reputation and status to that of the volags [voluntary agencies or NGOs]'." 
US government officials were also in favour of the Joint Mission continuing supplies to 
Khmer Rouge camps as a way in which to give a neutral and respectable hue to such 
activities. `We wanted ICRC and UNICEF to do the feeding because we did not want it 
to be a US effort', explained a State Department official in Washington.75 After several 
months of negotiations and the first Vietnamese attack on the border camps, ICRC 
ceased its involvement in the food distributions, but UNICEF continued, insisting upon 
considerably reduced rations to the camp and distributions to women only. The Thai 
government agreed to this compromise since it still fulfilled the primary aim of having 
UNICEF's name associated with the feeding, and it was able to supplement the food 
distributed through the Thai army deliveries and the compliance of CRS and World 
Relief. 
The humanitarian relief effort also inadvertently conferred legitimacy on individual 
Cambodian leaders and `middle- managers' through their role in the management of the 
74 Mason and Brown, Rice, Rivalry and Politics, p. 146 and p. 149. 
75 As cited in ibid., p. 159. 
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refugee camps and distribution systems. The camp presidents and heads of relief 
departments established to oversee the distribution of various goods tended to be from 
former middle class, educated backgrounds and able to speak French or English." -Many 
of these camp leaders cited customary expectations that leaders should be materially 
richer than the population to show their prowess as leaders, to justify keeping extra 
relief goods for themselves. `The appropriations both emphasise and consolidate the 
status and power differentials between the two groups. This practice has a long tradition 
in Kampuchea and therefore provides a model of action for those now in authority.'" 
The offices of camp president or department head bestowed legitimacy and prowess on 
their incumbents, but it was the authority they held over the distribution of relief 
supplies which enabled these individuals to retain almost complete control over the 
refugee population. 
2.4 Population Control 
Retaining control over the lives of the Cambodian border population was crucial to the 
containment role of the refugee camps, and such control was maintained in a variety of 
ways. Externally, the imposition of martial law and the deployment of Thai Task Force 
80 officers restricted the movement of refugees beyond the camps' perimeters, which 
were fenced with barbed wire.78 The widely documented brutality of the Task Force 80 
personnel dissuaded violations of camp regulations," and served to quash any notions of 
permanent settlement in Thailand arising among the refugees.80 
The proximity of military camps to the civilian camps added another physical element 
of external control over the population, although this was even more strongly 
institutionalised through the military appointment of all levels of civilian camp 
leadership. Reynell's study, in fact, found that in Site 8, Greenhill and Site 2, top 
officials in the civilian administration were also officials in the military hierarchy.B1 
76 Reynell, Political Pawns, p. 70. 
7' ibid. 
78 The only camp which was not surrounded by barbed wire was Greenhill, administered by Sihanouk's 
FUNCINPEC. See Jackson, Just Waiting to Die ?, p. 9. 
79 Complaints about the behaviour of Task Force 80 personnel eventually lead to its replacement with a 
specially trained security force, the Displaced Persons' Protection Unit (DPPU) in August 1988. See 
Refuge Denied, pp. 55 -58 for testimonies of Task Force brutality. 
80 Reynell, Political Pawns, p. 143. 
81 ibid., p. 65. 
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Camp presidents were generally appointed by apolitical- military elite living outside the 
camps who in turn appointed officials to head the various camp departments, such as 
health, education and security. These department heads chose their administrative team, 
the prerequisite for which was attendance and a certificate from one of the camps' 
political education schools, known as `civic schools' or `psychological warfare 
schools' .82 The camp administrators also controlled the nomination of local staff to work 
with the aid organisations in the camps.ó3 Hence conformity to the political ideology of 
the CGDK was entrenched through the administrative structure of the camps, and 
enforced through the control that loyal supporters exercised over the aid distribution 
system. 
Giving refugees autonomy to undertake as many functions as possible in a refugee camp 
setting is a commonly held principle in refugee relief programs, and UNBRO and other 
aid agencies working in the camps delegated considerable responsibility to the refugees 
to run the camps and conduct distributions. Camp administrators were even given the 
responsibility of determining the quantity of rice each person was to receive when a 
direct system of distribution was introduced into Greenhill camp in 1986.84 In addition, 
civilian police were selected by the refugee leadership to enforce camp rules and control 
internal security. However, these measures, while sound in theory, inadvertently assisted 
in institutionalising and legitimising the control of the CGDK- appointed personnel. 
Moreover, attempts to improve the day -to -day physical safety of the refugees, although 
important, were only cosmetic: the root of the problems lay in the very nature and raison 
d'être of the camps. 
The aid structures in the refugee camps therefore assisted in establishing and 
maintaining control over the refugee population, through physically restricting refugee 
movements and through permitting the refugee leadership to hold authority over the 
food and non -food items necessary to sustain life, and the camp judicial system. These 
forms of control were supplemented by the use of fear, intimidation and violence against 
the refugee population, particularly in the Khmer Rouge camps as was discussed in the 
previous section. Executions of civilians and army deserters were reported from the 
82 ibid., p. 69. Also see Jackson, Just Waiting to Die ?, p. 9 for a brief description of these schools. 
s3 Reynell, Political Pawns, p. 82, and Mason and Brown, Rice, Rivalry and Politics, pp. 61 -62_ 
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closed camps and in Site 8, the UN- assisted Khmer Rouge camp, infractions of the 
camp rules were punished with `re- education', gaol terms or `disappearance'.85 Forced 
population transfers from civilian camps to military camps were undertaken on 
numerous occasions: the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights estimated that by 
December 1988 some 15,000 Cambodians under Khmer Rouge control had been moved 
to closed camps near the border, where they were subjected to shelling.ó6 Reports of 
many refugee casualties reached aid organisations, but access of aid officials to evacuate 
the wounded was denied by the Khmer Rouge leadership. ICRC had consistently 
requested medical access to Khmer Rouge camps to no avail, and only rarely received 
patients transferred to medical facilities in Khao I Dang holding centre. Invariably the 
patients were in such a critical state by the time they arrived that they died. The Khmer 
Rouge then used this as an excuse to forbid further transfers or access of aid 
organisations, attributing the deaths to Western medical techniques.87 
Political intimidation was also common in the non -Khmer Rouge camps, with gaol 
terms and `disappearances' inflicted upon refugees expressing views contrary to those of 
the leadership. Reynell reports that even complaints against camp conditions or 
expressions of concern for the future were construed as disloyal and were thus 
punishable." Conscription also occurred in all the camps, but UNBRO managed to curb 
this to a certain extent in Site 2 by threatening to cut off food supplies to the camp. This 
tactic did not work in the Khmer Rouge camps, however: in order to pressure for greater 
access, UNBRO terminated the supply of aid to Huay Chan camp in May 1988. In 
response, the Khmer Rouge leadership dismantled the camp and moved the occupants to 
other Khmer Rouge camps in the region.89 
The importance of controlling the refugee population to maintain the image of a support 
base for the factions was, as earlier discussed, crucial to the legitimacy of the CGDK. 
Such population control became equally, if not more, important, however, as prospects 
of a peace agreement and a Vietnamese troop withdrawal began to surface in 1988 as 
talks were initiated with Cambodia's Prime Minister, Hun Sen. The stakes had suddenly 
u Refuge Denied, pp. 47 -50. 
86 ibid., p..47. 
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altered from unity to competition among the factions, and the civilian populations 
constituted an important card in future political negotiations for power in Phnom Penh. 
Hence once again the refugees became a tool in the political process and many were 
moved towards `repatriation camps' nearer the border in late 1988. The Khmer Rouge, 
with Iogistical support from the Thai army, virtually emptied many camps. The 
inhabitants were moved into `liberated' zones of Cambodia to provide a foothold and 
base of support for the faction following the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops.90 In a 
letter sent to the Thai newspaper The Nation, a Khmer Rouge official denied that the 
refugees were forcibly relocated, stating: 
whenever the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea succeeds in liberating 
wholly or partially any area of our territory which provides relative security, 
our people are bent on returning home. As Kampuchean citizens, this is not 
only their right but also their duty to participate in the war of liberation against 
the Vietnamese aggressors." 
Asia Watch reported that 20,000 people were moved into Cambodia by the various 
factions in the first three months of 1990,92 and between 60,000 and 100,000 inhabitants 
of the Khmer Rouge `hidden camps' were also thought to have crossed that year.93 The 
forced repatriation generated concern among aid agencies: the lack of choice of the 
refugees was compounded by harsh conditions in Cambodia, and large numbers of 
refugees returned to the UN camps, many with malaria, malnutrition and land mine 
injuries. Moreover, the partitioning of the country among the factions was likely to lead 
to a continuation of the war. `The resistance wants to populate the liberated areas with 
the refugees, not only to control the areas but also to keep their hold on these people', 
reported the head of ICRC in Thailand, Jean- Jacques Fresard. `This seems to lead to a 
Lebanonization of Cambodia.'" 
After effectively remaining silent over the preceding decade, the issue of repatriation 
galvanised aid organisations into campaigning for the formation of a neutral camp in 
Thailand or neutral reception centres inside Cambodia, through which refugees could be 
channelled to their region of choice. Although Thailand officially agreed to the 
9° Murray Hiebert, `The Khmer Rouge regroups', Far East Economic Review, 1 December 1988, p. 34. 
91 As cited in ibid. 
92 Violations of the Rules of War by the Khmer Rouge, p. 3. 
93 Peter Eng, `Cambodian Refugees Continue to be Used as Pawns', Associated Press, 14 January, 
1991. 
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establishment of such a camp in March 1990, the factions opposed the idea as it was 
obviously not in their interests to `neutralise' their populations. The US Government 
was also against the initiative, claiming that `the closing of Site 2 would be a disaster' 
for the KPNLF. u In February 1991, a coup d'état in Thailand effectively ended Thai 
support for the establishment of neutral camps, and these did not eventuate. 
The NGO solidarity which characterised the campaign for a neutral camp at the end of 
the 1980s was a significant reversal from the antagonisms which permeated the border 
relief operation and aid to the interior of Cambodia a decade earlier. The political 
environment had polarised the aid community, and the majority of aid organisations 
were forced to choose whether they would work along the border or inside Cambodia. 
The following section explores the way in which the aid organisations reacted to the 
Cambodian refugee crisis, the circumstances surrounding which effectively denied them 
any humanitarian space in which to operate. 
3. THE RELIEF RESPONSE: THE HUMANITARIAN IMPASSE 
Why was it only in the mid to late 1980s that aid agencies publicly lobbied for the 
creation of humanitarian space in the form of a neutral camp, when none of the 
parameters of such space had been present since the outset of the aid program, or inside 
Cambodia? Aid organisations were not permitted unhindered access to populations in 
need; were unable to assess independently the needs of vulnerable groups; were 
prevented from adequately controlling the distribution of relief supplies; and were 
accused of political bias by both sides of the conflict. Furthermore, aid agencies did not 
have sufficient security guarantees to work freely in the border region, to stay overnight 
in the refugee camps, or to travel to many regions inside Cambodia. The aid 
organisations reached an impasse: the only `neutrality' possible in the provision of 
humanitarian assistance was ensuring that humanitarian aid benefited both sides equally. 
It was impossible to avoid contributing to the war effort. Given that it was the camps 
themselves and the aid which sustained them that compromised the safety of the 
refugees, why was there so little public condemnation of the system to which aid 
agencies were unwilling accomplices? 
95 Steven Erlanger, `Thai Wants Cambodia Refugees in Neutral Camps', The New York Times, 25 
March, 1990, as cited in Niland, `The Politics of Suffering', p. 146. 
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Several inter- related factors help to explain the reluctance of aid organisations to 
challenge openly the misuse of aid by all parties. First, geopolitical strategic and 
ideological interests dominated humanitarian concerns, restricting the room for aid 
organisations to manoeuvre vis -à -vis the host governments and the conditions they 
imposed. Compromise and silence were the conditions of access. Public protest risked 
expulsion. Second, humanitarian concerns, particularly the spectre of famine, became a 
propaganda tool for both sides of the conflict. Whatever statements the aid organisations 
made played into the discourse of either side. Moreover, public pressure driven by what 
Shawcross called a `crisis of Western conscience'96 forced the hand of organisations 
when negotiating for respect of humanitarian principles, and undermined the potential 
for solidarity within the aid community. 
Superimposed on this environment were the positions and attitudes adopted by the aid 
organisations themselves. Unable for the most part to work on both sides or to ensure 
that aid did not benefit one side of the conflict, many agencies chose a party or side with 
which they would work. A `culture of justification' developed as the polarised aid 
community sought to defend their choice, and critical analysis diminished. In the 
absence of an obvious alternative to the status quo, agencies turned a blind eye to the 
political repercussions of their actions and focused on the technical provision of aid. 
This enabled success to be measured in quantifiable terms, and helped divert attention 
from the potential consequences of continued provision of aid to the camps and the 
interior of Cambodia. 
3.1 The Price of Access 
The Thai Government and Western donors dictated the terms of the border aid program 
through imposing strict regulations and controlling the financial arrangements that 
underwrote the relief system. From the outset Thai authorities clearly showed that they 
would not tolerate criticism, no matter how diplomatic. The ICRC Head of Delegation 
in Bangkok, Francis Amar, was told to Ieave Thailand after he appealed to the Thai 
Government to halt the refoulement of some 42,000 Cambodians who were forced into 
mine -infested areas below Preah Vihear. Amar's statement, that the people were pushed 
back against their will and might either lose their lives or face the same situation which 
ve Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy, p. 195. 
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forced them to seek refuge in Thailand, was angrily dismissed by Prime Minister 
Kriangsak as Thailand's business, `done to protect the national interest. 
Thai authorities also proved that they had no compunction in stopping humanitarian 
activities if aid agencies did not comply with their wishes. The aforementioned threat 
issued to ICRC and UNICEF, of prohibiting their participation in the entire relief 
program unless they resumed feeding the Khmer Rouge, illustrates this point well. 
Thailand also used the withholding of humanitarian aid as a way of punishing the 
Vietnamese- backed regime in Cambodia, suspending authorisation of relief flights from 
Bangkok to Phnom Penh in response to the first offensive launched against the border 
refugee camps. Restrictions on the activities and statements of aid personnel were 
further enforced along the border through the imposition of martial law. Authorisation 
to enter the border area was only granted by the military wing of the Government. 
The caution exhibited by aid organisations operating in Thailand was exemplified by 
UNHCR, which failed to honour its own mandate in order to avoid jeopardising its 
presence in the country. Responsible for hundreds of thousands of Indochinese refugees 
in a country which had not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention or 1967 Protocol, 
UNHCR relinquished its protection responsibilities for Cambodians along the border in 
favour of concentrating on resettlement opportunities for refugees in the holding centres 
away from the border. Some 200,000 Cambodian refugees were resettled in the West, 
but the price for this success was silence. UNHCR did not even protest against the 
refoulement at Preah Vihear which, at the time, was the Iargest single case of forced 
repatriation since the agency was founded in 1951. Dennis McNamara, former Head of 
the UNHCR Protection Unit in Geneva, later admitted that the lack of protest by 
UNHCR `must be seen as one of the low points of its protection history.'98 The absence 
of UNHCR along the border deprived the refugees of legal protection since UNBRO 
was not imbued with such responsibility. 
The autonomy and independence of aid organisations were further suppressed through 
donor pressure. The purse strings of the border operation were firmly held by Western 
governments with an interest in sustaining the resistance movement through the 
9' Bangkok Post, June 12 1979 as cited in Robinson, Double Vision, pp. 55 -56. 
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humanitarian relief effort. The US, in particular, had significant leverage over the Thai 
Government by virtue of its economic and military aid to Thailand, and had direct 
influence over the border relief program as the largest single donor, meeting about one 
third of the total cost." Supporting the Khmer resistance movements through the aid 
program was an overt objective of the US Embassy in Bangkok,10° and their funding 
commitments gave the US a strong say over where and how the money would be spent. 
The monopoly of US financial control was consolidated when UNBRO assumed 
coordination of the border program in early 1982, because, with the exception of 
Christian Outreach and Handicap International, between 90 and 100 percent of NGO 
programs were funded through UNBRO.'°' Itself dependent upon voluntary 
contributions from states, UNBRO was obliged to explain and justify its program and 
expenditure to donors in pledging meetings held twice or three times per year. This 
funding system and the requirement that NGOs obtain UNBRO permission to 
commence operations along the border effectively guaranteed that donor states retained 
full control of the aid operation. Aid agencies were reticent to challenge the hand that 
fed them. As Jackson remarked: 
Where the voluntary agencies have fallen down is... in serving as a voice for 
the people for whom they are working... the agencies have been effectively 
muzzled by their close association with UNBRO. Being almost totally 
dependent on it for funding appears to have made the agencies unwilling to 
look into the implications of their work.102 
The regime in Phnom Penh was no less influential in determining the direction of the 
interior aid effort. Aware that aid to the border region nourished forces opposing Phnom 
Penh, the Heng Samrin regime made cessation of aid to the border a condition of 
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agencies were forced to choose on which side they would work. A litany of other 
government controls followed. Agencies were required to submit detailed lists and 
schedules of relief supplies and were obliged to consign all relief to the government for 
distribution, thereby relinquishing control over where and to whom the aid would be 
dístributed.104 Western medical personnel were not permitted to work in the country for 
the first two years, and no personnel could obtain visas if the quantity of material 
destined for technical projects was deemed insufficient by the authorities. In fact, the 
number of visas issued to staff of aid organisations was directly proportional to the 
budgets of agencies. Hence UNICEF and World Vision with budgets of $5 million each 
could obtain about 12 visas, but agencies with small budgets were threatened with non - 
renewal of visas if their planned expenditure was not augmented.L05 
The Vietnamese determination to impose a compliant regime in Cambodia made all 
other issues subservient. Policies to consolidate the regime prioritised food distributions 
to the army and government bureaucrats over the general population, and the political 
indoctrination of the Cambodian people took precedence over technical training. 
Political education sessions interrupted the work of all Cambodians, with detrimental 
consequences for the rehabilitation of infrastructure and services. The priority given to 
strategic and ideological interests over humanitarian concerns was starkly illustrated by 
the decision to construct a bamboo wall along the western border of Cambodia, 
allegedly to prevent guerrilla incursions into the country and the exodus of people out. 
Commencing in early 1984 and codenamed, `K5', the project engaged a fixed number of 
`voluntary workers' from each province for 3 -6 months to clear land in the malaria and 
mine- infested jungle. Exacerbated by lack of food and physical exhaustion, malaria was 
estimated to have killed 5 percent or 50,000 of the one million peasants who were 
forced to participate in the first two years.i06 Lacking any real strategic value, the project 
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The price of humanitarian access to Cambodia was compromise and silence; the aid 
agencies rarely protested against the unacceptable conditions of operation,101 and never 
mentioned human rights abuses or forced labour. In fact the only time they broke their 
silence was to issue a statement in favour of the regime in Phnom Penh. In April 1985, 
for example, a report appeared in the Bangkok Post detailing some of the forced labour 
involved in the construction of the bamboo wall, in which aid organisations were cited 
as the source of the information. In response, the UNICEF representative in Phnom 
Penh prepared a declaration for the newspaper on behalf of all agencies in Cambodia 
which was copied to the Cambodian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, denying the medical 
consequences of the `agricultural clearance'. Only one NGO representative refused to 
sign the statement.i° 
Humanitarian principles were compromised along the border and inside Cambodia, and 
room for aid organisations to manoeuvre to claim humanitarian space was extremely 
limited. To complain about the imposed conditions risked expulsion from Thailand and 
Cambodia. Weighed against the dubious potential gains such complaints could achieve, 
most agencies judged that it was better to remain silent in order to continue to 
participate in the relief program. These limitations were compounded by the propaganda 
war in which the prospect of famine and the response to it were the major weapons. 
3.2 The Crisis of Western Conscience 
The use of famine as a propaganda tool by both sides of the conflict exacerbated many 
of the problems the aid agencies experienced in negotiating humanitarian access to 
Cambodia, and in publicising the true extent of the difficulties experienced in providing 
humanitarian assistance. After months of denying authorisation for aid organisations to 
conduct an assessment inside Cambodia, Phnom Penh permitted a short visit to 
Cambodia in July 1979, during which the administration proclaimed that a famine 
threatened the lives of two million Cambodians. Access to the rural areas was refused, 
but what the aid officials saw around Phnom Penh left them with little reason to 
106 Luciolli, Le Mur de Bambou, p. 128. 
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question the validity of the claim. They proposed to mount an immediate emergency 
response, but protracted negotiations with Phnom Penh over the conditions of 
operations slowed the process, with UNICEF and ICRC reluctant to accept the 
conditions imposed. 
The media frenzy sparked by images of the aftermath of the Khmer Rouge regime, 
however, forced the hand of the aid agencies. By September 1979, increasingly dramatic 
analogies were being drawn between Pol Pot and Adolf Hitler, and stories of a 
Cambodian holocaust flashed around the world. The spectre of famine killing two 
million more before Christmas', was added to the fray, with the fundraising campaigns 
conducted by aid agencies propelling the imperative to ``do something'. `If we don't act 
by Tuesday - come Friday they won't be starving - they'll be dead', declared a World 
Vision advertisement. The British Red Cross pictured an emaciated child with the 
caption, `Some children in Kampuchea look like this... the rest are dead.'109 Journalists 
like John Pilger added fuel to the fire, vehemently criticising the US for its lack of aid to 
Cambodia, claiming that the Vietnamese were placing no obstacles to the 
implementation of an aid program, and blaming the aid organisations for the slow 
response.i0 He added further pressure on UNICEF and ICRC by suggesting that the 
public donate to Oxfam rather than other agencies. Oxfam had recently entered 
Cambodia and accepted all the government demands including providing no aid to the 
border, an act which threatened to undermine the stance of UNICEF and ICRC. Before 
long the pressure of public opinion led to concessions by the Joint Mission and the Heng 
Samrin regime: the former relaxed their normal monitoring requirements and the latter 
softened insistence for ICRC and UNICEF to stop their operations along the border. 
According to Shawcross, `there was no single moment in Phnom Penh in which such 
compromises were openly made and agreement was explicitly reached'. "' 
The issue of famine was then used by each side to attack the other. Having invited 
Western aid to Cambodia in July in order to alleviate famine, Phnom Penh claimed in 
late October that the problem had been solved: starvation had been averted through aid 
from socialist countries. Moreover the regime charged that fears of famine were a plot 
09 Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy, p. 204. 
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hatched to discredit the regime and to supply food and equipment to Pol Pot's forces. 
Aid personnel were granted access to rural areas of Cambodia in mid- November and 
indeed found no evidence of famine, only pockets of hunger. The US, its allies and 
Western journalists, however, refused to believe that this could be so, instead viewing 
the denial as part of a policy to orchestrate famine and eliminate internal resistance to 
Vietnamese rule. The Vietnamese obstruction of aid efforts then became the focus of 
attack, and donors became reluctant to provide more aid in the absence of monitoring 
reports. Thus the issue of famine had benefited Phnom Penh in attracting international 
agencies and the legitimacy they bestowed on the country. The famine also benefited the 
West which, through exploiting public guilt at having forsaken the Cambodian people 
during the Pol Pot years, could demonise the Vietnamese regime for allowing the 
population to suffer again, and justify its support to the opposition movement. As Rufin 
points out, `our way of envisaging socialist countries oscillates constantly between an 
ironic criticism of their inefficiency, and suspicion that they can orchestrate diabolical 
plots in fine detail.' 1z 
The polarisation of the aid issue left humanitarian organisations in a quandary. Although 
there was no famine, the needs of the population were still immense and the increasing 
reluctance of donors to provide funding jeopardised aid programs. Any public 
statements issued by aid organisations played into the hands of either side. An ICRC 
official, for example, lamented the problems of food distribution in Cambodia, and 
warned that the aid flow could not continue indefinitely unless distribution was 
improved. In response, a New York Times editorial stated that: 
whatever one calls it, the lack of food has killed many people, food remains in 
short supply, and Phnom Penh and Hanoi refuse to give full support to those 
most able to help... Phnom Penh, Hanoi and Moscow are making any civilized 
arrangement more difficult with their cynical tolerance of starvation when there 
is food at hand. They must be doing something very, very wrong when they 
drive professional feeders of the hungry to start talking about withholding 
food. ' 
The acrimonious context made it impossible to raise an honest and detached debate 
about the true extent of the humanitarian needs in Cambodia and the most appropriate 
"Z Jean- Christophe Rufin, Le piège humanitaire (Paris: Jean- Claude Lattés, 1986) p. 209. 
'3 As cited in Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy, p. 216. 
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response to them. It was futile to appeal to donors or diplomatic part ies to assist in 
negotiating conditions of operation. 
3.3 Taking Sides 
The ban imposed by Phnom Penh on agencies working along the border denied the 
possibility of asserting a neutral position in the conflict for all but the few agencies 
mentioned earlier which were granted exemption. Each aid organisation was forced to 
choose the side on which it would operate. Reflecting on the options available, Rony 
Brauman explained that `the choice was... not between a political position and a neutral 
position, but between two political positions: one active and the other by default'."' 
Either aid organisations consciously determined which side or faction with which they 
would work or they assumed a political position by virtue of their presence. 
The choice was not easy. Other Cold War contexts had contained identifiable `good' 
and `bad' sides: in Afghanistan, the disproportionate force used by the Soviet regime 
clearly delineated the `victims' from the 'oppressors', and in Central America, 'victims' 
and `oppressors' were defined according to right wing or left wing ideology. But in 
Cambodia, both sides contained `oppressors'. The Khmer Rouge had annihilated part of 
the Cambodian population and espoused a radical socialist ideology. And the 
Vietnamese, although initially liberating the country, remained as an army of 
occupation. Instead of allowing people to choose their future path, communism had 
been imposed and brutal policies of forced labour and reform cast dark shadows over 
the regime for all but the staunchest communists and Vietnamese sympathisers. 
In the absence of a clearly `good' side, most aid agencies decided to assist the side to 
which they held least aversion, rather than the most affinity. There were some 
exceptions to this such as the Comité d'aide sanitaire à la population cambodgienne, a 
French NGO run by communist doctors. Its support of the regime in Cambodia extended 
to screening potential organisations and personnel offering assistance to Cambodia and 
backing Phnom Penh's claims that no medical personnel, only equipment, was needed 
Rony Brauman, Refugees Camps, Population Transfers, and NGOs', in Jonathan Moore (ed.), Hard 
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in Cambodia.(' But for most agencies, support was based on either a strong aversion to 
communism and Vietnamese expansionism, or to the Khmer Rouge. The `crisis of 
Western conscience' played a role on each side. Oxfam, for example, readily agreed to 
provide no aid to the border in order to assist Cambodians who were neglected by the 
West throughout the Pol Pot years. Oxfam and ICRC officials believed that an even 
more important contribution than humanitarian aid lay simply in being in Cambodia, 
considerate ambassadors from the world against which the Khmer Rouge had raised the 
barricades, a testament to some form of humanitarian victory over foul revolution and 
impoverished diplomacy.716 Aid organisations like CRS and the International Rescue 
Committee (IRC), by contrast, were strongly anti -communist and looked towards the 
`boat people' fleeing Vietnam to dispel doubts about the threat of Vietnamese tyranny. 
A few aid agencies such as Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) held a strong aversion to 
both the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese regime in Phnom Penh. MSF withdrew 
support from the Khmer Rouge camps as soon as the emergency period subsided, and 
restricted their assistance to the non -Khmer Rouge refugee camps."' MSF also refused 
to work inside Cambodia following a visit there in 1979, judging that aid was not 
reaching the civilian population, but remained in the hands of the government. 
Furthermore, MSF refused to submit to the system of payment for access to Cambodia 
and to the obligatory accompaniment of a government officials when assessing the 
needs of the population. In one of the only public advocacy campaigns undertaken by 
aid organisations during the Cambodian crisis, MSF, Action Internationale Contre la 
Faim (AICF) and IRC organised a `March for the Survival of Cambodia' along the 
Thai- Cambodian border in 1980. Although fairly successful in publicising the lack of 
access to the Cambodian population, the march added to the propaganda war of political 
powers and further polarised the aid community. 
Other agencies Iike CRS and World Relief also openly assumed a political position, 
having little compunction in offering to replace UNICEF and ICRC in supporting 
Khmer Rouge camps. For other agencies, however, a mixture of naivety and the `culture 
I's See Rufin, Le piège humanitaire, p. 216. Of 450 doctors in Cambodia in 1975, only 45 remained after 
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of justification' helped to sustain their positions. Shawcross comments on the naivety 
and ignorance he encountered when talking with some aid workers who had no idea of 
the history of the Khmer Rouge and the atrocities they committed.18 The `well - 
organised' nature of Khmer Rouge camps impressed many aid personnel and was in 
contrast to the rather chaotic nature of non -Khmer Rouge camps. Other aid workers 
believed that the contact permitted with the Khmer Rouge through the relief effort 
would `tame' individuals and change their behaviour. `To a certain extent', Niland 
suggests, `this perspective became both motivation and rationale to work alongside the 
Khmer Rouge however disquieting their record or disturbing their practices.' 19 Most aid 
personnel also adopted sanitised language to diminish the discomfort caused by the 
obvious misuse of aid. The Khmer Rouge feeding program was referred to as `feeding in 
the south', stealing was called `leakage', and soldiers who arrived for treatment at 
medical clinics were referred to as `people from outside the camp' .12° 
Concentrating on the technical aspects of aid delivery was another way in which aid 
organisations pushed aside the dilemmas inherent in working in the Cambodian crisis. 
The provision of aid along the border was a large operation and logistically challenging. 
By narrowing the operational focus to satisfying the physical needs of the refugee 
population, aid organisations could deem the program a success. This attitude is 
epitomised in the foreword to Rice, Rivalry and Politics, one of the earliest books to 
expose the stark dilemmas confronting the aid organisations in the Cambodian refugee 
camps. By placing the absence of famine and starvation as the benchmarks for success, 
Rudy von Bemuth, at that time the Director of CARE Bangladesh, dismisses the 
political arena as `mundane' and therefore inconsequential. 
In the face of the often conflicting and sometimes petty interests they describe, 
perhaps one must conclude that the miracle of the Cambodian refugee 
operation was that the success of the whole somehow transcended the sum of 
its parts... Brown and Mason are fortunate enough to write about an effort 
which accomplished its fundamental objectives of averting famine and 
starvation. If by the end of 1980 the dimension of human tragedy that captured 
the world' s attention in 1979 has been replaced by a return to mundane coldwar 
[sic] political rivalries, this transition was a tribute to the collective efforts and 
118 Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy, pp. 308 -309. 
119 Niland, `The Politics of Suffering', p. 110. 
120 Mason and Brown, Rice, Rivalry and Politics, pp. 60 -61 and Niland, `The Politics of Suffering', p. 
101. 
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policies of the relief community which Mason and Brown so effectively 
analyze.' 
Agencies working inside Cambodia also used technical successes to justify the 
continued provision of humanitarian assistance after the emergency period of 1979- 
1981. They dismissed the conditions of work and constant surveillance as `details' and 
rarely acknowledged the difficulties of operating in the country.'22 The `culture of 
justification' was exacerbated by the need to convince donors to continue support to 
programs in Cambodia when funding was jeopardised by the propaganda surrounding 
the issue of famine. In contrast to the public acknowledgment of difficulties made by 
ICRC, Oxfam withheld information about the absence of famine, and issued statements 
in support of the honesty and dedication of officials in the Heng Samrin regime.123 The 
standards and mandates to which aid organisations usually adhered were also relaxed in 
Cambodia to avoid jeopardising their status in Phnom Penh. Organisations usually 
professing support to `grass roots organisations' and `proximity to the victims' found 
themselves working exclusively with members of the government from their offices in 
hotels reserved for foreigners. Cambodians were forbidden to speak to the `imperialist 
spies' and aid organisations allocated finance to construction projects with little human 
dimension. The truth was suppressed or altered, even in reports appearing a decade later. 
Benson, for example, cites a 1990 UNDP report which characterised the relationship 
with the Heng Samrin regime as `open and collaborative' during the emergency period, 
and Benson adds that `the Cambodian government controlled the relief efforts centrally, 
but was relatively flexible, accepting all offers of assistance'.124 
Luciolli, who worked in Cambodia from 1984 -1986, however, suggests that it was 
precisely the limitations placed on the number of aid organisations permitted in 
Cambodia that exacerbated the NGO compromises and undermined the solidarity 
among agencies.15 A queue of organisations had requested permission to work in 
Cambodia, but the ceiling imposed meant that one had to leave before another was 
permitted to enter. The bargaining power of aid organisation was curtailed under such 
121 Rudy von Bemuth, `Foreword', in Mason and Brown, Rice, Rivalry and Politics, p. xv. 
122 Luciolli, Le Mur de Bambou, p. 262. 
123 Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy, pp. 215 -216. 
124 NGO Assistance to Cambodia, 1979 -90: Lessons for the United Nations Development System (New 
York: Report of a United Nations Development Mission to Cambodia, United Nations Development 
Programme, 1990), in Benson, The Changing Role of NGOs, p. 74. 
125 See Luciolli, Le Mur de Bambou, pp. 263 -266. 
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conditions and one agency was unlikely to back another with the risk of expulsion so 
close at hand. Luciolli cites the experience of the Swiss Red Cross to illustrate this 
point. After working in the hospital in Kampong Cham since 1981, the team was 
expelled in 1985 after one of the surgeons asked a Vietnamese military officer who was 
smoking to leave the operating theatre. Subjected to a trial, the team was accused of 
being an enemy of the people and CIA agents and was told to leave. The issue was 
allegedly not even discussed in the scheduled coordination meeting of the agencies in 
Cambodia, but was dismissed as an affair of the Swiss team. 
The lack of solidarity within the aid community, the justification of inappropriate 
policies and regulations, and the sanitised hue given to operations in Cambodia and 
along the border all undermined the capacity of the aid community to improve the 
conditions under which aid was provided, and to ensure accountability to intended 
beneficiaries. Rather than fighting to claim humanitarian space, and trying to remain as 
independent as possible of the political agendas steering the aid program, the aid 
organisations became part of the conflict and contributed to the arsenal of either side. 
The dominance of Cold War political stakes and the use of humanitarian concerns for 
propaganda purposes limited the extent to which aid organisations could influence the 
course of the aid program. But the acquiescence in the status quo and the excuses 
provided by aid agencies for accepting the unacceptable also contributed markedly to the 
absence of efforts to address the real needs of the refugee and internal Cambodian 
populations. 
CONCLUSION 
Humanitarian aid played an integral role in a vicious circle which enveloped the 
Cambodian refugee program in Thailand. Cambodian refugees fled to the Thai border in 
search of sustenance and protection, but in the ubiquitous political environment, the 
provision of the former compromised the latter. The camp structures became 
mechanisms with which to control the refugees, the presence of whom was crucial to the 
existence and legitimacy of the Coalition Government. The formation of this 
government -in -exile and the presence of its forces in turn jeopardised the physical safety 
of the refugees, subjecting them to attack from Vietnamese troops in Cambodia and the 
Khmer Rouge coalition partner. Hence humanitarian action sustained the refugees 
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whose presence sustained the CGDK, whose activities against the Cambodian regime 
provoked attacks against the camps which housed the refugees. 
The negative consequences of humanitarian aid in the Cambodian crisis were 
unintended by aid organisations, but were deliberately orchestrated by the host and 
donor governments. The absence of humanitarian space in the Cambodian refugee 
camps rendered apolitical humanitarian assistance impossible; to be present was to 
contribute to the political objectives of the border relief operation. Similarly in 
Cambodia, it rapidly became apparent that humanitarian aid destined for the survivors of 
the Khmer Rouge regime would assist in sustaining the Vietnamese -installed 
government in power. Aid agencies were caught between the duty to meet the needs of 
the refugees and interior Cambodian population, and the repercussions of strengthening 
both sides of the conflict. A combination of public pressure and the burden of Western 
conscience drove many agencies to work in Cambodia or along the border at any cost. 
The Cambodian crisis begged the question: at what point should aid organisations refuse 
to accept the unacceptable? Professing to alleviate suffering, they were at best 
ineffective, and at worst, accomplices in a situation which led to greater suffering for the 
populations held hostage along the border and subjected to human rights abuses. 
Aid organisations were aware of the dilemmas the circumstances provoked. There was a 
flow of reports from advocacy and human rights groups illuminating the problems and 
recommending various improvements, such as moving the camps away from the 
border.126 Operational agencies also engaged in advocacy on specific issues, such as 
proposed cuts in aid budgets; human rights abuses, particularly the forced population 
movements of the Khmer Rouge; the lack of access to the hidden border camps; and the 
Khmer Rouge occupancy of the Cambodian seat at the UN.127 However, no unified 
approach to the broader issues was tackled until the issue of a neutral camp arose in 
response to repatriation concerns. NGOs operating in Cambodia were also vocal, even 
forming an NGO Forum on Kampuchea in 1986, based in Brussels. Their advocacy, 
however, was also less about obtaining humanitarian space in their operations than 
challenging the international isolation of Cambodia. 
126 See, for example, Cambodians in Thailand: People on the Edge (Washington: United States 
Committee for Refugees, 1985), p. 20. 
12' See Benson, The Changing Role of NGOs, pp. 64 -65. 
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The humanitarian aid organisations faced many obstacles to more concerted attempts to 
improve the plight of the refugees. They were limited in the extent to which they could 
criticise host government policies or influence the overall structure of the camps. They 
were largely left with the choice of complying with the conditions imposed or not 
participating in the relief program. A few agencies made moral or political decisions to 
prevent aid from flowing to the Khmer Rouge or Vietnamese- backed government. The 
participation of the Khmer Rouge in the coalition, however, made association with the 
faction only one step removed: the difference was only whether aid directly or indirectly 
assisted their resuscitation. Had the CGDK won a military victory against the 
Vietnamese forces, Professor Sukhumbhand Paribatra, former Director of Security 
Studies Program at Chulalongkorn University, was convinced that the post -war 
government would have been dominated by the Khmer Rouge, in spite of Western 
assurances that they opposed a Khmer Rouge return to power. 
Despite the much -touted improvements made by the non -communists, the facts 
are clear: while the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) has 
considerable assets in terms of its population base and a number of troops but 
little or no unity or political will, the Armee Nationale Sihanoukiste (ANS) 
seems to have both the unity and the will, but not the numbers, and the Khmer 
Rouge remain by a long way the most coherent, organised, determined, well - 
armed and numerous of the three factions.128 
Twenty years after the beginning of the refugee influx into Thailand, the last remnants 
of the Khmer Rouge are finally emerging from the jungles. Humanitarian aid, ostensibly 
given to people in need because they are members of a shared humanity, helped to 
revive and sustain a military force which showed the least regard for humanity. Aid 
organisations incur responsibilities to the beneficiaries of their assistance when they 
choose to intervene in a crisis. Just as their presence can confer Iegitimacy on regimes or 
authorities so it imparts a sense of solidarity with the `victims' and an element of trust. 
Operating through administrative structures which controlled and dominated the refugee 
population violated that trust. The refugees were deprived of their rights as asylum 
seekers and suffered human rights abuses on a regular basis. The aid organisations were 
indirect accomplices in this system, but through their acquiescence in the status quo and 
128 Sukhumbhand Paribatra, Kampuchea Without Delusion (Malaysia: Institute of Strategic and 
International Studies, 1986), p. 14 as cited in Jackson, Just Waiting to Die ?, p. 19. Paribatra currently 
holds the post of Deputy Foreign Minister in Thailand. 
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their acceptance of funds from donors implicated in the abuse of the refugee population, 
aid organisations were partly responsible for its continuation. 
CHAPTER 5 
THE RWANDAN REFUGEE CAMPS IN ZAIRE 
Fifteen years after the first Cambodian peasants were marched across the Thai border by 
the Khmer Rouge, the same scenario was replayed with different actors on a different 
continent. In a small country in central Africa, the governing regime ordered the 
annihilation of a segment of the population, and was ousted from power by an invading 
force. To evade defeat, the regime directed the exodus of two million of its compatriots 
to neighbouring countries and settled among them, evading justice and rearming for 
future conflict. The analogy with the Khmer Rouge was immediately drawn: `Huey to 
Prevent a Cambodian Epilogue in Rwanda' was the title of an article contributed to the 
International Herald Tribune by Alain Destexhe.' Yet for all the prior warning, and live 
media coverage of the genocide and refugee exodus, the refugee camps became 
sanctuaries for another genocidal regime. 
This chapter examines the Rwandan refugee crisis which was provoked by genocide and 
civil war in Rwanda. The genocide, which claimed between 500,000 and 800,000 lives 
in less than 100 days, was orchestrated by hardline Hutu in the Rwandan Government 
intent on preventing the implementation of a power -sharing agreement with the minority 
Tutsi ethnic group. A planned campaign of extermination of anyone perceived to 
support the Tutsi -dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) commenced on 6 April 
1994 and ended with the defeat of the Government by the RPF, three months Iater.2 
State directives drove the slaughter of Tutsi, and state directives encouraged the Hutu 
population to flee the country when the Rwandan Government Forces (Forces Armées 
Rwandaises - FAR) faced imminent defeat. Two million Hutu sought asylum in Zaire, 
Tanzania and Burundi until the majority was forced to return to Rwanda in late 1996.3 
Alain Destexhe, `Hurry to Prevent a Cambodian Epilogue in Rwanda', International Herald Tribune, 
11 August 1994, p. 6. 
2 The three most comprehensive studies of the Rwandan genocide are Rwanda: Death, Despair and 
Defiance (London: Africa Rights, revised 1995 edition); Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis 1959- 
1994: History of a Genocide (London: Hurst & Company, 1995); and Leave None to Tell the Story: 
Genocide in Rwanda (NY: Human Rights Watch, 1999). 
3 Refugee statistics from May 1995 when repatriation had effectively ground to a halt were: 722,000 
around Goma, 302,000 around Bukavu and 41,000 near Uvira in Zaire; I66,000 around Karagwe and 
437,000 around Ngara in Tanzania; and 231,000 in Burundi. See UNHCR, The State of the World's 
Refugees 1995: In Search of Solutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 33. 
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Each paradox of humanitarian action was manifest in the Rwandan refugee camps in 
Zaire, and hence this chapter demonstrates the magnitude of the failure of the aid 
community to learn from past experience. Humanitarian action permitted the defeated 
government and army to regroup, gain strength, and maintain control over the refugee 
population to dissuade their return to Rwanda. The camps facilitated the protection of 
these individuals through their presence among refugees and provided a pool of recruits 
and a `captive' population to mobilise for a continuation of the civil war and genocide. 
Aid nourished the combatants and became a tool of control in the camps. Members of 
the former Rwandan government proclaimed the formation of a government -in -exile in 
Zaire, and the military forces (ex -FAR) conducted armed incursions into Rwanda. 
The guerrilla activities undertaken by the ex -FAR from their bases in eastern Zaire 
became a source of destabilisation in the region in general, and in Rwanda in particular. 
Attacks launched against genocide survivors, witnesses to the genocide, and local 
Rwandan officials hardened the attitudes of the Rwandan Government, and provoked 
harsh reprisals by members of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) against suspected 
sympathisers of the Hutu rebels. These reprisals then fed the propaganda of the refugee 
camp leadership, assisting in the campaign to prevent the repatriation of the refugees. A 
vicious circle developed: the presence of the refugees facilitated the military activities of 
the rebels, which in turn generated retributions from the RPA. The violence fed the 
refugees' fear of returning to Rwanda, and hence they remained at the service of the ex- 
FAR and government, permitting the launch of further offensives. 
The most striking feature of the Rwandan case is that the misuse of humanitarian action 
was not orchestrated by, or in the interest of, donor governments, yet more effectively 
assisted the combatants than any of the previous cases. Free of the dominant political 
stakes of the Cold War period, the Rwandan refugee crisis was not manipulated or 
driven by external powers for strategic or ideological supremacy. In fact, the 
international response to the Rwandan crisis was characterised by the inverse: the Iack 
of strategic importance of the region minimised external interference. Hence the 
Rwandan case study sheds some new light on why the paradoxes of aid persist when, for 
the first time, this was not in the interests of donor nations or the vast majority of aid 
organisations working in the camps. 
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This case also illustrates the potential gravity of the consequences of militarised refugee 
camps for the refugees sheltered therein. In the absence of international action to remove 
military elements from the camps, the RPA, in coalition with rebels from the Alliance 
des Forces Démocratique pour la Libération (Alliance of Democratic Forces for 
Liberation - AFDL) opposed to President Mobutu of Zaire, attacked and destroyed the 
refugee camps between October and December 1996. The majority of the refugees were 
forced back to Rwanda, but hundreds of thousands fled west into the interior of Zaire 
where they were hunted down by AFDL and RPA combatants, deemed `legitimate' 
targets through their association with the ex -FAR and militias who propelled them west. 
Tens of thousands died or disappeared. Despite recognition of the role of the refugee 
camps in the Rwandan conflict, and numerous overt threats to disband the camps made 
by the Rwandan Vice -President and Minister of Defence, Paul Kagame, little was done 
to stop violation of the civilian character of the refugee camps. The system established 
to protect the refugees ultimately endangered them. How and why this occurred is the 
subject of this chapter. 
Part One contextualises the importance of humanitarian aid to the former Rwandan 
government and army by examining the use of Zaire= territory as a military sanctuary. 
Millions of dollars worth of assets were taken from Rwanda by the retreating army, and 
banks were looted, providing a considerable source of revenue to the exiled forces from 
the outset. The military fled with much of their arsenal, and received arms shipments 
while in exile. 
Part Two illustrates, however, that the presence of the refugees and the humanitarian aid 
that they attracted were the most important sources of support for the defeated 
government and army. 
Part Three explores the various attitudes of the aid organisations vis -à -vis the dilemma 
they faced operating in the camps. The knowledge that aid was strengthening a clique 
responsible for genocide was weighed against the `humanitarian imperative' to provide 
aid to anyone in need. Many organisations considered withdrawing their support from 
the camps and some did. Others decided to stay to fight to minimise the abuse of aid 
from the inside. Although debate about the negative consequences of aid was more 
engaged and widespread than in previous refugee contexts, some organisations seemed 
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oblivious to ethical considerations, and a small minority even sympathised with the 
radical 'Hutu cause'. Although less polarised than in Cambodia or Central America, the 
opinions of individual aid workers tended to be shaped by the populations with whom 
they were working. Many appeared unaware of the context and the events which 
precipitated the refugee crisis. 
1. ZAIRE AS A MILITARY SANCTUARY 
Zairean authorities played a pivotal role in facilitating the rearming and training of the 
ex -FAR and militias in Zaire. The host nation provided the ex -FAR with the territorial 
base on which the army could reorganise; permitted the army and government officials 
free movement; and ignored international calls for the arrest of war criminals. The ex- 
FAR established military bases, and Zaire became a conduit for weapons and supplies to 
the force. Furthermore, the ex -FAR was able to create a highly organised military 
structure while in exile in Zaire, and launched frequent attacks on Rwandan officials and 
infrastructure. Documents found in the camps after they were attacked in late 1996 
provide a rare insight into the way in which the former army and government 
reorganised after their defeat, and how humanitarian aid became integrated into their 
planning and operations.4 
The Rwandan army fled into Zaire virtually intact, having faced a rapid defeat at the 
hands of the RPF. As soon as the genocide began, signalled by the shooting down of 
President Juvénal Habyarimana's plane on 6 April 1994, the RPF began their offensive 
from the demilitarised zone in the north of the country, and from Kigali where a 600 - 
strong battalion was stationed under the Arusha Accords.' The RPF rapidly gained 
territory against the larger and better -equipped army, taking control of Kigali on 4 July. 
The report of a meeting of the High Command of the ex -FAR held in Goma, Zaire in 
As mentioned in the Introduction, I am grateful to Sam Kiley of the London Times, Massimo 
Alberizzi of the Italian newspaper Corriere Della Sera, Christian Jennings of Reuters and Chris 
Tomlinson of Associated Press for these documents. The documents were left behind after the ex- 
FAR fled the rebel attack against the Goma camps in late 1996. Many of them were contained in a 
filing cabinet belonging to Major -General Augustin Bizimungu, Chief -of -Staff of the ex -FAR. 
Documents from this source will hereafter be marked with the letters (c.d). 
5 The Arusha Accords were the peace and power -sharing agreements between the Rwandan 
Government and the RPF, signed on the 4 August 1993. The Accords included, inter alia, provision 
for the integration of the RPF into the Rwandan Government Forces. 
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early September 1994,6 blamed a combination of external and internal factors for the 
defeat. Externally, the ex -FAR accused the United Nations Assistance Mission for 
Rwanda (UNAMIR) of complicity with the RPF; implicated Uganda, Belgium, the 
United States (US) and Burundi in the RPF victory; and cited the sudden abandonment 
by France as their principal and only reliable military partner. In addition, the report 
laments the failure of the Rwandan regime to organise `parallel supply circuits to by- 
pass the [arms] embargo" which the UN Security Council had imposed on the Rwandan 
Government in Resolution 918 of 17 May 1994. Internal factors stressed the lack of 
unity between the politicians and the military; poor training, management and planning; 
power struggles within the military after 6 April 1994; an erosion of discipline at all 
levels; and the presence of RPF allies at the heart of government and in the FAR. 
President Mobutu's close alliance with Habyarimana ensured a secure sanctuary for the 
defeated army and government officials in Zaire.' They arrived en masse with hundreds 
of thousands of Hutu civilians, encouraged and sometimes forced to leave with the 
retreating troops. Crossing the border into North Kivu in mid -July 1994, senior officials 
initially resided in tourist hotels along Lake Kivu, before becoming better organised and 
regrouping militarily. `Regroupment is our number one priority' proclaimed the Chief - 
of- Staff, General Augustin Bizimungu in an interview with Le Monde in late July,' 
Senior officers in Goma moved to `the Bananeraie' near Lac Vert refugee camp, while 
the soldiers lived in the large refugee camps, particularly Mugunga (see Map 6). In 
South Kivu, where the exodus to Zaire was slightly later due to the protection provided 
by the French Opération turquoise, the military were organised into two . principal 
camps, Panzi for those accompanied by families, and Bulonge for single men. Another 
military camp was based on Idjwi Island in Lake Kivu. 
6 Rapport de la Réunion du Haut Commandement des Forces Armées Rwandaises et des Membres des 
Commissions tenue à Goma du 02 au 08 Septembre 1994' (Goma: mimeo, 1994), pp. 32 -33. 
'Rapport de la Réunion', p. 32. 
8 Mobutu deployed several hundred members of his Division Spéciale Présidentielle to Rwanda in 
October 1990 in response to an RPF invasion from Uganda. 
9 Jean- Baptiste Naudet, `L'ex -armée gouvernementale entre les mains du Zaire', Le Monde, 27 July 
1994, p. 6. 
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Map 6: The Rwandan Refugee Camps in the Great Lakes Region 
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The armed forces restructured in the first few months in exile, fusing with the National 
Gendarmerie under a single authority, called the `Rwandan Armed Forces Command' .10 
This was initially placed under the auspices of the Minister of Defence, Colonel 
Athanase Gasake. Four commissions were established: Social Affairs; Information and 
Documentation; Planning and Operations; and Capital and Finance. The meeting of the 
High Command held in September 1994 also mentions a fifth commission, `Politics and 
External Relations'. The armed forces were consolidated into 2 divisions: the first 
containing 7,680 men and the second 10,240 men. Separate support units were also 
established, which consisted of an additional 4,000 men, to make a total of 
approximately 22,000 soldiers." This figure is slightly lower than most external 
estimates of troop strength, which suggested that between 30,000 and 50,000 ex -FAR 
resided in Zaire.12 The military documents offer IittIe clarification on the number of 
° Major- Général Augustin Bizimungu, `Restructuration des Forces Armées Rwandaises' (n.p.: mimeo, 
n.d.) (c.d). 
it Gratien Kabiligi, `Projet: Libération du Rwanda' (n.p.: mimeo, n.d.) (c.d). 
12 A UNHCR report concerned with security in the camps (Refugee Camp Security in the Great Lakes 
Region. Geneva: EVAL/01 /97, Inspection and Evaluation Service, UNHCR, April 1997, p. 9) 
estimated that 30,000 of the 40,000 Rwandan Armed Forces fled to Zaire, and numbered the 
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Interahamwe and Impuzamagambi militia13 living in the camps, the estimates for which . 
vary between 10,000 and 50,000.14 References to the militias in the military documents 
are limited to complaints about the liability caused by their lack of discipline, and a 
decision to forbid their presence in the military camps unless they underwent proper 
military training.' 
The self -proclaimed government -in -exile also restructured following a meeting of the 
political parties held in Bukavu on 2 and 3 September 1994, and reduced the number of 
ministries to seven. Théodore Sindikubwabo and Jean Kambanda remained as President 
and Prime Minister respectively, and Callixte Kalimanzira, formerly of the Interior 
Ministry, became Minister of Social Affairs and Refugees.l6 
The ex -FAR and former government had considerable financial and military resources 
at their disposal: cash and assets requisitioned from Rwanda before they retreated; 
private and government foreign bank accounts; and arms sold by states willing to breach 
the UN arms embargo. All movable assets were requisitioned by the army or senior 
officials during their retreat to Zaire and the banks, in which Tutsi accounts were frozen 
at the beginning of the genocide, were emptied of cash. Gérard Prunier estimates that 
Interahamwe militias at 10,000 - 15,000. The estimate provided in the Joint Evaluation of Emergency 
Assistance to Rwanda was `30,000 government soldiers, militia members, local officials and former 
national leaders'. (Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, `Early Warning and Conflict Management', 
Study 2 in David Millwood (ed.), The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons 
from the Rwanda Experience, Copenhagen: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency 
Assistance to Rwanda, 1996, p. 58). Following an interview with the former governor of the Central 
Bank, Prunier suggested that 50,000 militia were active during the genocide, a figure that he said 
matched the strength of the regular army (The Rwanda Crisis, p. 243), although how many of them 
crossed into Zaire is unclear. Reed estimated that the combined ex -FAR and militias in Zaire 
numbered 50,000 (Wm. Cyrus Reed, Refugees and Rebels: The Former Government of Rwanda and 
the ADFL Movement in Eastern Zaire. Washington: US Committee for Refugees, 1997, p. 7). A UN 
Secretary- General's report to the Security Council estimated that 50,000 ex -FAR and their 
dependents resided in Zaire, and at least 10,000 militia members. (Report of the Secretary- General on 
Security in the Rwandese Refugee Camps. S/1994/1308, 18 November 1994, p. 3). 
13 The militia known as the Interahamwe (those who work together) was created in 1992 as the 'youth 
movement' of the ruling party of Habyarimana, the Mouvement révolutionnaire national pour le 
développement et la démocratie (MRND). The Impuzamagambi (those who have the same goal) was 
the militia of MRND's coalition partner, the Coalition pour la défense de la République. These 
militias were among the main perpetrators of the genocide. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, pp. 367 -368. 
16 See footnote 12. 
1s 'Rapport de la Réunion', p. 20. 
6 The other `portfolios' were filled as follows: Joseph Kalinganire was Minister of Information; Jérôme 
Bicamumpaka remained Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation; Stanislas Mbonampeka who 
had been Minister of Justice before the genocide was reinstated; Innocent Habamenshi was Minister 
of Capital and Equipment; Frédéric Kayogora was Minister of Mobilisation and Youth, and Athanase 
Gasake was Minister of Defence. This list was published in Amizero - L'Espoir, No. 0, 7 -14 
November 1994, pp. 9 -10, as summarised in ASBL Dialogue (ed.), Revue de la Presse Rwandaise 
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some $30 -40 million worth of local currency (Rwandan francs) and another $30 -40 
million of foreign currency was taken into Zaire.17 In addition to cash, hundreds of 
vehicles, buses, trucks and machinery worth millions of dollars left Rwanda. `We have 
money, we left Rwanda with everything except the houses', claimed Colonel Anselme 
Nkuliyekubona.1e Not all of this cash and property remained at the disposal of the 
government or military, however: the sale of state property for individual profit was so 
prevalent that it became the target of the notorious extremist publication Kangura.19 The 
paper stated that goods sold for personal profit included 610 trucks, 1,380 cars, coffee to 
the value of $300,000, minerals, and property from the country's biggest oil company, 
Petro- Rwanda.20 It also accused the former director of a tea enterprise of the theft of 
$520,000; the former Defence Minister, Augustin Bizimana of the theft of $640,000; 
and the former Minister of Public Works of the misappropriation of $1,000,000 and 13 
trucks from the ministry.21 Nevertheless, many assets did remain at the disposal of the 
ex -FAR for military use and to earn revenue from the refugees and aid organisations, 
which will be discussed further in the next section. 
The ex -FAR also managed to enter Zaire with considerable quantities of military 
hardware. Although the Zairean authorities confiscated many weapons at the border, 
personnel from Human Rights Watch Arms Project testified that these were kept in 
military bases near Goma, and were maintained by ex -FAR soldiers." One inventory of 
Rwandan military hardware in the possession of the Zairean army listed six helicopters, 
over 1,000 artillery pieces, some 35,000 light weapons, and several armoured vehicles.23 
Amnesty International reported that some weapons were sold back to the ex- FAR.24 
Certain pieces of equipment, such as the helicopters, were useless in the absence of 
(Brussels: as contained in a CD Rom produced by the International Documentation Network on the 
Great African Lakes Region, Geneva, No. 5, 1998, Vol. 1). 
i7 Personal communication, 5 May 1999. 
e Naudet, `L'ex-année gouvernementale entre les mains du Zaire'. 
19 For a description of the role of Kangura as the 'mouthpiece of the most fanatical of extremists' since 
its establishment in 1990, see Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance, pp. 70 -75. 
20 'Quels sont Ies politiciens qui se sont montrés cupides depuis notre exil ?', Kangura, No. 62, 1 -15 
November 1994, p. 14, as summarised in ASBL Dialogue, Revue de la Presse Rwandaise. 
21 
'Gens recherchés pour vol', Kangura, No. 65, 1 January 1995, p. 11 as summarised in ABSL 
Dialogue, Revue de la Presse Rwandaise. 
22 Rwanda/Zaire. Rearming with Impunity: International Support for the Perpetrators of the Rwandan 
Genocide (New York: Vol. 7, No. 4, Human Rights Watch Arms Project, May 1995), p. 12. 
23 `Situation Armement Remis aux FAZ' (n.p.: mimeo, n.d.) (c.d). 
24 Rwanda: Arming the Perpetrators of the Genocide (London: AFR 02/14/95, Amnesty International, 
June 1995), p. 2 and p. 4. 
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spare parts and maintenance, and some equipment including three of the helicopters was 
reported to have been returned to Kigali by the Zairean Government in February and 
April 1996 (Appendix 1)." But these supplies were augmented by new shipments of 
arms to the camps which were either directly facilitated by Zaire or tacitly permitted 
entry to Zairean territory. 
Rumours of arms flights landing at Goma airport at night resounded in the aid 
community and the press. Proof of such flights, however, was more difficult to obtain, 
as a report of the UN Commission of Inquiry established to investigate breaches of the 
arms embargo attests.26 The inquiry, which investigated allegations made by Human 
Rights Watch Arms Project, Amnesty International, television documentaries" and the 
press, did manage to verify two of the arms shipments cited which were sold by the 
Government of the Seychelles to Colonel Théoneste Bagosora, in the belief that the 
purchase was on behalf of the Zairean Government. The two shipments, which landed in 
Goma in mid -June 1994, contained AK -47 rifles, mortar shells, and ammunition, and 
were flown on Air Zaire aircraft 26 The cost of the two shipments was $330,000. 
Invoices and air waybills found in the camps also document the arrival of weapons in 
Goma. Many of these arrived before the imposition of the UN arms embargo on 17 May 
1994, but after the genocide had commenced, while at least two showed shipments after 
the embargo had been imposed. Most of the invoices were from a British firm, Mil -Tec 
Corporation, which operates from the Isle of Man. Addressed to the Minister of Defence 
in Bukavu, Zaire, one statement of invoices and payments shows eight flights between 
18 April 1994 and 18 July 1994 at a cost of $6,515,313. Payments made were shown to 
total $4,807,000, indicating an outstanding balance of $1,708,313. A letter dated 7 
December 1994 requests payment of the outstanding balance, stating that funds paid for 
the last flight of 18 July had been blocked in Cairo by the US Government `due to the 
situation in Rwanda at that time'. The letter reminds the Minister of Defence of the 
25 
`Armement Dont Dispose le FPR' (n.p.: mimeo, 26 September 1996) (c.d). 
26 Re p ort of the International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda). Annex to Letter dated 13 March 1996 
from the Secretary- General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1996/195, 14 
March 1996). The UN Security Council established the International Commission of Inquiry in UN 
Resolution 1013 of 7 September 1995. 
27 Rwanda/Zaire. Rearming with Impunity; Rwanda: Arming the Perpetrators of the Genocide; The Big 
Story, Twenty -Twenty Television, 17 November 1994; and `Merchants of Death' Carlton Television, 
13 June 1995. 
28 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda), p. 15. 
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service rendered by Mil -Tec over the past five years, particularly the rapidity of the 
response to the Minister's urgent request for arms on 10 April 1994 (Appendix 2). A 
waybill dated 18 May 1994 indicates that Mil -Tec shipped arms from Tirana, AIbania to 
Goma on Okada Air, and the accompanying invoice lists the cargo as 2,500 AK -47 
rifles; 10,000 30 -round magazines with 2,500 vests with magazine and grenade 
pouches; 2,000 60mm mortars; 255,360 rounds of 7.62 x 39 ammunition; six 155mm 
mortars and 102 RPG7 rockets. The total cost of the cargo, freight, handling and 
insurance was $1,074,549. Another invoice dated 13 July lists ammunition and RPG7 
rockets as cargo, with a destination of Kinshasa. Since this invoice was in the possession 
of the ex -FAR, it can reasonably be assumed that the shipment was destined for the 
former Rwandan army. Recording Kinshasa as the destination reduced suspicions that 
the arms shipments were circumventing the UN embargo. 
Other allegations of arms deliveries to Goma implicate South African, Israeli, Albanian, 
and Chinese officials. The wife of Habyarimana, Agathe Kanziga and her brother, 
Séraphim Rwabukumba, for example, allegedly purchased $5 million worth of rifles and 
grenade launchers while on a trip to China in October 1994.29 The French Government 
was also deeply implicated in supporting the FAR.3° In addition to the well documented 
military assistance given to Rwanda before and during the genocide,31 troops deployed 
for Opération turquoise facilitated the protection and retreat of the army and interim 
government from the `safe humanitarian zone' in the southwest of Rwanda. French 
Lieutenant- Colonel Jean- Claude Perruchot acknowledged that the Rwandan interim 
President, Théodore Sindikubwabo and three of his ministers were present in the safe 
zone 32 The French Government issued contradictory statements about its intentions to 
arrest those responsible for genocide, but ultimately French authorities deemed this 
29 
`Bears Guard Honey', Africa Confidential, No. 288 (20 February 1995) as cited in Rwanda/Zaire. 
Rearming with Impunity, p. 15. 
30 Some of the accusations levied at the French Government by Human Rights Watch Arms Project, 
however, seem to have a tenuous factual base. Claims made of French involvement in arms deliveries 
to Goma and in training the ex -FAR at French military bases in the Central African Republic were 
investigated by renowned Libération journalist Stephen Smith who challenged the evidence on which 
the allegations were based. (`Livraisons d'armes au Rwanda: retour sur un rapport contestable', 
Libération, 31 July 1995, p. 8). He found that the primary source of the information, Mr Jean -Claude 
Urbano, was inaccurately described as a French Government official. Urbano also denies making the 
statements attributed to him. Furthermore, Smith could find no evidence of Rwandan soldiers trained 
in French military bases in the Central African Republic. 
;1 See Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, pp. 100 -114, pp. 227 -311 and pp. 336 -345; Leave None to Tell the 
Story, pp. 116 -125 and 654 -668; and Jean- François Bayart and Gustave Massiah, `La France an 
Rwanda: Entretien', Les Temps Modernes 583 (July- August 1995): 217 -227. 
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beyond their mandate. `Our mandate does not authorize us to arrest them on our own 
authority. Such a task could undermine our neutrality, the best guarantee of our 
effectiveness', the French Foreign Ministry declared on 16 July.33 On 17 July the French 
military `initiated and organized' the evacuation of the interim government to Zaire?' 
Human Rights Watch documented reports of the French refuelling army trucks loaded 
with looted goods, and delivering ten tonnes of food to the army in Goma on 21 July.35 
The hard currency required to purchase weapons came from embassy and private bank 
accounts abroad in addition to the looted Rwandan banks and sale of stolen property. 
Pruner claims that Rwabukumba had control of bank accounts in Belgium containing 
approximately $50 million dollars.36 Delays by some foreign governments in recognising 
the new regime in Kigali also permitted the former government to continue to draw on 
embassy accounts for up to 10 months after the government's demise. In Kenya, 
Holland, Tanzania, Egypt and Zaire, diplomats of the former regime continued to 
occupy diplomatic property, and removed all assets before they left" The former regime 
also sought to recoup any funds remaining on Defence Ministry contracts which had not 
been fulfilled. A report of the Commission du Partimoine Finances et Accroissement 
des Ressources (Commission for Capital, Finance and Resource Growth) listed several 
million dollars worth of deposits and payments made for contracts that were never 
fulfilled. These included a deposit of $1 million with a company named OMI in Nairobi 
for which no delivery had been received, and half of a $4.6 million contract with a 
Monsieur Lemonier which was suspended due to the imposition of the arms embargo. A 
$4.5 million dollar contract with a private South African arms dealer was also 
unfulfilled, and $1.7 million was to be reimbursed from Captain Barril since Opération 
turquoise reportedly restricted Barril's ability to fulfil his training contract to the FAR.38 
32- 
`Rwandan Officials Escape to Safe Zone', International Herald Tribune, 16 -17 July 1994, p. 5. 
33 Assemblée Nationale, Mission d'information commune, Enquête sur la tragédie rwandaise (1990- 
1994), Tome I, Rapport, p. 325 as cited in Leave None to Tell the Story, p- 686. 
n Patrick de Saint -Exupéry, `Rwanda: les `trous noirs' d'une enquête', Le Figaro, 17 December 1998, 
as cited in Leave None to Tell the Story, p. 687. 
35 Leave None to Tell the Story, p. 688. Also see Adelman and Suhrke, `Early Warning and Conflict 
Management,' pp. 54 -57 for a discussion of the ambiguous nature of Opération turquoise. 
36 Peer, personal communication, 5 May 1999. 
37 Reed, Refugees and Rebels, p. 7 and Rwanda/Zaire. Rearming with Impunity, p. 4. 
38 Human Rights Watch also mentions Captain Paul Barril's contract with the Rwandan Ministry of 
Defence to conduct training at Bigogwe military camp in the northwest of Rwanda. See None Left to 
Tell the Story, p. 665 -668. Barril and his private security company, `Secrets, Inc.' is also discussed by 
Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, footnote 4, p. 128 and pp. 216 -219. 
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The report mentions that debts with regular arms suppliers had to be settled before new 
orders could be placed, and also emphasises the need to unblock funds still held in the 
Rwandan National Bank before the new Rwandan regime could claim them. Whether or 
not the government was successful in recovering any of these funds is unclear. 
The $30 -40 million dollars worth of Rwandan francs taken to Zaire was used to conduct 
a profitable smuggling operation between Kigali and Goma, where the exchange rates to 
the US dollar were 200 and 700 respectively.39 This prompted Kigali to issue new tender 
of the 500, 1000 and 5000 Rwandan Franc notes in January 1995 to invalidate this 
source of revenue for the former regime. The ex -FAR was also able to pay its soldiers in 
Zaire from this fund and to reward the loyalty of infiltrators and `partisans' inside 
Rwanda. The budget for a military operation into Rwanda, for instance, mentions the 
payment of daily allowances in Rwandan francs: 500 Frw per soldier; 500 Frw per 
guide; 2,500 Frw per partisan; and 10,000 Frw per `agent passeur' (smuggler or 
courrier).a9 The operation was aimed at `sowing maximum insecurity' in the western 
regions of Rwanda. Targets suggested in the plan included: bridges on principal roads; 
power lines; small units of RPA soldiers from which military equipment could be 
seized; lightly defended detention centres; political leaders and RPA personnel; 
populated communities (colonies de peuplement); and town water supplies in Gisenye, 
Ruhengeri and Kïbuye. Mention was also made of urban terrorism, and the document 
states that `for propaganda purposes, the accent should be put on influential persons 
such as business people, teachers and health personnel'. 
The cross -border raids into Rwanda, which commenced soon after the exodus to Zaire, 
served several purposes. First, the creation of a climate of insecurity in Rwanda helped 
to dissuade the refugees from returning home. The attacks added weight to the constant 
discourse of the military leaders that they would reinvade Rwanda and reclaim power by 
force. The specific targeting of returnees such as Dr Anatole Bucyend'ore, a Hutu 
regional medical officer who returned to Gisenye from Goma and was shot dead in 
February 1995, increased the reluctance of refugees to return.4t Second, the guerrilla 
attacks provoked harsh reprisals by the RPA against civilian populations suspected of 
39 Gérard Prunier, Rwanda: Update to End of March 1995 (UK: Writenet, May 1995), p. 3. 
4° Annex 2, `Plan Ops 1 Div' and Annex 3, `Plan . Ops 2 Div' of an unknown document (c.d). 
41 See Rwanda: Arming the Perpetrators of the Genocide, p. 5. 
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sympathising with Hutu rebels. These reprisals renewed fears in the Hutu population of 
arbitrary justice and victimisation, and damaged the image of the RPA and the Rwandan 
Government internationally. Third, the continuing costs associated with the destruction 
of property placed an additional burden on the Kigali government. The financial 
problems imposed by the looting of the country, and the Iong delays experienced by 
Kigali in accessing international sources of finance, were exacerbated by the further 
destruction caused by these acts of sabotage. Fourth, by showing that the war was not 
over between the RPA and the ex -FAR, the latter hoped to generate pressure on Kigali 
to negotiate with the former regime. And fifth, cattle looted and equipment seized in 
Rwanda helped to maintain the strength of the forces in Zaire. 
The target of guerrilla incursions during 1996 increasingly became genocide survivors 
and witnesses to the genocide, presumably to eliminate potential sources of testimony in 
national genocide trials which began later that year. The UN Human Rights Field 
Operation in Rwanda (HRFOR) reported that at least 98 cases of attack against genocide 
survivors or witnesses were reported between January and June 1996, 85 of which 
resulted in death.42 Evidence collected suggested that members of the ex -FAR 
perpetrated 90 of these 98 cases. Many of the victims' names allegedly appeared on 
death lists, indicating the organised nature of the killings. In one example, a group of 
40 -50 infiltrators from Idjwi Island in Lake Kivu attacked a small village in the south of 
Kibuye Préfecture on the night of 18 June 1996. Between 10 -12 genocide survivors and 
their relatives were killed.a3 
The guerrilla strategies and tactics employed in the raids into Rwanda constituted a 
major part of the training curriculum of the ex -FAR in Zaire. Being largely 
unaccustomed to fighting in this way, numerous courses were held for all echelons of 
the military. Training manuals covering subjects like leadership, the history of guerrilla 
warfare, Rwanda's military history, and propaganda were found among Bizimungu's 
papers. One course conducted in early 1996 for the police in Kibumba camp included 
sessions on: guerrilla - maquis; special operations and military tradition; clandestine life 
and survival techniques; individual and section tactics; ideology; raids, ambushes and 
42 Attacks on Genocide Survivors and Witnesses to the Genocide Update (Kigali: 
HRFOR/STRPT /20/2/5 July 1996/E, UN Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda, 5 July 1996), p. 
1. 
a ibid., p. 3. 
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infiltration; and orientation, map reading and communication. In a letter on official 
Rwandan Defence Ministry letterhead from Colonel Tharcisse Renzaho to the FAR 
command, Renzaho discussed the organisation of a military course to be held at Katale 
and Mugunga refugee camps (Appendix 3). He requested that 200 exercise books be 
made available, and food and accommodation at Bulengo between 22 and 30 October 
1995. He also requested use of a minibus to facilitate travel. 
More important than technical training, however, was the promulgation of propaganda 
designed to ensure the continued loyalty of soldiers and the general population to the 
extremist agenda. The importance of adhering to a common discourse was clearly 
expressed by the Commission for Information and Documentation in the meeting of the 
High Command in September 1994, and plans were made to reinstate Radio Rwanda 
and Radio -télévision libre des mille collines (RTLM), and to establish a printing house 
to `facilitate the birth of favourable newspapers in the region'." The propaganda 
produced by the military and former government was shrewdly adapted to specific 
audiences and events, yet constantly reiterated a central theme: that the Hutu were the 
victims of the Rwandan crisis. This victim discourse subscribed to the following logic. 
The Hutu have always been oppressed by the Tutsi, but suffered increased atrocities at 
the hands of the Tutsi since the RPF invasion of 1 October 1990. The Hutu are 
demonised by the propaganda of the RPF and the partiality of the UN, international 
media, and certain states, which falsely claim that they perpetrated a genocide against 
the Tutsi. As the majority, the Hutu should be in power, but the RPF refuses to negotiate 
with the Hutu, wanting to retain complete power in Rwanda. The insecurity in Rwanda 
and the reluctance of the refugees to return is evidence of the brutal oppression and lack 
of legitimacy of the new government. The political stalemate leaves the former 
government, army and the refugees with no other option than to return to Rwanda by 
force. 
A document titled `Our Liberation Struggle' provides a good illustration of the `victim 
discourse' and the denial of culpability by the former army: 
All Hutu people, whether in the interior or in exile, are demonised. They are 
held globally responsible for the misfortune which they did not cause or 
provoke in the least. `The genocide' has become a commercial fund for the 
" `Rapport de la Réunion', p. 24. 
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RPF which uses it as a pretext for refusing dialogue between Rwandans aimed 
at definitively resolving the ethnic conflict which has ravaged Rwanda since 01 
October 1990 as 
Claims of genocide against the Hutu were an important component of this `victim' 
discourse. In a letter to the Zairean Ministry of Defence, Gratien Kabiligi, second in 
command of the ex -FAR, claimed that the killings perpetrated by the RPA in Rwanda 
constituted proof of the continuing genocide of the Hutu by the Tutsi. 
The hypothesis according to which the RPF kill the Hutu `in revenge' is simply 
unacceptable by the principles of human rights, and fallacious since this 
extremist Tutsi organisation has selectively massacred Hutu since October 
1990... The massacre of these Hutu constitutes one of the elements (among 
others) which shows that the Tutsi army aimed and planned the reduction, or 
even methodical elimination of Hutu populations in the region, and that it is, as 
a consequence, responsible for the genocide 46 
The propaganda was generally based on actual events or issues discussed in the media, 
with the interpretation manipulated to fit the extremist agenda. Widespread criticism of 
the failure of the UN forces to stop the genocide in Rwanda, for example, was repeated 
in the camp literature, but with the emphasis changed to the failure of UNAMIR to halt 
the RPF invasion. Events like the massacre of internally displaced Hutu at Kibeho in 
April 1995 fed into the existing propaganda of Tutsi repression of the Hutu, and the 
failure of the UN troops present to stop the massacre again `proved' the partiality of the 
UN force. Accusations of UN partiality were not restricted to internal consumption; 
Augustin Bizimungu also blamed the international community for the former 
government's defeat in an interview with the French newspaper Le Figaro.47 By 
adhering closely to real events reported by human rights organisations and the 
international media, the leadership in Zaire appeared reliable and justified in their calls 
for the Rwandan population to remain `in exile'. New recruits were also encouraged by 
slogans exaggerating many of the real problems of justice in Rwanda such as: 
A Hutu kills a Tutsi = Genocide! We hang him 
A Tutsi kills some Hutu = Legitimate Defence Reflex's 
45 `Notre Lutte de Libération', Annex 6 of unknown document (n.p.: mimeo n d) p 1 (c.d). 
aó Letter from Gratien Kabiligi to the Defence Minister of Zaire, `Memorandum Relatif au Drame 
Rwandais' (Goma, 25 June 1995), p. 5 (c.d). 
47 Patrick de Saint -Exupéry, `Jamais nous ne baisserons les bras', Le Figaro, 28 July 1994, p. 2. 
68 `Le FPR Se Confirme Comme un Front Tribaliste Anti -Hutu' (n.p.: mimeo, n.d.), p. 3 (c.d). 
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In denying the genocide and blaming the RPF for violating the peace agreement by 
invading Rwanda, the former government and military sought to justify a return to the 
power -sharing agreements made under the Arusha Accords. The Commission of Politics 
and Exterior Relations considered that: 
the path of negotiations is the least costly, the most simple and the fastest way 
to facilitate the return of the Rwandan population to their country and that it is 
necessary, by consequence, to encourage all initiatives to support direct 
negotiations between the RPF and the government -in- exile. The base of 
negotiations should be the Arusha Peace Accords. The Commission thinks that 
all possible means should be used to apply pressure on the RPF to accept to 
negotiate (interior sabotage, the media, the deployment of emissaries to foreign 
countries, etc).49 
Thus the Commission recommended that the military remain subordinate to the former 
government's authority since it was a party to the Arusha Accords and, `in spite of 
everything, remained credible and popular with the population'.50 However, the military 
expressed serious misgivings about the loss of the government's international legitimacy 
and absence of official recognition as the `government -in- exile', and recommended that 
the military form a politico -military structure of its own in case the government -in -exile 
proved a failure. By early 1995, this premonition threatened to become a reality as 
Kigali refused categorically to engage in dialogue with the former regime. This refusal 
helped the propaganda cause, `justifying' the call for a return to Rwanda by force, 
which, as mentioned above, kept the military mobilised and the refugees in constant fear 
of returning. But on the political front, the deadlock necessitated a new strategy and the 
establishment of a more `legitimate' negotiating partner for the RPF. In April 1995 Le 
Rassemblement pour le Retour et la Démocratie au Rwanda (Rally for the Return and 
Democracy in Rwanda - RDR) was formed, the legitimacy for which derived, as the 
name suggests, from the refugees. Having failed to regain international support, the 
military sought to dissociate itself from the tarnished image of the former government 
and looked to the most important resource the defeated regime had at its disposal - the 
population. The limits of the military sanctuary provided by Zaire were reached; it was 
44 
`Rapport de la Reunion', p. 9. The UN Secretary- General's report of 18 November 1994 
(S/1994/1308, p. 4) noted that some of the demands made by the political and military leaders in 
discussions with UNAMIR included negotiations with the new Government; involvement of the UN 
in facilitating negotiations with the new Government; revival of acceptable elements of the Arusha 
Accords; power -sharing; the establishment of an international tribunal to address massacres 
committed since 1990; and the organisation of early elections, and guarantees of security and the 
return of property in Rwanda. 
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in the humanitarian domain that the conditions necessary to mount a return to Rwanda 
were sought. The Military High Command issued a declaration published in Kangura in 
May, stating that the relationship between the FAR and the government -in -exile ceased 
on 29 April 1995,51 and threw its weight behind the RDR. 
In summary, during two and a half years in Zaire the defeated government and military 
pursued parallel strategies on the diplomatic and military front to regain power in 
Rwanda. The compliance of Zairean authorities permitted the rearming and training of 
the ex -FAR, and the pursuit of a policy to destabilise Rwanda through conducting cross - 
border guerrilla attacks. But while there were several indications that the military 
became increasingly organised in Zaire between 1994 and 1996,== it is unlikely that the 
ex -FAR had the capacity to realise its numerous threats of a full -scale invasion of 
Rwanda. Evidence of the ex -FAR's military inferiority via -à -vis the RPA was provided 
in late 1996 when they were chased from the refugee camps and military bases in 
eastern Zaire by the Alliance forces. Their organisation on paper and in the minds of 
international observers was not matched by realities on the ground. But the perception of 
an imminent invasion sowed fear in the minds of the refugees and aimed to complement 
diplomatic attempts to bring Kigali to the negotiating table. Pruner suggests, 
furthermore, that the new Rwandan Government also exaggerated the level of military 
preparedness of the ex -FAR in order to Iegitimise its future actions against the camps by 
convincing international public opinion that the ex -FAR constituted a formidable 
threat." Rather than a military solution, the ex -FAR and former government depended 
upon a diplomatic solution, based primarily on the return of the two million refugees 
under their control. It was the Rwandan population and the humanitarian aid they 
attracted that constituted the most important resource at the hands of the former regime. 
5° Rapport de la Réunion', p. 5. 
51 `Déclaration du Haut Commandement des FAR réuni à Bukavu les 28 et 29 avril 1995', Kangura, 
No. 70, May 1995, pp. 8 -9 as summarised in ABSL Dialogue, Revue de la Presse Rwandaise. 
52 In addition to suggestions contained in the ex -FAR's own documents, international observers noticed 
a greater professionalism by the military. In an internal memo dated 12 July 1996, the Head of sub - 
office of UNHCR in Goma, Joel Boutroue, remarked that the activities of the ex -FAR had become 
less numerous but were of better quality: more targeted and focused, and more destabilising. He also 
noted that improvement in military organisation had led to a decreased number of soldiers in the 
refugee camps. Memo from J. Boutroue to A. Akodjenou, `Re: E -mail from J.van Drunen of 12 July', 
12 July 1996 . 
ss Prunier, personal communication, 5 May 1999. 
Chapter 5 The Rwandan Refugee Camps in Zaire 214 
2. ZAIRE AS A HUMANITARIAN SANCTUARY 
As indicated earlier, medía images, first of genocide, and later of hundreds of thousands 
of people streaming across Rwanda's borders, were beamed into lounge -rooms across 
the globe. While hand -wringing and denial were the hallmarks of the international 
response to the genocide, the massive population exodus and Iooming public health 
catastrophe galvanised the major powers into action. But the action was of a 
humanitarian rather than political nature, and in spite of widespread knowledge of the 
composition of the population flow, the focus for the next two years remained on the 
provision of humanitarian assistance. Echoes and warnings from the past were to no 
avail. Within days of the exodus, Prunier predicted that if the former leaders retained 
their power in the camps they would divert aid supplies, deter the refugees from 
returning, and conduct military operations into Rwanda, thereby sprouting `the roots of 
the next crisis' S' Destexhe cautioned that `in no circumstances should the humanitarian 
agencies use the former administration of Rwanda to help them channel distributions of 
aid'.55 The warnings went unheeded: ignorance could not be blamed for the predicament 
that ensued. 
This section begins with a brief discussion of the population exodus into Zaire and the 
nature of the international response to this outflow. It then examines the diverse 
strategies employed by the former regime to control the refugee population, and the 
regime's attempts to gain legitimacy by `representing' the refugees. The protection and 
revenue that the camp structures provided to the génocidaires and army are then 
discussed. 
2.1 The Population Exodus and International Response 
The exodus of two million Rwandans to neighbouring territories was not, for the most 
part, a spontaneous flight propelled by fear as in most refugee contexts, but was a 
deliberately orchestrated evacuation of the population incited by the Rwandan state 
apparatus. As the RPF advanced throughout the country, whole villages and communes 
were ordered on to the roads to escape the atrocities that years of cyclic violence and 
54 Gérard Prunier, `Rwanda: La Crise Rwandaise: structures et deroulement' (UK: Writenet, July 1994), 
also reprinted in Refugee Survey Quarterly 13, Nos. 2 and 3 (1994): 13 -46 cited in Refugee Camp 
Security in the Great Lakes Region, pp. 19 -20. 
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propaganda had taught them to expect. The instigators of the genocide had sought to 
inculpate the entire Hutu population in the killing; leaving few with clean hands 
minimised the risk of finger pointing and accusations once the extermination was 
complete. Thus hundreds of thousands participated in the massacres, tens of thousands 
due to hatred, or for financial gain, and the rest reluctantly, from fear, or because they 
were ordered to do so. The entrenched system of bureaucracy and administrative 
hierarchies were used with devastating effect to command those accustomed to being 
mobilised by the political system into action `for the common good'. The army, national 
police and all levels of government administration ordered the people to `work' and 
distributed weapons which they referred to as `tools'. When the same system ordered the 
population to flee, hundreds of thousands of them obeyed. 
The first massive exodus occurred into the Ngara district of Tanzania in late April 1994 
when approximately 170,000 Rwandans crossed in one 24 -hour period. Thousands more 
crossed in the ensuing months and were settled in several camps, the largest of which 
was Benaco. The main exodus into Zaire was even more rapid; between 500,000 and 
800,000 Rwandans crossed into North Kivu between 14 and 17 July 1994 i6 The scale of 
the influx overwhelmed the capacity of aid organisations to respond adequately, and the 
lack of sanitation facilities and presence of large polluted water sources provoked an 
epidemic of cholera and dysentery. The epidemics killed at least 50,000 refugees in the 
month after their arrival, constituting between 6 and 10 percent of the total populations 
The public health disaster provided UN member states with the perfect ingredients to 
elicit a large -scale response by the `international community': a dramatic, well 
publicised show of human suffering in which the enemy was a virus and the saviour was 
humanitarian aid. Paralysed during the political crisis, military forces were suddenly 
mobilised for the `humanitarian' disaster, transforming the genocide into a `complex 
emergency' in which there was no good or bad side, only victims. The US Government, 
which warned its officials to avoid using the word genocide due to the moral obligations 
ss Destexhe, `Hurry to Prevent a Cambodian Epilogue'. 
56 Initial population estimates were as high as 1.2 million, but by early August cluster -sample surveys, 
mapping exercises and aerial photographs suggested lower numbers. Goma Epidemiological Group, 
`Public health impact of Rwandan refugee crisis: what happened in Goma, Zaire, in July, 1994 ?', The 
Lancet 345 (February 1995): 339 -344 at p. 340. 
Goma Epidemiological Group, `Public health impact of Rwandan refugee crisis', p. 342. 
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the term invokes," did nothing to halt the bloodshed in Rwanda but deployed a 3,000 
strong military force to Goma to fight the ravages of cholera. 'The United States is 
determined to lead a worldwide humanitarian response, working with the United 
Nations to mobilize the international community', declared the head of the US Agency 
for International Development (USAID), Brian Atwood.59 'The U.S. government 
response so far has been massive, aggressive, and immediate as possible ...ours is the 
only response that could have handled this problem.'60 A more modest contribution from 
the US three months earlier could have saved hundreds of thousands of lives.ó1 
Characterising the genocide and its aftermath as 'chaos', the obvious remedy was 
'humanitarian assistance' and 'stability'. Atwood asserted that `the United Nations must 
be on the front lines in the war against chaos... the desperate people in Goma, make no 
mistake about it, are the victims of this chaos ...we simply can not let the cancer of 
chaos spread.'62 Thus he called upon the international community to join the US as 'it 
develops the machinery for effective crisis prevention'. Adding insult to injury, Atwood 
called upon the new Rwandan Government to 'embrace the call for meaningful power - 







The State Department and the National Security Council issued instructions to Administration 
spokespersons to say that `acts of genocide have occurred'. The New York Times reported: `American 
officials say that so stark a label [as genocide] could inflame public calls for action the Administration 
is unwilling to take... without oil or other resources as a rationale, the case for intervention would 
have to be based on whether ending the killing is worth the cost in American lives and dollars'. 
Douglas Jehl, `Officials Told to Avoid Calling Rwanda Killings "Genocide -, New York Times, 10 
June 1994, p. A8. Secretary of State Warren Christopher defined responsibility for stopping the 
genocide in strictly legal terms: `The international community as a whole has a general obligation to 
do what they can to avoid genocide, but it does not impose on the United States or any other country a 
specific obligation to go into that country and to prevent the genocide, either by the use of force, or 
otherwise.' Elaine Sciolino, `Secretary Reframes U.S. Obligation in Rwanda', International Herald 
Tribune, 23/24 July 1994, p. 4. 
J. Brian Atwood, `Relief Immediately, Then Crisis Prevention Quickly', International Herald 
Tribune, 25 July 1994, p. 4. 
J. Brian Atwood, prepared statement for the `Crisis in Central Africa' Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee of Foreign Relations, US Senate, 26 July 1994, p. 
9 and 10. 
The former Force Commander of UNAMIR, General Romeo Dallaire, considered that a total force of 
5,000 troops and a peace enforcement mandate could have prevented most of the killing in Rwanda. 
UNAMIR's mandate extended to 2,500 troops, thus only necessitating an additional 2,500. See Scott 
R. Feil, Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda (New 
York: Carnegie Commission on Deadly Conflict, 1998). 
Atwood, 'Relief Immediately'. 
ibid Gérard Prunier suggested that the West's insistence on `broadening the government's base' and 
`political reconciliation' so soon after the genocide was tantamount to having expected Chancellor 
Konrad Adenauer to include former Nazis in the first post -war Bundesrepublik cabinet. Rwanda: 
Update to end of March 1995, p. 5. 
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offering scant resources to the government to undertake these noble tasks 64 Moreover, 
the US military foray into Goma, Operation Support Hope, was established as a strictly 
humanitarian operation with no peacekeeping role and was not, therefore, imbued with 
the mandate to arrest the war criminals that Atwood insisted must receive a fair trial. 
While claiming to be developing machinery to prevent crises, the military forces on the 
ground permitted war criminals and an entire army to mingle with the refugees and set 
up camp in Zaire. The military logistics helped establish a humanitarian sanctuary in 
which the war criminals and army received protection, sustenance, legitimácy, and 
continued to control the population which they had shepherded into Zaire for that 
purpose. 
It is important to state that the refugee camp inhabitants were a mixture of bona fide 
refugees, Rwandans who had been ordered to flee, and people evading revenge or 
prosecution for crimes they committed during the genocide. The latter group should 
have been excluded from refugee status under international conventions that are 
discussed further below, but in the absence of mechanisms with which to remove 
suspected war criminals, they resided in the camps and benefited from the international 
rights accorded to refugees. Some authors, notably Alex de Waal, refer to the refugees 
as Externally Displaced Persons to reflect the illegitimacy of refugee status for such 
individuals .° However, such a term denies the existence of real refugees among the 
population which fled, and infers that they did not warrant international protection. 
Generalisations, like that of de Waal, abound in the literature in support of arguments to 
either assist or abandon the camp population. The fact that half the camp inhabitants 
were women and children and thus `innocent' was frequently invoked, yet gender does 
not preclude participation in genocide. The notion that the refugees were `hostages' of 
ca The US Government was slow to recognise the new Rwandan Government and was influential in 
stalling earmarked funds from the World Bank, which insisted that the Rwandan Government repay 
$10 million in arrears in order to unblock the $250 million allocation. When the US did allocate funds 
to Rwanda, it was significantly less than for the neighbouring refugee camps: $231.9 million in 
humanitarian assistance for the regional Rwandan crisis compared with $73.3 million to Rwanda in 
fiscal year 1994; $242.4 million compared with $46.2 million in 1995; and $177.9 million compared 
to $13.2 million in 1996. Chronology of US Government (USG) Humanitarian Assistance to Rwanda 
and Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DROC) (since April 6, 1994) (Washington: 
USAIDBureau for Humanitarian Response (BHR) Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance 
(OFDA), 1997), pp. 10, 13 and 17. 
Alex de Waal, Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa (Oxford and 
Bloomington: Africa Rights & the International African Institute in association with James Currey 
and Indiana University Press, 1997), p. 204. 
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the former regime was also regularly espoused, yet this denied individual agency and 
responsibility of the refugees themselves for the status quo. While generalisations are 
often necessary, it is important to bear in mind that the camp inhabitants were not a 
homogeneous population, and that many fled Rwanda owing to a well -founded fear of 
persecution. This fact, in particular, was concealed and remains overlooked, for reasons 
of political expediency. Thus a brief digression here is warranted to illustrate the 
justified fear of returning that many refugees harboured. 
Evidence that the RPF committed atrocities during their march on Kigali surfaced in 
August 1994 during an inquiry into conditions for repatriation commissioned by 
UNHCR. The investigating team, headed by a highly experienced and respected US 
Government consultant, Robert Gersony, found that the RPF had killed between 25,000 
and 45,000 persons between April and late August 1994. But UN Secretary- General 
Boutros Boutros -Ghali suppressed the Gersony Report following US pressure to do so, 
and Gersony's findings were either discredited as having a weak factual base,óó or were 
said to `not exist'67 although officials of UNHCR had already presented them to 
members of the Rwandan Government." A combination of guilt at the Iack of 
international initiatives to halt the genocide, political expediency to see the refugees 
return, and a desire to delineate clearly a `good side' from a `bad side' made 
international observers reluctant to raise issues of human rights abuses by members of 
the new regime. Gérard Prunier, testifying at the Belgian Senate Inquiry into the 
genocide, had the courage to revisit his earlier scepticism about Gersony's findings,ó9 
66 A spokesperson for the UN Rwanda Emergency Office said that the report gave no physical or 
forensic evidence of its claims: `These are sensitive allegations made without proof . Two UN 
Agencies At Odds on Report Of Rwanda Killing', International Herald Tribune, 26 September 1994, 
p. 4. See also John Borton, Emery Brusset and Alistair Hallam, `Humanitarian Aid and Effects', 
Study 3 in David Millwood (ed.), The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons 
from the Rwanda Experience (Copenhagen: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of 
Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996), endnote 49, p. 49. 
67 A letter from UNHCR Branch office in Kigali to the Representative of the Special Rapporteur for 
Rwanda states that the Gersony Report `does not exist'. A copy of the letter is included in Leave None 
to Tell the Story, p. 726. According to sources close to the investigation, the discussion of the 
Gersony Report in Leave None to Tell the Story (pp. 726 -735) is the most accurate and authorative 
that is available. 
68 Senior UNHCR official, personal interview, March 1998. The Gersony Report is allegedly in the safe 
of Sadako Ogata, the High Commissioner for Refugees. 
a In The Rwanda Crisis, pp. 323 -324, Prunier cast doubt on the credibility of the contents of the 
Gersony Report, suggesting that the killing of 250 -300 persons per day without attracting attention 
would have been very difficult. He suggested that the Gersony Report `tended to obscure rather than 
clarify the problem'. 
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saying fe crois aujourd'hui que ce chiffre est une sous-estimation' .7° He admitted that at 
the time of Gersony's inquiry, he considered the results to be an over- estimate because 
he did not want to believe that the people to whom he felt ideologically close could 
commit massacres. However, after conducting interviews of his own, he reached a 
similar conclusion to that of Gersony" Although incommensurate with the systematic 
and indiscriminate killings carried out by the former Rwandan regime, the exactions 
committed by members of the RPF gave Rwandans a genuine reason to flee, hence 
contradicting the generalised notion that all the camp inhabitants were brainwashed 
`hostages' of the deposed government forces. 
2.2 Population Control and the Quest for Legitimacy 
The number of Rwandans who fled to neighbouring countries entirely of their own 
volition was nevertheless a minority. The evacuation of the population was a calculated 
military strategy aimed at undermining the credibility of the new Rwandan Government 
and providing the ousted regime with a strong asset with which to claim legitimacy and 
attract international sympathy. A member of the foreign ministry in the former 
government said, `even if they [the RPF] have won a military victory they will not have 
the power. We have the population. They only have the bullets'.72 
Retaining the population in exile became imperative to the prospects of the former 
regime, and the military was directed to `continue to play their role of avant -guard in all 
initiatives aimed at a return to Rwanda, to warn of any uncoordinated returns and, above 
all, to discourage them by creating a climate of insecurity in Rwanda.'7i The leadership 
adopted a multi- faceted approach to dissuade refugee repatriation, combining 
intimidation, violence and propaganda with the creation of control mechanisms at every 





`I believe today that this number is an under -estimate'. Commission d'enquête parlementaire 
concernant les événements du Rwanda (Brussels: Compte Rendu Analytique des Auditions, Senat de 
Belgique, 11 June 1997), p. 717. 
ibid. Also see Témoignages de Nouveaux Réfugiés sur les Violations des Droits de l'Homme 
Perpétrées par le FPR (Bukavu: Ligue des Réfugiés Rwandais Pour Ies Droits de l'Homme 
(LIRDHO), December 1994) for testimonies of refugees who fled Rwanda after October 1994. 
Jean Bosco Barayagwiza, former director of political affairs in the foreign ministry, as quoted in 
Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance, p. 1094. 
`Rapport de la Réunion', p. 12. 
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for the former diminished, significantly aided by events in Rwanda which also militated 
against enthusiasm among the refugees for a return home. 
During the first few months, violence was rife in the refugee camps in Zaire and was the 
primary tool used to control the refugee population. A retrospective survey undertaken 
in one camp suggested that 4,000 refugees died as a result of violence perpetrated by the 
militia, undisciplined Zairean soldiers and other refugees7ó Individuals or families who 
expressed the desire or tried to return to Rwanda were accused of sympathising with `the 
enemy' and threatened or killed. Others were beaten along the road to Rwanda and told 
that the beating saved their lives as, according to an anonymous pamphlet which 
circulated in Mugunga camp, `of all those made to return by UNHCR, not one has 
survived' .75 Rumours of infiltrators in the camp generated an atmosphere of fear and 
violence, and resulted in the death of hundreds of refugees suspected of being `RPF 
agents', often without any provocation. Allegations of poisoning were particularly 
prevalent, and food vendors often came under attack, if something was awry or if a 
client became ill. Names of `bandits' and enemy networks appeared on lists in the 
camps together with the locations of the blindés (refugee shelters) in which they lived. 
Security conditions for the staff of international aid agencies were also precarious and 
attempts to direct aid to the most vulnerable refugees rather than the most powerful 
provoked threats and intimidation against local and international staff. An observer 
returning from Goma in late 1994 predicted that it was `only a matter of time before one 
or more international relief workers are assassinated in the Goma camps' .76 The 
Canadian branch of CARE decided to withdraw from Goma after a serious incident in 
Katale refugee camp. CARE had established a separate security structure to that run by 
the political and military leadership, and had hired a Rwandan `Scout' organisation to 
help control access to the camp and direct traffic. In September, a group of militia 
blamed the death of a bandit in the camp on the Scouts, and went searching for them and 
issued death threats to several CARE staff members. The international staff evacuated 
74 John Eriksson, `Synthesis Report' in David Millwood (ed.), The International Response to Conflict 
and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience (Copenhagen: Steering Committee of the Joint 
Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996), p. 29. 
75 Cited in Rwanda and Burundi. The Return Home: Rumours and Realities (London: AFR 02/01/96, 
Amnesty International, 1996), p. 36. 
76 Jeff Drumtra, Site Visit to Rwanda, Zaire, and Burundi (Washington: US Committee for Refugees, 20 
October to 17 November 1994), p. 15. 
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the camp but upon their return found that 35 of the Scouts had been murdered and 
replaced at the camp entrance by armed militia members.77 CARE Canada announced its 
withdrawal in October. 
By early 1995 several events contributed to the reduction in the level of conspicuous 
insecurity in the camps and the adoption of more subtle methods of population control. 
First, a contingent of 1,500 Zairean military personnel (Contingent zairois de securité 
dans les camps - CZSC) was deployed in the camps under an agreement with the UN. 
Unsuccessful attempts to solicit troops from UN member states (discussed below) had 
left few other options than accepting the Zairean Government's offer, and an aide - 
mémoire was signed on 27 January 1995. The force was tasked with improving public 
order in the camps; preventing intimidation and violence aimed at deterring the 
voluntary repatriation of refugees; protecting humanitarian facilities and personnel; and 
escorting refugee convoys to the Rwandan border. The first contingent, which was 
recruited from the Special Presidential Division of the Zairean armed forces, had some 
success in improving the conditions in the camps, but the second contingent engaged in 
exploitative activities, `extorting money, levying taxes on refugees illegally carrying on 
economic activities, and allegedly using refugees for sex or for prostitution'," Thus 
although the soldiers contributed to the reduction in overall levels of insecurity, other 
problems surfaced, and the CZSC never managed to fulfil one of its principal objectives, 
the prevention of intimidation against refugees opting for repatriation.79 
The second and more important reason for the decline in violence was due to the 
leadership's need for international recognition and sympathy once a return to Rwanda by 
force became increasingly unlikely. The threatened withdrawal of 15 NGOs from the 
camps in Goma unless security improved coincided in November 1994 with the 
reorganisation of the former government and army, and a review of their strategy of 
return to Rwanda. It was strongly in the interests of the former regime to quell the 
violence in the camps, to avoid jeopardising the presence of the aid organisations and 
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government organisations (NGOs) would have further reduced international sympathy 
for the refugees, and compromised the efforts of the former regime to improve their 
international image in the hope of opening dialogue with Kigali. 
The third reason for the reduction in overt violence was the consolidation of more subtle 
forms of control in the camps. The placement of loyal supporters in strategic 
administrative posts, and the revival of the propaganda machine - much of the material 
for which was based on real events in Rwanda - superseded the role of direct violence 
and intimidation in controlling the refugees. Within a few months of their formation, the 
organisational structures of the camps served to retain almost complete control over the 
refugee population. Several observers have remarked that the same administrative 
structures that existed in Rwanda were re- created in the Rwandan camps in Tanzania 
and Zaire: préfectures, communes, secteurs and cellules.80 But in many camps, in fact, 
there were several organisational structures superimposed on one another to monitor and 
control even more assiduously the activities of the refugees. 
The 'cellule to préfecture' system was retained as one level of administrative 
organisation, even though the refugees in the Zairean camps were more scattered than in 
Tanzania, where communes of origin had been geographically maintained. Only in 
Kahindo camp in Zaire were the refugees physically grouped according to their regions 
and villages of origin.81 A semblance of democracy was introduced in the camps in 
1994, with Ieaders at the commune level elected by the refugees. International 
organisations were invited to attend the election to `verify' the democratic nature of the 
vote, although the process by which candidates were nominated was not clear. Speeches 
generally ensued and refugees formed a line behind the candidate of choice. The elected 
commune representatives then elected a préfet (although they dropped these political 
titles in favour of `representative'). 
Following the reorganisation of the former government and military in September 1994, 
another level of authority was imposed upon the refugee camps. One of the 
recommendations made at the meeting of the High Command was that `the government 
must make every effort to supervise this population, especially as the refugees have 
80 See, for example, Rwanda and Burundi. The Return Home, p. 32; Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, pp. 
313 -314; and Horton et al., `Humanitarian Aid and Effects', pp. 96 -97. 
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elected their leaders at the camp level'.0 Hence, in early November, members of the 
newly formed political commissions, mentioned in the previous section, were placed in 
the camps. In Goma, the Social Commission of Rwandan refugees of North Kivu, which 
consisted of 15 members, established four main subcommissions: security; social; 
capital and finance; and communication and information. Four persons were appointed 
in each préfecture to represent these commissions, with the exception of `capital and 
finance' which was replaced at the camp level by a distribution commission. The four 
commission appointees elected one representative to sit on the Camp Council (conseil 
du camp), which was the liaison committee that met with UNHCR, the Zairean 
authorities and the NGOs. 
The Commission then replicated in the camps the type of `auto- defense' neighbourhood 
security system that had been so effective in locating and killing Tutsi during the 
genocide for `self- defence'. The camps were geographically delineated into quartiers, 
sous- quartiers and then into cells of 10 or so blindés. A security officer was elected in 
each cell by his neighbours; they then elected sous- quartier officials who in turn elected 
a head of each quartier. All chefs de quartier were represented on the Camp Council. 
UNHCR had geographical zones for distribution but these did not necessarily match 
those of the quartiers, effectively creating three levels of organisation. 
UNHCR refused to meet with the government -in -exile in Zaire specifically to avoid 
according legitimacy to these individuals as a negotiating partner of the UN. Meeting 
with other war criminals was sometimes unavoidable, however, if they held positions 
within the camps which entitled them to sit on the Camp Councils. The social 
commissions also contained extremists, the most notorious of whom, François Karera, 
was best known for his justification of the genocide because 'the Tutsi are originally 
bad'.n Living in Zaire with impunity, he oversaw many of the refugee camp functions 
such as presiding over the local elections in `Ruhengeri préfecture' in early December 
81 Report from EIeanor Bedford to MSF Amsterdam and Brussels, `Update weeks 6 -7 (January 15- 
February 1)' (Goma: mimeo, 7 February 1995), p. 2. 
82 `Rapport de la Réunion', p. 12. 
83 Jane Perlez, `A Hutu Justifies Genocide', International Herald Tribune, 16 August 1994, p. 1. 
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1994.84 He was the former préfet of Greater Kigali and number 43 on the Rwandan 
government's list of principal génocidaires, wanted for trial. 
Again following the proposals made in the meeting of the High Command, a final layer 
of control was placed over the refugee camp population. The meeting recommended 
that: 
The military leaders must ask Rwandan intellectuals to assist the politico - 
administrative authorities in raising awareness and supervising the refugees. 
They should be asked to take initiatives to create reflection groups on subjects 
of patriotism and the return to our country. Ask them to approach foreign 
organisations to make them understand our cause and to request their assistance 
for the population... The Rwandan intellectuals should seek employment in the 
international realm to get close to the foreigners.85 
Such `reflection groups' were established in most camps and served as an important 
medium through which to transmit the revised Rwandan history and messages of Hutu 
victimisation that were discussed in the previous section. Attended by refugees, these 
meetings were held regularly to discuss politics, security, developments in Rwanda, and 
constraints faced by the refugees in returning to Rwanda. In addition, the Social 
Commission urged the refugees to create a variety of associations in the camps 
including women's associations, associations of handicapped persons, and intellectual 
associations. A Rwandan NGO collective was also formed. Although predominantly 
espousing aims of reconciliation and dialogue with organisations in Rwanda, the extent 
to which these associations could claim any real independence or autonomy from the 
ubiquitous control of the political and military leadership is questionable. 
The formation of the aforementioned organisation, RDR, was also an attempt to gain 
increased legitimacy for the Rwandan leaders through claiming to represent the refugee 
population. Evidence suggests that the RDR was formed as an alternative to the 
government -in- exile, and was specifically led by people not directly associated with the 
genocide. The Director was François Nzabahimana who was the former Minister of 
Commerce, and the executive secretary was Innocent Butare who was out of the country 
when the genocide commenced. Espousing rhetoric of justice, tolerance, respect for 
human rights, and the end of ethnic cleavages, the RDR sought to open negotiations 
84 Report from Eleanor Bedford to MSF Amsterdam and Brussels, `Elections' (Goma: mimeo, 5 
February 1995), p. 2. 
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with Kigali as a precursor to the dignified repatriation of the refugees. The RDR was 
initially welcomed by the aid organisations in the camp, and received considerable 
kudos as an organisation until it was thought to have been undermined by extremists.8ó 
The heavily edited manifestoes of the RDR and its embryonic predecessor, the Front 
Democratique Rwandais (FUR), found in Bizimungu's files suggest, however, that 
extremists always ran it. In one version of the FDR statutes, presented in Appendix 4, 
Article 1 has been amended by hand from a `politico -military movement' to a 'socio- 
political organisation'. It is also interesting to note how the terminology of UNHCR has 
been adopted: to the first objective of the FDR, the organisation of refugee repatriation, 
has been added `in dignity and security to Rwanda'. 
Finally, as illustrated in the last section, the production and widespread distribution of 
propaganda in the camps contributed to maintaining psychological control over the 
refugee population. The extremist newspaper Kangura, responsible for espousing ethnic 
hatred before and during the genocide, continued to be produced under the editorship of 
indicted war criminal Hassan Ngeze, and distributed in the camps. Another extremist 
publication, Amizero, began in November 1994 and was published by the Association 
des Journalistes Rwandais en Exil (AJRE), with the former editor -in -chief of RTLM, 
Gaspard Gahigi, as editor. Articles in these publications often tried to reflect the 
concerns of the refugees. In Kangura in early 1995, Ngeze wrote: 
There are questions that everyone asks. When we will return? How will we 
return? Where are the preparations? No one is resolving these questions. To be 
able to return, the refugees must win 3 wars: a war of arms, of politics, and of 
information. Everyone must examine their conscience to determine their 
contribution. `What should I do to make our problem known to the 
international community', `Can I financially support a newspaper? Can I give 
a donation to buy arms? Can I analyse the current situation and propose 
solutions ?' It is regrettable that the intellectuals and former authorities are 
conspicuous by their lack of thought and their indifference. It is time for the 
refugees to collaborate, from the peasant to the businessman, from the military 
to the religious. The young and the old must be ready: the time to enter by force 
is close since the RPF have refused all negotiation.97 
se Joël Boutroue, UNHCR Team Leader, Goma, personal interview, 8 August 1997. Members of the 
media were not so naive, questioning the credibility of the RDR from the outset. See `You're saying 
we did it ?', Economist (3 -9 June 1995), p. 44. 
n Hassan Ngeze, `Editorial: Apprenons à parler et à poser des questions. Sachons découvrir la vérité et 
soyons clairvoyants', Kangura, No, 65, 1 January 1995, pp. 1 -2 as summarised in ABSL Dialogue, 
Revue de la presse Rwandaise (Italics in original). 
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Clandestine radio also periodically broadcast in the camps, and a variety of other forms 
of dissemination were used to spread messages aimed at dissuading the refugees from 
returning to Rwanda. Some of the clergy produced the most inflammatory literature, 
including a pamphlet which used passages from the Bible to justify genocide.88 
Thus the former politicians and military retained strong control over the refugees 
through the use of violence, coercion, authority, propaganda, and social networks. The 
need for open intimidation and violence to prevent the refugees returning to Rwanda 
lessened as a web of sub -committees, neighbourhood security units, and associations 
embracing almost all segments of society was cast over the camps. The growing 
insecurity in Rwanda, partly provoked by cross -border military raids, but also due to the 
rising power of hardliners within the Kigali regime, added weight to the discourse 
promulgated in the camps, and discouraged refugee returns. As the Special Envoy of 
UNHCR, Carol Faubert, said in an interview with Le Monde in July 1995: `The violence 
has disappeared in the camps, but it could recur. For the moment, three months after the 
Kibeho massacre, the camp extremists have no need to discourage the refugees from 
returning.'" The organisational structures of the refugee camps facilitated the 
mechanisms of control, but the paramount problem from which all other paradoxes of 
humanitarian assistance in the camps stemmed was the presence of the former army and 
government in the refugee camps. 
2.3 Protection 
The defeated government and their supporters benefited from two types of protection 
through seeking asylum in Zaire: legal protection through recognition as refugees, and 
physical protection since the RPA did not, for the most part, pursue them across the 
border. Legal protection was provided through the accordance of prima facie refugee 
status to all asylum seekers who fled Rwanda, under the provisions of Article 1.2 of the 
88 Report from Eleanor Bedford to MSF Amsterdam and Brussels, `March 6 -19' (Goma: mimeo, 27 
March 1995), p. 12. Even in a letter to the Pope dated August 1994 a group of priests in Goma 
justified the killings and claimed that `the number of Hutu civilians killed by the army of the RPF 
exceeds by far the Tutsi victims of the ethnic troubles'. See Death, Despair and Defiance, pp. 906- 
907. 
89 Jean Hélène, `Des organisations humanitaire reprochent aux autorités rwandaises de ne pas favoriser 
le retour des exilés', Le Monde, 30 -31 July, 1995, p. 4. 
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1969 OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. 
This convention grants status to: 
every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign 
domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the 
whole of his country of origin or nationality is compelled to leave. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, exclusions clauses contained in the 1951 and 1969 Refugee 
Conventions disqualify from refugee status persons suspected of committing inter alia 
war crimes and crimes against humanity, but the blanket bestowal of refugee status 
precludes individual status determination. Central to the protection tenet of international 
refugee law is the principle of non -refoulement, the guarantee that states will refrain 
from forcing refugees to return to their country of origin. Recognising that refugee status 
in the Rwandan case protected criminals, the Bujumbura Conference on Assistance to 
Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons in the Great Lakes Region noted that the 
principle of non -refoulement did not apply to those suspected of genocide. 
If it is determined that certain individuals do not deserve international refugee 
protection, in which case the principle of non -refoulement does not apply, such 
persons may be subjected to extradition procedures, under conditions of due 
process of law.9° 
But these legal prescriptions presupposed the capacity to identify individuals implicated 
in the genocide and, once they were identified, to facilitate their removal from the 
refugee camps and extradition to Rwanda or the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) in Arusha. Tanzania. The Exclusion Clause was applied to 20 
Rwandans once they were indicted by the ICTR in September 1996,91 but hundreds of 
thousands of others remained in Zaire benefiting from protection against prosecution 
rather than persecution.9t 
Under international law it is the host nation that is responsible for ensuring that the 
refugee camps had an `exclusively civilian and humanitarian character' .n As an ally of 
9° Plan of Action (Bujumbura: 1995BUJCONF.3, Regional Conference on Assistance to Refugees, 
Returnees and Displaced Persons in the Great Lakes Region. 12 -17 February 1995), Item 11. 
91 UNHCR Excludes 20 Indicted Rwandans (Geneva: Public Information Section, UNHCR, 24 
September 1996). 
92 The Synthesis report of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda suggested that 
between 10 -15 percent of the camp population was directly implicated in the mass killing, although 
no explanation of the basis for this calculation was provided. See Eriksson, 'Synthesis Report', p. 39. 
93 In accordance with EXCOM Conclusion 48 of 1987. 'No. 48 (XXXVIII) Military or Armed Attacks 
on Refugee Camps and Settlements' 1987 Executive Committee - 38`° Session in Conclusions on the 
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the former Rwandan regime, the Zairean Government was, on the one hand, reluctant to 
arrest war criminals or jeopardise the prospects of the regime's return to power in 
Rwanda. But on the other hand, Zaire was in need of the international prestige conferred 
upon states hosting refugees. Whether by design or by default, the Zairean authorities 
managed to weave a path through the conflicting loyalties, compromising one for 
another when necessary. Uncertainty about Zaire's reliability is reflected in several of 
the ex -FAR's military documents; a suspicion well founded in light of Zaire's return of 
military equipment to Rwanda in early 1996. From the UN perspective too, Zairean 
authorities proved to be an unpredictable negotiating partner. In the initial months of the 
relief operation, the Zairean Government indicated to the UN Department of Peace 
Keeping Operations (DPKO) its readiness to separate the military and former 
government officials from the rest of the refugees; to receive the political authorities in 
Kinshasa for movement to a third country; and to allocate sites away from the border to 
which the military could move?° None of these actions was ever realised, however, and 
the aide -mémoire signed for the CZSC deployment made no mention of separating or 
arresting the former government authorities. The Zairean Government also violated the 
principle of non -refoulement in August 1995, expelling some 14,000 Rwandans and 
2,000 Burundian refugees from Zaire. This move came in response to the UN Security 
Council's decision to lift the arms embargo on Rwanda.95 Invoking national security 
concerns, the Government of Zaire reminded the UN member states of the importance 
of Zairean hospitality towards the refugees.9ó 
In addition to the legal protection that the body of refugees obtained for those 
responsible for genocide, the presence of hundreds of thousands of refugees provided a 
human shield against attack until late 1996. The proximity of the refugee camps to 
International Protection of Refugees adopted by the Executive Committee of the UNHCR Programme 
(Geneva: UNHCR, 1991), pp. 109 -111 at p. 110. 
94 
`United Nations Mission on Security in the Rwandese Refugee Camps. Terms of Reference' (New 
York: Department of Peace Keeping Operations mimeo, 1 September 1994). 
95 See Boutros Boutros -Ghali, `Introduction', in The United Nations and Rwanda 1993 -1996 (New 
York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996), pp. 3 -111 at pp. 89 -90. 
96 The refoulement also reflected internal power politics between President Mobutu, who was in favour 
of hosting the refugees, and Prime Minister Kengo wa Dongo, who wanted the refugees to leave 
Zaire. Both sought to capitalise on the presence of the refugees in this traditionally anti- government 
region of Zaire; Mobutu through permitting the refugees, dependent upon his good will, to remain in 
the region, and wa Dongo, through promising the local inhabitants, resentful of the refugee presence, 
that the refugees must return to Rwanda. Wm. Cyrus Reed, Contested Government, State Decay, and 
Public Policy: The Role of Zaire in the Great Lakes Crisis, (Second Draft of a Paper presented to the 
International Studies Association Convention, Washington, D.C., February 1999). 
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Rwanda permitted the launching of cross border raids from the refugee camps, without 
provoking harsh reprisals for over two years. As illustrated in earlier chapters, the 
physical protective function of refugee camps is usually derived from the international 
condemnation that an attack on the refugee population would provoke. But in the case of 
the camps in Zaire, the stage was set during two years of shrewd analysis and careful 
planning by the Rwandan Government to minimise the diplomatic repercussions of the 
assault on, and destruction of, the camps. First, although RPA involvement in the 
offensive was widely assumed, the Rwandan Government consistently denied any 
involvement in the offensive against the camps until July 1997, thus attracting public 
denunciation only from one of Zaire's allies, Gabon.97 When Paul Kagame did admit 
Rwanda's role, he justified the action stating that the UN had failed to resolve the 
security threat the camps posed to Rwanda. `We told them clearly: Either you do 
something about the camps or you face the consequences'." Kagame had, in fact, issued 
repeated warnings of Rwanda's intention to attack this source of regional instability 
since March 1995,99 and it came as no surprise to most informed observers. 
Second and most importantly, the dismantling of the camps and the return of the 
refugees to Rwanda was the outcome that the UN and donor governments wanted but 
had failed to accomplish themselves. The US Government, in particular, had sanctioned 
a tougher approach to the refugee problem, stating at the Rwandan Roundtable meeting 
in June 1996 that 
while voluntary repatriation remains the preferred option of the U.S. 
government, the on- the -ground reality in the camps dictates that this option 
becomes less and less viable over time... It is time to look at other options to 
maintaining the current status of the refugee camps no matter how difficult it is 
to reconcile those options with refugee conventions.100 
s7 Peter Smerdon, `Rwandan links with Zaire rebels hard to disguise', Reuters, 22 November, 1996. 
98 John Pomfret, `Rwanda Admits It Led Drive to Topple Mobutu', International Herald Tribune, 10 
July 1997, p. 7. 
99 Kagame stated in March 1995 that his Government would pursue any criminals who attacked Rwanda 
by attacking the country in which they were found. See Question of the violation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in any part of the world, with particular reference to colonial and other 
dependent countries and territories (UN General Assembly Report A/51 /942, Human Rights 
Questions: Human Rights Situations and Reports of Special Rapporteurs and Representatives, July 
1997), pp. 17 -18. 
00 US Statement delivered by Richard McCall, Chief of Staff, USAID to the Rwandan Roundtable 
Conference, Geneva, 20 -21 June 1996, p. 4 and p. 6. 
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There is little doubt that individuals in the US Government approved of the offensive 
against the camps: Kagame even publicly commended the US for `taking the right 
decision to let it proceed':i01 The camps were expensive to maintain, were causes of 
regional destabilisation, and attempts to encourage the voluntary repatriation of the 
refugees had been largely unsuccessful over the past two years. The situation had 
reached an impasse because UN member states had failed to support initiatives aimed at 
breaking the hold of the political and military leaders over the refugees in the camps. 
Boutros -Ghali recognised in November 1994 that `the most effective way of ensuring 
the safety of the refugees and their freedom to return to Rwanda would be the separation 
of political leaders, former Rwandese government forces and militia from the rest of the 
refugee population'.m He proposed several options involving the deployment of UN 
troops to undertake tasks ranging from progressively establishing security in the camps 
for refugees and aid personnel, through to the separation of the military and political 
elements from the refugees under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Noting the difficulty 
of obtaining the necessary number of troops for UNAMIR in Rwanda, Boutros -Ghali 
recommended the less ambitious option which required fewer soldiers. But even this 
proposal proved unpopular with UN member states and only one country of the 60 
approached agreed to provide personnel. The opportunity to avert a deadlock in the 
crisis and work towards a resolution was relinquished. 
Thus in providing legal and physical protection to the former government and army for 
over two years, the Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire became a `legitimate' target of 
attack for the Rwandan army and allied Zairean rebels. States were unwilling to commit 
the necessary resources to Zaire to address problems impeding a resolution of the 
refugee crisis, and welcomed an initiative directed towards an outcome desired by the 
`international community'. The fact that Rwanda had warned of such an outcome for 18 
months, had gained US tacit approval, was discreet about its involvement, and directed 
the bulk of refugees back to Rwanda, averted international condemnation for the attack. 
The camps' protective functions had been short- lived, not only for those undeserving of 
such protection but also for the genuine refugees. The absence of international volition 
101 Pomfret, `Rwanda Admits it Led Drive'. 
102 Report of the UN Secretary- General on Security in the Rwandese Refugee Camps (S/1994/1308), p. 
1. 
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to assure `exclusively civilian and humanitarian character' of the refugee camps 
compromised the raison d'être of asylum: the protection of refugees. 
2.4 War Economy 
Diverse initiatives were employed by the political and military leadership in the 
Rwandan refugee camps to generate revenue for their activities in exile. Some income 
was directly derived from the humanitarian relief effort, through inflated population 
numbers, theft of aid supplies, and the taxation of local employees of humanitarian 
organisations. Other income was indirectly gained through the refugee camps from the 
body of consumers from which substantial profits could be made. Brothels, cinemas, 
bars, restaurants, health centres, import/export offices, money- changers, transport 
services and commercial shops of all description were established in the camps from the 
extensive haul of equipment, vehicles and capital taken from Rwanda. Many refugees 
also had assets at their disposal, having fled with household goods, money and other 
belongings. This was fed into the booming camp economy which was controlled by the 
camp leadership. 
The extent of the revenue directly sourced from the humanitarian relief program varied 
according to the camp and region. Inflated beneficiary numbers, for example, was a 
bigger problem in Bukavu and in the Tanzanian camps in Ngara, than in the refugee 
settlements around Goma. The first official registration of refugees in Ngara in July 
1994 produced a figure of 230,000, which was significantly lower than the 350,000 
names appearing on lists provided by the camp leadership.103 Hence for ten weeks 
humanitarian aid for 120,000 people was misappropriated by those in charge of the 
distribution process. In Bukavu, a refugee count undertaken in late February 1995 
reduced the beneficiary population from 350,000 to 300,000 refugees, indicating that aid 
for 50,000 refugees for six months had `disappeared'. In Goma, by contrast, the original 
planning figure of 1.2 million was revised to 850,000 by August 1994 on the basis of 
aerial surveys taken by the US and French military, and the number requiring food was 
1°3 Lessons Learnt from the Rwanda. Emergency (Geneva: EC /1995/SC.2/CRP.21, Sub -committee on 
Administrative and Financial Matters, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, 
7 June 1995), in Annex C of Lessons Learned from the Burundi and Rwanda Emergencies (Geneva: 
Eval/04 /96/Rev.1, Inspection and Evaluation Service, UNHCR, 1996), p. 7. 
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further reduced to 740,000 at the end of September.104 The census of late January 1995 
registered a total of 722,000 refugees, which, according to a UNHCR evaluation, `tallies 
well... if departures are taken into account'. The report asserts that 'at no time during 
the emergency was food either delivered or distributed in excess of these 
requirements."" The assumption that aid was not wasted is only accurate, however, if 
the 71,395 spontaneous returns to Rwanda that UNHCR recorded between October 
1994 and the end of January 1995 (of a total 201,702 since July)106 were among refugees 
already excluded from the food distribution. The Goma representative of the World 
Food Programme (WFP), Robert Hauser, was quoted in Libération disputing the 
September estimate. Commenting on the high malnutrition rates in the camps he stated 
that this was even more unacceptable given that 'we deliver daily in all camps sufficient 
food to meet the needs of 740,000 refugees when we know that there is approximately 
600,000.' 107 
The debate about refugee numbers re- emerged as an intensely political issue following 
the 1996 attack on the camps and the disappearance of an unknown number of 
Rwandans. Other methods of verification, such as medical data and statistics derived 
from nutritional and vaccination surveys, however, indicated that UNHCR's figures 
were fairly accurate before the destruction of the camps.108 
The establishment of accurate beneficiary numbers in the camps ran counter to the 
interests of the political and military leadership, and attempts to conduct refugee 
registrations faced sabotage. In addition to economic gains, exaggerating the number of 
refugees outside Rwanda via -à -vis the number in the interior was central to attempts to 
discredit the new Rwandan regime and challenge its right to power. The government -in- 
exile claimed that 4,050,000 refugees resided in Zaire, with 500,000, 300,000 and 
50,000 refugees in Tanzania, Burundi and other countries respectively.109 Thus the first 
106 `Situation Report No. 10' (Goma: UNHCR mimeo, 25 September 1994) and Borton et al., 
`Humanitarian Aid and Effects', p. 106. 
1°5 Lessons Learnt front the Rwanda Emergency:' Further Reflections (Geneva: EC /46 /SC /CRP.28, 
Standing Committee, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, 28 May 1996), 
in Annex D of Lessons Learned from the Burundi and Rwanda, p. 4. 
06 Situation Report No. 19, 15 January-15 February 1995 (Goma: UNHCR mimeo, February 1995). 
107 Alain Frilet, 'Le tranquille exil des chefs de guerre hutus', Libération, 23 November 1994, p. 15 
108 See Jean-Hervé Bradol and Anne Guibert, `Le temps des assassins et l'espace humanitaire, Rwanda, 
Kivu, 1994 -1997', Hérodote, No. 86/87 (1997): 116 -149 at p. 137. 
09 Thacien Hahozayezu, 'Les vrai statistiques des réfugiés', Amizero - L'Espoir, No. 0, 7 -14 November 
1994, pp. 6 -7 as summarised in ABSL Dialogue, Revue de la Presse Rwandaise. 
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attempt at conducting a census in October 1994 was plagued by insecurity, and the 
registration was postponed until January. The January registration encountered attempts 
of fraud and in some communes, ration card verification had to be repeated up to five 
times. Eventually UNHCR arrived at a satisfactory figure, having uncovered many 
fictitious cellules, secteurs and even communes. However, a renewed attempt at 
registration in August 1996 failed after the 700,000 refugees boycotted the count. 
Rumours had circulated in the camps that the ink used for registration caused sterility 
and death, and would identify refugees if they were forced to return to Rwanda. Since a 
joint communique announcing the start of repatriation had been issued by the Prime 
Ministers of Zaire and Rwanda on 22 August, the latter rumour fed into the real fears of 
the refugee population. 
Registration exercises, in any case, did not stop the theft of aid supplies. The high 
malnutrition rates mentioned by the WFP representative in Goma in 1994 were Iargely a 
reflection of the uneven distribution of rations within the camps. Relying on the 
commune heads to prepare lists of beneficiaries and assist in the distribution left the 
system open to manipulation. One estimate suggested that a quarter of the 10,000 tonnes 
of food destined for distribution was diverted to the camp leadership.1' A food basket 
monitoring survey undertaken in the Goma camps in October 1994 revealed the 
disparities of rations: 40 percent of households in Kibumba camp received less than the 
2,000 Kcal ration to which they were entitled, with 29 percent receiving less than 1,000 
Kcal, and 13 percent receiving more than 10,000 Kcal rations. Rations containing less 
than 1,000 Kcal were found among 32 percent of the population in Kahindo, 19 percent 
in Mugunga and 9 percent in Katale.'" Rates of severe malnutrition in Mugunga camp 
increased from 3.3 percent of children under five years of age in August to 8.2 percent 
in October 1994. Increases in rates of severe malnutrition were also experienced in 
Kibumba and Kahindo camps. Katale had a small decrease but the rate remained high at 
5.9 percent in October.' 
The direct looting of warehouses containing food and other aid supplies was also 
undertaken by the defeated forces; in November 1994, for example, WFP officials 
10 Frilet, `Le tranquille exil', p. 15. 
'l' Borton et al., `Humanitarian Aid and Effects', p. 96. 
"2 Situation Report No. 6, 1 -31 July 1994 (Goma: UNHCR mimeo, July 1994). 
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discovered 200 tonnes of food from their warehouse being loaded on a barge for 
Bukavu, headquarters of the former government.13 But towards the end of 1994 much of 
the overt theft and diversion of food aid had diminished, and the camp malnutrition rates 
began to decline, reflecting the change in strategy and increased professionalisation by 
the military and political leadership outlined in the previous section. While a 
considerable amount of food was probably stockpiled in the earlier months, a 
combination of the threat of withdrawal from the camps made by the NGOs in 
November, and the restructuring and redefinition of the military and political structures 
led to a decrease in the pillage of aid supplies. Images of massive theft portrayed in the 
international media compromised the new objectives of gaining international legitimacy 
and sympathy for the refugees. 
Other, more discreet forms of income generation from the humanitarian aid operation 
continued. The taxation of tens of thousands of refugees employed with international 
agencies provided the camp leaders with a steady income, although the amount is 
impossible to quantify. Interviews with former refugees indicated that the tax varied 
among the different sites: in Benaco camp in Tanzania the refugees were apparently 
taxed 2 days payment per month, plus 100 Tanzanian Shillings per person over 18 years 
of age, whereas in Goma a 20 -30 percent levy was imposed on all employed refugees. 
The salaries paid to local staff in Goma until March -April 19951" ranged from $270 per 
month for a doctor, to $2 per day for a casual labourer. Engineers and administrators 
earned $210; drivers earned $180; nurses' salaries ranged from $180 to $120 per month; 
auxiliary health staff and cooks earned $95, and cleaners $75 per month. The difficulty 
of calculating an average wage across all casual and permanent employees is 
compounded by variations in the numbers of refugees employed between the periods of 
intense activity and those of consolidation and stability - some 100 international NGOs 
were present in Goma at the peak of the cholera epidemic.15 Although the full extent of 
13 Fri let, `Le tranquille exil', p. 15. 
14 As discussed again below, a `coalition' of several NGOs in Goma agreed to reduce salaries to the 
equivalent rates in Rwanda and revert from payment in dollars to the Zairean currency to reduce the 
sum taxed by the camp leadership. The Belgian section of MSF successfully implemented a 50 
percent pay cut across the board in March 1995 and MSF Holland implemented a graduated pay cut 
of 40 percent in April 1995. Report from Eleanor Bedford to MSF Amsterdam and Brussels, `March 
6 -I9'. 
u5 See Borton et al., `Humanitarian Aid and Effects', p. 38. By the end of 1994 there were 45 NGOs in 
Goma, 44 in South Kivu and 31 in Tanzania working as implementing partners of UNHCR. Impact of 
Military Personnel and the Militia Presence in Rwandese Refugee Camps and Settlements, 
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revenue earned from taxation can never be accurately determined, a rough indication of 
the scale can be extrapolated from considering one NGO program during the non - 
emergency period. In July 1995 the Belgian section of MSF was employing 550 local 
staff in its health program in Kahindo camp which housed 108,000 refugees. The 
program included running a 230 bed hospital, a 24 -hour nutritional centre, 3 
dispensaries, 4 health posts and a community health care program. Given that the 
number of casual labourers employed at this time would have been minimal, an average 
wage could be expected to have been at least $100 per month. If 550 employees paid 
one fifth in tax each month, then the camp leadership collected $11,000 per month from 
the local staff of one NGO in one camp alone. Multiplied by the number of local staff 
employed in food and non -food distributions; water and sanitation activities; camp 
management; warehousing and shelter; social programs for orphans and the 
handicapped; family tracing; education; agriculture; and vocational training, the revenue 
would have been considerable. Moreover, salaries were paid in US dollars until mid 
1995 since sourcing an adequate quantity of Zairean currency was problematic. 
In addition to taxation, the camp leadership often charged refugees for supplies to which 
they were freely entitled from UNHCR. One former refugee1ó reported that when she 
and her family arrived in Inera camp near Bukavu they were obliged to purchase the 
land on which to build a shelter. She said that the price of land varied according to the 
location, with the highest prices paid for the sites closest to camp facilities. Her family 
paid $100 for a whole package of land, plastic sheeting, a blanket, a cooking set, and 
their first ration. Items were also individually sold; plastic sheeting cost $20 per piece. 
She also purchased a place on a beneficiary Iist, claiming it was a faster way to receive 
food than via the official UNHCR system. Having bought beer for the chef de quartier, 
she said that over time he replaced a false name on his list with her real name. 
The vehicles looted from Rwanda became another source of revenue for the camp 
leadership. Several bus and taxi services were established around and between the 
various camps and Goma town. A report of the activities of Bus A9240 dated 14 
October 1995, indicated that $3,018 was made in a five month period from servicing the 
Mugunga -Katale -Mugunga route. The report also shows that $2,875 of this was spent on 
(Bujumbura: 1995BUJCONF.3, RegíonaI Conference on Assistance to Refugees, Returnees and 
Displaced Persons in the Great Lakes Region, 12 -17 February 1995), p. 3 
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construction costs for the 2nd Division of the ex -FAR, reconnaissance missions and the 
purchase of technical materials.'" Some revenue also came directly from aid 
organisations to which vehicles were rented. An accounting sheet of the Finance 
Commission in North Kivu presented in Appendix 5, for instance, showed bus rental to 
the Irish NGO Goal among its revenue details for the period April to September 1995. 
According to the report, Goal paid $6,680 between April and June for the rental of Bus 
A9225. 't 
The Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire thus provided an effective humanitarian sanctuary 
to the former Rwandan government and army. Protected from prosecution, they resided 
in the camps with impunity and manipulated the aid structures in the camps to increase 
their military and political power. The sanctuary provided by Zaire enabled them to 
resume the killing they started in April 1994, and to sabotage reconstruction and 
reconciliation attempts in Rwanda. The camp leadership prevented the refugees from 
returning to Rwanda, and injected them with hatred and genocidal rhetoric for over two 
years. After repeated warnings by the Rwandan Government, the camps were attacked 
and destroyed by the Rwandan army and Zairean rebel forces. 
The offensive began against the Uvira camps in South Kivu in October 1996, ostensibly 
led by Zairean Banyamulenge rebels. Persecution against Tutsi members of the 
Banyarwandan19 population living in North Kivu had risen dramatically since the influx 
of predominantly Rwandan Hutu refugees, and this together with an expulsion order for 
the Banyamulenge issued on 7 October 1996 by the deputy governor of South Kivu, was 
given as rationale for the assault.120 The speed and precision with which the offensive 
occurred rapidly overcame opposition, and refugees fled the camps. By early November 
the AFDL Coalition reached the camps in the Goma region.'2' The refugees initially fled 
"6 Personal interview with Marie -Rose Mukamudenge, Kigali, 4 January 1997. 
1° Joel Bararwerekana, `Rapport d'activities du Bus A9240' au Comd 2 Div (Mugunga: handwritten 
mimeo, 14 October 1995) (c.d). 
18 Gaston Iyamuremye, `Rapport de Gestion Financière de la Commission du Patrimoine de la 
Communauté Rwandaise en Exil au Nord -Kivu' ( Mugunga- mimeo, 30 September 1995) (c.d). 
19 The Banyarwanda of North Kivu and the Banyamulenge of South Kivu are speakers of Kinyarwanda, 
the language also spoken in Rwanda. Many lived in Kivu before the colonial boundaries were drawn 
and others moved into the region during colonial times and since. 
120 For a report on the persecution of Tutsi in the Masisi region of eastern Zaire see Ethnic Cleansing 
Rears its Head in Zaire: Population in Masisi Suffers Untold Hardship (Amsterdam: Médecins sans 
Frontières, 1996). 
12' For refugee accounts of the attacks on the camps see Zaire: "Attacked by All Sides ": Civilians and 
the War in Eastern Zaire (New York: Vol 9, No. 1 (A) Human Rights Watch, 1997). 
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west but their path was blocked by the advancing troops and most were routed back to 
Rwanda. Those from Bukavu and Uvira, however, were pursued west and were attacked 
on numerous occasions as aid organisations attempted to assist them.`22 Hundreds of 
thousands died or disappeared. 
Paul Kagame, the mastermind behind the destruction of the refugee camps, blamed the 
organisations which maintained the camps for their violent demise: 
I think we should start accusing these people who actually supported these 
camps - spent one million dollars per day in these camps, gave support to these 
groups to rebuild themselves into a force, militarized refugees, and when, in the 
end, they are caught up in the fighting and they die I think it has more do with 
these people than Rwanda, than Congo, than the Alliance. Why shouldn't we 
accuse them ?123 
While deflecting personal responsibility for unsavoury events in the region has become 
a trademark of Kagame, his question is valid, although not to the extent he suggests. 
Primary responsibility for the attack on the camps resides with the authorities who 
ordered, organised and participated in efforts to destroy the camp and kill the remnants 
of the refugee camp population. Secondary responsibility lies with those actors who 
provided the means of destruction, and who were accessories to such acts by their tacit 
approval, their silence, or their denial of events as they occurred. But how much 
responsibility rests with the UN, donor governments and private aid agencies which 
sustained the refugee camps in the knowledge of their role in the conflict, and of the 
probability that the camps would attract such an assault? To what extent did their 
acquiescence in the status quo inculpate them in the ensuing crisis? 
The next section explores this question of responsibility in relation to the options 
available to the humanitarian aid community, and the choices that they were forced to 
make. Should the `humanitarian imperative' to save lives have taken precedence over 
considerations of the consequences of such action in the prevailing context of the 
Rwandan refugee camps? 
122 See Forced Flight: A Brutal Strategy of Elimination in Eastern Zaire (Paris: Médecins sans 
Frontières, May 1997) excerpts of which are presented in Stephen Smith, `MSF Accuse: 190,000 
réfugiés hutus disparus au Zaire', Libération, 20 May 1997, pp. 1 -2. 
'23 As cited in Philip Gourevitch, `Continental Shift', The New Yorker (4 August 1997): 42 -55 at p. 55. 
Chapter 5 The Rwandan Refugee Camps in Zaire 238 
3. THE RELIEF RESPONSE: IMPERATIVES VERSUS CONSEQUENCES 
In the Rwandan refugee camps, the negative consequences of humanitarian action 
stemmed from a change in two axioms of refugee management. First, adherence to 
norms of community -based and participatory refugee assistance created, rather than 
alleviated, problems associated with refugee agency and control. Text book 
prescriptions of refugee management that were developed in the 1980s heeded calls by 
Barbara Harrell -Bond and others126 for greater refugee involvement in relief programs, 
and greater attention to the personal accounts of refugees, following the erroneous 
rejection of Cambodian refugee testimony about the Khmer Rouge. Thus these were 
applied to the Rwandan operation. The local leadership was appointed to liaise between 
the refugees and the aid agencies; the refugees were settled in the same community 
groups as existed in Rwanda to lessen the trauma of dislocation; and refugee testimonies 
were collected and disseminated. 
In the rush to meet the material needs of such a large population, analyses of the history 
and nature of the refugee caseload were delayed. Hence refugee reports of RPF atrocities 
were repeated to journalists in spite of the Iack of direct witnesses to the alleged 
events,° and the entire refugee program in Tanzania was constructed on a false premise. 
By June 1994, however, any enduring doubts within the aid community of the true 
nature of the refugee leadership were dispelled when an attempt to remove a known 
génocidaire from Benaco camp, Jean -Baptiste Gatete, almost caused a riot when his 
followers, brandishing machetes, sticks and rocks, surrounded the UNHCR compound. 
Nevertheless, the same mistakes were made in Goma and Bukavu one month later, but 
this time it was the humanitarian imperative to save lives which prevailed over all other 
concerns. The difficulty of responding to the refugee influx into Goma cannot be 
overstated. The sheer volume of refugees was compounded by environmental 
constraints imposed by the hard volcanic rock and problems of access to clean water 
supplies, which continued for Kibumba camp long after it was resolved for the other 
'24 Barbara Harrell -Bond, Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees (Oxford: Oxford Univers 
Press, 1986). 
'25 See Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance, pp. 1079 -1084 for some of the misleading accounts 
reported by aid agency personnel. 
ty 
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sites.t26 In addition to the devastating cholera and dysentery epidemics, malnutrition 
rates were high, and a meningitis epidemic surfaced in late July, necessitating a mass 
vaccination campaign against meningitis in addition to the routine measles vaccination 
program. The impulse to save lives superseded all other concerns. 
The second and more important axiom which was reversed in the Rwandan context and 
permitted the status quo to continue in the camps, was with regard to the role of 
powerful states. In past refugee crises such as those illustrated in previous chapters, 
humanitarian aid was used by states as a tool with which to pursue foreign policy 
objectives. In the Rwandan case, aid was used as a tool with which to avoid foreign 
policy engagement. The humanitarian response was a substitute for political action in a 
region deemed to be outside the foreign policy interests of the wealthier nations. By 
engaging the military in a war against cholera, the governments of the US, Israel, Japan, 
and Holland127 demonstrated their concern for the 'chaos' in which the Rwandan 
population was embroiled, without committing to the potentially dangerous task of 
dealing with the génocidaires. They were opting for the `apolitical' domain of 
humanitarian assistance even though the absence of any military initiative to remove the 
political leaders or at least the uniformed soldiers from the camps, permitted them to be 
ensconced in the humanitarian sanctuaries. Once reorganised and having re- established 
control in the wake of the epidemics, the political and military leadership was much 
harder to remove. The lack of an appropriate political mandate for the international 
forces led to greater problems in the long -term. The constraints on effective action 
imposed by limited mandates were recognised in an official inquiry into lessons learned 
from the UNAMIR mission in Rwanda.128 But reflecting the pusillanimous concerns of 
states to remain aloof from political or military engagement, the report did not suggest a 
[26 Trucking water to Kibumba camp cost $1 million per month. Drumtra, Site Visit to Rwanda, Zaire, 
and Burundi, p. 14. 
f27 The French military were active in the war against cholera, but are excluded here because they also 
engaged in a political response in Opération turquoise, albeit under a humanitarian mandate. Since 
the French had political interests in the region, they followed the previous axiom of professing 
`humanitarian' intent to pursue foreign policy objectives. 
`28 Astri Suhrke, by contrast, illustrates that UNAMIR did have various mandates to protect Rwandan 
civilians, including the rules of engagement drafted by Dallaire, number 17 of which specifically 
stated that `UNAMIR will take the necessary action to prevent any crime against humanity'. See Astri 
Suhrke, `Dilemmas of Protection: The Log of the Kigali Batallion', in Howard Adelman and Astri 
Suhrke (eds), The Path of a Genocide: The Rwandan Crisis from Uganda to Zaire (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 1999), pp. 253 -270 at pp. 264-265. 
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more robust mandate, but recommended increased measures to publicise the limits of 
the military role to reduce future expectations. 
Many Rwandese believed that the United Nations was there to stop the 
genocide and were bitterly disappointed when this was not the case... 
UNAMIR should have done much more to inform the public about its limited 
role and mandate early on, particularly for the protection of civilians at risk, so 
as not to give the people a false sense of security. This might have also averted 
disasters such as the Kibeho massacre, where internally displaced people in the 
Kibeho camp believed that UNAMIR soldiers would protect them from the 
RPA. [29 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to delve further into analysing the purpose of 
military deployment if it is not to prevent civilians from being massacred. Suffice it to 
say that the emergence of a new normative paradigm in the post -Cold War world in 
which humanitarian action becomes an alibi for politicians driven to `do something' by 
domestic constituents, gives humanitarian assistance an additional paradoxical 
consequence. Furthermore, in the Rwandan camps the purely humanitarian response of 
powerful nations was accompanied by a discourse which assisted in the transformation 
of the genocide into a `complex emergency'. Former UN Secretary- General Boutros- 
Ghali called upon the international community to address the "`genocide" of hunger, 
thirst and disease' '3° among the refugees in Zaire. Trivialising the significance of the 
Rwandan genocide in this way served to put all the victims on an equal footing, and 
avoided the need to apportion blame. Brauman suggests that it is tantamount to calling 
rape a `gynacological crisis'.131 
By the end of 1994, it was clear that neither an international military nor civilian police 
force was going to be deployed to the camps to provide protection for the refugees and 
aid organisations. It was also clear that the presence of the former political and military 
leaders in the camps would at best constitute an enormous obstacle to a resolution of the 
crisis by blocking refugee repatriation, and at worst, would reignite the Rwandan, and 
possible a broader, conflict. Thus for the aid agencies present in the camps the 
129 Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda 
(UNAMIR), October 1993 -April 1996 (New York: Lessons Learned Unit, UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations, 1996), p. 42. 
10 Report of the Secretary- General to the General Assembly on emergency assistance for the socio- 
economic rehabilitation of Rwanda (A/49/516, 14 October 1994), paragraph 26. 
131 Rony Brauman, `Genocide in Rwanda: We Can't Say We Didn't Know', in François Jean (ed.), 
Populations in Danger 1995: A Médecins Sans Frontières Report (Rushcutters Bay, NSW: Halstead 
Press, 1995), pp. 85 -90 at p. 89. 
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humanitarian imperative to give aid wherever it was needed clashed with the duty of aid 
organisations to ensure that their aid does not benefit belligerent parties.132 The aid 
organisations were thus required to prioritise the ethical principles to which they would 
adhere. Privileging the humanitarian imperative meant remaining in the camps to meet 
the needs of the population, regardless of the broader consequences of that action. 
Privileging the duty to avoid contributing to the war effort of belligerents in the camps 
meant withdrawing and withholding assistance. A few aid organisations decided to 
withdraw. The majority decided to remain. The following section explores the rationales 
behind the positions adopted by the aid agencies. 
3.1 Weighing the Consequences 
Two NGOs withdrew from the Rwandan refugee camps on ethical grounds once the 
emergency phase of the relief operation subsided. The French section of Médecins sans 
Frontières (MSF), and the International Rescue Committee (IRC), weighed the potential 
consequences of continued support to the camps against the imperative to remain, and 
decided to leave.133 This decision was determined by several inter -related factors. First, 
while it was impossible to predict precisely what consequences the militarised refugee 
camps might have on the future of the refugees and the region, analogies were drawn 
from past experience, particularly the revival of the Khmer Rouge. As mentioned in the 
introduction, Alain Destexhe, who was secretary- general of MSF at the time, wrote in 
the International Herald Tribune in August 1994: 
The situation in Rwanda is beginning to have a dangerously close resemblance 
to Cambodia in the 1980s, when humanitarian aid provided by the international 
community revived and boosted the Khmer Rouge war effort. 
If the United Nations does not act immediately to ensure safe conditions for the 
return of the Rwandan refugees, it will be too Iate to prevent the authors of the 




Article 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 is the basis for the `right' to give humanitarian 
assistance, but permits belligerents to refuse passage of aid if it is diverted from its destination or 
gives definite advantage to the military efforts of an enemy. 
This analysis more fully reflects the position of MSF than IRC since I am more acquainted with the 
arguments of the former. However, an interview with Roy Williams formerly of WC, confirmed that 
the organisation debated whether to leave or remain in the camps, and withdrew for moral reasons. It 
was the first time in 64 years that the IRC board had made such a decision. Personal interview, 2 
October 1997. 
Destexhe, `Hurry to Prevent a Cambodian Epilogue'. 
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MSF engaged in rigorous internal debate over the dilemmas posed by working in the 
refugee camps, and framed the question in terms of the purpose or finality of 
humanitarian aid, asking whether the organisation could refuse to assist a population in 
distress in the name of moral principles. Ultimately, strong predictions that the camps 
would create greater problems in the future were invoked. 
Far from participating in the resolution of the conflict, international aid 
perpetuates the situation and, worse still, prepares the crisis of tomorrow... 
when they refuse to take into account the context in which they operate, in the 
name a misunderstood neutrality, the international organisations prepare... the 
worst for tomorrow.'35 
The lack of international support for initiatives proposed by UNHCR and others to 
demilitarise the camps, and the probability that the overall status quo would remain, 
heightened the second consideration in arguments to withdraw. Should a humanitarian 
aid organisation professing to alleviate suffering be an accomplice to a system which so 
obviously violates this fundamental principle? NGOs do not have a mandate to react to 
every situation in which there are humanitarian needs, but choose between those they 
respond to and those they do not. The question of complicity in strengthening a regime 
responsible for committing genocide was particularly strong, since it was the aid 
mechanisms themselves in the camps which permitted the former government to retain 
control over the refugee population. As illustrated throughout this thesis, it is not 
unusual for aid to have unavoidable side -effects. But in the case of the Rwandan camps 
it was nothing but the aid which was sustaining the viability of the old regime, and was 
actually being used against the refugees, through distribution mechanisms, health 
structures, refugee administration, and policing initiatives. MSF drew the line when aid 
was turned against the very people it was trying to assist, and withdrew from the camps. 
The prospect of withdrawing aid from the camps inevitably raised the question of the 
fate of the bona fide refugees in the camps. This was the point on which advocates of a 
withdrawal found their staunchest critics. The arguments espoused by the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata were indicative of the 
prevailing discourse. Asked why UNHCR did not withdraw, she replied: `there were 
also innocent refugees in the camps; more than half were women and children. Should 
:35 Médecins sans Frontières, Pourquoi nous quittons les camps de réfugiés rwandais (Paris: MSF, 
December 1994), p. 1. 
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we have said: you are related to murderers, so you are guilty, too ?' 16 But MSF viewed it 
as a systemic problem, not as a question of whether individual refugees deserved food or 
not. `It is not the aid given to children which must be questioned' wrote Dominique 
Martin, one of the MSF directors in Paris, `but the logic of the system where the 
populations are used by their "shepherds" for political ends. They serve as hostages, bait 
for international aid which permits the refugee leaders to build up their political 
strength.'" Nevertheless, the question remains of whether IRC and MSF would have 
withdrawn had they been the only organisations operating in the camps, knowing that a 
loss of life might result. It is doubtful, if the case of Tanzania is any indication. A few 
cases of cholera were diagnosed in Benaco camp in December 1994 just as MSF was 
leaving which prompted its offer to extend until the epidemic subsided. UNHCR 
declined the offer and in the event the outbreak did not spread. It is ironic that on the 
one hand the immediate replacement with other aid organisations of those withdrawing 
on moral grounds diminished the impact of the point they were making. Solidarity 
among NGOs and a joint commitment to take a stand would have strengthened the 
weight of the argument. On the other hand, the immediate substitution of one NGO with 
a queue of others eased the anguish of leaving. 
Other aid agencies grappled with the moral dilemmas in the camps and divergences of 
opinion were common. The emergency operations manager for CARE UK, James 
Fennell, for example, recommended that CARE only continue assistance to the camps 
on the proviso that the international community brings the génocidaires to justice. 
CARE UK's former Chief Executive, Charles Tapp, however, publicly distanced 
himself from Fennell's comments. He acknowledged that `we are going to be feeding 
people who have been perpetrating genocide', but considered that `our remit is to 
provide humanitarian assistance. That is what we have to do'.16 UNHCR also faced 
calls for its withdrawal from the Rwandan refugee camps from internal staff and 
external advisers. Internally, calls for the deployment of an international military 
presence resounded, and one position paper suggested that if no such assistance 
136 Cited in Ray Wilkinson, `The Heart of Darkness', Refugees, No. 110 (Winter 1997): 5 -13 at p. 9. l' Dominique Martin, `Face à l'inacceptable dans les camps de réfugiés ruandais' (Paris: MSF mimeo, 
n.d.), pp. 2 -3. 
138 Mark Huband. `Aid or Justice for Rwanda ?', The Observer, 31 July 1994, as cited in Rwanda: Death, 
Despair and Defiance, p. 1091. 
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eventuates, ` UNHCR should seriously consider and be prepared to pull out'.13° The 
paper suggested that an United Nations Border Relief Organisation (UNBRO) -style 
organisation could take the place of UNHCR, containing no protection role, but only 
relief functions. 
Externally, Professor Guy Goodwin -Gill also questioned the logic of UNHCR's 
continued presence in the camps of Zaire. Pointing out that the mandate of UNHCR is 
not to provide material assistance but is the protection of refugees, he suggested that, 
after the initial emergency was over, some serious re- analysis should have been 
undertaken. `At that point, and in the face of the international community's 
unwillingness to take the necessary supportive steps, UNHCR's inability to fulfil its 
primary responsibility to provide international protection to refugees, let alone promote 
its declared objective of facilitating return, might well have conditioned a response to 
withdraw.' 140 
The International Protection department of UNHCR, however, determined that `the 
mandatory function entrusted to UNHCR by the international community in assisting 
host countries to cope with refugee influxes... justifies our continued presence even 
under the most trying circumstances'.161 The High Commissioner agreed. `My mandate - 
unlike those of private aid agencies - obliges me to help'.142 Moreover, there were fears 
inside UNHCR that a withdrawal could make UNHCR irrelevant in refugee contexts of 
the future, particularly in light of the growing aversion to refugee asylum and erosion of 
the central tenets of refugee protection.1a3 Such a fear was not unfounded: the dominant 
role of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in providing for the Kosovar 
refugees in 1999 could be the start of a trend of marginalising UN structures when it 
suits powerful nations to do so. Thus UNHCR remained present in the camps and 
searched for innovative solutions to the impasse in voluntary refugee repatriation caused 
by the presence of the political and military leaders in the camps, and conditions inside 
Rwanda. 
39 S. Lombardo and K. Paul, Position Paper on International Protection Issues in Eastern Zaire, 20 
October 1994 as cited in Lessons Learned from the Burundi and Rwanda Emergencies, p. 15. 
X40 Guy Goodwin -Gill, `Rwanda -Zaire: Refugee Camps and the Protection of Refugees', International 
Journal of Refugee Law 8, No. 4, (1996): 630 -639 at p. 632 (emphasis in original). 
141 A paper presented to the High Commissioner by the Director of International Protection on 18 
November 1994, cited in Lessons Learned from the Burundi and Rwanda Emergencies, p. 16. 
142 Cited in Wilkinson, `The Heart of Darkness', p. 9. 
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3.2 The Imperative to Remain 
UNHCR played an unenviable role in the Rwandan refugee crisis as intermediary 
between the various stakeholders. The organisation was required to contend constantly 
with the conflicting demands of the Zaire= authorities, the refugees, the camp 
leadership, the Rwandan Government, the NGOs, and the institutional donors while 
trying to uphold its own mandate to provide protection to refugees. Several options to 
alleviate the problems in the camps were explored by the UN, including moving the 
camps further from the border,144 and hiring a private security firm to police the camps, 
but these were rejected on financial and logistical grounds.15 The Iack of alternatives 
placed the onus on UNHCR to find a `durable solution' to the crisis, the obvious being 
repatriation to Rwanda. But the challenge was to reconcile the principles embedded in 
refugee law, particularly with regard to the voluntary nature of repatriation and security 
guarantees for returnees, with the competing demands of the donors and the Rwandan 
government to resolve the refugee problem, and the determination of the refugees to 
remain in exile. 
In the latter half of 1994, UNHCR withstood considerable pressures from other UN 
agencies and donors, and suspended its role in repatriation due to concerns raised in the 
Gersony report about the safety of returnees. By December repatriation resumed, but the 
number of returnees dropped from 800 per day in February to none following the 
Kibeho massacre in April 1995.14 The refugee refoulement from Zaire in August shifted 
143 Jean- François Durieux, UNHCR Geneva, personal communication, 8 August 1997. 
144 Recall that UNHCR and host states are urged to establish refugee camps `a reasonable distance' from 
international borders. See `No. 48 (XXXVIII) Military or Armed Attacks on Refugee Camps and 
Settlements' (Executive Committee - 38th Session, 1987) in Conclusions on the International 
Protection of Refugees Adopted by the Executive Committee of the UNHCR Programme (Geneva: 
UNHCR, 1991), pp. 109 -111 at p. III. This is generally considered to be about 50 km. 
145 In September and October 1994 a joint UNHCR/UNAMIR team inspected sites proposed by the 
Government of Zaire on which to construct military camps. Assuming that the military would have 
been willing to move, the option was still judged to be too costly and logistically difficult. See Impact 
of Military Personnel and the Military Presence, p. 9. The UN Secretariat also explored the 
possibility of contracting a private security organisation for the camps, but the $60 million per year 
price tag `undoubtedly contributed to the option being discarded'. Refugee Camp Security in the 
Great Lakes Region, p. 11. UNHCR has also been reluctant to engage private security firms for 
reasons of principle and accountability, and because such a measure would detract from the 
responsibility of host states to ensure the security, and humanitarian and civilian character of refugee 
camps. See The Security, and Civilian and Humanitarian Character of Refugee Camps and 
Settlements (Geneva: EC/49 /SC/LNF.2, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's 
Programme, 14 January 1999), paragraph 16. 
146 UNHCR, State of the World's Refugees 1995, p. 33. 
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UNHCR's priority from facilitating repatriation to promoting it,167 and initiatives such as 
cross -border visits and information campaigns were launched to counter the extremist 
propaganda in the camps. The limited success of these endeavours led to increased 
pressure from the donors, particularly the US, to compromise some of the principles of 
refugee asylum for a resolution to the refugee problem. The attack on the camps pre- 
empted such a move towards the refugees in Zaire, but UNHCR became Iess averse to 
forced repatriation from Tanzania in December 1996, which drew sharp criticism from 
human rights organisations.14B Throughout the period UNHCR shifted its approach to the 
refugee issue in accordance with the latest priority, determined by the actions of the 
multiple stakeholders in the crisis. UNHCR invoked the obligations contained in its 
mandate as a rationale for remaining in the refugee camps, but ultimately failed to 
ensure either the legal or the physical protection of the Rwandan refugees. 
NGOs remaining in the Rwandan refugee camps had no such mandate requirements, 
adhering instead to self- imposed regulations and objectives. The importance aid 
organisations placed on the ethical issues raised by the Rwandan crisis varied greatly. Of 
those that considered their presence within an ethical framework, the majority 
prioritised the humanitarian imperative to give assistance wherever it is needed, and 
relegated responsibility for the outcomes to the political domain. Although not mutually 
exclusive, five main areas of argument and approach can be identified among the NGOs 
who remained operational in the camps: adherence to the humanitarian imperative in 
itself; the belief in a possibility of change; a pragmatic focus on technical service 
delivery; a business or institutional logic; and an ideological commitment to amend the 
`victimisation' of the Hum people. Most approaches contained elements of each. 
The humanitarian imperative is premised on the notion that individuals have a right to 
certain minimum standards by virtue of their membership of humanity, regardless of 
who they are or what they have done. Indeed, neutrality for some means refraining from 
making judgements about who does and who does not warrant assistance. Many 
agencies that remained operating in the camps subscribed to the importance of 
upholding this fundamental principle of humanitarianism - even though the 
consequences might be worse in the long -run. All in need were entitled to aid, the 
17 See Rwanda and Burundi. The Return Home, p. 49. 
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purpose of which was not to solve the crisis or address the causes, but to treat the 
symptoms. The rest is inherently political and thus not compatible with the neutral and 
impartial nature of aid. Peter Walker of the International Federation of the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies (II'RCRC), a staunch defender of the humanitarian 
imperative, considered that leaving the camps was analogous to refusing to treat an 
injured drunk driver in order to prevent the driver from repeating the act.149 
Considerations of the potential longer -term consequences of the camps, including their 
possible role in the prolongation of conflict, caused consternation among many 
agencies, but was ultimately deemed to be the responsibility of the political actors who 
had failed to meet their responsibilities to ensure the civilian nature of the camps. Some 
agencies also disputed that the outcome would inevitably be pernicious, and argued that 
the short-term consequences could be more accurately predicted than those of the future. 
Nick Stockton from Oxfam, for example, argued that the removal of water distribution 
services from the camp was more certain to provoke a large loss of life than the future of 
the refugee camps per se.150 Oxfam frequently debated withdrawing from the camps but 
decided to remain, judging that the rights of the refugees to receive aid superseded the 
problems derived from supplying it. It was considered to be morally and legally 
unacceptable to achieve a punishment by the withdrawal of rights.151 One set of rights, it 
was argued, cannot be sacrificed to achieve another. 
While debating many of these issues, some NGOs were swayed in their decision to stay 
by a commitment to try to influence the way the camps were administered to minimise 
the perverse effects of humanitarian assistance. Some, such as the Dutch and Belgian 
sections of MSF, felt that their ability to continue to lobby for change in the camps 
would be jeopardised by leaving.152 Organisations have far greater access to information 
and stronger legitimacy when operational than on the sidelines, and continued 
operations could be used to engage donors more in the process they were financing. 
1" Raymond Bonner, `Refugee Agency's Rwanda Policy Is Assailed', International Herald Tribune, 23 
December 1996, p. 7. 
'a9 Peter Walker, Director of Disaster and Refugee Policy, International Federation of the Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies, personal interview, 5 August 1997. 
150 Nick Stockton, Emergencies Director, Oxfam. Personal Interview, 22 August, 1997. 
15' ibid. 
152 MSF produced two reports aimed at lobbying for change, Breaking the Cycle (Amsterdam: MSF, 
November 1994) and Deadlock in the Rwandan Refugee Crisis: Virtual Standstill on Repatriation 
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Hence some NGOs worked together to pressure for changes in the camps and through 
conducting a 'résistance humanitaire',153 managed to reduce the quantity of aid 
resources that were diverted to the military. As mentioned earlier, a coalition of NGOs154 
lobbied for change and threatened to withdraw from the camps in Zaire unless security 
conditions and access to the vulnerable improved. They also advocated for and assisted 
in conducting censuses to reduce inflated population figures, and together reduced the 
number and salaries of local employees, previously higher than for equivalent positions 
in Rwanda, to limit the tax imposed by the military. Furthermore, the payment of local 
salaries was changed from sus to local currency among the larger NGOs. Implementing 
these changes was dangerous in the insecure context of Zaire,'" and personnel of aid 
organisations received death threats and were menaced. Nevertheless, some of the 
lobbying had a positive effect and security in the camps improved. 
The third and most prevalent approach adopted by NGOs was a pragmatic focus on the 
technical provision of relief. While some agencies may have favoured a pragmatic 
approach in their construction of a moral hierarchy, most of these NGOs overlooked the 
ethical issues posed by operating in the militarised refugee camps. As illustrated in each 
of the earlier case -studies, the technical focus tends to judge the success and failure of 
programs by the achievement of practical standards such as the number of litres of water 
available per person, the malnutrition rates in the camps, the vaccination coverage 
achieved, or the numbers of children attending school. The Joint Evaluation of 
Emergency Assistance to Rwanda exemplified this perspective, assessing the 
performance of NGOs according to professional standards. The ethical issues were 
ignored. The only reference made to the withdrawal of MSF from the camps was in 
relation to service delivery: 
(Brussels: MSF International, July 1995). The remaining MSF sections withdrew from the camps in 
late 1995. 
153 Alex Parise!, General Director of MSF in Brussels (formerly the Head of MSF -B in Goma), personal 
communication, 7 January 1999. 
in The NGOs which signed the petition were: MSF (3 sections), CARE (6 sections), IRC, American 
Refugee Committee, Farmacenticos sin Fronteras, Centre Canadien d'Etude et de la Coopération 
Internationale, Oxfam, and Médecins du monde. 
'SS In Tanzania threats were also made agaínct staff, but fewer agencies actively challenged the misuse of 
aid. Concern was the only agency responsible for food distributions that attempted to change the 
system to minimise diversions. The attempt in Lumasi camp was successful. See Johan Pottier, `Why 
Aid Agencies Need Better Understanding of the Communities They Assist: The Experience of Food 
Aid in Rwandan Refugee Camps', Disasters 20, No. 4 (1996): pp. 324 -337. 
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This withdrawal meant that other agencies, in some cases less experienced than 
MSF- France, had to take -over the services provided by the agency. The [Joint 
Evaluation] Team were [sic] unable to assess the extent to which this had a 
negative impact on the quality of services provided to the refugees in those 
camps where MSF- France had worked.'56 
By ignoring the ethical issues of the camps and emphasising technical standards, some 
of the NGOs undermined efforts of agencies that were striving to minimise the abuse of 
aid. The levels of assistance provided to the camps was disproportionate to that given to 
local Zairean and Tanzanian populations, and to the interior of Rwanda. Of the total 
emergency assistance provided by donors from April to December 1994, only one -third 
was spent inside Rwanda,15' and much of that was allocated to the internally displaced 
Hutu populations. The disparities in aid were a source of resentment by the Rwandan 
Government. Relatively sophisticated vocational training and psycho -social programs 
were being conducted in the camps while rudimentary improvements to the justice 
system in Rwanda were ignored, in spite of the widespread acknowledgment that justice 
was a pre- requisite to breaking the cycle of impunity that plagued Rwanda, and was 
essential to the start of reconciliation. While rejecting the idea that refugees anywhere 
prefer to remain in camps due to the services provided than return to their homes, 
UNHCR and the NGO coalition considered that the special nature of the Rwandan 
camps warranted reduction of services to a minimum to curb aid abuses by the former 
regime and encourage repatriation. They implemented changes and encouraged other 
agencies to do likewise, but some NGOs continued to implement camp improvements 
and continued to augment the number of refugees employed.158 Moreover, some NGOs 
ignored the ethical implications of having génocidaires on their payroll and did not 
screen either existing or new recruits to the agency.159 
For many NGOs working in the camps there was an element of institutional logic which 
influenced the way in which they reacted to the crisis. There can be a thin line between 
lobbying for action to prevent or stem a crisis, and raising the funds necessary to react to 
156 Borton et al., `Humanitarian Aid and its Effects', endnote 36, p. 48. 
`5' Tor Sellström and Lennart Wohlgemuth, `Historical Perspective: Some Explanatory Factors', Study 1 
in David Millwood (ed.), The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the 
Rwanda Experience (Copenhagen: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency 
Assistance to Rwanda, 1996), p. 5. See footnote 64 for the disparities in US allocations to the 
regional humanitarian crisis vis -à -vis Rwanda, which exemplifies this larger trend. 
Iss See Jeff Drumtra, Rwandan Refugees: Updated Findings and Recommendations (Washington: US 
Committee for Refugees, October 1995), p. 4. 
159 ibid. 
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it. NGOs are dependent on securing finance to mount an operation through contracts 
with the UN, project funding from donor agencies, and private contributions from the 
general public or private corporations. Advertising is expensive, so when the media 
cover a disaster, the free publicity for organisations interviewed or filmed is 
immeasurable. For many, the intense media coverage of the refugee exodus and cholera 
epidemic in Goma meant that they could not afford not to be present.160 Thus the 
necessity to find a niche and become operational took precedence for many over 
analysing the context. And once lucrative contracts were obtained from UN and donor 
agencies, the prospect of leaving became even more remote since it could jeopardise all 
future relationships with the donors.16L 
The compulsion to be visible generated competition among aid organisations, 
particularly in Goma. Flags, stickers and t -shirts bearing the logos of organisations, once 
a protective measure to alert belligerent parties of a humanitarian presence, became turf 
markers in the battle to secure a niche. In an article entitled `Did you see me in Goma ?: 
War of logos in the supermarket of NGOs' Richard Dowden remarked that the 
atmosphere in Goma gave the impression that an election was under way, with the 
agencies `exhibiting their name and their logo in the manner of soft-drink 
manufacturers.762 The stiffest competition revolved around media- friendly tasks such as 
managing orphanages and organising family reunions. Constructing latrines and 
spraying for vector control rarely sparks the imagination of journalists the way that 
orphan babies do. Thus for many aid organisations operating in Zaire, the priority was to 
mount a high -profile program, raise the organisation's profile at home, and replenish 
bank accounts to ensure the continued viability of the organisation as a whole. 
Finally, there were some aid agencies present in the Rwandan refugee camps which 
sympathised with the cause espoused by the Hutu hardliners and assisted the refugee 




Save the Children -UK did not intervene in Goma due to a lack of available resources, thereby 
forgoing considerable fundraising revenue which some members of the organisation such as the future 
representative for SCF in Rwanda, David Shearer, thought was foolish. John Seaman, one of the 
senior directors in London, however, believes that the delay provided `the luxury of a period of 
thought'. SCF avoided the moral turmoil through working on reconstruction in Rwanda. Personal 
communications, August 1997. 
The relationship between UNHCR and the French section of MSF deteriorated markedly as a result of 
the withdrawal. UNHCR asked how they could rely upon MSF in the future. 
Richard Dowden, `M'as -tu vu à Goma? Guerre des logos au supermarché des ONG', Courier 
International No. 202 (15 -21 September 1994): 33 (reprinted from the Independent on Sunday). 
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which they worked and their relationships with the local population, and expressed 
compassion towards the predicament of the refugees. But for a few agencies, the support 
went beyond this, particularly those agencies attached to the Catholic church. Caritas 
provided food to the Panzi and Bulonge military camps near Bukavu and defended their 
decision to Human Rights Watch Arms Project, saying that Caritas had `no choice' 
because no other organisation was prepared to feed them and that `they have to eat, they 
are not all murderers'.' The decision was further justified in the Caritas Information 
Report No. 7 of September 1995 as a preventive measure to stop camp inhabitants 
stealing food from other refugees. `The starving refugees of Bulonge will not let the 
WFP trucks pass to distribute goods to their neighbours in Cimanga, and those of Panzi 
will probably try to stop and to pillage the trucks destined for Nyangezi'.'" Such an 
image of destitute and starving military personnel is at odds with evidence provided 
earlier in the chapter, but if this was true, a case could perhaps be made for such a 
pragmatic approach. However, other messages emanating from Caritas and its associate 
organisations under the church umbrella indicate that their sympathies were biased 
against the new Rwandan regime. Claims of a double genocide permeate articles written 
by Caritas staff,'5 and in documents produced by religious reflection groups in 
Bukavu.'64 Furthermore, François Nzabahimana, director of the RDR, was formerly the 
president of the Executive Committee of the White Father periodical Dialogue, and had 
strong links with the Bukavu groups. His material received endorsement through 





Rwanda/Zaire: Rearming With Impunity, footnote 67, p. 16. 
Abbé Pierre Cibambo, `Caritas - Info no. 7' (Bukavu, September 1995) in Philippe de Dorlodot (ed.), 
Les réfugiés rwandais à Bukavu au Zaire: De nouveaux Palestiniens? (Paris: Groupe Jérémie and 
L'Harmattan, 1996), pp. 225 -232 at p. 232. This book contains a collection of articles, speeches, 
information reports and letters written by Catholic groups in Bukavu. 
See, for example, Alphonse Ngamije, Agent de la Caritas á Goma, `Réfugiés Rwandais: Quel 
Avenir ?', Dialogue, No. 181 (March 1995): 27 -32 at p. 31. 
A piece written on 26 July 1994 by Philippe de Dorlodot, the editor of the collection of texts from the 
Catholic church, discusses the treason that the Hutu felt at the loss of their country to the minority 
Tutsi. He states that an objective view of Rwandan history is indispensable to understanding the 
stakes, particularly `the will of the minority Tutsi to reconquer the power'. He claimed that the West 
was manipulated and ill- informed of facts concerning the Hutu -Tutsi problem. `There are two 
genocides in Rwanda' (emphasis in original). `Quelques vérités sur l'enfer rwandais', in Philippe de 
Dorlodot (ed.), Les réfugiés rwandais à Bukavu au Zaire: De nouveaux Palestiniens? (Paris: Groupe 
Jérémie and L'Harmattan, 1996), pp. 88 -89 at p. 88. 
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declaration and a report citing the presence of 4 million refugees in Zaire.167 The work 
was published in 1996, long after the RDR was known to follow a hardline agenda. 
The question remains, then, of the extent to which aid organisations that supported the 
camps share responsibility for the consequences. The death of 4,000 camp inhabitants 
clue to violence in the camps, mentioned earlier, is significant in itself. But the 
destruction of the camps and massacres that followed claimed many more victims. Had 
the refugees not been routed back to Rwanda by the AFDL - the timing of which 
suggests that its aim was to quash the rationale for an international military intervention 
that might otherwise have interfered with the push for Kinshasa - the consequences 
might have been worse. As it is, the total cost in human lives is still not known: by July 
1997, UNHCR recorded a return to Rwanda of 834,000 refugees, and another 52,000 
were located in Zaire and its neighbouring countries, leaving some 213,000 
unaccounted.168 Thousands of these are known to have been killed.'69 Thus the aid regime 
established to protect the refugees actually endangered them. 
Chapter L noted two important factors to be considered in apportioning liability: the 
knowledge on which aid organisations based their decisions, and their capacity to have 
acted differently. Looking briefly at each in turn, it is interesting to note how few 
agencies referred to experience gained in the past through working in militarised refugee 
camps. The previous chapters illustrated the similarity of problems faced by aid agencies 
in other refugee contexts, particularly Cambodia, yet few in the aid community reflected 
on the parallels. Aid organisations also had knowledge of the possible destruction of the 
camps as Kagame repeated his threat on several occasions. Doubts about the Rwandan 
Government's determination to resolve problems of this kind should have been 
dispelled by the massacre at Kibeho in April 1995. Thus aid organisations could not 
claim ignorance of the manipulation of humanitarian action in the camps; the threats 
1a François Nzabahimana, `La situation dans les camps', and François Nzabahimana, Rassemblement 
pour le Retour et la Démocratie au Rwanda (RDR)' in Philippe de Dorlodot, Les réfugiés rwandais ä 
Bukavu au Zaire: De nouveaux Palestiniens? (Paris: Groupe Jérémie and L'Harmattan, 1996), pp. 
134 -136 and pp. 179 -181 respectively. 
`68 UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees: A Humanitarian Agenda (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997), p. 23. The number of refugees who fled west was the subject of acrimonious debate in 
the wake of the offensive, and diverted attention from the crucial issue of how to assist these people. 
Statistics are notoriously unreliable: the Rwandan genocide is estimated to have killed between half a 
million and one million people, meaning 500,000 give or take 500,000. There is no hierarchy of 
horror. Ten thousand deaths is not less atrocious than 100,000. Josef Stalin reputedly said: one death 
is a tragedy, one million deaths is a statistic. 
169 See Bradol and Guibert, `Le temps des assassins', pp. 144 -148. 
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made to close them; or the consequences of the militarisation of refugee camps in the 
past for the welfare of the refugees and future stability of the country. 
Their capacity to change the situation, however, was more limited. Without the 
capability to remove the former regime from the refugee camps, aid agencies could only 
chose between remaining or withdrawing. Most rejected the option of withdrawal; Slim 
says that to have withheld aid meant working on the principle of `doing evil that good 
may come' -a principle he says would make an absurdity of the humanitarian mandate 
of relief agencies.10 But the idea that withholding aid is doing evil presumes that 
external aid is indispensable to the survival of the refugees. This assumption warrants 
challenging; even a cursory glance at results of the Rwandan refugee return suggests that 
aid organisations may exaggerate their importance to the survival of vulnerable 
populations. 
Once forced back from Zaire, the refugees were required by the Rwandan Government 
to return immediately to their home communes. The establishment of transit or internally 
displaced person (IDP) camps was prohibited to avoid problems like those of Kibeho 
resurfacing, and aid activities were restricted to the provision of dry food, water and 
emergency medical care at way -stations along the road. The aid organisations were 
indignant about their restricted role, which was further reduced during the refugee 
repatriation from Tanzania for which only two aid organisations, the Rwandan Red 
Cross and IFRCRC were authorised to assist. The result, however, was that road 
congestion was minimised and the refugees returned to their home communes with few 
problems that the presence of aid personnel could have averted. " This was not the first 
time that successful relief operations occurred with minimal or no assistance from 
international agencies: relief programs for Sahrawi refugees in Algeria in the 1970s and 
Afghan refugees in Iran in the 1980s were undertaken without international aid. In Iran, 
10 Hugo Slim, Doing the Right Thing - Relief Agencies, Moral Dilemmas and Moral Responsibility in 
Political Emergencies and War (Uppsala: Report No. 6, Studies on Emergenices and Disaster Relief, 
Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1997), pp. 12 -13. 
"t It should be mentioned, however, that the absence of a major cholera outbreak among refugees 
returning from Zaire was probably due to enduring partial immunity to the disease since the entire 
population of Goma was infected with the cholera bacterium in 1994 (only a small percentage 
develops severe symptoms). No one is sure how long such immunity lasts, but the low incidence in 
1996 suggests that it could be for two or more years. Of those who did contract the infectious disease, 
the case -fatality rates were low due to the preparation and skill of aid workers. I am grateful to Dr 
Ron Waldman of the Program on Health Consequences of Forced Migration at Columbia University 
for a discussion of this point (11 January 1999). 
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over 2 million refugees were integrated into the local community without the 
establishment of parallel services as occurred for the Afghan refugees in Pakistan. And 
when UNHCR personnel gained access to the Sahrawi refugee camps in the Algerian 
desert in the 1980s, they found the camps to be so well organised that no further 
intervention was necessary.12 The assumption that the withdrawal of assistance 
necessarily condemns refugees to an unacceptable fate does not withstand scrutiny. 
A further point to consider in any assessment of the responsibility of aid organisations 
for the consequences of the camps is that the choice they faced between remaining in the 
camps or withdrawing arose because others had already failed to uphold their 
responsibilities. As Henry Shue argues, the duty to aid per se only occurs once duties to 
avoid depriving and to protect from deprivation have failed to be performed.13 Aid 
organisations do not inherit the responsibilities that others have failed to fulfil. The 
belligerents on both sides failed to respect international humanitarian law obliging a 
distinction between combatants and non -combatants, and governments failed in their 
responsibility to uphold and enforce such laws in refugee camps. But is it enough that 
aid organisations decry the `humanitarian alibi', and blame the `international 
community' for its lack of political will to deal with the causes of the crisis? After all, if 
Ambassador Aldo Ajello, Special Envoy of the European Union to the Great Lakes 
Region blames the `international community' for the Great Lakes crisis,'" as does Bill 
Richardson, US Ambassador to the United Nations,15 who or what is the `international 
community'? It seems to be a nebulous entity to which all blame can be apportioned 
with no responsibility assumed. 
There has to be a point at which aid organisations acknowledge that by choosing to 
intervene and professing to alleviate suffering they undertake certain responsibilities to 
the people whose expectations they raise. Furthermore, they should acknowledge that 





Peter Hakewill, former UNHCR medical coordinator, personal communication, January 1999. 
Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996). 
Aldo Ajello, Opening Statement at the Second International Berlin Workshop, Improving African and 
International Capabilities for Preventing and Resolving Violent Conflict: The Great Lakes Region 
Crisis (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 3 -5, 1997), pp. 35 -39. 
Bill Richardson was quoted in Gourevitch, `Continental Shift', p. 52 saying: `The failure of the 
international community to respond adequately to both the genocide and the subsequent mixing of 
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alibi, aid organisations are accepting the government funds that create the façade. In a 
sense, by fulfilling the duty to aid and appeasing public consciences aroused by the sight 
of suffering, aid agencies are inadvertently permitting states to abrogate their higher 
order responsibilities of prevention and protection. 
Exploring some of the broader policies pursued by donor governments with respect to 
the Rwandan crisis raises further questions about how aid organisations can reconcile 
their duty to vulnerable populations with the often conflicting concerns of the 
institutions that finance their activities. The attainment of stability, however superficial, 
was the principal policy pursued by donors in Rwanda in the aftermath of the genocide, 
superseding all other issues, including human rights and justice. It is ironic that the same 
donor community that funded the largest source of insecurity to Rwanda sought stability 
inside the country to such an extent that it suppressed the Gersony report that alleged 
serious human rights abuses by members of the new regime. "6 Although justifiably 
embarrassed to censure human rights abuses of the Rwandan Government after having 
done nothing to stop the genocide, and permitting génocidaires to live with impunity in 
UN- sponsored refugee camps, the dismissal of excesses as `normal' after such a tragedy 
aided the rise of hardliners in the government at the expense of the moderates. "' Donors 
had leverage with the new government; when cautionary representations were made in 
the wake of the Gersony report and prior to the donor conference of January 1995 in 
Geneva, the killings reduced markedly. "a But once the $587 million was pledged, `the 
killing spree started again', according to former Interior Minister Seth Sendashonga,19 
culminating in the Kibeho massacre of April 1995. 
genocidal killers with the legitimate refugee population in the former eastern Zaire only served to 
prolong the crisis'. 
16 The Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda remarked that the Gersony Report was 
suppressed because `had it been officially released at the time it would have reduced the legitimacy of 
the new government and severely jeopardized efforts by UN agencies and many of the donor 
organisations to assist the new government to establish an effective administration'. Borton et al., 
`Humanitarian Aid and Effects', foomote 49, p. 49. 
177 Three senior Hutu members of the government were sacked in August 1995, the Prime Minister, 
Faustin Twagiramungu, the Minister of Interior, Seth Sendashonga, and the Minister of Justice, 
Alphone -Marie Nkubito. Twagiramungu, in particular, had been publicly critical of the `parallel 
government' which had formed its own army and a `ministry of walkie- talkies' from the diverse secret 
service organisations. See Stephen Smith, ` Twagiramungu, martyr de la réconciliation', Libération, 
30 August 1995, p. 6. See also Prunier, Rwanda: Update to End July 1995, for a discussion of the 
rise of hardliners to power within the government. 
18 Leave None to Tell the Story, p. 14. 
19 Seth Sendashonga's outspoken criticism of the Rwandan Government after his departure led to an 
attempt on his life in Nairobi in February 1996. The would -be assassin, Francis Mugabo, was in 
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The international reaction to the Kibeho massacre and its aftermath exemplified the 
political expediency dominating donor policies towards Rwanda. Although several 
donors suspended non -humanitarian aid to Rwanda following the massacre to show 
their concern at the human rights violations,180 aid was resumed within one month upon 
the publication of the report of an `International Independent Commission of Inquiry' 
into the massacre,18' despite the flagrant sham created by the Commission. Four features 
of the Commission and its findings are particularly salient. First, the legitimacy and 
independence of the Commission was highly questionable. It was proposed by and 
answerable to the accused party, the Rwandan Government, and the Rwandan 
representative appointed to the commission was Christine Umutiini, a former Director of 
Cabinet and part of the Ugandan inner circle (Akazu) of the RPF. t82 Created as an ad hoc 
body, the Commission was not accountable to an established institution, thereby 
minimising potential follow -up. 
Second, and indicative of its lack of independence, the Commission failed to determine 
even a range of the number of deaths at Kibeho. The Rwandan Government alleged 334 
fatalities, and the UN counted 4,000, although revised the offical figure to 2,000. The 
Commission avoided comment, suggesting on the one hand that `the numbers are more 
than those formally counted in the Kibeho camp', and on the other, noting `the unusual 
discrepancy between the various initial counts and estimates of fatalities and the actual 
number of non -fatal casualties, suggesting over -estimation in the initial fatality counts 





charge of visas at the Rwandan Embassy in Nairobi. Since he held diplomatic immunity he was 
deported to Rwanda. Sendashonga was murdered in May 1998, shot in his car on his way home from 
a meeting. Gérard Prunier, personal communication, 17 November 1999. 
The US suspended non -humanitarian assistance; Belgium suspended part of its bilateral aid; and the 
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action. Anton Barre, David Shearer, Peter Uvin with contributions from Christian Scherrer, The 
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it is surprising that an estimate could not be made considering the presence of a forensic 
specialist in the investigative team, and the testimony of UN peacekeepers who 
physically counted 4,000 dead and 650 wounded with a pace counter before they were 
halted by an RPA patrol.'84 
Third, through the omission or glazing over of important facts, the report was biased in 
favour of the government position. For example, despite mentioning that of the 70,000 
IDPs that had returned home from Kibeho by March 1995, 60 percent had stayed home 
(hence 40 percent had not),185 the Commission failed to acknowledge the legitimate fears 
that the IDPs had of conditions at home. These included: widespread incidents of 
violence and insecurity throughout the country; the growing number of arrests of 
genocide suspects, many of whom even the government admitted were innocent;186 and 
the illegal occupation of houses by returnees from the Tutsi diaspora, complaints against 
whom could result in false accusations of guilt and hence imprisonment. Instead, the 
Commission emphasised the Rwandan Government rationale for wanting the camps 
closed, primarily strong suspicions that the camps sheltered génocidaires who were 
responsible for continuing instability in the south. The Commission found that the 
action of the RPA was `disproportionate and, therefore, violative of international law', 
but offered five factors as explanations, bordering on justifications, for the slaughter, 
including deficiencies in communication, equipment, training and experience. These 
findings partly explain the reluctance of the Commission to verify the number of deaths: 
at some point the argument in favour of the `accidental' nature of the killings would 
have been hard to sustain. 
The fourth feature and pièce de résistance of the report is that it apportions 
responsibility for the deaths at Kibeho among the RPA, NGOs, UNAMIR and the 
unidentified armed elements among the IDPs. In other words, the report concludes that 
the failure of UNAMIR and the aid agencies to persuade or coerce the internally 
184 Colonel Peter Warfe, Recent examples of the application of International Humanitarian Law in 
conflict situations (Hobart: Address to the Australian Red Cross National Conference, International 
Humanitarian Law: The Challenge of Effective Implementation, 22 -23 July 1999). Colonel Wade 
was the force medical officer of the Australian contingent in UNAMIR 11 in April 1995. In spite of 
the number of dead counted by the Australians, the official UNAMIR death figure was put at 2,000. 
Wade says that this figure was a compromise between numbers submitted by the force provost 
marshall, the Zambian Batallion and the Australian troops. Military observers also reported seeing the 
RPA exhuming bodies in the camp and transporting them elsewhere. 
185 Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry, p. 6. 
186 Adelman and Suhrke, `Early Warning and Conflict Management', endnote 132, p. 94. 
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displaced to leave the camp carried the same weight as opening fire with machine guns 
on a crowd of detained men, women and children. Having effectively excused the 
Rwandan authorities of wrongdoing and paved the way for the resumption of aid, the 
report closes with the recommendation to the international community `to continue 
encouraging and assisting the Rwandan Republic in its efforts to achieve justice, 
national reconciliation and reconstruction' .187 It was only a small step from `resolving' 
the IDP problem at Kibeho to `resolving' the refugee problem in Zaire, and all in tune 
with the donors' objectives. 
In many respects it is not the Commission's report in itself that is the most tragic aspect; 
inaccurate or biased reports are nothing new. It is the acceptance of such an overtly 
flawed report by donor governments, journalists, the UN and NGOs alike. Rather than 
challenging the validity of the findings and uniting to denounce the violation of human 
rights and to reassert humanitarian principles, international agencies blamed each other, 
and further deflected responsibility from the people who undertook the killing. Philip 
Gourevitch, one of the apologists for the Kibeho massacre, cites the deputy chief of the 
UN Human Rights Mission in Rwanda, Mark Frohardt, as saying: 
I have no intention of trying to justify the manner in which Kibeho was 
closed... but I do believe that it is important to understand that the inability of 
the relief organisations to coordinate a successful operation set the stage for the 
tragedy that followed. Once the army saw that the efforts of relief agencies to 
move people out of the camps were ineffective, they knew they were the only 
institution, or force, in the country capable of closing the camps.'88 
In spite of his role as a human rights official, he seems to suggest that aid organisations 
should have transported people home against their will and with no guarantee of safety, 
in order to avoid a massacre he suggests was otherwise inevitable. Yet to blame NGOs 
for the massacre is absurd. The men who ordered and carried out the killings are to 
blame for the massacre. Aid agencies had stopped providing assistance to the camp and 
had no access to the population. After that, the refusal to participate in such a process is 
a legitimate ethical choice. As Rony Brauman has articulated in reference to other 
situations, `deciding to act means knowing, at least approximately, why action is 
187 Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry, p. 13. 
i89 Philip Gourevitch, We Wish To Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: 
Stories from Rwanda (New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux, 1998), p. 205. 
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preferable to abstention.' 189 Had international personnel been aware that the RPA would 
open fire on the displaced population if they did not leave the camps, then they were 
obliged to pressure the Rwandan Government to prevent human rights abuses, rather 
than participate in the violation of one set of rights to achieve another. 
The DPKO lessons -learned' report absolves the Rwandan regime of responsibility even 
more thoroughly, not even mentioning the bullets, but blaming a lack of coordination for 
the massacre. 
One instance when the coordination mechanism of the integrated operations 
centre failed was in the Kibeho camp for internally displaced people in late 
April, 1995. The Government's decision to close the camp, by force if 
necessary, resulted in a stampede in which many people lost their lives. Some 
of those interviewed stated that if the Government, UNAMIR and the 
humanitarian community had coordinated well with each other by providing 
transportation and allowing sufficient time to those who were willing to return 
to their home communes, some lives could have been saved. 190 
Even a recent Organisation of Economic Co- operation and Development (OECD) study 
specifically analysing the role of official development assistance in producing incentives 
and disincentives for conflict failed to question any aspect of the Commission's report 
despite the weight that it carried in the resumption of donor funding. Although an 
important finding in itself, the report only notes with relation to the Kibeho incident that 
the policies pursued by individual donor nations and the European Union (EU) were `if 
not directly conflicting, at least inconsistent' 29' The Rwandan regime had skilfully 
deflected attention away from its strong -arm tactics and laid the blame at the feet of the 
aid community for supporting the structure. It was a dress rehearsal for the refugee 
camps in Zaire 18 months later. 
CONCLUSION 
A number of significant points emerge from this chapter. First, the Rwandan refugee 
camps played a vital role in the insurgency against the Rwandan regime. Although the 
former Rwandan regime and army fled to Zaire with considerable financial and material 
189 Brauman, `Refugee Camps, Population Transfers, and NGOs', p. 192. 
'90 Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda 
(UNAMIR), October 1993 -April 1996, p. 35. 
191 Barré et al., The Limits and Scope for the Use of Development Assistance and Disincentives for 
Influencing Conflict Situations, p. 18. 
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assets, it was the humanitarian sanctuary that permitted their continued survival as an 
entity until late 1996. Despite the professionalism of the ex-FAR and government -in- 
exile on paper, benefit of hindsight illustrates that the former government and army 
never had the capacity to reinvade Rwanda successfully. The refugees were the crucial 
bargaining chips in the former regime's plan to start negotiations with Kigali, and the 
camp structures helped to keep the population in exile. In addition, the guerrilla attacks 
launched from Zaire helped to keep Ioyal supporters mobilised, sabotaged 
reconstruction and reconciliation efforts inside Rwanda, and generated reprisals against 
the Hutu population which added weight to the hardliner discourse promulgated in the 
camps. Thus rather than playing a complementary role to a military strategy supported 
from external patrons, the Rwandan refugee camps and the humanitarian aid therein 
guaranteed the survival of the genocidal force. 
Second, in spite of the knowledge acquired by aid organisations in the past about the 
negative consequences of humanitarian action, these recurred and were more insidious 
than on previous occasions. Yet unlike in the Afghan, Cambodian, Salvadoran or 
Nicaraguan refugee camps, for all but the pro -Hutu agencies working in the Rwandan 
camps, the misuse of humanitarian aid was not in the name of a `just' cause. The vast 
majority of aid organisations did not justify their tolerance of the abuse of aid by 
appealing to a greater good that would be served by permitting the revival of the former 
Rwandan regime, and government donor funds were not channelled to the camps to 
serve this end. The paradoxes of humanitarian action were genuinely unintended. 
Aid organisations share responsibility for some of the tragedies of the last three years in 
the Great Lakes region because by accepting the priorities and agendas of the 
government donors whose money they accept, they permit governments to abrogate their 
political responsibilities to address the more profound issues at the root of the crisis. 
Through half- hearted political engagement in the Rwandan crisis, donor governments 
assisted in the re- emergence of extremists of both sides of the political and ethnic 
divide, with the resultant attack on the refugee camps, and the erosion of norms of 
refugee protection. In the end, it is the people that aid organisations are trying to help 
and the principles protecting future populations that fall victim to the politically 
expedient policies of powerful states. 
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Moreover, through permitting humanitarian action to be manipulated, and dismissing an 
ethic of refusal, aid agencies risk seeing humanitarian action become a scapegoat for the 
failure of others to uphold their obligations and responsibilities. Senior US officials like 
Brian Atwood and Leonard Rogers used their `revelation' in March 1997 about the 
perverse effects of humanitarian action to call for a future policy linking humanitarian 
aid more closely to US foreign policy. In the International Herald Tribune they wrote: 
It now seems clear that in those camps more than a million people were 
controlled against their will by the perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda... 
Shocking but true, the provision of humanitarian assistance by the United 
States, the European Union and others helped those who committed genocide 
to control these people for more than two years...The future course seems 
clear: Humanitarian aid must be Iinked more closely to our foreign policy.192 
Feigning prior ignorance of the militarised nature of the refugee camps and blaming aid 
for the problem was a shameless attempt to shed responsibility for the failures of 
political leaders to address all but the humanitarian consequences of the crisis from the 
outset. After all, this thesis has shown that the US is one of the nations most acquainted 
with the role that refugee camps can play in war, yet the lessons of history are 
selectively applied. When the Khmer Rouge analogy was raised, it was not to argue for a 
tougher stand against those responsible for genocide, but to advocate for a less voluntary 
policy of repatriation. McCall ended his speech at the 1996 donor meeting with the 
words: 
I am still haunted by the role that humanitarian assistance and humanitarian 
sanctuary in Thailand played in guaranteeing the survival of the Khmer Rouge. 
We all tried to do the right thing, but we accomplished the wrong result. Nearly 
twenty years later, the people of Cambodia are still paying the price. The 
situation in the refugee camps, particularly in Zaire, is not unlike the choices 
we faced 20 years ago on [sic] Cambodia. And I very much hope that we do not 
repeat the same errors.193 
For the aid organisations, operating in the Rwandan refugee camps involved difficult 
tradeoffs between competing moral principles. Most agencies decided to stay to meet 
the immediate needs of the population at the possible expense of future needs. Others 
192 J. Brian Atwood and Leonard Rogers, `Rethinking Humanitarian Aid in the New Era', International 
Herald Tribune, 12 March, 1997, p. 10. At the time of writing, the authors were the administrator of 
US Agency for International Development and the acting administrator of its Bureau for 
Humanitarian Response, respectively. 
'93 US Statement delivered by Richard McCall to the Rwandan Roundtable Conference, Geneva, 20 -21 
June 1996, p. 6. 
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decided that in the absence of achieving what was just, they should at least not 
participate in what was so obviously unjust. It is hard to weigh the pros and cons of each 
position, particularly when future events cannot be foretold. But there are few scenarios 
in humanitarian aid operations which had more relevant precedents and could be as 
accurately predicted than the Rwandan refugee context. As Gasper says, an ethic that 
accepts a responsibility to help must also then assess whether, when, and how one really 
helps, otherwise it becomes only an ethic of response, not responsibility.'" Humanitarian 
action is a means to an end, not an end in itself, and the Rwandan crisis raises serious 
questions about the humanitarian imperative. 
'94 Gasper, 'Drawing a Line' - Ethical and Political Strategies in Complex Emergency Assistance', p. 
26. 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This thesis has now reached the point at which it began. The testimony of Narcísse 
recorded at the outset provides a glimpse of the consequences of the attack on the 
Rwandan refugee camps for the refugees who sheltered in them. Having watched the 
departure of international staff from Uvira, Bukavu and Goma, the refugees were left 
alone to face the consequences of the misuse of the camps. 
This thesis sought to explore, in the context of a wider comparison, how the Rwandan 
refugee camps became embroiled in the ongoing conflict, and why this was allowed to 
happen. It aimed to understand what precedents existed that should have informed 
political leaders and aid organisations of the likely consequences of the camps. To this 
end it examined several cases and demonstrated that the paradoxes of aid present in the 
Rwandan camps were manifest in previous situations. It showed that aid organisations 
had knowledge of the negative effects of their assistance in each case, and identified 
some of the ways in which aid agencies reacted to these. 
Some of the reasons for the persistence of the paradoxes of aid have been alluded to in 
the course of the study. This final chapter draws these together by exploring some of the 
institutional constraints faced by aid organisations in preventing the recurrence of 
negative effects of humanitarian action. It then comments on the implications of these 
findings for humanitarian action in the future. First, however, it will review some of the 
main findings that emerged from the case studies. 
1. REFUGEE- WARRIORS AND HUMANITARIAN ACTION 
1.1 The Relationship between Aid and Conflict 
One of the objectives of this study was to contextualise humanitarian action within the 
broader politico -military environment to shed light on the relative importance of aid in 
the conflicts under review. Thus each case study examined the host state as a military 
sanctuary for insurgents as well as a humanitarian sanctuary for refugee -warriors. Table 
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3 presents a summary of the `performance' of each, ranked from low to high. The 
judgement is based on the relative value of aspects of the humanitarian and military 
sanctuaries to each guerrilla movement; it is not a comparison between cases. Hence 
although the financial aid provided by the US to the Nicaraguan contras between 1979- 
1989 was less than one third ($400 million) of that provided to the Afghan mujahideen 
between 1980 -1987 ($1.5 billion), both eclipsed the relative contribution of aid to the 
war economy and are thus given a `high' rating. 
Table 3: Relative Benefits of Military and Humanitarian Sanctuaries to Guerrilla 
Movements 










































































The camps provided a high level of protection until they were attacked and destroyed. 
The most prominent observation from the table supports Jean- Christophe Rufin's initial 
idea regarding the relative benefits of humanitarian sanctuaries: the Iegitimacy derived 
from refugees and the control mechanisms provided by refugee camp structures were the 
most consistently advantageous aspects of refugee camps to combatants. Insurgents who 
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enjoyed strong support from host states and external patrons had less need of the 
protective functions of refugee camps, or humanitarian aid to supply the war economy, 
than those without such benefits. The Nicaraguan case is largely the inverse of the 
Rwandan case. External backers had little influence over relations between the guerriIIa 
movement and the civilian population; thus it was in this realm that refugee camps 
performed their most important function. 
This finding, although not astonishing in itself, has two implications. Tt provides weight 
to an hypothesis mentioned in Chapter 1, that the end of superpower patronage to 
guerrilla factions is likely to increase the importance of other resources available to 
support war economies, one of which is humanitarian aid. The importance of 
humanitarian aid to the war economy is likely to be proportional to the resource base of 
the warring parties. In areas bereft of easily accessible and saleable natural resources, 
such as Somalia and the Sudan, humanitarian aid will have a greater impact on the 
conflict than in resource -rich areas of Sierra Leone and Liberia. This has implications 
for the deliberations of aid organisations concerning the relative good and harm of 
humanitarian action in each context. 
Yet the thesis findings also show that although the diversion of aid commodities to 
waning parties is the most visible paradox of humanitarian action and hence the most 
common basis of claims that aid prolongs conflict, this is not necessarily the most 
significant contribution of humanitarian action to war. The legitimacy and control 
mechanisms provided to belligerents are more important in certain conflicts. Hence 
although they are less easily measured than contributions to the war economy, these 
side- effects of humanitarian assistance must be included in deliberations on overall 
impact. 
The cases examined in this study illustrate the difficulty of determining whether 
humanitarian action can be said to have prolonged a given conflict. In the Afghan and 
Nicaraguan cases, the level of military support lent to the mujahideen and contras 
suggests that aid played a complementary but not essential role in their respective 
conflicts. In both cases the refugees had strong symbolic value and helped to justify 
Western support to the resistance. In the Cambodian conflict, the ultimate importance of 
humanitarian assistance is harder to assess: on the one hand, the humanitarian sanctuary 
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resuscitated the Khmer Rouge forces after their defeat, and empowered and legitimised 
the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). On the other hand, 
strategic imperatives would no doubt have prompted allies to supply food and other 
goods in addition to military equipment to the anti -Vietnamese forces even without the 
humanitarian façade provided by the relief program. The Khmer Rouge kept up to 
100,000 civilians in hidden border camps, and with backing from the Chinese 
Government would doubtless have continued to wage the guerrilla war against Phnom 
Penh regardless of the border aid operation. Again, the refugees held a primarily 
symbolic value to sanction policies pursued by Western governments. 
In the Rwandan refugee case, by contrast, evidence suggests that humanitarian action 
prolonged the Rwandan conflict. It certainly increased its intensity. Although the 
defeated regime and army had considerable assets at their disposal in Zaire, it is 
doubtful that they could have survived as more than roving guerrilla groups without the 
protection and sustenance provided by the refugee camps. The contemporary Armée de 
Libération du Rwanda (ALIR), which consists of ex -FAR and Interahamwe members, 
provides an indication of how the defeated force may have organised without the 
refugee camps. Yet this new force is backed by Laurent Kabila's government in the 
context of the regional conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Given that 
in 1994 Mobutu's government did not pay its own soldiers, it is unlikely that the 
génocidaires would have received the kind of support from Mobutu that the ALIR is 
presently receiving from Kinshasa. Moreover, without the large number of refugees to 
disrupt the ethnic balances in North Kivu, the ex -FAR and Interahamwe may have 
found hostile hosts in the Tutsi Banyarwanda living in the Masisi region. 
One significant point to emerge from the case studies is how humanitarian action in the 
post -Cold War period has been transformed from a tool with which governments pursue 
foreign policy objectives, to a tool with which to avoid foreign policy engagement. 
During the Cold War battle for ideological supremacy, refugees were a potent symbol of 
the tyranny of the opposing side, and helped to justify and legitimise support for 
refugee -warriors in accordance with tenets of the Reagan Doctrine. Humanitarian action 
was deployed and manipulated to serve this end, and aid organisations faced obstacles 
when applying humanitarian principles and influencing the policies of actors in the 
omnipresent political environment. The ending of the Cold War eased political 
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imperatives that had dominated humanitarian concerns, but rather than empowering 
humanitarian organisations to reassert respect for humanitarian values, political 
disengagement left humanitarian action in a vacuum. Without the power or mandate to 
address the causes of crises, yet deployed as the primary response, humanitarian action 
is reduced to a palliative to assuage domestic public conscience in industrialised nations. 
Ironically, the paradoxes of humanitarian action in the Rwandan refugee camps were 
worse when unintended than when they were deliberately orchestrated in other contexts 
by donor governments to advance foreign policy goals. 
1.2 The Knowledge and Attitudes of Aid Agencies 
A number of significant points also emerge from the case studies regarding the attitudes 
and approaches of aid organisations to the paradoxes of humanitarian action. First, it 
seems that the extent to which the side- effects of aid were acknowledged and debated 
among aid organisations depended largely upon the perceived `justness' of the cause 
that humanitarian action was inadvertently assisting. Afghan self -determination was 
widely supported and aiding the resistance generated little debate, whereas the camps in 
Central America and Cambodia polarised the aid community around contending images 
of the `good' side. Rwanda generated the most consternation among humanitarian actors 
since, for the first time, the side -effects of aid were not serving some perceived greater 
good. 
The second point that emerges - and also contributes to an explanation of the 
widespread tolerance of the misuse of aid - is the prevalence of a technical approach to 
humanitarian action in all of the cases discussed. For aid agencies that focused first and 
foremost on fulfilling the material needs of refugees, issues of a political or ethical 
nature were suppressed. For some, the neutrality of humanitarian action necessitated an 
apolitical focus, abstaining from engagement in any form of political debate or 
controversy. For others, a perceived inability to influence the situation provoked a 
pragmatic response to the crisis. Successes and failures of aid programs could be judged 
in terms of technical standards of aid delivery; recall that the efficiency and organisation 
of the Khmer Rouge camps impressed several aid personnel. As all the cases illustrate, 
however, by their participation, aid organisations were necessarily implicated in the 
larger political picture, particularly when in receipt of funds from governments pursuing 
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a political agenda. Whether they acknowledged it or not, unless they intervened equally 
on both sides of a conflict or ensured that their aid accrued no benefit to a warring party 
- something impossible - aid organisations were supporting one side by default. 
This leads to the third observation drawn from the case studies: that when humanitarian 
principles clash, aid organisations differ in the priority that they accord to each. The 
ethical evaluations implicit in the trade -offs are guided by different factors. It is 
insightful to review some of the ways that individual agencies reconcile these competing 
principles. Of paramount concern to ICRC is the application of strict neutrality to its 
operations which facilitates access to the heart of conflicts in some instances, and 
restricts access altogether if permission is not forthcoming. In the Cambodian crisis, 
ICRC's insistence on a presence on both sides of the conflict successfully overcame 
Phnom Penh's prohibition on other agencies, whereas in Afghanistan, ICRC was not 
permitted to work in resistance areas until 1988. 
Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) and Oxfam, by contrast, privilege principles of 
proportionality over concerns of neutrality, judging that the needs on one side are often 
greater than on the other, or that the nature of the regime precludes aid effectively 
reaching the people in need. Thus Oxfam's abhorrence of the Khmer Rouge and 
concerns of justice for the Cambodian people directed its decision to work inside 
Cambodia and not with the refugees along the Thai -Cambodian border. MSF similarly 
chose not to work with the Khmer Rouge, but considered that the nature of the 
Vietnamese- backed regime in Phnom Penh obviated the possibility of aiding civilians 
inside Cambodia, so limited its assistance to non -Khmer Rouge camps. In the Afghan 
conflict, MSF worked inside Afghanistan with the mujahideen, judging that the 
indiscriminate and disproportionate force employed by Soviet troops warranted aiding 
the victims of atrocities, regardless of the violation of neutrality and state sovereignty. In 
Honduras MSF made a concerted effort to assist refugees fleeing the right -wing 
government in El Salvador and the left -wing government of Nicaragua, recognising that 
there were victims of atrocities on both sides. 
Finally, perceptions of a `just' cause often guide aid organisations in choosing sides and 
shape their attitudes towards the abuse of humanitarian assistance by guerrilla 
movements. Yet in each case cited the `justness' of the cause was no guarantee that the 
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guerrilla leadership was concerned for the welfare of the civilians under their control. 
Although helping to free people from the tyranny of oppression may be a humanitarian 
act, the use of humanitarian action to pursue such ends is problematic. As the Afghan 
chapter indicated, while leaders like General Masood showed genuine concern for the 
welfare of civilians, others, Like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, did not. Once the Soviets 
withdrew and the factions turned their guns on one another, as far as the West was 
concerned the idealised `freedom fighters' became `warlords' as the humanitarian aid 
they were accustomed to diverting was no longer in the name of a `just' cause. The 
subjectivity of the judgements made by aid organisations was most starkly illustrated in 
Honduras, where aid organisations chose to work with refugees according to ideological 
interpretations of what was just'. Again, although the Salvadorans were fighting to 
overthrow a regime responsible for terror and widespread human rights abuses and as 
such gained the support of many aid agencies, the means employed in the refugee camps 
violated the basic rights of the refugees. 
Cambodia most clearly illustrated the limits of invoking claims of a `just' war to defend 
the manipulation of aid by one party to a conflict: oppressors were found on both sides. 
Aid organisations had to turn a blind eye to many abuses in order to defend the 
compromises made in operating along the border or in Cambodia. The inclusion and 
dominance of the Khmer Rouge in the CGDK discredited claims that working in non - 
Khmer Rouge camps entailed no ethical compromises, and although the regime in 
Phnom Penh faced harsh treatment from the `international community', this did not 
justify the behaviour of the Vietnamese- backed regime towards Cambodian civilians or 
aid organisations. One wonders whether the Cambodian peasants appreciated the gesture 
of solidarity shown by the aid agencies based in Phnom Penh as they were marched to 
the border to construct the bamboo wall. 
These cases illustrate the pitfalls of a `solidarity' approach to humanitarian action, and 
the repercussions of permitting humanitarian action to be manipulated for a `good' 
cause. In each case it was the people to whom the aid organisations had primary 
responsibility who suffered as a consequence of the lack of humanitarian space. The 
fight against tyranny and totalitarianism may have been just, but did this end justify all 
means to achieve it? This raises broader questions about the labelling of victims, and the 
basis on which aid organisations judge the side they consider is right. It is interesting to 
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note that the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), `freedom fighters' opposing the tyranny 
of Serbian President Slobodan Milosovic, took steps to `cleanse' the territory of Serbian 
residents after its NATO -assisted victory in much the same way that Milosovic 
attempted with Albanian residents a few months earlier. The victims of today are 
potentially the aggressors of tomorrow. 
2. INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS TO LEARNING 
The preceding chapters highlighted external constraints confronting aid organisations in 
applying humanitarian principles to their operations and mitigating the negative 
consequences of humanitarian action. In addition to these external factors over which 
aid organisations have little control, there are many endogenous determinants of the 
international relief system that help to explain why the paradoxes of humanitarian action 
recur and persist. This section discusses several institutional factors that impede the 
ability of aid organisations to learn from past experience and to change their behaviour 
accordingly. But first it is important to reiterate a point made in Chapter 1 about the 
inevitability of negative consequences. Humanitarian action is imbued with an inherent 
and inescapable paradox. 
The humanitarian constraints imposed on the conduct of war are broadly concerned with 
two areas: discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate targets in war, the most 
basic of which is combatants from non -combatants; and the principle of proportionality 
to limit unnecessary suffering and destruction. But any rules constraining the means of 
warfare are likely to slow the speed of victory, hence lengthening the duration of 
conflict. Military leaders throughout history have debated whether it is less cruel to have 
a swift, decisive victory ignoring humanitarian restraints, or a conflict drawn out by 
respect for humanitarian laws. Thus the idea at the heart of restraining the means of 
conflict potentially prolongs it. 
At another level, provisions of humanitarian action and the requisites of war lead to the 
inevitable use of the former in pursuit of the latter. The granting of immunity to medical 
installations and wounded combatants permits military personnel to be resuscitated and 
returned to combat. Protected spaces in war are liable to be infiltrated when one party to 
the conflict is facing defeat and possible annihilation, thereby violating the sanctity of 
Chapter 6 Conclusions and Implications 271 
the protected space and jeopardising its raison d'être. Guerrilla warfare blurs the 
distinction between combatants and non -combatants, raising ethical issues about the 
level of complicity - and hence legitimacy as targets - of individuals undertaking vital, 
yet unarmed, combat support functions. And the provision of essential goods and 
services is crucial to generate real or perceived civilian allegiance necessary to claims of 
power and legitimacy. Humanitarian aid enters regions Iacking essential provisions, and 
aid becomes a stake in power struggles. Thus at an intrinsic and practical level, the 
paradoxes of humanitarian action will persist. 
Chapter 1 noted Mary Anderson's assertion that aid organisations should `do no harm'. 
This assumes that they can indeed contrive to `do no harm', yet such an idea is an 
illusion. Recognising this is essential to deliberations over the most ethically sound 
approach to a given situation: `doing no harm' is not possible because in practice, 
humanitarian action will always generate winners and losers. The best that aid 
organisations can hope to do is minimise the negative effects of their action. Applying 
knowledge gained from past experience is an important prerequisite for achieving this, 
but as the case studies have shown, few of the lessons of the past are heeded. Previous 
chapters have noted that the status of knowledge and ignorance is an important 
determinant in judging culpability for a given outcome, thus it is important to explore 
some of the constraints that aid organisations face in applying lessons of the past. 
Recalling remarks quoted in Chapter 1, Levy suggests organisational learning occurs as 
a result of the assimilation of individual learning and knowledge into the memory, 
policies and decision -making procedures of an organisation. Levy defines individual, 
experiential learning as `a change of beliefs (or the degree of confidence in one's 
beliefs) or the development of new beliefs, skills or procedures as a result of the 
observation and interpretation of experience'.' A key component of this definition - the 
interpretation of experience - provides the first clue as to why, at one level, aid 
organisations might not have learned from precedents to the Rwandan crisis. Thus it is 
useful to examine some of the factors that influence the interpretation of experience by 
individuals. Also implicit in this definition is recognition that learning does not 
necessarily involve change in policies and practice since many factors may prevent the 
Jack S. Levy, `Learning and foreign policy: sweeping a conceptual minefield', International 
Organisation 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994): 279 -312 at p. 283. 
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implementation of changes proposed on the basis of experience. Levy argues that 
`individual Iearning is necessary but not sufficient for organizational learning and 
studies of organizational learning, should attempt to specify at what point in the cycle 
the learning gets blocked'.2 Thus after analysing factors that influence learning at the 
individual level, the following section examines aspects of the international aid regime 
that impede the process by which individual learning can be transformed into positive 
changes in the provision of humanitarian relief. 
2.1 Interpretation of Experience 
At the most rudimentary level, the way in which individuals interpret experience is 
shaped by the conceptual and analytical framework they apply to observations; in other 
words, the lens through which they view the context. Every aid worker enters the field 
with his or her own history, assumptions, beliefs, motivation and expectations of what 
one can hope to achieve. As the case studies illustrate, the ways that aid personnel 
interpreted events differed according to individual political and ideological views. Only 
in the Rwandan case was there widespread consensus about the nature of the problem. 
But opinions were still divided over the most appropriate course of action to follow. 
Individuals are also influenced by the organisational culture of the agency with which 
they are affiliated. Mark Walkup defines organisational culture as the fundamental 
assumptions and beliefs shared by members of an organisation, as well as `the written 
and unwritten rules, codes of conduct, patterns of interaction, standard operating 
procedures, rituals, and myths that shape the behaviour of both an organization and the 
individuals that comprise it' .3 Most aid organisations have moments in their history or 
certain personalities that define the essence of the organisation and become part of its 
identity. Individuals shape the organisational culture as their experiences and behaviour 
become integrated into the structure of the agency, and this in turn influences the way 
that members of the organisation interpret experience. 
The ways that individuals cope with the stress of relief operations is also significant in 
shaping perceptions of experience. As the case studies illustrate, individuals must 
2 ibid., p. 289. 
3 Mark Walkup, Policy Dysfunction in Humanitarian Organizations: The Role of Coping Strategies, 
Institutions, and Organizational Culture', Journal of Refugee Studies 10, No. 1 (1997): 37 -60. 
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reconcile the competing needs and demands of refugees, refugee leaders, host 
authorities, donor governments, head office staff, international and national team 
members, and personnel of other organisations. The magnitude of the problem is often 
larger than can be met with a humanitarian response, and aid personnel are expected to 
be adaptable and proficient in undertaking a multiplicity of tasks.' Dealing with 
suffering and death is emotionally stressful, particularly if insufficient means are 
available to meet the needs of the population, necessitating choices about who will 
receive assistance and who will not. Even when this is not the case, the utilitarian public 
health approach applied to aid operations means that refugees in need of `specialised' 
care might not receive it. These causes of stress are compounded when insecurity and 
concerns about the misuse of aid generate questions about the viability and side -effects 
of the aid program.' 
In his insightful study, Walkup examines some of the psychological coping strategies 
that aid personnel adopt in response to the stress of their environment, and how these 
become institutionalised into the organisational culture of aid agencies. The four stages 
through which he suggests such coping strategies develop - overwork, detachment, 
transference, and reality distortion - help to shed light on some of the phenomena noted 
in the case studies. 
In the first stage Walkup suggests that aid personnel often try to overcome the distress 
of their environment and the relative limits of their effectiveness by overworking. In the 
process, colleagues and refugee representatives are often excluded from participation in 
decision -making and implementation since this is perceived to slow progress. 
Overworking commonly produces `burnout' which impairs the effectiveness and 
lucidity of individuals, reducing analytical potential and capacity for change. To 
Walkup's observations could be added a tendency at this stage to focus on the 
immediate and micro -level dimensions of the problem, rather than the longer -term, 
bigger picture. 
For an interesting discussion of some of the roles aid personnel are expected to fulfil, see Hugo Slim, 
`The Continuing Metamorphosis of the Humanitarian Practitioner: Some New Colours for an 
Endangered Chameleon', Disasters 19, No. 2 (1995): 110 -126. 
s For a more detailed discussion of the stress experienced by emergency workers see Ruth A. Barron, 
`Psychological Trauma and Relief Workers', in Jennifer Leaning, Susan M. Briggs and Lincoln C. 
Chen, Humanitarian Crises: The Medical and Public Health Response (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1999), pp. 143 -175. 
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A second phase that Walkup identifies is one of detachment by aid workers from the 
people they are trying to assist. Such detachment eases the guilt and frustration of not 
being able to resolve all the problems with which refugees are confronted, and is 
manifest both mentally and physically. Less contact with the refugees reduces the 
burden of requests or complaints, and aid personnel spend more time isolated in the 
vehicle or office. As was evident in many of the case studies, adopting a technical focus 
and concentrating on concrete, measurable tasks helps deflect attention from 
emotionally or ethically disturbing areas. Walkup also views the tendency of 
humanitarian personnel to isolate themselves with other expatriates in compounds and 
engage in black humour as a way of coping. 
When aid personnel can no Ionger detach themselves, Walkup suggests they begin to 
rationalise behaviour by transferring guilt away from themselves towards other factors, 
like `politics', `donors', the `host government' and even the `victims'. Recalling the 
Rwanda crisis, it was the `international community' which was to blame. By professing 
to have no control or power over the system, aid workers can rationalise inaction, or, as 
the Honduran and Cambodian cases show, acceptance of the status quo. Using terms 
like `complex emergency', and reiterating how much more complicated, dangerous and 
ubiquitous disasters are today than in the past, also helps to excuse by transferring blame 
to the nature of crises themselves. 
Walkup recognises that there are many external constraints confronting aid personnel 
but argues that they are reluctant to admit that their policies or actions may contribute to 
the problem. This tendency is due in part to a sense that benevolence should somehow 
be above critical scrutiny, that acts undertaken with good intentions can be excused 
from judgement. Manifest in sentiments from `at least we tried' through to aversions to 
evaluation because `you can't put a price on life', aid personnel are often indignant that 
their good will and hard work are subject to review. Complaints from the beneficiaries 
of aid tend to generate the worst form of indignation among aid workers, and the rights 
of beneficiaries as individuals become lost among claims of self- sacrifice by aid workers 
and accusations of ingratitude towards the refugee population. Yet in spite of this 
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aversion to criticism, Walkup notes that `most personnel are quick to point out errors of 
other organizations, while maintaining that "our organization is different"' .6 
The final stage Walkup identifies is reality distortion: `when reassigning the blame no 
longer satisfies and protects the ego, or when it is no longer possible to conceal the 
inadequacies, aid workers create false illusions of success to enable them to feel a sense 
of self -worth and accomplishment in the midst of institutional inadequacy or failure'? 
One of the most common manifestations of this distortion, he suggests, is the perception 
noted by Harrell -Bond among aid personnel, that people of other cultures do not suffer 
to the same extent as people in the West; that their greater exposure to pain and 
suffering somehow makes them immune.' Kurt Jansson, the first Director of the UN 
Emergency Office in Ethiopia during the famine of 1984 -1985 engaged in this type of 
cultural relativism when criticising MSF's public denunciation of the Ethiopian 
Government's resettlement program. He conceded that `no doubt there were casualties 
in the very hasty and badly organised transport of people... and conditions in many 
resettlement areas were bad', but dismissed the concerns as emanating from a young and 
inexperienced team who were `highly excitable, reacting emotionally to any events that 
they with their Western standards did not think appropriate'. 
To be sure, they had seen people in poor health leaving relief camps for 
transport to a transit camp or to a settlement area, and had seen the often harsh 
way local officials dealt with these people. This was nothing new to those relief 
workers aware of the marks that centuries of feudalism and oppression had left 
on the mentality of the peasant population, but it was quite understandable that 
some MSF staff, young and inexperienced as they were, should have been upset 
at what they saw. Ethiopia is not France. 9 
Jansson also characterised Chairman Mengistu as a man of `intelligence, quiet dignity, 
reserve and great courtesy' who held `a deep concern for the fate of his own people',10 
illustrating the extent to which reality can be distorted. It is interesting to note that it was 
Jansson who headed UNICEF in the Joint Mission in Phnom Penh from June 1980. 
Shawcross remarked that relations between the Heng Samrin regime and the Joint 
Wallcup, `Policy Dysfunction in Humanitarian Organizations', p. 46. 
ibid. 
s B.E. Harrell -Bond, Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1986), p. 206 as noted in Walkup, `Policy Dysfunction in Humanitarian Organizations', p. 47. 
9 Kurt Jansson, Michael Harris and Angela Penrose, The Ethiopian Famine (London: Zed Books, 
1990), pp. 24 -25. 
10 ibid., p. 29 and p. 31. 
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Mission improved after Jansson's appointment `not because the program in Cambodia 
started to work smoothly; it was rather that Jansson considered that complaint was now 
counterproductive'." This demonstrates how important individual agency and 
perception can be in determining the ethical and practical parameters of an aid 
operation. 
The use of sanitised language, as was evident in the Khmer Rouge camps in Thailand, is 
another example of reality distortion, this time a conscious form to insulate individuals 
from the implications of their task. An even more significant form of self- delusion was 
expressed by aid workers who claimed that through engaging with Khmer Rouge 
officials they could influence their behaviour. Perceptions of the nature of the 
Vietnamese- backed regime were also distorted to comply with the image of a 
responsible regime, necessary to secure funding for humanitarian activities. 
These psychological coping strategies impact upon the way that experience is 
interpreted, particularly through generating a defensiveness towards criticism that 
impedes the ability of individuals to admit to, and learn from, mistakes. However, not 
all of these tendencies among aid workers can be attributed to coping -strategies alone, 
there are other equally important factors to consider. The necessity, for example, to 
choose between two equally undesirable courses of action and defend such a choice may 
involve strong moral arguments that are not determined by psychological stress. 
Furthermore, criticisms by personnel of one aid agency of another does not necessarily 
indicate a transference of blame but may be generated by competition between agencies 
for media exposure and recognition, or may be in response to incompetence and bad 
practices. The contemporary discourse emphasising the increased complexity of crises 
and the dichotomy between the Cold War and post -Cold War environments also 
influences the interpretation of experience, infusing aid workers with the idea that there 
are no relevant precedents from past; that the complexity is new and requires novel 
solutions and approaches. Experiences are interpreted on the basis of this premise. 
This discussion has demonstrated that what individuals Iearn depends upon their 
interpretation of events, and that these are influenced by many factors and can vary 
considerably among individuals. These impressions may then be assimilated into the 
11 William Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy: Cambodia, Holocaust and Modem Conscience (New 
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organisational beliefs of each agency, and analyses of the same aid operation can differ 
markedly from one agency to the next, even when hindsight has afforded greater 
scrutiny of facts and interpretation. The Cambodian operation, for example, is still 
perceived very differently by members of MSF and those of Oxfam, illustrating that 
different views have permeated into each organisational culture. Responding to a 1997 
MSF publication reflecting on the past that characterised the Heng Samrin regime as a 
`pitiless and predatory dictatorship', a member of the Oxfam affiliate in Australia 
(Community Aid Abroad) wrote: `this comes as somewhat of a surprise given that the 
Heng Samrin regime did its best in international isolation and not only rebuilt a country 
shattered by the most brutal genocide in recent memory but did it with little external 
assistance'.12 The author then states that `this type of attack which is all too frequent in 
the book highlights both an ideological agenda and a self -righteous tone which only 
diminish the complex issues raised...', illustrating the strength with which different 
opinions can endure. The lack of common analysis among agencies has strong 
implications for the ability of the aid system as a whole to adjust its behaviour to 
diminish the negative consequences of humanitarian action. 
But even assuming that there was a `correct' analysis to be made of a given situation, 
the assimilation of this knowledge into a change in policies or practice can be blocked at 
several stages along the way. There are two phenomena, in particular, that impede the 
ability of aid organisations to learn lessons of the past: a culture of justification that is 
manifest externally to protect public confidence in humanitarian action; and a logic of 
institutional self -preservation that determines much of the inter -agency dynamic that 
occurs within the aid system. These are not mutually exclusive and contain many 
tendencies that might just as easily be associated with either explanation. 
2.2 The Culture of Justification 
A culture of justification pervades the international relief system and hampers its ability 
to confront and rectify problems or mistakes experienced in operations of the past. Part 
of the culture of justification stems from individual defensiveness towards criticism that 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), p. I78. 
Z Patrick Kilby, `Review of Médecins Sans Frontières, World in Crisis: The politics of survival at the 
end of the twentieth century', African Studies Review & Newsletter 19, No. 1 (June 1997): 39-41. 
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becomes assimilated into organisational behaviour, as Walkup suggests. But the 
eschewal of criticism has a more important systemic rationale that is intrinsic to the way 
that aid organisations - NGOs in particular - function. 
In contrast to business, where it is the satisfaction of the client that ensures financial 
viability, in humanitarian action it is the satisfaction of the donor. To exist and have the 
financial resources necessary to respond to emergency situations, aid organisations 
depend upon the generosity of the public in industrialised nations, either directly 
through fundraising activities or indirectly through aid allocations in government 
budgets. Thus aid agencies have a strong institutional incentive to portray humanitarian 
action as an indispensable remedy for human suffering. For the most part, accountability 
to donors takes precedence over ensuring that beneficiaries receive timely and 
appropriate humanitarian assistance, and the negative consequences of humanitarian 
action are downplayed. 
It seems that in Western industrialised nations, a sense of duty and responsibility to 
assist distant members of humanity only arises when they are perceived to suffer 
extreme hardship. Even then there are apparent limits to empathy (discussed below). 
The perceived need to justify foreign aid to domestic audiences and highlight its positive 
attributes is demonstrated by the Australian Agency for International Development 
( AusAID) on its official website. Rather than explaining its foreign aid budget in terms 
of Australia's responsibilities to the world community, AusAID justifies it by 
downplaying the cost of aid. It shows that of $100 of government expenditure, only 
$1.20 is spent on aid compared with $36 for social security and welfare, and $8 for 
defence. It justifies the allocation further by saying that most of the $1.20 is spent inside 
Australia.13 The majority of Americans are also averse to their current level of aid 
expenditure, with three -quarters considering that the amount is too large and two -thirds 
advocating a reduction.'4 Thus it is not only the voluntary sector that must appeal to the 
public's sense of common humanity; governments must justify spending taxpayers' 
money in this way. 
13 http:// www. ausaid. aov.au/australianaid/ozaidOl.htm 1997 as noted in Fiona Terry, `The Paradoxes of 
Humanitarian Aid', Agenda: A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform 5, No. 2 (1998): 135 -146 at p. 
136. 
14 Carol Lancaster, Aid to Africa: So Much to Do, So Little Done (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1999), pp. 105 -106. 
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The fragility of the base of public interest and support in humanitarian action creates 
two related tendencies among aid organisations associated with the culture of 
justification. The first is the perceived need to amplify the gravity of a situation or 
selectively report the worst aspects of it in order to arouse sufficient awareness and 
action to raise a response. The media play a vital role in this process, and a symbiotic 
relationship exists between aid organisations and journalists: the former rely on 
coverage and the latter benefit from subject matter, insights and logistical assistance in 
the field.15 Both aid organisations and journalists benefit from presenting images that 
shock Western audiences, often Ieading to what has been described as `disaster 
pornography'. 16 The `CNN factor' has gained notoriety in contemporary international 
affairs, on the one hand raising awareness of problems across the globe as they occur, on 
the other, desensitising audiences through allowing graphic pictures rather than in -depth 
reporting to convey the story. Although the `CNN factor' is widely believed to be 
another of the post -Cold World changes with which the aid community must contend, 
this effect of media reporting has been noted before. Shawcross remarked in 1984 that: 
The flood of instant information in the world today - at least in the western 
industrialized world - sometimes seems not to further but to retard education; 
not to excite but to dampen curiosity; not to enlighten, but to dismay. The poet 
Archibald MacLeish once noted "We are deluged with facts but we have lost or 
are losing our human ability to feel them "." 
The lack of public interest in distant disasters then generates a greater need to dramatise 
problems to arouse concern, and the situation spirals. 
The Rwanda case shows the magnet effect of media coverage to aid agencies, and the 
perception among many that they could not afford to be absent from Goma. The 
opportunity for free publicity at a time of heightened public awareness generated 
1s This relationship suffered a major setback during the Rwandan crisis, however, with several 
journalists complaining that they had been lied to and manipulated by aid organisations in relation to 
fears about the safety of refugees dispersed by the attacks on the Rwandan camps. The return en 
masse of the majority without significant incident was taken as `proof that the aid organisations had 
lied for fundraising purposes. The fact that 200,000 refugees were missing was overlooked in the 
outrage generated by the sight of healthy refugees returning. For a detailed discussion of the dispute 
between journalists and aid organisations at this time see Nik Gowing, `New Challenges and 
Problems for Information Management in Complex Emergencies: Ominous lessons from the Great 
Lakes and Eastern Zaire in late 1996 and early 1997', (London: Conference Paper for `Dispatches 
from Disaster Zones: The Reporting of Humanitarian Emergencies', 27 -28 May 1998). 
16 David Rieff, `The Humanitarian Trap', World Policy Journal 12, No. 4 (1995/96): 1 -11 at p. 7. 
' William Shawcross, `The Numbing of Humanity: Have We Had One Atrocity Too Many ?', The 
Washington Post National Weekly Edition (September 1984): 23 -24 at p. 23. 
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competition for visibility among aid agencies and the resultant ubiquitous display of 
agency logos and quest for media- friendly projects. This media and donor -driven 
context is not conducive to generating the sound political analysis and considered 
response necessary to limit the potential for the misuse of aid. It also skews attention 
and resources to regions that are judged of interest to Western audiences. One needs 
only to glance at the tins of chicken pate, foil -wrapped cheeses and fresh fruit and milk 
provided to Kosovar refugees to realise that budget allocations were greater there than in 
forgotten tragedies away from the media spotlight. 
The second implication of the reliance of aid organisations on support by the general 
public is that it discourages open discussion among aid organisations about the failures 
or negative consequences of humanitarian action. Most aid agencies paint their activities 
only in a positive light. A comment by an official of World Vision captures the 
prevailing view: 
You can't confuse the public with complex issues. Starving babies and 
droughts are something that people can understand. But trying to explain 
corruption or aid abuses is not going to help our fundraising and will only 
hamper our work.[$ 
Aid organisations depend upon an image of `doing good' for their support and are 
reluctant to jeopardise this image by airing concerns that aid may not be serving the 
purposes for which it was intended. Similarly, aid agencies are quick to thwart any 
accusations of wrongdoing or failure. The aid industry has little regulation, and one of 
the purposes of the various Codes of Conduct is to improve self -regulation of the 
industry to enhance accountability. However, the repercussions of serious criticisms 
levied at one organisation can reverberate throughout the industry as a whole, as 
allegations against CARE Australia illustrated to the Australian aid community in 
1995,t9 Thus agencies are more likely to close ranks and stifle criticism of aid practices 
and operations than engage in honest public debate. 
Is 
19 
As cited in Edward Girardet, `Public Opinion, the Media, and Humanitarianism', in Thomas G. Weiss 
and Larry Minear (eds), Humanitarianism Across Borders: Sustaining Civilians in Times of War 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), pp. 39 -55 at p. 46. 
A two part exposé containing allegations of, inter cilia, financial mismanagement and misleading 
advertising was aired on Australian commercial television in 1995. All Australian aid agencies 
experienced a loss of public confidence as a result. 
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As Chapter 1 highlighted, the increased criticism of humanitarian action that appeared in 
the wake of the Rwandan crisis provoked widespread reflection within the aid 
community and a greater commitment to evaluating aid programs. While a positive 
development, evaluations in themselves provide no guarantee of organisational learning: 
failures in the Rwandan operation were not due to a paucity of information. Evaluations 
must be read and acted upon. The danger with this sudden fad - recall that at least 25 
independent evaluations were planned for Kosovo by October 1999 - is the false sense 
of achievement and `accountability' that it creates. As Minear points out: 
The swing of the pendulum from a dearth of thoughtful material to an 
abundance of it is welcome and overdue. Yet the latter extreme may be as 
unhelpful to the process of learning and change as was the former. Even the 
proliferation of so- called lessons learned units is not in and of itself a sign of 
progress. Since serious learning requires institutional change, such units might 
better be called "lessons- learning" or "lessons identified" units and viewed as 
means to an end rather than ends in themselves.i0 
The culture of justification may have dictated that a more responsible image of aid is 
required to avert criticism and a Ioss of public confidence, but whether greater 
recognition of the problems will lead to less abuse of aid remains to be seen. 
2.3 The Logic of Institutional Preservation 
In contrast to the culture of justification which is projected predominantly towards 
external audiences, a logic of institutional preservation dominates much of the 
organisational response and behaviour of aid agencies with respect to other actors within 
the aid regime. The culture of justification impedes organisational learning through 
limiting the extent to which individual knowledge is absorbed and assimilated into 
organisational culture, and the logic of institutional preservation hinders the application 
of knowledge into changes in policies and practice. There are three aspects of the Iogic 
of institutional preservation that illuminate why the paradoxes of aid recur and persist in 
spite of knowledge acquired. The first two relate to the preservation of the aid industry 
as a whole - why it will prevail. The third concerns the logic of organisational 
preservation - how aid agencies respond to this. The logic of institutional preservation 
particularly militates against the likelihood that aid organisations will countenance an 
2° Larry Minear, `Learning to Learn', paper prepared for OCHA Seminar on Lessons Learned on 
Humanitarian Coordination, Stockholm, 3 -4 April 1998, p. 9. 
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ethic of refusal in humanitarian action even when the harm of an operation appears to 
outweigh the good. 
First, underpinning the logic of institutional preservation is the ingrained belief within 
the aid community that humanitarian action is indispensable to the survival of refugees 
and other victims of disasters. AIthough studies of Iocal coping -mechanisms may 
contradict this assumption - Alex de Waal holds that `relief is generally merely a 
footnote to the story of how people survive famine'21 - this supposition prevails as the 
axiomatic starting point for humanitarian action. It has remained largely unquestioned in 
spite of increased reflection on humanitarian issues within the aid community, 
indicating that although aid organisations might be willing to reconsider changes in 
behaviour and enhanced accountability, they are unwilling to question their raison 
d'être. 
In fact, the very tools developed to increase the responsibility of aid organisations are 
built around the primacy of the humanitarian imperative. The principal Code of Conduct 
affirms the right to give and receive humanitarian assistance as the first principle of 
humanitarian action, and this frequently translates into a demand for humanitarian 
access in the field 22 Emphasising access to vulnerable populations shifts attention from 
justice and protection for the people in need, to the means with which to assist them. 
This aid- centricity is most apparent when peacekeepers are given the mandate to protect 
humanitarian convoys and personnel, not the local people for which the aid is intended. 
This occurred in northern Iraq, Somalia and Bosnia, `as if soap or milk powder could 
prevent bombs from falling on hospitals, or generosity could offer protection against 
murder and expulsion' 23 The provision of humanitarian aid is a means to an end, the end 
being the preservation of life and dignity. While insecurity or belligerent actions can 
prevent aid reaching vulnerable populations, the deployment of military forces to protect 
21 Alex de Waal, Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa (Oxford and 
Bloomington: Africa Rights & the International African Institute in association with James Currey 
and Indiana University Press, 1997), p. 1. 
22 The press release issued by MSF upon winning the 1999 Nobel Peace Prize exemplifies the arrogance 
often associated with such demands: `MSF is independent and impartial in the name of medical ethics 
and demands that the right to humanitarian assistance be respected. MSF demands full and 
unhindered freedom to carry out its mandate.' MSF welcomes Nobel support for peoples' right to 
humanitarian assistance (Brussels: MSF Press Release, 15 October 1999). 
2J Françoise Bouchet -Saulnier, `Peacekeeping Operations Above Humanitarian Law', in François Jean, 
(ed.), Life, Death and Aid: The Médecins Sans Frontières Report on World Crisis Intervention 
(London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 125 -130 at p. I28. 
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the means in isolation of the ends is a dangerous travesty. A fuII belly does not provide 
civilians with protection. What is the point of securing humanitarian access to people if 
it deters one from recognising that they are in danger of losing their lives to violence? 
Perhaps the most significant illustration of the overweening belief in the indispensability 
of humanitarian action is the growing consideration given to employing private security 
companies to enforce the right of humanitarian access. Subscribing to the discourse of 
greater chaos and complexity, and less respect for international law in the `new world 
disorder', such measures are deemed necessary in the context of declining state interest 
to intervene militarily.24 According to an article in Jane's Intelligence Review, Defence 
Systems Limited (DSL) already counts the UN, CARE and Goal among its clients, 
alongside Shell, Mobil, and De Beers26 The article notes that supporting `humanitarian' 
missions has gradually gained DSL respectability, even allowing it to shed its 
`mercenary tag' .É6 The ethical and practical issues raised by the hiring of private security 
are too numerous to be dealt with in this study:27 suffice it to suggest that if humanitarian 
action has been reduced to a logistical exercise, better to contract a supermarket chain to 
deliver aid with the protection of DSL and at least avoid the humanitarian pretence. 
The second aspect of the logic of institutional preservation is closely related to the first: 
the humanitarian enterprise will prevail due to the nature of democratic governance in 
the West. As discussed earlier, deploying a humanitarian response is a visibly effective 
way for politicians to respond to public calls to `do something', thereby satisfying their 
constituents. Demands for more concerted action will generally not eventuate due to the 






For a excellent example of a dramatised account of problems in providing aid that leads to a proposal 
to engage private security, see Michael Bryans, Bruce D. Jones and Janice Gross Stein, Mean Times: 
Humanitarian Action in Complex Political Emergencies - Stark Choices, Cruel Dilemmas (Toronto: 
Report on the NGOs in Complex Emergencies Project, Volume 1, No. 3, Program on Conflict 
Management and Negotiation, Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, 1999). 
Kevin O'Brien, `Freelance forces: exploiters of old or new -age peacebrokers ?', Jane's Intelligence 
Review (August 1998), pp. 42 -46 at p. 44. 
ibid., p. 45. 
In addition to all the implications this issue raises concerning the responsibilities of states; the 
meaning of humanitarian action; the concept of `rescue'; and the repercussions of creating a new 
market for private security forces; the idea of aid organisations protected by private security 
delivering humanitarian aid to Grozny in defiance of the Russian army is absurd. 
See Rony Brauman, `L'assistance humanitaire internationale', in Monique Canto -Sperber (ed.), 
Dictionnaire de philosophie morale et politique (Paris: PUF - Presse Universitaires de France, 1996), 
pp. 96 -101. 
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compassion, empathy or justice. Michael Ignatieff articulated the difference with 
reference to the Bosnian war: 
If the cause of Bosnia failed to arouse the universal outrage and anguish that 
the atrocity footage on our television screens led one to expect, it was not 
because those watching such images in the comfort of their living rooms lacked 
ordinary human pity. The charitable response was quite strong. The real 
impediment to sustained solidarity ran deeper: in some deeply ingrained feeling 
that "their" security and "ours" are indeed divisible; that their fate and ours are 
indeed severed, by history, fortune, and good luck; and that if we owe them our 
pity, we do not share their fate 29 
Humanitarian action will remain the preferred tool of politicians because of its media 
appeal and public display of concern. The way that politicians react to early- warning 
signs verses emergencies in the international arena is much the same as in the domestic 
sphere: millions of dollars might be allocated to saving the life of a lone yachtsperson 
whose predicament is broadcast on the evening news, but the same sum is unlikely to be 
allocated to an improved weather forecasting system that could prevent future tragedies 
for many more sailors. Moreover, although it is known that humanitarian action is not 
the answer to crises generated by conflict, public pressure will ensure its deployment in 
much the same way that prisons are known to be an ineffective way to reduce crime 
rates and reform criminals, yet the public outcry in the face of serious crimes guarantees 
that prisons will prevail. 
The third aspect of the logic of institutional preservation concerns the way in which aid 
organisations position themselves vis -à -vis the above realities and in relation to one 
another. The expansion of humanitarian activity at the end of the Cold War and the 
proliferation of NGOs has created a veritable `aid industry'. Larger global budgets for 
humanitarian aid - $6 billion by 199530 - and the readiness of aid organisations to expand 
the notion of `humanitarian' activity beyond the provision of life -saving relief into areas 
of post- conflict peace -building and reconstruction has opened up new markets for 
Western commercial interest, and aid is becoming an enterprise. Since 1996, for 
example, `WorldAid' conferences have brought together `all those with a stake in aid to 
29 Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience (London: Chatto & 
Windus, 1998), p. 108. 
ao Randolph C. Kent, The battle for the soul of aid', WorldAid '96: A special Supplement of the 
Crosslines Global Report on WorldAid '96 (Geneva: 30 September -4 October 1996) 
http:// www.worldaid.orp/wa96/battle.htm (accessed 23/08/98) 
Chapter 6 Conclusions and Implications 285 
voice their concerns, promote their ideas and debate aid's future'31 around exhibits of the 
latest technological wares in water purification systems, communication equipment, 
high protein biscuits, plastic sheeting, prosthesis materials, and even mine detectors. 
Most aid organisations have embraced the expanded niche, and the technocratic 
approach featured in the case studies looks likely to flourish in the future. The High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata is fully supportive of the expanded domain, 
suggesting that `governments, business and humanitarians share a goal: meeting the 
needs of people, whether we look at them as citizens, as shareholders and customers, or 
as victims of war and persecution'. n 
This growth of the `aid industry' has been accompanied by attempts to consolidate and 
regulate it. Aid evaluations have consistently identified a lack of coordination among 
agencies as a major shortcoming of relief operations, and the need for increased 
coordination has been embraced as a panacea to problems encountered. This climate 
generates strong pressure to conform with the dominant views of government donors 
and UN agencies striving to forge a `coherent' response. The UN's Strategic Framework 
for Afghanistan discussed in Chapter 1 exemplifies this trend, prohibiting partner 
agencies from voicing divergent views on issues of principle. In this atmosphere of 
coordination and conformity, aid organisations that prefer to retain independence or hold 
different views are increasingly regarded as recalcitrant. This trend militates against the 
likelihood that aid agencies will oppose the views of donor governments or withdraw 
from a context for other than security reasons. It goes against the logic of self - 
preservation. 
This applies both to NGOs and to UN agencies. The Rwandan crisis showed how 
quickly one NGO was replaced by another, even when the first was withdrawing for 
ethical concerns that all aid organisations professed to share,33 and David Rieff has noted 
31 Randolph C. Kent, 'WorldAid '98 conference examines aid's unprecedented changes', 24 June 1997. 
http : / /www.worldaid.org/conf.htm (accessed 23/08/98). 
3d Sadako Ogata, `Let's Get Business and Humanitarians Together', International Herald Tribune, 25 
November 1999, p. 4. 
33 John Prendergast noted the lack of solidarity between NGOs in Sudan in 1992 when the UN 
suspended convoys to an area because of the murder of three relief workers and a journalist, yet 
Norwegian People's Aid and Catholic Relief Services expanded their food deliveries to cover the area 
that the UN was boycotting. John Prendergast, Frontline Diplomacy: Humanitarian Aid and Conflict 
in Africa (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p. 23. 
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how competition for donor funds can determine an NGO's entire rationale for action.;° 
As the Honduran and Rwandan cases showed, UNHCR is not immune from such 
pressure due to its dependence upon voluntary financial support from UN member 
states. UNHCR faces a conflict between its protection and assistance tasks: the more 
effectively it undertakes the former, the less likely it is that it will receive funding to 
undertake the latter. The Rwandan context clearly illustrated this clash and UNHCR's 
response to it was mixed. It privileged protection concerns when acting upon the 
findings of the Gersony Report, opposing the wishes of donors and the opinions of other 
UN agencies. But UNHCR privileged its assistance function and future relevance 
overall in the Rwandan camps through choosing to remain in spite of its inability to 
protect refugees. The expansion of UNHCR's tasks has been undertaken at the expense 
of its traditional protection role. 
In conclusion, this section has explored some of the endogenous factors within the 
international relief system that inhibit the potential for aid organisations to learn from 
experience of the past. AIthough there are irremediable constraints to escaping the 
negative side- effects of humanitarian action, the different interpretation of matters by 
individual aid personnel; the way this influences and is influenced by the organisational 
culture of aid agencies; the culture of justification that permeates the entire aid 
community; and the logic of institutional preservation, all weigh against diminishing the 
paradoxical consequences of humanitarian action. The mantra of `complex 
emergencies', `humanitarian crises' and the `new world disorder' distorts analysis of 
contemporary situations. As George Orwell said of the condition that clichés and 
stereotypes produce: `this reduced state of consciousness, if not indispensable, is at any 
rate favourable to political conformity'.0 
The willingness of aid organisations to comply with the objectives and priorities of 
government donors and UN agencies even when these are obviously driven by political 
expediency as in the case of Rwanda does not bode well for the values on which 
34 Rieff cites a member of Action Internationale Contre la Faim (AICF) in Sudan who said that the 
organisation only retained a presence in a region of the Sudan to be visible to the European 
Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO). Rieff, `The Humanitarian Trap', pp. 4 -5. 
i5 George Orwell, `Politics and the English Language', in Inside the Whale and Other Essays 
(Markham, Ontario: Penguin Books, 1988, originally published in Horizon 76, April 1946), p. 153, as 
cited in Catherine Lu, `Cosmopolitanism and Humanitarian Intervention' (Washington: Paper 
presented to the International Studies Association Convention, 16 -20 February 1999), p. 10. 
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humanitarian action was founded. Rather than applying knowledge gained in the past to 
contemporary operations, `lessons' have been used instrumentally, particularly by 
members of the US Government, to support policy preferences. Invoking in 1996 
memories of the Khmer Rouge to justify `less voluntary' repatriation from the Rwandan 
camps, and using `revelations' in 1997 of the abuse of refugee aid to call for tighter 
controls in the future, were shameless abuses of history. 
The continued ascendancy of technical responses to crises is liable to dominate moral 
and ethical issues and concerns. Harrell -Bond remarked more than a decade ago that 
'discussions of aid programmes conducted under the banner of humanitarianism 
concentrate... not on reasons for failures, but on competing claims to moral rectitude. 
The struggle for moral supremacy', she added, `can be fierce indeed'." Yet it is 
interesting to note that when an aid organisation does make an ethical or moral stand, 
other aid agencies tend not to engage in debate on this plain, but attempt to discredit or 
undermine the position on technical grounds. Jansson's dismissal of MSF's credibility 
in Ethiopia was illustrated above, and similarly de Waal, although agreeing with MSF's 
move, diminishes it as arising from `political naiveté'. He surmised that had MSF field 
staff been more aware of the implications of reporting what they had seen `they would 
have followed their colleagues in other agencies and remained silent'.37 This contrasts 
with MSF's own interpretation." 
hi a similar way several aid organisations dismissed MSF's withdrawal from the 
Rwandan refugee camps. Caritas staff said that the rationale was `purely budgetary', but 
was justified on political grounds," and Charles Tapp of CARE argued that MSF had 
run out of funding.* The most interesting to note, however, was Bruce Jones who 
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Millenium in 1995.4' Yet a report he produced for CARE Canada two years later, he 
wrote that MSF: 
had already pulled out of one camp, citing ethical issues, but MSF 
communications personnel privately will admit that MSF's role in the camp 
was in any case at an end, and that the ethical issue was not the one which 
determined the timing of the withdrawal.ó2 
Even after being sent MSF internal and external documentation to show the contrary," 
Jones retained the remark - attributed to a confidential interview with an MSF staff 
member - in subsequent revisions of the report. It is ironic that a publication in the same 
series co- authored by Jones five years after MSF's withdrawal recommends that NGOs 
develop a new humanitarian ethic that includes the option of withdrawal or 
disengagement.44 
3. IMPLICATIONS 
The suggestion of a need for a new humanitarian ethic is interesting to consider in light 
of the findings of this study. The perceived need for a `new' approach is premised on the 
assumption that the context is fraught with new dilemmas, something that this study has 
shown to be overstated. It is not a `new' ethic that is needed, but a moral framework that 
could provide guidance to aid organisations when thinking ethically about humanitarian 
action. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Codes of Conduct for humanitarian actors 
specify principles to which aid organisations should adhere, but provide no indication of 
how to weigh one principle against another when they conflict. Similarly, recent 
suggestions that aid organisations countenance the option of withdrawal are made while 
also asserting the humanitarian imperative.45 They offer little insight into how to 
61 He cities an MSF statement that said: `In Bukavu the situation has deteriorated to such an extent that 
it is now ethically impossible for Médecins Sans Frontières to continue aiding and abetting the 
perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide' that was quoted in The Glasgow Herald (Glasgow, 15 
November 1994), p. 4. Bruce D. Jones, "`Intervention without Borders ": Humanitarian Intervention 
in Rwanda, 1990 -94' Millenium 24, No. 2 (1995), pp. 225 -249 at fn 60, p. 245. 
42 Bruce D. Jones, Rwanda Report: International NGOs in the Response to the Rwandan Emergency 
(London and Toronto: `NGOs in Complex Emergencies' Project, a Collaborative Project of CARE 
Canada, the Harrowston Project on Conflict Management, University of Toronto, and the Conflict 
Analysis and Development Unit, London School of Economics, July 1997), section 2.3.3. 
a3 The documentation was sent by me after reading the draft report and meeting with Jones in London_ 
Bryans, Jones and Stein, Mean Times, pp. 37-41. 
as Bryan Jones and Stein, Mean Times. See also Marc Lindenberg, `Complex Emergencies and NGO5: 
The Example of CARE', in Jennifer Leaning, Susan M. Briggs and Lincoln Chen (eds), 
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reconcile such contradictory values. Without a hierarchy or ordering of principles, they 
can be engaged to justify any form of action or decision; they do not serve as a 
constraint to permissible action. 
Although this thesis was predominantly concerned with exploring problems facing 
humanitarian action, the findings have implications for the development of policy 
guidelines, and how such guidelines should be approached. The Rwandan chapter 
highlighted two conceptions of ethical evaluation; one that privileged the humanitarian 
imperative above all else, and one that privileged concern for the consequences of the 
camps. Most aid organisations subscribed to the former. As a senior official of UNHCR 
argued: 
We know we are often in a lose -lose situation. But if we leave, however we 
justify it to ourselves in terms of not collaborating with criminals, what it 
means on the ground is that we are abandoning the innocent civilian population 
to its fate. They are in no position to do anything to change their Ieaders, if they 
wanted to. It seems to me that what is truly unacceptable -I mean for us, both 
within the U.N. system and the NGGs- is to abandon them. I believe that 
morally there is nothing for us to do except stay.'° 
Yet the outcome of the Rwandan refugee camps illustrated the negative consequences of 
honouring the humanitarian imperative at all cost. A more effective moral framework 
needs to be developed through which competing principles of humanitarian action could 
be weighed against one another, taking into account the consequences of privileging one 
principle over another. Humanitarian actors need to assume more responsibility for the 
consequences of their actions. 
How much weight should be given to potential consequences is open to debate. 
Arguments in favour of only valuing the consequences of humanitarian action could 
lead to pragmatic approaches in which the ends justify the means, or in which the rules 
are made up as a relief operation progresses, according to the circumstances. 
Pragmatism is problematic as a moral framework to guide humanitarian action. 
Concerned with preserving the dignity of individuals, humanitarian action cannot 
sanction the use of all means to save life, and consistency is a crucial value to uphold in 
a moral position. As Neil MacCormack argues: `whatever be the variations in possible 
Humanitarian Crises: The Medical and Public Health Approach (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1999), pp. 211 -245. 
66 As cited in Rieff, 'The Humanitarian Trap', p. 9 (emphasis in original). 
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moral positions which people may have, there are criteria of coherence and consistency 
of judgements and principles which can be and ought to be applied to anything which 
claims to be a "moral position ", as distinct from mere gut reaction or knee -jerk 
prejudice'." Rules should also be announced in advance so that all parties understand 
the basis on which humanitarian action is provided. 
Thus neither a rigid adherence to the humanitarian imperative nor a pragmatic approach 
in which the ends justify the means provides an effective moral framework through 
which to conduct ethical evaluation. It is evident that the humanitarian imperative and 
humanitarian principles provide important guidance to humanitarian action, but rather 
than constituting values that should be honoured in themselves come what may, they 
may have to be called into question in extreme situations. The principle of impartiality, 
for example, is an important value to uphold. Adhering to and promulgating it promotes 
consistency in the application and provision of aid. It cautions against the application of 
double standards or arbitrariness towards populations or authorities as this might result 
in accusations of partiality and impede the possibility to operate. Thus the consequences 
of applying the principle of impartiality to aid operations would in most cases outweigh 
the consequences of applying divergent standards of treatment and care. Similarly, the 
humanitarian imperative is an important value to promote to ensure concern among 
different members of humanity for the welfare and dignity of the other. But these values 
needs to be weighed against other values in determining which line of action promotes 
the best overall good. In exceptional circumstances - like that of the Rwandan refugee 
camps - in which it is humanitarian action itself that is harming those it aims to assist, 
refusing to subscribe to the humanitarian imperative might promote a better overall 
consequence for the population. To say let humanitarianism prevail should the heavens 
fall' (fiat justitia et ruant coeli4t) is absurd. 
Given the inescapable nature of the paradoxes of aid, humanitarian aid organisations 
should be aiming to minimise the negative consequences of their action. Reflection and 
vigilance should be directed towards a form of `harm minimisation' like that of some 
programs seeking to help drug addicts: the programs do not attempt to address the 
addiction, but try merely to avoid some of the deadly concomitants such as overdose or 
" Neil MacCormack, Legal Right and Social Democracy: Essays in Legal and Political Philosophy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 129. 
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infection with human immuno -deficency virus (HIV). Humanitarian actors should 
ensure that the most rudimentary tasks - like alleviating life -threatening suffering - are 
undertaken with minimal harm before expanding humanitarian action into peace 
building or conflict resolution activities. If aid organisations pursue the latter, they are 
not only likely to increase the negative consequences of humanitarian action, but further 
exonerate states of their responsibilities in these realms. Aid organisations cannot 
lament the humanitarian alibi while contributing to it through undertaking state 
functions. Furthermore, broadening the role and interpretation of humanitarian action is 
likely to increase its manipulation by political powers as the traditional values and 
principles on which it stands become eroded. 
Applying this framework at a practical level can provide guidance in assessing the 
potential good versus harm of humanitarian action. Informing authorities of operational 
standards like those outlined in the Introduction, and applying them consistently to all 
parties and situations provides a basis on which to operate to minimise the potential 
negative effects of aid. Such standards include the freedom to assess independently the 
needs of the population; retain unhindered access to the population; conduct, monitor 
and evaluate the distribution of aid; and obtain security guarantees for expatriate and 
local personnel, and property. Obtaining agreement to these rudimentary standards 
would not only increase vigilance over the perverse effects of aid but provide a good 
indication of the level of respect that local authorities have for aid organisations and 
concern for the population under their control. Rather than opting for a `solidarity' 
approach according to perceptions of the `justness' of the cause, such criteria provide a 
more objective tool of evaluation. The aid operation assisting Ethiopian and Eritrean 
populations through the guerrilla fronts in the 1980s is held up as a model of the 
`solidarity' approach to aid, not because of the justice of the fight against the Mengistu 
regime per se, but because of the responsibility and concern the guerrillas showed for 
the civilian populations under their control. Aid organisations knew that although aid 
fed soldiers, it also reached the civilian population for which it was intended. By the 
same token, the refusal of the regime in Phnom Penh to agree to any of these operational 
standards in the early 1980s should have warned aid organisations of the indifference it 
held towards the Cambodian people. 
°B Literally translated means let justice prevail, should the heavens fall'. 
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Of course not all of these operational standards may be successfully negotiated: security 
guarantees might be tenuous because of armed conflict, or local authorities might insist 
that `minders' accompany aid organisations when conducting surveys and evaluations. 
Respect for some standards needs to be weighed against the non -respect of others, and 
decisions of the relative good or harm of aid judged accordingly. But a bottom line of 
acceptable compromise needs to be established in order to ensure that the negative 
effects of aid do not outweigh the good. The predominant view among aid agencies 
about the indispensability of aid has skewed the weight of the humanitarian imperative 
in considerations of the most appropriate action to pursue. Once this assumption is 
questioned, aid agencies can consider circumstances in which the best approach might 
be to withdraw. Claims that potential consequences of relief operations cannot be 
predicted are flawed; the thesis has shown the similarities of the paradoxes of 
humanitarian action between several cases, and highlighted some of the aspects on 
which aid agencies must focus in order to minimise the perverse effects of assistance. 
Realising that past experience - even during the Cold War period - is relevant to the 
contemporary problems facing aid agencies is the first step to addressing them. 
Aid organisations and personnel need to be instilled with the need for vigilance about 
the negative consequences of humanitarian action. In a practical sense, the most obvious 
way to do this is through training courses and manuals that already exist. The negative 
consequences of humanitarian action should become a core component of training, 
given the same prominence as technical subjects. Tools also need to be developed that 
assist aid personnel to consider the context in which they are operating and conduct 
ethical evaluation of various courses of action. A form of `harm -minimisation 
questionnaire' could assist aid workers identify potential problem areas early during the 
emergency phase. The questionnaire could include a set of generic questions from broad 
concerns of geopolitics and regional relations, to power structures within displaced 
groups and communities. Such a form might help aid workers identify the various 
factors at work in a particular situation and then measure them against each other, even 
if, as previously noted, the yardsticks for such measurements are subjective. Raising 
awareness and reflection at an early stage would enhance vigilance. 
In all the self -examination in which the aid industry must engage, it is important to 
remember that aid organisations do not inherit responsibilities that others have failed to 
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honour. It is not the humanitarian actors who pull triggers or throw bombs. The ultimate 
responsibility for human horror lies with those who do, and it is perhaps an important 
element of vigilance not to accept horror as a given with which humanitarian action 
must deal. Horror should not be a given. The first response should be militancy against 
it rather than rescue from its consequences. Humanitarian action cannot be a substitute 
for political action. 
But humanitarian actors also need to enhance their conception of responsibility and 
refocus on accountability to recipients of humanitarian assistance rather than donors. 
Part of the `empowerment' process preached so piously by many NGOs could be to 
instil a culture of consumer advocacy among populations receiving aid. It would be 
interesting, for example, to hear the comments of refugees themselves if they were 
allowed to see the fundraising material by which the public in donor countries is 
informed of their plight and of the good that humanitarian action is allegedly achieving. 
This thesis has shown that humanitarian action is imbued with inherent paradoxes that 
inevitably lead to some negative consequences, but that these are exacerbated by the 
behaviour and culture of aid organisations. The paradoxes of humanitarian action will 
recur and persist, and the most that aid organisations can hope to do is minimise the 
negative consequences of their action. This inevitability provides an ethical imperative 
for vigilance in humanitarian action. Humanitarian action will never attain perfection: 
rather than aiming for a first -best world we must aim for a second -best world and adjust 
to that accordingly. 
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APPENDIX 1 
ARMEMENT DONT DISL'OSE LE FER 
Pi DVENiu@CE 
- 14 X G3 
CHINE, URSS 
R S A 
OTAN, 290 FAL ont été rétrocédés par le 
¿AIRE AU R'w.'AI:DA le 13 Fév 1G96 à 
GIEE YI 
Rétrocédés par le CAIRE. 
II. ARI-.ES SP 
1) ì:itrailleurses 








- r. A G 
- 292 BREN 
2) I iortiers 
- Mor 60 mm 
- Mor 80 - 81 mm 
- Mor 82 mm 
- For 120 mnn 
- Mor 122 mm 
3) Canons 
- CSR 75 mm 
- Canon 105 mm 
- Canon 106 mm 
- Cann- 122 mm 




U S A 
27 ont été rétrocédées par le zAIRE le 
13 Fév 96 
R S A, 36 ont été rétrocédées par le ZAIRE 
CHINE 
Belgique, 70 ont été rétrocédées par le 
ZAIRE. 
Rétrocédées per le ZAIRE le 13 Fév 96. 
CHINE, RSA 
dont 3 rétrocédés par le ZAIRE le 13/2/96 
2 ont été rétrocédés par le FAIRE 
2 ont été rétrocédés par le ZAIRE 
2 ont été rétrocédés par le ¿AIRE 
Laissées surtout par la 1:INUAR lors de sa 
fuite en Avril 1994. 
Dont 1 rétrocédé per le ZAIRE 
III. VEHICULES BLINDF,S 
- 2 X Véh B1 se trou- 
vent à l'entrée de 
la tortt de NYUNGIEE 
(Forte barrière) 
- 3X AMI, 60mm 
Rétrocédés par le ZAIRE ( ?) 
Rétrocédés per le ZAIRE le 13 Eév 1996 
N.B: Un accord de vente de pièces de recha- 
nge vient d'être conclu entre la RSA 
et le Rwanda le 28 Sep 1996. 
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IV. Le FPR n'a pas d'UTK connue 
mais plusieurs CHARS ont été 
observés à le Base US de 
MULINDI près de KANCF BE. 
U S A 
V. AVIATION 
3 aéronefs dont: - 2 Héli rétrocédés par le ZAIR le 13 Fév 96 at GIS à la délég,RWANLAISE 
-1 Héli rétrocédé par le ZAIRE le 3 
Avr 96 à KIP?DU (cUNILMA) au Comd 
Avn Mil (Mej NUNYURANGABO), transpo- 
rté à Kgl grace à l'appui Log de la 
HINUAR. 
VI. D C A (Défense contre les 
avions) 
L'APR dispose d'une petite 
Unité de Déf AA (Air Défense 
artillery) équipée de quel- 
cjues missiles SAX 7; d'obus 
AA genre canon BITUBE 37 mm 
et des Mi QUADRUPLES 14.5 tam 
4 canons BITUBES rétrocédés par le 
ZAIRE 
1 X di QUL.DRUPL rétrocédée par le 
ZAIEE. 
VII. MARINE 
- Zodiacs équipés de MAG et d'a 
de P;í.50 (pat dans le 
lac KIVU) 
- 2 X Vedettes dotées de 
RADARS de SURVEILLANCE (Fat 
dens le Lac KIVU) 
CANADA (après les combats d'IWAHU) 
VIII. ARIES TRADITIONNELLES 
- Arcs + flèches Fabrication locale 
Des Trg eu maniement de ces 
armes ont été remarqués dans 
le RUGEZI en Commune BUTARO 
(Rua.ENG;_RI ) 
TX. En plus de tout cet err.,t, U S A 
le FFR dispose de 4 X DS 
47.3 pour le déminage. 
N.B; Chaque Bde dispose de son Unité d'appui feu direct (Direct Support) 
tendis que les armes d'appui général (general support) sont stockées à 
KANOMBE (KIGALI) et à MULINDI (BYUMBA, ancien QG du FPR). 
: C t RATi01_ id1iIITED 
RAGNAL HOUSE, 18 PEEL ROAD, DOUGLAS -ISLE -OF -MAN 
7th DECEMBER 1994. 
THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE, 




RE :OUTSTANDING PAYMENT. 
We refer to a meeting held in Nairobi on the 5th December 
1994 at your Embassy, with His Excellency the Minister of 
Finance His Excellency the Ambassador to Kenya and Col 
Kayumba Cyprien. 
The meeting was arranged by MIL_TEC, after months of 
uncertainty and loss of contact due to the current situation 
in Rwanda and most of all the lack of communication. 
Your excellency, as you are well aware, we have been 
suppliers to your Ministry for over 5 years, and were able 
to assist you with supplies during your time of need. 
We were asked to supply goods in April and May of 1993 
(ANNEX 1 AND 2) for which we were promised payment 
but never paid. 
We were approached for very urgent supplies on the 10th 
of April 94, after the tragic death of His Excellency the 
President, we received this urgent request from Col 
Kayumba, Major Tereraho and finally from the, then 
Minister of Defense Augustin Bizimana, as you will see our 
first shipment was delivered 8 days later at this time we 
insisted to the then Minister for the outstanding payment 
and we were assured these would be paid forthwith, the 
schedule of our shipments amounts of our invoices and 
payments received are reflected in our statement (ANNEX 
3). 
oennndonro Ae4Aroee- Dn1 nvre mien unvC C altQCCY II r TFI ffiAl R1-9f14-1011: CAY fQ11 R1-M]Z1O4n 
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nts were made to us from Kigali,Belgium, France and 
o, we also received 1 payment of 450.000 dollars from 
of your suppliers (DYL INVESTMENTS) who was 
unable to fulfil his delivery commitments to you, but had 
been paid by your Ministry. 
A transfer of U.S.Dollars 578.645.90 was effected from 
Cairo for our last shipment on 1817194, we however never 
received the payment, we reported this matter to Col 
Kayumba, Mr.Bizimana and Mr.Zikamabhari of your Cairo 
Embassy, who informed us that the funds had been blocked 
in the U.S. We believe the blockade was initiated by the 
U.S. due to the situation in Rwanda at that time. 
It was suggested by some of your officials that the amount 
of U.S.S 578,645.00 was received by us, we enclose a 
confirmation from our Bank (ANNEX 7) we can assure you, 
that had we received this payment we would not be making 
any claims for it. 
We spoke to Major Tereraho on various occasions, who 
confirmed to us the receipt of all the goods in good order. 
We also believe tbat we were the only suppliers who 
successfully supplied your Government with goods, where 
as your other suppliers did not perform despite having 
been paid for the goods in question. 
As you are aware that the credit given to you is against 
borrowing from Commercial Banks and as such we have to 
charge you interest at the rate of 1.25% per month, from 
the time the money has been outstanding. 
You will realize that we have gone out of the way to assist 
your Ministry in times of need. 
0 
Go 
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rent and very difficult financial situation has been 
ed to His Excellency, the Minister oof Finance, and 
can not express our very serious problems with our 
Bankers because of this long outstanding of U.S.Dollars 
1,708,313.09 as per (ANNEX 3 ) plus the interest as per 
(ANNEX 4 -5 AND 6).totaliug to U.S.Dollars 254,062.90 
respectively, making a grand total outstanding of 
U.S.Dollars 1,962,375.90 
Under the circumstance we will be obliged if you would 
kindly review the above situation urgently and we await 
your most urgent action and settlement. 
May we also add that we are able to assist you in the 
future if you so require. 
Yours sincerely, 
FOR AND BEHALF OF 
MIL -TEC CORPORATION LTD. 
6.i. HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRIME MINISTER 
HIS EXCELLENCY THE MINISTER OF FINANCE 
RIS EXCELLENCY THE AMBASSADOR TO KENYA 
COL KAYUMBA CYPRIEN 
MAJOR TERERAHO CYPRIEN 
IKR.BIZIMANA AUGUSTIN (FOR INFORMATION) 
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RAG L HOUSE, 18 PEEL ROAD, DOUGLAS- ISLE -OF -MAN 
28th MAY 1993. INVOICE NO:0105. 










CARTOUCHES X 5.56mm 
@ U.S.$ 210 PER 1000 
CARTOUCHES X 7.62mm LOOSE 
= 
@ U.S.$ 310 PER 1000 
417.220 CARTOUCHES X 7.62mm LINK 
@ U.S.$ 390 PER 1000 
40.000 CARTOUCHES X 7.62mm LINK 
4 BALL - 1 TRACER 
@ U.S.$ 390 PER 1000 = 
TOTAL F.O.B. U.S.$ = 
FREIGHT U.S.$ = 
INSURANCE U.S.$ = 
TOTAL C.I.F. KIGALI U.S.$ = 
ORIGIN : ISRAEL 










PRO -FORMA INVOICE N °;MIL /MINADEF /05/93/05 
OF 10 -05 -1993. 
FOR & ON BEHALF OF :- 
MIL -TEC CORPORATION LTD. 
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28th APRIL 1993. 
INVOICE NO: 0101 





500 ONLY ACCUS CD N1 - 1,2V, 7Ah 0 FF: 421 = 210.500.00 
TOTAL C.I.F. KIGALI FRENCH FRANCS = 210.500.00 
ORIGIN : E.E.C. 
PAYMENT: UPON RECIEPT OF GOODS IN KIGALI. 
FOR & ON BEHALF OF: - 
WP- 
M° RATION LTD. 
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r THE HON.MINISTER., 
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, 
BUKAVU, 
ZAIRE, 
TEC RATION LIMITED 






DATE AMOUNT U.S.$ RECEIVED US$ U.S.DOLLARS. 
1 18.04.94 INVOICE 853.731.00 
PAYMENT 1.265.500.00 




3 03.05.94 INVOICE 942.680.00 
'AYMENT 450.000.00 
'AYMENT 130.000.00_ 
4 09.05.94 INVOICE 1023.840.00 
5 PREVIOUS INVOICE 549.503,00 
6 PREVIOUS INVOICE 511.415.09 (EQUIVALENT TO FF :2.710.500) 




8 18.07.94 INVOICE 753.645.00 
'AYMENT 175.000.00 
INVOICE 68.750,00 
6.515.313.09 4.807.000,00 1.708.313.09 
U.S,DOLLARS BMANCEDUE 1.708.313.09. 
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U.S. DOLLAR INTEREST CALCULATION 
OUTSTANDING AMOUNT U.S. 549503.00 
RATE OF INTEREST L25% PER MONTH. 
28/MAY/1993- 
28 /JUNE /1993 
28 /JUL X11993 
28 /AUG /1993 
28/SEPT/1993 











28/0CT/1993 ' 584716.32 7308.95 592025.27 
28/NOV/1993 592025.27 7400.32 599425.58 
28/DE C/1993 599425.58 7492.82 606918.39 
28/JAN/1994 606918.39 7586.48 614504.86 
28/FEB/1994 614504.86 7681.31 622186.17 
28/MAR/1994 622186.17 7777.33 629963.49 
28/APR/1954 629963.49 7874.54 637838.03 
28/MAY/I994 637838.03 7972.98 645811.00 
28/JUNE/1 994 645811.00 8072.64 653883.63 
28/JUL/19 94 653883.63 8173.55 662057.17 
28/AUG/1994 662057.17 8275.71 610332.88 
28/SEPT/1004 670332.38 8379.16 678712.04 




AS AT 28/NOV/1994 U.S. DOLLARS 137693.03 
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U.S. DOLLAR INTEREST CALCULATION 4Q° 
PRICIPAL AMOUNT 2,710,500 FRENCH FRANC 
AT EXCHANGE RATE 5.3 OFF TO 1 U.S. DOL 
OUTSTANDING AMOUNT U.S. DOLLAR 51141,9 
RATE OF INTEREST 1.25% PER MONTH. O 
AMOUNT INTEREST TOTAL 
1/12193 511415.09 6392.69 517807.77 
1/1/94 517807.77 6472.59 524280.36 
1/2/94 524280.36 6553.51 530833.86 
1/3/94 530833.86 6635.42 537469.28 
1/4/94 537469.28 6718.37 544187.64 
1/5/94 5441.87.64 6802.35 550989.98 
1/6/94 550989.98 6887.38 557877.35 
1/7/94 557877.35 6973.47 564850.81 
1/8/94 564850.81 7060.64 571911.44 
1/10/94 571911.44 7148.89 579060.33 
1/11/94 579060.33 7238.25 586298.58 
1/12/94 586298.58 
TOTAL INTERST AS AT 1/12/94 
U.S. DOLLARS 74883.56 
Appendix 2 
U.S. DOLLAR IN REST CALCULATION 
OUTSTANDING OUNT U.S. 647395.00 
RATE OF IN EC, ST 1.25% PERMONTR. 
AMOUNT INTEREST TOTAL 
18/07/94 647395.00 8092.44 655487.43 
18/08/94 655487.43 8193.59 663681.02 
18/09/94 663681.02 8296.01 671977.03 
18/10/94 671977.03 8399.71 680376.74 
18/11/94 680376.74 8504.71 688881.44 
18/12/94 688881.44 
TOTAL INTEREST OUTSTANDING 
AS AT 18/12/94 U.S.DOLLARS 41486.46 
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Mil -Tec Corporation Limited 
c/o Mr Rajpar 
Ragnall House 
18 Peel Road 
DOUGLAS 






11 November 1994 
Re: Mil-tec Corporation Limited 
Further to your meeting with Mr Pugh on the 7th November, I write 
to confirm that'we have not received the sum of $578,645.00 from 
Cairo. 
I trust this is satisfactory but if I can be of any further 
assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me at this office. 
Yours faithfully 
(YY-(6Dnki, n - 
Foreign Business Officer 
Mrs M Franklin 
iaómvl Wesentmier Bawl Pte 
Member of rho NatWest Lile end NtetWeft LM Trust Merkeh9 Graq 
\ .REPUBLIQUE RWANDAISE 
.....;GIERE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE 
ARMEE RWANDAISE' 
ETAT -MAJOR 
OBJET t C.C.0 
K[K<ULGAs le 11 Ootobiió 19; 
APPENDIX 3 
Au C omd BAU 
Zafo t Comd Bde 2 Div (Tous) 
41 -29 
i. La première période de cours C.C.0 est programmée du r au -31 Oct 95 pour 
les 2324 et 25 Bde. 
2. Le nombre de candidats est + 80 dont la 4 se trouve à KATAL eARINDO. 
Pour dos raisons pratiques une classe sera organisée à KA:LLE at une autre 
à MGUNGA. Las candidats de KIBUMBA feront partie de la classe de KUGUNGA. 
Pour PUG1NGA l'endroit du coure est BUI 0 tandis que le Coed 24 Bde 
déterminera lui -ztne l'endroit convenable à KATALF. 
3. Lee matières suivantes seront di::pensées : 
- La politique 
Les causes de la défaite 
- L'idéologie 
) 
- Le leadership ` 
- La guerilla (oPS guerilla - la vie dans la clandestinité) 
OPS spéciales (Raidembuseade- ccitr$le de cone 
- 8echercba Rens 
Utilisation du Gia 
4. Boca demandons votre intervention pour disponibilí,er lo moyens suivants : 
Lee cahiers L 2C0) 
Logement à BULENGO pour 15 personnes de LjütJA du 24'AÚ 33/ Octobre 1995 
ainsi que leur alimentation évaluée approziamativement comme suit ; 
(2 z repas per jour et 3 repas de viande ) CO Kg de haricot - 36 Kg de 
128 Kg de pomme de terre - 12 Kg de viande - ingrédients + ldgtmmes (non 
évalués) 
Moyen de Tpt s 1 s MINIBUS pour assurer dé ..lr cerent cndidate de MOGU. Gl 




La 25 Bde fournira 1 z Ctte pour la Axa mission. 
Les candidats de KIBUPFBA se déplaceront par au- 2 Div á llaller comme au 
40 c,i 
retour. (Arrivé à t".UGUNGL le iTOot 95, départ le 81'liev 95). 
Une bouteille per candidat à la oiature de #a p6riode soit 65 bouteilles. 
5. Vous trouveras en annexe le CANEVAS das cours. Je voue demanderais de libérer 
Yc>v sGG,sSa 
les NO NTILILINA et 6i retenus pour dormer respectivement le coure 
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IZI-71,01:3131_, I Q= R_W21\IDI-1 I SIS 
1-'13.30 S "1-1VTITT S DU -F-p_c>rr-r prz..mc,cp....zyr I Cot= 
ItIALA1VDPI. I S 
t. DU FRONT DEMOCRATIQUE RWANDAIS 
Article I 
Il est creé, en M44140.2'2-. 1-M.*L11-724-ze "Front 
Démoerateicitie Rwandais" en abrégé - -(F7`..)Di'RWA). 
Arteele 2 
Les buts poursuivis par le FrODERWA son: : 
a. orc.aniser les r,.ft:ci6..e de lour 
ibA CG: QI Pa (-."-ou-xzte- Q.-vitttsq 
t. luttez pour la'D,éreocr,ctie, le respect des Droits 
l'Homme -et la :ustce Sociale au Rwanda_ 
L. Amener ,Deu2lo rwandais U prend-:e conscience de son 
1-31e stun s l'attrIbutinn et l'exerctee du pouvoir. 
U . StimIcr lés efforts du peuple rwandais en vue de la eeemkedW 
Reconstruction Nationaliet le prosl-es socio-6cono:nique 
au Rwanda. 
Le FRCIDERWA a pour Devise: 
SflLIDARTTE - Pltrr- DEMOCRATIE. 
d 
Art.L.e 4 
\::e-,Dra au du -F.ZODERWA es' const"tué de Gauchr 
-,uleurs-"-ROUOE et ;NC si nifianutte 
Csesit_ 
Article :7 
Lu sige du FRODERWA est établi provisrement au "ZAIRE?, 
Il Oms,4-6.t.abtb-ot4'&VilririttivVmellit..*A1 Eitmcfrustb eal_u44-4-4-e-s 
- iurès 
6 
Las .r.oyens cruet ion du FRODERWA sont n.)tamment : 
- L'organisation des réunions, conférences1 séminaires et 
congrès. 
- L pnt i 
e .c/ btei.,:zaten ete, 15,17 
- La constitution d'un bud,2.t 
- Le maintin sic la cohésion des rwandais 
- 1.7encadrement citi peuple . 
A:t;ele 7 
In ses structures et cadUe&,le F7ODERWA: 
- Doftermine, ensoi.ene et 'enterprte sa doctrine polltiqac. 
- E:lugne, o.-tt!-;ont la cohésion de cru 
(6)s\Atuksei-,,sv, 
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- mithods in,:a.ignaments ut 
doc.-J:1:1i l'éluHnn. 
Ir. DES :.=DRES DU FRODERWA 
Article 3 
Tout Rwandais est litre dadhérer cc 7RODERWA. Les Membrus 
doivent se conformer aua satuts at 1:élémcsts du FRODERWA. 
Aticlè é 
Tout membro du FROD7PWA a le droiteilir at d'étre élu au: 
organes dirigeants dans les rendi:I:as détérminées par ics 
statuts. nglamcnts at :=DERWA. 
tiéla IC 
Les t O nts, 
considérés comme sympathit, tout 't.ranger 
saLltiant le 71:0_77-_= ot appc:t. :o-ntrihutiro 
appréaia U !a das FRODERWA. 
L.1 kA",--4 aieusIA -0 - ik :-.64tAmku. weitto - Acile-m,4 
:::. DE: ORO= CI=TPAU7. 77: FPC=RTA 
Article LI 
Les Organs Centrauii Jo FPODEaTA 
ee. P 4xLE Ce-L1 =='5'ge-e241/ 
2: 
441e6e="Mik E.16NAIL 
PpáA.lidce_xAtta ,ODERWA 'West l'arzana _ La 
direction du N;vP,,,u6oxs,du 770277WA ast assurée par une 
Président qui représente le F=RWA et çui en est 
dcant sa, me;nres. 7: acr.,roque 
Comité Directeur et préside leurs séances. 
t En cas 'M.)sence at d'emphemcni, les réunions sont 
1présidées par le )te:%V&Kil.re Jdn FRODERWA. 
PrésiCent du FRODERWA riente ci c.)ntr6le tous les 
Crgones r. -a 
Ar:iae 12 
Amiii0e0r1 
Article III SA!. 
1..2 President dl.: FRODERWA est élu par I 
pou: un mindat da 4 .Ins 
a!isolue mebres dittll:AsgEr'Z.Ofafralc, 
ri:t cas acance d7.1 Président Jécés. aleIt-mlssicItt 
-tout antlse dé cessati,:n fDTtctions, les 
fonétor.s de Présiden sont assuméi. ipar Ic 
c'':":-nu les électlns d:un atitité Lacsiac,. 
j0,111:5 qui ent l':-.:v:.!1-turc da 1:t vaaani'é. 
lorsque Présider. le At41-rie trosvc!nt 
Jans l'a des c.i-jessus les 
fi-tt:_t:,t,:t- je - 
--tercés lc 
majorité 
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Le Ye...veau Présidr.:nl est 
2e3igne suiYant la proc6due p76vu dans 1c présenI aati-' 
L A-cm eempose. : 
el") - Des 2u Comité DIrecteur ri.q¡Akp5 c.4Co...ités de Secteurs 
.1.k.Ce.ree° 
session ordin.repuel_ acte de convocation qui contient 
.ht 
Art.c_e I, 
l'ordre du jour est communiqué aux membres de-dieare-0Pe-g 
duteJreedee avant la date de la reunion .et sous plis 
confidentiel. 
.,..rtiole lé 
se dzononce sur tous les prot,imes 
3 concernant leS=DERWA. I! notamment pour rôle principale 
de : 
a. Adopter le 7lappor'.. du C1:kité Directeur 
P. Fixer au MC::?il des Man:este le programme d'actin du 
c. ElireOle.s7-,',--1- 77()D77W.,ek k440.1.41.3-,1e...kmarrtio, OLA-e-444ebirek 
d. AarEter*?nei7ltuts et :ZI-,,lements du FROD7RWA 
e. Dissoudre ' 'r - - /(CaA*UUeuill 
f. Pre:-.dre teLltes resolutions s 
Articl,L. :Ti_ 
peut rtre convoqué à tout moment an 
axtracadinairc par le PrésidentisleelOODERWA. Il 
examine uniquement les points inscrits à l'ordre du jour 
contenu dans l'acte de convocation. 
QArticle 
ado2te ses résolutins à la 
des membres presens..Le., citvo-tlxv,m, 
Article 19 
0% 
Le Comité DIRECTEUR est composé : 




d. DeSI;r01A1 4 V0,14,0 
ma or _ . 
-'74.i.afdr 
Article 20 
To.n les membres du Comité Directeur sont élus per 
Le_ .151a1.6_,3 
Article 21 
1*\1 Sous la conduite du Préside.-..t, le Comité Directeur dirige 
la Politique du FRODERWA et arreteAtk budget du FRODERWA. 
Article 22 
Le Comité Drectr tous les Trois mois en 
session ordinaLt-::. Il pert ôtrc conv-oqué en sessins 
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:11.2iii-lair.... ,1,...' ''.:..t :ILI'.2 1,: clifr.:onar:cs 
Vt4-vs.;\, G... Q 6kAKtji, AS. , 
Cmmissicns, 
- Commission Politiciue 
-Commisioo Patrim3i:le 7inances 
Social: 
- Commission de fkarinsIL4e, 
Les enlres des !k Commlssicos sont choisit par 
Comité: Diracteer. 
Article 2= 
a. La Commission Politiqu :rate des Affaires Politiques, 
Administrati,:es, disciplinaires et des 
I:. La CruMissi.: ,ly ?a:rLaine des 7inance traite des 
AfFrcs 7inanuires, = r et de 31.1dget. 
:. Co Cmmissior S::': affaires Soci 1 es, ofr4-444,-7 
J...-=se, et :le a Saaié. 
-n traI d,:::s affaires 6-.....49*--06e-A,- 
u. L. Colission de klila./à1A4 traite des 
affaires de relat'on 
le a,kosk, 
cl, OEs QQ. eVve-cl.fi. (17,4-4-1.2 
,1_40 t Les 0:ganes_de Secteu: se:nt 
.*1041.-1/4,4 de Secteur 
Le Comité de Secteur 
je L 
Article 2 - 
leSINpuletit4 de Secteur examine toutes les questions lui 
soumis par ses membres et se prononce sur le bilan dos 
réalisations et l'évolution du FROD:RWA dans le Secteur sur 
tout les plans politique, économique, social et culture. 
Article 4 
de Secteur, composec cie toua 4 membres c112.4QPIA4 
61,10=nt en son s,2in le C:)mité de Secteur de membres. 
Article 
Le Comité de Secteur et composé d'un Président, du 
Secrétaire et d'un Tsésoi Ie, 
Article 3.f.f4Y / 
Le Comité de Secteur est losgane exécutif diN.1.12AW, 
de Secteur il veille l'exécution des directives de 
il t t:i)utes le s ,questions 
intéressant I- 1 
2N. I CA G IA 
6eIng7tVI2731=4/6.4,913,70- s32117, 
TluawAncK sal 11oT:yeTn.7 vmuadc»L:: 
surp Olditon 3 _Tnoe ',nad:_luapTs;?id 
snp D3AU 




'sJa2u11 -lá sluawAnoN 
11-6.1 
r 
_ - ,1- a.-cgI3aE no JVM-.)IIVX=XI 




-0-cret-vor-a TP11515-ra itrty 
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kovA 
6 
003V0110 du FRODERt\A sont consti:uLs 
- Ses biens propres 
- Les cotisations 
- Le Produit de la vente du Matériel 
- Les dons e.),- hue 
Art icle 3A7' 
La Perception, :a estirn 
ass:.:rés par 1:u Commission 
16-AG-6-2nrn 
x-er c, 
l'A- 0,6 tic-17Z,, 
cs..a4-kA u v1/4ANA,;., (3t) Ord D= LA DISCIPL= vrsvo.. A 
ruxtozw.tdixes1-' 
A:tic:e 
Les fautes dis:plinaira roOt : 
- Les pr6j1u:'.; 
au la tIviatIon de ses priaci:es tata 
,d1finis pa- aanifsotuu*_r 201. 
Tour los aLtes contrailes aux s",:tute at 
LCIC 2. 5 
'fr. membre recDr:-.-1t: c,oupab:: fait !:ab 
,:-Iter:alxées par 1c 7e:._:,10 
Z." -lr. ,...- m e41,110;1 ' :, -'' . 
Fait A (,=. 
Mugunga, le 30 Septembre 1995 
APPENDIX 5 
RAPPORT DE GESTION FINANCIERE DE LA COMMISSION DU PATRIMOINE DE LA COMMUNAUTÉ 
RWANDAISE EN EXIL AU NORD -KIVU 
1. QUEI U S CONSIDERATIONS UTILES 
a. Ce rapport concerne la période allant du 14 Avril au 30 Septembre 1995, 
période pour laquelle j'exerce la fonction de Trésorier de la Commission 
du Patrimoine. 
315 
b. Il y a lieu de signaler qu'aucune remise- reprise n'a été effectuée entre 
Mr MUTEMBEREZI Pierre Claver, Trésorier sortant et moi -même en date du 
14/4/95. D'ailleurs, Mr MUTEMBEREZI a disparu depuis cette date sans laisser 
de traces avec un détournement de 15.431 SUS non encore récupérés jusqu'à 
présent. Mr BIGIRO Léonidas, actuel Président de la Commission du Patrimoine 
A partir du 14/04/95, doit également 165 SUS envers la caisse, somme à sa 
charge durant la Présidence de la Commission du Patrimoine par Mr MUTEMBEREZI. 
c. Un cahier, sorte de livre de caisse à la disposition du Trésorier, sert à 
l'enregistrement des recettes et des dépenses et chaque opération effectuée 
porte un numéro d'ordre. Exemple: 001/D/95 pour les opérations de dépenses; 
001/R/95 pour celles de recettes pour Exercice 1995. 
d. Ce rapport présente les opérations comptables par mensualité et un tableau 
synthétique est fourni à la fin. 
e. Il y a à déplorer l'absence de mécanisme de contrôle financier au sein de la 
Commission du Patrimoine. L'argent, c'est la confiance; mais jusqu'où peut 
aller cette confiance lorsque l'argent appartient à toute une Communauté? 
2. RECE.r1 S ET DEFENSES REALISEES DU 14/04/95 AU 30 SEPTEMBRE 1995 
a. Mois d'Avril 1995 
1. RECETTES 




001/R/95 26/4 Produit locdtion Bus A9225 2.530 2.530 
Chez GOAL 
2. DEPENSES 
001 /0/95 2 Frais NSANZABAGANWA 120 120 
002/0/95 2 Charges A9225 600 720 
003/0/95 " F.R. à KIBUMBA 07 727 
o04/D/95 " F.R. à KIBUMBA 10 737 
005/0/95 4 " F.R. à TWAGIRAYEZU Laurent 10 747 
oo6/D/95 " F.R. à KIBUMBA 25 772 
007/D/95 " j Remboursement RWAJEKARE 64 836 
oc8 /D/95 _ " ais Taxi NSANZABAGANWA 20 856 
009 /0/95 J 28/4 mboursement ONATRACOM 67 923 
010/D/95 29/,k. 'me chauffeur NSHIMIYIMANA 4o 963 
011/D/9R ime chauffeur M[TGABO 40 1.003 
013/0/95 varice Perdiems 
'F.R, 
1.350 2.353 
014/D/95 30/4 à KIBUMBA 11,5 2.364,5 
015/D/95 " 
* 
Achat d'un cachet Commissipn P. 20 2.384,5 
017/D/95 " ,, Rapport au Portier chez GOAL 10 2.394,5 
3. SOLDE: 2.530 8 - 2.394,50 $ = 135,50 5. 
- 2 - 






























Produit location Bus A9225 chez GOAL 
It If II 
Prime chauffeur RUMBEKI 
Achat matériel de bureau 
F.R. MUGUNGA 
Prime MBAG0R0ZIKI L. 
Achat d'un registre 
F.R. à MUGUNGA 
Achat cahier du Trésorier 
Avance perdiems 
F.R. Dossier MUTEMBEREZI 
Investigations CAME 1513 
F.R. Contact à la 4 REGION MILITAIRE 
F.R. Dossier MUTEt1BEREZI 
Investigations sur véhicule CNFR 
par MBAGOROZIKI 
Rapport Col KUSIKUSA 
Achat d'un registre 
F.R. à MUGUNGA 
F.R. à MUGUNGA 
F.R. à KIBUMBA 
Rapport à la G.C. de GOMA 
Frais négociation dossier Bus A9224 
Achat matériel de bureau 
Rapport Salle de réunion it KIBUMBA 
F.R. à KIBUMBA 
3. SOLDE 2.450 g, - 1.839,50 $ = 
c. MOIS DE JUIN 1995 
1. RECEl'itS 
004/R/95 1 27/6 
2. DEPENSE,S 
038/D/95 07/6 Prime de dactylographie 
040 /D/95 08/6/ Charges Bus A9225 
041/D/95 09/6 Achat Pièces de rechange Bus A9225 
042/D/95 09/6 Frais de photocopie 
043/D/0 02/6 Frais d'essence CTTETS 
044/D/95 14/6 Frais photocopie dossier pr KINSHASA 
045/D/95 21/6 F.R. Visite C.Z.S.C. 
046/0/95 23/6 Achat matériel de bureau 
047/D/95 28/6 F.R. dans la recherche d'un local pour 
les travaux de la Commission du Patrimoine 
048/D/95 28/6 F.R. à MUGUNGA 
049/D/95 29/6 Rapport aux Autorités ZaTroises 
050/D/95 " Frais négociation pour la réduction de 
Taxe à la contribution 
051/095 " Charges Bus A9225 100 1.259 
610,50 $ 

































































3. SOLDE 1.700 
- 
1.259 $ = 441 $. 
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Produit de location Bus A9225 
Produit de vente d'une Jeep SUZUKI 
à KIBUMBA 
Produit location Bus A9225 
Produit de vente CAME1513, 
- 1bre avance 
- 26me avance 
Expédition du Courrier à KINSHASA 
F.R. à KATALE 
F.R. à KIBUMBA 
Frais de taxi 
F.R. payée à SEKABUGA F. 
Prime à un expert pour R.O.I. /C.P. 
Charges Bus A9225 
Fraie entretien Bus A9225 
F.R. à MUGUNGA 
F.R. à KIBUMBA 
Versement à 1tEM.FAR 
Prime de gardiennage Jeep SUZUKI 
vendue à KIBUMBA 
Contact avec clients du CAME 1513 
n n n n 
Investigations sur CA.MITSU avec CZSC 
Visite famille feu MAKOMBE 
Prime à un expert T.M. 
F.R. à MUGUNGA 
Frais entretien Bus A9225 
Achat matériel de bureau 
Frais d'essence OTTE TS 
Fraie de mission 




Prime de dactylographie 
Prime à NDAGIJIMANA 
F.R. contact à 1tEM/CZSC 
Achat Pièces de rechange Bus CZSC 
Frais mission à BUTEMBO 
Location Taxi 
3. SOLDE : 7.646 $ - 6.603 8 = 1.043 8. 










Produit de vente CTTE TOYOTA DYNA 
Commune NKUMBA 
Produit de vente OrPE T. Rila D.C. 
Investigations sur un camion 
Charges Bus A9225 
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o88/D/95 o6/8 PP, Rachat prison BAHEMBERA 300 556 
089/D/95 08/8 Frais d'entretien Bus A9225 150 706 
090/D/95 09/8 Frais de prison BAB 4BERA 100 806 
091/D/95 10/8 Prime à un technicien 3o 836 
092/D/95 14/8 Versement à l'EN. FAR 804 1.640 
093/0/95 16/8 Visite pire KANYANKOROTE 4o 1.680 
094/0/95 16/8 Prime à un indicateur 20 1.700 
095/0/95 23/8 Financement Comité de Crise Camp 200 1.900 
MUGUNGA 
096/D/95 24/8 n tt n 20 1.920 
097/D/95 29/8 ,t O 100 2.020 
3. SOLDE : 1.800 s 2.020 s 220 s 
f. MOIS DE SEPTEMBRE 1995 
1. RIDCE'rrrs 
011/x/95 14/9 Produit location Bus A9225 1.4144 1.444 
012/x/95 18/9 Produit de vente du CA.MITSU 
Benne - 1ère avance 5.000 6.444 
2. DEPENSES 
098/D/95 01/9 Financement Comité de crise 
Camp MUGUNGA 100 100 
099/D/95 02/9 Contact avec Cdt CZSC Camp MUGUNGA 80 180 
100/D/95 05/9 Financement C.C.C.MUGUNGA 100 280 
101/D/95 07/9 Financement C.C. C.MUGUNGA 200 480 
102/0/95 Achat matériel de bureau 35 515 











106/0/95 13/9 Rachat prison TERERAHO 300 1.061 
107/D/95 15/9 Charges Bus A9225 266 1.327 
108/D/95 " Versement à 1'EM.FAR 1.178 2.505 
109/0/95 16/9 Frais Commission à GATSINZI 640 3.145 
110/D/95 18/9 Faux billet remis á EIGIRO 100 3.245 
111/0/95 18/9 Argent emporté par EIGIRO 120 3.365 
112/0/95 22/9 Frais de mission à BUTEMBO -FSH1 2.500 5.865 
113/D/95 20/9 Fraie de mission 50 5.915 
114/D/95 27/9 Investigations /Pelle Chargeuse 100 6.015 
115/D/95 27/9 n tt u 20 6.035 
116/D/95 28/9 Fraie de Commission au Lt NZOLO 160 6.195 
117/D/95 28/9 Filature CA.MITSU de MURWANASITYAKA 80 6.275 
118/D/95 30/9 Filature pelle- chargeuse 05 6.28o 
119/D/95 30/9 Filature pelle -chargeuse 30 6.315 
3. SOLDE 6.444 s - 6.315 = 129 $ 
3. TABLEAU SYNTEETIQUE DES RECETTES ET DEPENSES 
MOIS REChrrES (5) DEPENSES (s) SOLDES (S) 
AVRIL 1995 2.530,00 2.394,50 + 135,50 
MAI 1995 2.450,00 1.839,50 + 610,50 
JUIN 1995 1.700,00 1.259,00 + 441,00 
JUILLET 95 7.646,00 6.603,00 + 1.043,00 
AOUT 1995 1.800,00 2.020,00 - 220.00 
SEPTEMBRE 95 6.444,00 6.315,00 + 129,00 
TOTAUX: 22.570,00 20.431,00 + 2.139,00 
-5- 
4. RELEVE DES DETTES ENVERS LA TRÉSORERIE Appendis 5 319 
$ - lors de la vente du CA.MITSUBISHI à KATALE 
$ - faux billet gardé lors de la même vente 
$ - faux billet lui remis pour échange par AFRIKA Alexi: 
$ - faux billets lui remis pour échange /IYAMUREMYE G. 
$ - emprunt 
$ - frais taxi Aoft 1995 non justifiés 
$ - prime agent GOAL non justifiée 
S - transport non justifié 










TWAGIRAYEZU Materne : 50 
BAHEMBERA Célestin : 50 
HABYARIMANA J.B. 20 
HABYARIMANA J.B. : 20 
TOTAL DES DETT1 : 894 
$ 
$ - emprunt 
$ - " 
$ - " 
$ - ff 
$ 
=axas = == 
5. ENCAISSE AU 30 SEPTEMBRE 1995: a) Théorique : 2.139 $ 
b) Réelle : 2.139 $ - 894 $ = 1.245 $( 
6. REMARQUES 
a. Le résultat financier relatif à la période considérée est très minime pour 
pouvoir venir en aide à nos réfugiés. 
Le poste "Mission" et les primes diverses engloutissent beaucoup d'argent 
eu égard aux recettes modérées perçues en dehors de celles émanant du Bus A9225 
b. Les produits de vente des véhicules par la Sous -Commission de RUTSHURU dans 
son ressort restent sous la responsabilité de Mr HIGIRO Léonidas, Président 
de la Commission du Patrimoine, jusqu'au jour de leur remise au Trésorier de 
la Commission devant tous les membres de la Commission. 
c. Les dettes envers la trésorerie doivent être remboursées sans délais sana quoi 
les mesures disciplinaires devraient être prises à l'encontre des fautifs. 
d. Les maigres résultats financiers enregistrés au cours de la période écoulée 
devraient nous inciter à redoubler d'efforts pour balayer tous les obstacles 
qui handicapent l'accomplissement digne et honnête de la mission qui nous est 
assignée. Le patrimoine à rechercher et à gérer appartient à la Communauté 
Rwandaise en Exil st à elle seule. 
Fait à Mugunga, le 30 Septembre 1995 
IYAMUREMYE Gaston 
Trésorier de la Comm Patrimoine. 
Mugunga, le 06 Novembre 1995 
Appendix 5 
COMPTENT DU RAPPORT DE GESTION FINANCIBRE DE LA COMMISSION DU PATRIMOINE 
RELATIF A LA PERIODE ALLANT DU 01 OCTOBRE AU 06 NOVEMBRE 1995 
1. Le 06/11/1995 correspond à la date à laquelle j'ai présenté ma démission au 
sein de la Commission du Patrimoine. 
2. Les opérations comptables reprises dans le rapport sont celles ordonnées par 
le Bureau de la Commission du Patrimoine lore de sa séance du 05/11/1995 au 
Siège de l'ONATRACOM en Exil et exécutées le 06/11/1995. 
Je signale à la Commission du Patrimoine que le 05/11/95, j'ai versé dans la 
Caisse de Solidarité de la Communauté Rwandaise en Exil une somme minable de 
Six cents Dollars (600 50E) représentant la moitié de l'encaisse réelle 
justifiée dans mon précédent rapport. 
3. Ordonnancement des recettes et des dépenses 
a) Mois d'Octobre 1995 
1° Recettes . Néant 
2° Dépenses = Néant 
JJ 
3° Solde = Néant 49 2E Q-i 
b) Mois de Novembre 1995 12°) DG19en J 
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Versement à la Caisse de 
Solidarité 
Payement à TERERAHO 
Payement à NSENGIYUMVA (F.R.) 
Payement à BANDIKURE Sudi 
Payement à HABYARIMANA J,B. (F.R.) 
Frais de Prison pour SIBOMANA 
Frais de transport 
Achat 30 1 de mazout 
Primes Personnel ONATRACOM 





















3° Solde = 0 - 1.158 = - 1.158 5. 
4. Synthèse de la situation mensuelle comptable du 14/04 au 06/11/1995 
M O I S RECETTES ($) DEFENSES ($) SOLDES ($) 
AVRIL 2.530,00 2.394,50 + 135,50 
MAI 2.450,00 1.839,50 + 610,50 
JUIN 1.700,00 1.259,00 + 441,00 
JUILLET 7.646,00 6.603,00 + 1.043,00 









OCTOBRE 0,00 0,00 + 0,00 
NOVEMBRE 0,00 1.158,00 - 1.158,00 
TOTAUX: 22.570,00 21.589,00 + 981,00 
a) Encaisse théorique 
b) Dettes envers la trésorerie 
c) Encaisse réelle 
d) Remarques: 
= 981 $ 
t 894 $ 
= 87 $ 
1. Mr HIGIRO Léonidas, Président de la Commission du Patrimoine, n'a jamais 
versé chez le Trésorier le produit global de + dix ventes de véhicules 
effectuées dans la: zone de KATALE. I1 lui revient donc de présenter son 
rapport à la Commission du Patrimoine. 
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2. I1 est demandé aux membres de la Commission du Patrimoine ayant contracté 
une dette envers la trésorerie de la rembourser dans les meilleurs délais. 
3. Les remarques reprises dans mon précédent rapport restent toujours valables. 
Fait à Mugunga, le 06 Novembre 1995 
IYAMUREMYE Gaston 
Trésorier de la Commission du Patrimoine, 
Démissionnaire 
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